LOGICK 



OR, THE 



RIGHT USE OF REASON 



IN THE 



INQUIRY AFTER TRUTH. 



WITH A VARIETY OF 



HULES TO GUARD AGAINST ERROR, 

IN THE AFFAIRS OF 

RELIGION AND HUMAN LIFE, 
AS WELL AS IN THE SCIENCES. 

BY ISAAC WATTS, D,D. 



A NEW EDITION, 
CORRECTED AND IMPROVED. 




LONDON: VW 

Printer 1 , by T. Oilier, Salisbury-fquare, 

for g. g. and j. robinson', otridge and son j ogilvy 
and son; j. scatcherd; j. Mathews; ,.longman and 
rees ; c. lav/; lackungton and co. j and j. mawman. 



1801, 



r (? 



; >t*2. 



TO 



SIR JOHN HARTOPP, BART. 

SIR, 

I' T "|s fit the Piiblick fhould receive, through your 
Hands, wliat was written originally for the Af- 
firmance of your younger Studies, and was then 
prefented to you. 

It was by the repeated Importunities of our 
Learned Friend Mr. John Eames, that I was per- 
fuaded to rcvife the Rudiments of Logic i, and when 
I had once Raftered myfelf to begin the Work, I 
was drawn {till oil ward far beyond my firft Defign, 
even to the Neglecl, or too long Delay, of other 
prefting and important Demands that were upon 
me. 

It has been my Endeavour to form every Part of 

3 Treatife both for the Inftru6tion o( Students, 
t: open their Way into the Sciences, and for the 
more extenfive and general Service of Mankind* 
that the Gentleman and the Chriftian might find- 
their Account in the Perufal as well as the Scholar. 
I have therefore collected and propofed the chief 
Principles and Rules of right Judgment in Matters 
of common and facred Importance, and pointed 
out our mod frequent Miftakes and Prejudices in 
the Concerns of Life and Religion, that we might 
better guard againfl: the Springs of Error, Guilt 
and Sorrow, which furround us in our State of 
Mortality. 

You know, Sir, the great Defign Of this noble 

Science is to refcue our reafoning Powers from 

their unhappy Slavery and Darknefs ; and thus, 

with all due Submiffion and Deference, it offers an 

umble Affitlance to divine Revelation. Its chief 

ufinefs is to relieve the natural WeakneiTes of the 

A3 Mind 



VI DEDICATION. 

Mind by fome better Efforts of Nature ; it is to 
diffule a Light over the Underftanding in ouf In- 
quiries after Truth, and not to furnifh the Tongue 
with Debate and Controversy. True Logick is not 
that noify Thing that deals all in Difpute and 
Wrangling, to which former Ages had debafed and 
confined it ; yet its Difciples mud acknowledge 
alio, that they are taught to vindicate and defend 
the Truth, as well as to fearch it out. True Logick 
doth not require a long detail of hard Words to 
amufe Mankind, and to puff up the Mind with 
empty Sounds, and a Pride of falfe Learning; yet 
fome Diftinclions and Terms of Art are neceffary to 
range every Idea in its proper Clafs, and to keep our 
Thoughts from Confufion. The World is now 
grown fo wife as not to fuffer this valuable Art to 
be engrofled by the Schools. In fo polite and 
knowing an Age, every Man of Reafon will covet 
fome Acquaintance with Logick, fince it renders its 
daily Service to Wifdom and Virtue, and to the 
Affairs of common Life, as well as to the Sciences, 

I will not prclurne, Sir, that this little Book is 
improved fince its firft Compofure in Proportion to 
the Improvements of your manly Age. But when 
you lliall pleafe to review it in your retired Hours, 
perhaps you may refrefh your own Memory in fome 
of the early Parts of Learning : And if you find all 
the additional Remarks and Rules made fo familiar 
to you already by your own Observation, that there 
is noth^ig new among them, it will be no unpleaf- 
ing Refleclion, that you have fo far anticipated the 
prefent Zeal and Labour of, 

SIR, 

Your mojl faithful, and 

London, Aug. Obedient Servant, 

24, 1724. 

I. WAITS.. 



INTRODUCTION 



AND 



GENERAL SCHEME.- 

IOGICK is the Art of ujing Reason* well in 
^j our Inquiries after Truth, and the Communica- 
tion of it to others. 

Reason * is the Glory of human Nature, and 
one of the chief Eminencies whereby we are raifed 
above our Fellow-Creatures the Brutes in this lower 
World. 

Reqfon, as to the Power and Principles of it, is 
the common Gift of God to all Men ; though all 
are not favoured with it by Nature in an equal 
Degree: But the acquired Improvements of it in 
different Men, make a much greater Diftinclion 
between them than Nature had made. I could 
even venture to fay, that the Improvement of Rea- 
Jbn hath raifed the Learned and the Prudent in the 
European World, almoit as much above the Hot- 
tentots, and other Savages of Africa, as thofe Sa- 
vages are by Nature fuperior to the Birds, the Beafts, 
2nd the Fimes. 

Now the Defign of Logick is to teach us the right 
Ufe of our Reafon, or Intelleclual Powers, and the 
Improvement of them in ourfelves and others ; this 
is not only neceffary in order to attain any compe- 
tent Knowledge in the* Sciences, or the x\ffairs of 

Learning, 

* The Word Reqfon in this Place is not confined to the mere 
Faculty of reafoning, or inferring one Thing from another, 
but kckides all the intellectual Powers of Man. 



% INTRODUCTION. 

Learning, but to govern both the greater and the 
meaner Aclions of Life. It is the Cultivation of 
our Reafon by which we are better enabled to diftin- 
guifh Good from Evil, as well as Truth from Falf- 
hood : And both thefe are Matters of the highefl 
Importance, whether vve regard this Life, or the 
Life to come. 

The Purfuit and AcquifiiioH of Truth is of infi^ 
nite Concernment to Mankind. Hereby we be- 
come acquainted with the Nature of Things both 
in Heaven and Earth, and their various Relations 
to each other. It is by this Means we difcover 
our Duty to God and our Fellow-Creature? : By 
this we arrive at the Knowledge of Natural Reli- 
gion > and learn to confirm our Faith in divine Re- 
velation, as well as to underftand what is revealed. 
Our Wifdom, Prudence, and Piety, our prefent 
Conduct, and our future Hope, are all influenced 
by the Ufe of our rational Powers in the Search 
after Truth. 

There are feveral Things that make it very necef-^ 
fary that our Reafon fboukl have ibme Ailiftance 
in the Exercife or Ufe of it. 

The firft is, the Depth and Difficulty of many 
Truths, and the Weakntfs of our Reafon to fee far 
into Things at once, and pe?ietrate to the Bottom of 
them. It was a Saying among the Ancients, Ve- 
ritas in Puteo, " Truth lies in a Well ;" and, to 
carry on this Metaphor, we may very jufty fay, that 
Logick does, as it were, fupply us with Steps whereby 
we may go down to reach the Water; or it frames 
the Links of a Chain, whereby we may draw the 
Water up from the Bottom. Thus, by the Means 
of many Rc.fonings, well connected together, Phi- 
lofophers in our Age have drawn a thoufanp 1 Truths 
out of the Depths of Darknefs, which our Fathers 
were utterly unacquainted with. 

Another 



INTRODUCTION 3 

Another Tiling; that makes it neceflary for our 
Reafon to have ibme i^ffiitance given it, is the Dif- 

and Falfe Colours in which many Things appear 
'to us in this prefent imperfect State: There are a 
thoufand Things which are not in reality what they 
appear to be, and that both in the natural and the 
moral World ; So the Sun appears to be flat as a 
Plate of Silver, and to be lefs than twelve Inches 
in Diameter : The Moon appears to be as big as the 

and the Rainbow appears to be .a large fub- 
ftantial Arch in the Iky ; all which are in reality 
grois Fa 1 (hoods. So Knavery puts on the Fape of 
Juftice y , Hypocrijy and Superftition wear the Vizard 
of Piety \ Deceit and Evil are often clothed in the 
Shapes and Appearances of Truth and Goodnefs* 
Now Logick helps us to (trip off the outward Dif- 
guife of Things, and to behold them, and judge 
of them in their own Nature. 

There is yet a farther Proof that our intellectual 
or rational Pczvers need fome Affiftance, and that 
is, becaufe they arc fo frail and fallible in the pre- 
fent State ; we are impofed upon at Home as well 
as Abroad-. We are deceived by our Se?ifes, by our 
rinatiins. by our Paffivns and Appetites, by the 
Authority of Men, by Education and Cuflom, &c. 
and we are led into frequent Errors, by judging 
according to thefe falfe and flattering Principles, 
rather than according to the Nature of Things. 
Something of this Frailty is owing to our very Con- 
ftitution, Man being compounded of Fleili and 
Spirit : Something of it arifes from our Infant 
State, and our growing up bv fmail Degrees to 
Manhood, fo that we form a thoufand Judgments 
before our Reafon is mature. But there is (till 
more of it owing to our original Defection from 
God ; and the fool i fh and evil Difpofitions that are 
found in fallen Man : So that one great Part of 

the 



A INTRODUCTION. 

the Defign of Logick is to guard us again ft the de- 
lufive Influences of our meaner Powers, to cure 
the Miftakes of immature Judgment, and to raife 
, us in fome Meafure from the Ruins of our Fall. 

It is evident enough from all thefe Things, that 
our Reajon needs the Affiftance of Art in our In- 
quiries after Truth or Duty ; and without fome 
Skill and Diligence in forming our Judgments 
aright, we (hall be led into frequent Miftakes, 
both in Matters of Science, and in Matters of 
Praclice, and fome of thefe Miftakes may prove 
fatal too. 

The Art of Logick, even as it affifts us to gain 
the Knowledge of the Sciences, leads us on to- 
ward Virtue and Happinefs ; for all our fpeculative 
Acquaintance with Things fhould be made fubfer- 
vient to our better Conducl in the civil and religious 
Life, This is infinitely more valuable than all Spe- 
culations -, and a wife Man will ufe them chiefly 
for this better Purpofe. • 

All the good Judgment and Prudence that any 
Man exerts in his common Concerns of Life, with- 
out the Advantage of Learning, is called natural 
Logick: And it is but a higher Advancement, and 
a farther Affiftance of our rational Powers, that is 
defigned by and expedled from this artificial Lo- 
gick. 

In order to attain this, we rnuft inquire what are 
the principal Operations of the Mind, which are put 
forth in the Exerciie of our Reafon : And we fhali 
find them to be thefe four, namely, Perception, 
Judgment, Argumentation and Difpojition. 

JSJow the Art of Logick is compofed of thofe Ob- 
fcrvations and Rules, which Men have made about 
thefe four Operations of the Mind, Perception, 
Judgment, Reafsmng, and Dfpofition, in Order to 
aflili: and improve them. 

I. Per- 



INTRODUCTION-. 5 

I. Perception, Conception, or Apprehenfion, is the 
mere fimple Contemplation of Things offered to 
our Minds, without affirming or denying any 
Thing concerning them. So we conceive or think 
of a Horfe, a Tree, High, Swift, Slow, Animal, 
Time, Motion, Matter, Mind, Life, Death, he. 
The Form under which thefe Things appear to the 
Mind, or the Refult of our Conception or Appre- 
henfion, is called an Idea. 

II. Judgment is that Operation of the Mind, 
whereby we join two or more Ideas together by 
one Affirmation or Negation ; that is, we either 
affirm or deny this to be that. So this Tree is high; 
That Horfe is not fwift ; The Mind of Man is a 
thinking Being ; Mere Matter has no Thought be- 
longing to it ; God is jufl ; Good Men are often mi- 

ferahle in this World; A righteous Governor will 
make a Difference betwixt the Evil and the Good; 
which Sentences are the Effect of Judgment, and 
are called Proportions. 

III. Argumentation or Reafoning\ is that Opera- 
tion of the Mind, whereby w T e infer one Thing, that 
is, one Proportion', from two or more Proportions 
premifed. Or it is the drawing a Conclufion, which 
before was either unknown or dark, or doubtful, 
from fome Proportions which arejnore known and 
evident. So when we have judged that Matter 
cannot think, and that the Mind of Man doth think, 
we then infer and conclude, that therefore the Mind 
of Man is not Matter. 

So we judge that A juft Governor will make a 
Difference between the Evil and the Good ; we judge 
alio that God is Vijujl Governor; and from thence 
we conclude, that God will make a Difference be- 
tween the Evil and the Good. 

Th 



6 INTRODUCTION. 

This Argumentation may be carried on farther, 
thus, God will one Time or another make a Diffe- 
rence between the Good and the Evil : But there is 
little or no Difference made in this World : There- 
fore, there mujl be another World wherein this Diffe- 
rence Jhall be made. 

Thefe Inferences or Conclujions are the Effects of 
Reafoning, and the three Propofltions taken all to- 
gether are called a Syllogifm or Argument, 

IV. Difpofition is that Operation of the Mind, 
whereby we put the Ideas, Proportions and Argu- 
ments, which we have formed concerning one Sub- 
jeer, into fuch an Order as is fitter!: to gain the 
clearer! Knowledge of it, to retain it longer!, and 
to explain it to others in the beft Manner : Or, in 
fhort, it is the ranging of our Thoughts in fuch 
Order, as is bell for our own and others Conception 
and Memory. The EfFecl of this Operation is 
called Method. This very Defcription of the four 
Operations of the Mind and their Effecls, in this 
Order, is an Inftance or Example of Method. 

Now as the Art of Logick affifts our Concep- 
tions, fo it gives us a large and comprehenfive View 
of the Subjects we enquire into, as well as a clear 
and diftjjnct Knowledge of them. As it regulates 
our Judgment and our Reafoning, fo it fee u res us 
from Mi flakes, and gives us a true and certain 
Knowledge of Things ; and as it furnifhes us with 
Method, fo it makes our Knowledge of Things 
both eafy and regular, and guards our Thoughts 
from Con fu (ion. 

Logick is divided into four Parts, according to 
thefe four Operations of the Mind, which it directs, 
and therefore we (hall treat of it in this Order. 



the 



A TABLE OF THE 

CONTENTS. 

THE Introduction, or general Scheme ', Page I • 

The FIRST PART, namely, 
Of Perception and Ideas* 

Chap. L Of the Nature of Ideas, p. 8. 

Chap. II. Of the Objects of Perception. Sect, i. Of 
Being in general, p. 10. Sect. 2. Of Sub/lances 
and their various Kinds, p. u. Sett. 3. Of 
Modes and their various Kinds ; andfirfi of effen- 
tial and accidental Modes, p. 16* Seel. 4. The 
farther Divifions of Mode, p. 20. Seel:.' 5. Of 
the ten Categories. Of Subftance modified, p. 25* 
Sect. 6. Of Not-Being, p. 26* 

Chap. III. Of the feveral Sorts of Perception or Ideas. 
Sect. 1. Of fenfible, fpirited, and abjlr acted Ideas > 
p. 28. Sect. 2. Offimple and complex, compound 
and collective Ideas, p. 33* Seel. 3. Of Univer- 
fal and particular Ideas, real and imaginary ', p. 34* 
Seel. 4. The Divi/ion of Ideas with regard to their 
Qualities, p. 39. 

Chap. IV. Of Words and their fever al Divifons, to* 
gether with the Advantage and Danger of them. 
Sect. 1. Of Words in general and their Ufe, p. 45. 
Seel. 2. Of negative and pofitive Terms, p. 51. 
Sect. 3. Ofjimple and complex Terms, p. 54. 

A 4 Sect 



VI II CONTEXTS, 

Seel. 4. Of Words common and proper , p. 56,- 

Seel. 5. Of concrete and abfiracl Terms, p. 58. 

Sect. 6". Of univoca I and equivocal Words, p. 58. 

Seel:. 7. Various Kinds of 'equivocal Words -, p. 61. 
Seel. 8. The Origin or Caufes of equivocal 

Words, p. 67^ 

Chap. V. General Directions relating to our Ideas : 
nan ely, 1. Of acquiring a Treafure of Ideas. 
2. (f retaining Ideas in Memory. 3. Of felecling 
ufeful Ideas. 4. Of the Government of our 
Thoughts, p. 71. 

Chap. VI. Special Rules to direcl our Conception of 
Things, p. 79. Seel. 1. Of gaining clear and dif- 
tincl Ideas, p. 80. Seel. 1* Of the Definition of 
Words or Names, p. 82. Seel. 3, Direcl ions con- 
cerning the Definition of Names, p. 84. Seel. 4. 
Of the Definition of Things, p. 100. Seel;. 5. Rules 
of Definition of the Thing, p. 105. Seel. 6. Ob- 
fcrvaiions concerning the Definition of Things, p. 
108, Seel. 7. Of a complete Conception of Things, 
p. 1 1 7« Seel. 8. Of Divifion, and the Rules of 
it, p, 118. Seel. 9. Of a comprehenfive Concep- 
tion of Things, and of AbftraEHon,^. 124* Seel. 
10. Of the exienjive Conception of Things, and of 
Dijlribution, p. 128. Seel, n.« Of an orderly Con- 
ception of Things, p. 133. Seel.. 12. Thefe five 
Rules of Conception exemplified,^. 135. Seel. 13. 
An illufiration of the Jive Rules by Similitudes + p. 

The SECOND FART, namely, 
Of Judgment and Propofition. 

CHAP. I. Of the Nature of a Propofition, and its 
feveral Parts, p. 144. 

Chap* 



CONTENTS. 2X 

Chap. II. Of the various Kinds of Propoftions. Sect. 
i . Of univerfal, particular, indefinite ', andfingular 
Proportions, p. 147. Sec"l. 2. Of affirmative and 
negative Proportions ,. p. 156. Se£h 3. 0/" the Op- 
position and Converfion of Proportions, p. 158. Se6l. 
4. 0/* pure and modal Proportions, p. 161. Seel. 5. 
Offngular Propofitions, whether fimple or complex y 
p. 163. Seel. 6. Of compound Propofitions, \>* 165. 
Sect. 7. Of /r«£ <2w^ y^^" Proportions, p. 171. 
Seel. 8. Of certain and doubtfid Propofitions of 
Knowledge and Opinion, p. 174. Seel:. 9. Of Senfe 9 
Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafon, Faith, and In- 
fpiration, p. 177. 

Chap. III. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the 
Doclrine of Prejudices, p. 186. Seel:. 1. Preju- 
dices arifing from Things, p. 188. Seel. 2. Pre- 
judices arifing from Words, p. 195. Sect. 3. Pre- 
jndices arifing from our/elves, p. 198. Seel. 4. 
Prejudices arifing from other Perfons, p. 214. 

Chap. IV. General Directions to ajjfift us in judging 
aright, p. 231. 

Chap. V. Special Rules to direel us in judging of par- 
ticular Objecls. Seel. 1. Principles and Rules of 
judgment concerning the Objecls of Senfe, p. 249. 
Seel:. 2. Principles and Rules of Judgment, in Mat- 
ters of Reafon and Speculation? p. 253. Seel. 3. 
Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters cf 
Morality and Religion, p. 259. Seel. 4. Principles 
and Rules of Judgment in Matters of human Pru- 
dence, p. 263. Seel:. 5. Principles and Rules of 
Judgment in Matters of human Tefiimony, p. 266. 
Seel. 6. Principles and Rules of Judgment in Mat- 
ters of divine Te/limony, p. 271. Seel. 7. Prin- 
ciples and Rules of judging concerning Things paft y 
prefent, and to come, by the mere Ufe of Reafon. 
p. 275. 

The 



Contents. 



The THIRD PART, namely, 
of Reafoning and Syllogifm. 

CHAP. L Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and of the 
Parts of which it is compofed, p. 280* 

Chap. II. Of the various Kinds of Syllogifms, with 
particular Rules relating to them. Seel. 1. Of unu 
verfal and particular Syllogifms, both negative and 
affirmative, p. 283. Seel. 2. Of [plain , fimple Syl- 
logifms, and their Rules, p. 285. Seel. 3. Of 
ihe Moods and Figures of fimple Syllogifm, p. 289. 
Seel. 4. Of complex Syllogifms, p. 292. Sect. 5. 
Of conjunctive Syllogifms, p. 296. Sect. 6. Of com- 
pound Sy I logifms, p. 301. Seel. 7. Of the middle 
Terms, of common Places or Topics, and Invention 
of Argument, p. 305. Sect. 8. Of fever al Kinds 
of Arguments and Demori/iraticns,-p. 308. 

Chap. III. The fioclrme J Sophifms. Sect. 1. Of 
feveral Kinds ofSophiJr- their Solution, p. 3 1 3. 

Sect. 2. Two general Tcjls of true Syllogifms, and 
Methods of folving all Sophifms, p. 323. 

Cha p. IV. Some general Rules to direel our Reqfon* 
'"£, P- 3 26 - 



The FOURTH PART, namely, 
of Method. 

CHAP. I. The Nature and Kinds of Method^ p. 340. 
CHAr. II. General and fpecial Rules of Method \ 
P- 349- 

INTRO- 



GEORGE R. 

GEORGE the Second, by the Grace of God, King of 
Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, 
&c. To all to whom thefe Prefents fhall come, Greeting. 
Whereas James Buckland, James Waugh, John Ward, Thomas 
Longman, and Edward Dilly, Citizens and Bookfellers of our 
City of London, have by their Petition humbly reprefented unto 
Us, that they have purrhafed the Copy-Right of the Whole 
Works of the late Doctor Isaac Watts, and that they are 
now printing and preparing for the Prefs new Editions with 
Improvements of fevenl of the feparate Pieces of the faid Doctor 
lfaac Watts. They have therefore molt humbly prayed Us, 
that We would be gracioufly pleafed to grant them our Royal 
Licence and Protection for the fole printing, publifiiing, and 
vending the faid Works, in as ample Manner and Form as has 
been done in Cafes of the like Nature ; We being willing to 
give all due Encouragement to Works of this Nature, which 
may be of public Ufe and Benefit, are gracioufly pleafed to con- 
defcend to their Requeft, and do therefore by thefe Prefents, 
as far as may be agreeable to the Statute in that Behalf made 
and provided, grant unto them, the faid James Buckland, James 
Waugh, John Ward, Thomas Longman, and Edward Dilly, their 
Executors, Adminiftrators, and Ailigns, our Royal Privilege 
and Licence, for the fole printing, publifiiing, and vending 
the faid Works for the Term of fourteeen Years, to be com- 
puted from the Date hereof, ftri&ly forbidding and prohibiting 
all our Subjects within our Kingdoms and Dominions, to re- 
print, abridge, or tranflate the fame, either in the. like, or any 
other Volume or Volumes whatfoever, or to import, buy, 
vend, utter, or diftribute any Copies thereof reprinted beyond 
the Seas, during the aforefaid Term of Fourteen Years, with- 
out, the Confcnt and Approbation of the faid James Buckland, 
James Vfraugh, John Waul, Thomas Longman, and Edyjard Dilly, 
their Extjcutors, Adminiftratbrs and Ailigns, by Writing under 
their Hands and Seals firft had and obtained, as they and every 
of them' offending herein, will anfvver the contrary at their 
Peril, whereof the Commiffioners and other Officers of our Cuf- 
toms, the Matter, Wardens, and Company of Stationers of our 
City of London, and all other our Officers and Minifrers, whom 
it may concern, are to take Notice, that due Obedience be ren- 
dered to our Pleafure herein fignitied. 

W. PIT T. 



THE 



FIRST PART 



OF 



L O G I C K 



Of Perceptions and Ideas. 

THE firft Part of Logick contains Obferva- 
tions and Precepts about the firft Operation 
of the Mind, Perception or Conception: And fince 
all our Knowledge, how wide and large foever it 
grow, is founded upon our Conception and Ideas, 
here we (ball confider, 

1 . The general Nature of them, 

2. The Objects of our Conception, or the Arche- 
types or Patterns of theje Ideas. 

3. The federal Dhffions of them. 

4. The Words and Terms whereby oiir Ideas are 
£xpre(fed. 

5. General Direcliofis about our Ideas. 

6\ Special Rules to direcl our Conceptions, 



B CHAP. 



8 I.0GICK ! OE, THE [PART I* 

CHAP. L 

Of the Nature of Ideas. 

FIRST, the Nature of Conception or Per- 
ception fhall j Lift be mentioned,* though 
this may feem to belong to another Science rather 
than Logic k. 

Perception is that Act of the Mind (or, as fome 
Philofophers call it, rather a Pqflion or Impreffion) 
whereby the Mind becomes confcious of any 
Thing; as when I feel Hunger, Thirft, or Cold, 
or Heat ; when I fee a Horfe, a Tree, or a Man ; 
when I hear a human Voice, or Thunder, I atn 
confcious of thefe Things, and this is called Per- 
ception. If I fludy, meditate, wifh, or fear, I am 
confcious of thefe inwards A&s alfp, and my Mind 
perceives its own Thoughts , Wiflies, Fears , &c. 

An Idea is generally defined a Refrefentation of 
a Thing in the Mind ; it is a Representation of 
fomcthing that we have feen, felt, heard, &c. or 
been confcious of. That Notion or Form of a Horfe, 
a Tree, or a Man, which is in the Mind, is called 
the Idea of a Horfe, a Tree, or a Man. 

That Notion of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Colour, 
Thought, or Wifh, or Fear, which is in the Mind ? 
is called the Idea of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Willi, 
&c. 

It is not the outward Object, or Thing which is 
perceived, namely, the Horfe, the Man, &c. nor 
is it the very Perception, or Senje, and Feeling, 

* Note, The Words Conception and Perception are often ufed 
promifeuoufly, as I have done here, becauie I would not cm- 
barrals a Learner with too many Diftin&ions ; but it' I were 
to diftinguifh them, I would lay Perception is the Confcioui- 
nefs of an Object when prefent : Conception is the forming an 
Idea of the Object whether prefent or abfent. 

namely, 



CH. lf| RIGHT USE OF REASON. 9 

namely^ of Hunger, or Cold, &c. which is called 
the Idea ;butitisthe Thing as it exifis in the Mind 
by Way of Conception or Reprefentation, that is 
properly called the Idea, whether the Object be 
prefent or abfent. 

As a Horfe, a Man, a Tree, are the outward 
Objects of our Perception, and the outward Arche- 
types, or Patterns of our Ideas ; To our own Sen fa- 
tions of Hunger, Cold, &c, are alfo inward Ar- 
chetypes, or Patterns of our Ideas i But the Notions 
or Piclures of thefe Things, as they are considered, 
or conceived in the Mind, are precifcly the Ideas 
that we have to do with in Logick. To fee a Horfe, 
or to feel Cold, is one Thing ; to think of, and 
converfe about a Man, a Horfe, Hunger, or Cold, 
is another. 

Among all thefe Ideas, fuch as reprefent Bodies 
are generally called Images, efpecially if the Idea 
of the Shape be included. Thofe inward Repre- 
fentations which we have of Spirit, Thought, Love, 
Hatred, Caufe, EffecJ, he. are more pure than men~ 
tal Ideas, belonging more efpecially to the Mind, 
and carry nothing of Shape or Senfe in them. 
But I ihall have Occafion to fpeak more particu- 
larly of the Original and the Diftinclion of Ideas 
in the third Chapter. I proceed therefore now to 
confider the Objects pf our Ideas. 



B 2 CHAP. 



lO LOGICK : OR, THE [PAKT I. 

CHAP. II. 

Of the Ohjeifs of Perception, 

SECT. L 

Of Being in general. 

riT^HE Object of Perception is that which is 
JL reprefented in the Idea, that which is the 
Archetype or Pattern, according to which the Idea 
is formed ; and thus Judgments, Prop oft lions, Rea- 
fons, and long Difcourfes, may all become the Ob- 
jects of Perception ; but in this Place we fpeak 
chiefly of the jirft and more fimple Objects of it, 
before they are joined and formed into Proportions 
or Difcourfes. 

Every Object of our Idea is called a Theme, 
whether it be a Being or -Not -Being ; for Not- Be- 
ing may be propofed to our Thoughts, as well as 
that which has a real Being. But let us firft treat 
of Beings, and that in the larger!: Extent of the 
Word. 

A Beim* is confidered nspojfible, or as aclual. 

When it- is confidered as poffible, it is faid to. 
have an Ejfence or Nature ; fuch were all Things 
before their Creation : When it is confidered as 
aclual, then it is faid to have Exigence alfo ; fuch 
arc all Things which are created, and God himfclf 
the Creator. 

Effence therefore is but the very Nature of any 
Being, whether it be actually exifting or no. A 
Rofe in Winter has an Effence, in Summer it has 
Exijlence ajfo. 

Note, 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 11 

Note, There is but one being which includes 
Exiftence in the very Eflence of it, and that is 
God, who therefore actually exifts by natural and 
eternal Neceffity : But the actual Exiflcnce of 
every Creature is very diftinct from its Effence, for 
it may be, or may not he, as God pleafes. 

Again, Every Being is confidered either as fub- 
ftfting in and by itfelf ; and then it is called a Sub- 
fiance , or it fubfiils in and by another, and then 
it is called a Mode or Manner of Being. Though 
few Writers allow Mode to be called a Being in the 
fame perfect Senfe as a $ubfta?ice is ; and fome 
Modes have evidently more of real Entity or Being 
than others, as will appear when we come to treat 
of them. Thefe Things will furnifh us with Mat- 
ter for large Difcourfe in the following Sections. 



SECT. II. 

Of Substances and their various Kinds, 

ASubftance is a Being which can fubfift by itfelf", 
without Dependence upon any other created 
Being. The Notion offub/ifiing by itfelf, gives Oc- 
cafion to Logicians to call it a Subftance. So a Horfe, 
a Houfe, Wood, Stone, Water, Fire, a Spirit, a 
Body 3 an Angel, are called Subftances,htC2LU& they 
depend on nothing but God for their Exiftence. 

It has been ufual alfo in the Defcription of Sub' 
fiance to add, it is that which is the Subject of Modes 
or Accidents ; a Body is the Subftance or Subject^ 
its Shape is the Mode. 

But left we be led into Miftakes, let us here take 
Notice, that when a Subftance is faid to fubftfi with- 
out Dependence upon another created Beings all that 
we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly 
deftroyed and reduced to nothing, by any Power 

B 3 inferior 



12 LOGICK : OE, THE [PART I, 

inferior to that of our Creator ; though its prefent 
particular Form, Nature and Properties, may be 
altered and deflroyed by many inferior Caufes : A 
Horfe may die and turn to Duft ; Wood may be 
turned into Fire, Smoke, and Afhes ; a Houfeinto 
Rubbim, and Water into Ice or Vapour; but the 
£ubftance or Matter of which they are made, itill 
remains, though the Forms and Shapes of it are 
altered. A Body may ceafe to be a Houfe or a 
Horfe, but it is a Body flill ; and in this Scnfe it 
depends only upon God for its Exigence. 

Among Sub/lances fome are thinking or eonfeious 
Beings, or have a Power of Thought, fuch as the 
Mind of Man, God, Angels. Some are extended 
and /olid, or impenetrable, that is, they have Di- 
mensions* of Length, Breadth, and Depth, and 
have alfo a Power of Refiflanee, or to exclude 
every Thing of the fame Kind from being in the 
fame Place. This is the proper Character of 'Matter 
or Body. 

As for the Idea of Space, whether it be void or 
full, that is, a Vacuum or a Pknu?n, whether it be 
interfperfed among all Bodies, or may be fuppofed 
to reach beyond the Bounds of the Creation, it is 
an Argument too long and too hard to be difputed 
in this Place what the Nature of it is : Jt has been- 
much debated whether it be a real Subftance, or 
a mere Conception of the Mind, whether it be 
the Immenfity of the divine Nature, or the mere 
Order of co-exiftent Beings ; whether it be the 
Manner of our Conception of the Diftances of 
Bodies, or a mere Nothing. Therefore I drop the 
Mention of it here, and refer the Reader to the 
firjl EJfay among the Plulofophical Effiiys by J, W* 
publifhed 1733. 

Now if we feclude Space out of our Confidera- 
tion, there will remain but two Sorts of Subftances> 
in the World, that is, Matter and Mind, or as we 

other wife 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 13 

otherwife call them, Body and Spirit ; at leaft we 
have no Ideas o£any other Subftance but thefe.* 

Among Subftances, fome are called Simple, fome 
are Compound, whether the Words be taken in a 
philofophical or a vulgar Senfe* 

Simple Subftances, in a philofophical Senfe, are 
either Spirits, which have no manner of Compofi- 
tion in them, and in this Senfe God is called afimple 
Being ; or they are the firfl Principles of Bodies, 
which are ufually called. Elements^ of which all other 

Bodies 

* Beeaufe Men have different Ideas and Notions of Subftances 
I thought it not proper intirely to omit all Accounts of them, 
and therefore have thrown them into the Margin. 

Some Philofophers fuppofe that our Acquaintance with Mat-* 
ftr or Mind, reaches no farther than the mere Properties of 
them, and that there is a Sort of unknown Being, which is the 
Subfiance or the SubjeH by which thefe Properties of folid Ex- 
ten/ion and of Cogitation are fupported, and in which thefe Pro- 
perties inhere or exift. But perhaps this Notion arifes only 
from our turning the mere abftracted or logical Notion of Sub" 
fiance orfelfifub/i/iing, into the Notion of a diftinct physical or 
natural Being, without any Neceffity. Solid Extenfion feems to 
me to be the very Subitance of Matter, or of all Bodies ; and a 
Power of Thinking, which is always in acl, feems to be the very 
Subitance of all Spirits ; for God himfelf is an intelligent, al- 
mighty Power : nor is there any need to feek for any other fe- 
cret and unknown Being, or abflratted Subjiance, intirely dif- 
tinct from thefe, in order to fupport the feveral Modes or Pro- 
perties of Matter or Mind, for thefe two Ideas are fufficient for 
that Purpofe ; therefore I rather think thefe are Subjiances. 

It muft be confefTed, when we fay, Spirit is a thinking Sub* 
fiance, and Matter is an extended folid Subfiance, we are ibme- 
times ready to imagine that Exteniion and Solidity are but 
mere Modes and Properties of a certain unknown Subftance 
or Subject which fupports them, and which we call Body ; and 
that a Power of Thinking is but a mere Mode and Property 
of fome unknown Subitance or Subject which fupports it, and 
which We call Spirit : But I rather take this to be a mere Mif- 
take, which We are led into by the grammatical Form and Ufe 
of Words: ; and perhaps our logical Way of Thinking by Sub" 
fiances and Modes, as well as our grammatical Way of talking 
by Subftanti'ves and AdjeSiives, help to delude us into the Sup- 
pofition. 

However, that I may not be wanting to any of my Readers, 
I would let them know Mr. Locke's Opinion^ which has ob- 

B 4 tained 



14 LOGICK : Ob, THE [PART t. 

Bodies, are compounded : ElenwUs are fuch Sub- 
fiances as cannot be refolved, or reduced, into two 
or more SubiKmces of different Kinds. 

The various Seels of Philofophers have attri- 
buted the Honour of this Name to various Things. 
, The Pcripatctick, or Followers of Ar'tfiotle, made 
Fire, Air, Earth, and Water, to be the four Ele- 
ments, of which all earthly Things were com- 
pounded ; and they fuppofed the Heavens to be a 
Quint effence, or fifth Sort of Body, difiincl: from ail 
thefe : But iince Experimental Philofophy and 

tained much in the prefent Age, and it is this : " That our Idea 
" of any particular Subitance, is only fuch a Combination of 
" iimple ideas as re prefent that Thing as fubtifting by itfelf, in 
" which the fuppofed or cont'ufed Idea of Subitance (fuch as it 
v is) is always ready to offer itfelf. It is a Conjunction of Ideas 
" co-exifting in fuch a Caufe of their Union, and makes the 
" whole Subject fubfifl by itfelf, though the Caufe of their 
" Union be unknown; and our general idea of Subftancc arifes 
" from the Selt-fubfiftence of this Collection of Ideas." 

Now if this Notion of Subfiance reft here, and be confidered 
merely as an unknown Caufe of the Union of Properties, it is 
much more eafy to be admitted ; but if Ave proceed to fuppofe 
a fort of real, fubftantial, diftinct Being, different from folid 
Quantity or Extension in Bodies, and different from a Panwr <f. 
Thinking in Spirits, in my Opinion it is the Introduction of a 
needlefs fcholaftical Notion into the real Nature of Things, and 
then fancying it to have a real Eodftence. 

Mr. Loch, in his Ejjay of Human Under/} an din%, Rook II. 
Chap. 22. §. 2. feems to ridicule this common Idea of Subflavce, 
which IVl en have generally fuppofed to be a fort of Subfiratum 
diftinct from all Properties whatsoever, and to be theSuppoit 
of all Properties. Yet in Book IV. Chap. 3. §. 6. he feems 
to fuppofe there may be fuch an unknown Subfiratum, which 
may be capable of receiving the Properties both of Matter and 
of Mind, namely, Extension, Solidity, and Cogitation ; for he 
fuppofes it poifible for God to add Cogitation to that Sub/lance 
which is Corporeal, and thus to caufe Mailer to think. If this 
be true, then Spirits (for aught we know) may be corporeal 
Beings, or thinking Bodies, which is a Do&rine too favourable 
to the Mortality of the Soul. But I leave thefe Debates to the- 
Philofophers of the ad will not be too poutive in my 

Opinion of this abftritfe Subject. 

See more of this Argument in Pbilofophical F.jjavs, before 
cited, BJfay '-d. 

Mat he- 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 15 

Mathematicks have been better underilood, this 
Doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The Che- 
's make Spirit, Salt, Sulphur, Water, and Earth, 
to be their five Elements, becaufe they can reduce 
all tcrreftrial Things to thefe five : This feems to 
come nearer the Truth; though they are not all 
agreed in this Enumeration of Elements . In fhort, 
our modern Philofophers generally fuppofe Matter 
or Body to be one fimple Principle, or Jolid Exten- 
fion, which being diverfified by its various Shapes, 
Quantities, Motions, and Situations, makes all the 
Varieties that are found in the Univerfe ; and there- 
fore they make little Ufe of the Word Element, 

Compound Subfiances are made up of two or more 
fimple Subitances : So every Thing in this whole 
material Creation, that can be reduced by the Art of 
Man into two or more different Principles or Sub- 
itances, isa Compound 'Body in the philofophical Senfe. 

But if we take the Words Simple and Compound 
in a vulgar Senfe, then all thofe are fimple Subfiances, 
which are generally efleemed uniform in their 
Natures. So every Herb is called a Simple ; and 
every Metal a Mmerah, though the Chemift per- 
haps may find nil his feveral Elements in each of 
them. So a Needle is a fimple Body, being only 
made of Steel ; but a Sword or a Knife is a Com- 
pound, becaufe its Haft or Handle is made of Ma- 
terials different from the Blade. So the Bark of 
Peru, or the Juice of Sorrel, is & fimple. Medicine : 
But when the Apothecaries Art has mingled feve- 
ral Simples together, it becomes a Compound, as 
Diafcordium or Mithridate. 

The Terms of pure and mixt, when applied to 
Bodies, are much akin to fimple and compound. So 
a Guinea is pure Gold, if it has nothing but Gold 
in it, without any Alloy of bafer Metal : But if 
any other Mineral or Metal be mingled with it, it 
is called a mixt Sub (lance or Body. 

Subftances are alfo divided into animate and in- 
animate* 



iff LOGICS: OR, the [part r. 

animate . Animated Subftances are either animal 
or vegetable* . 

Some of the animal Subftances have various orga- 
flicai or inftrumental Parts, fitted for a Variety of 
Motions from Place to Place, and a Spring of 
Life within themfelves, as Beafts, Birds, Fifties, 
and Infects ; thefe are called Animals. Other ani- 
mated Subftances are called Vegetables, which have 
within themfelves the Principles of another fort of 
Life and Growth, and of various Productions of 
Leaves, Flowers, and Fruit, fuch as we fee hi 
Plants, Herbs, and Trees* 

And there are other Subftances, which are called 
inanimate, becaufe they have no fort of Life in 
them, as Earth, Stone, Air, Water, &c. 

There is alfo one Sort of Subftancc, or Being* 
which is compounded of Body and Mind, or a rational 
Spirit united to an Animal ; fuch is Mankind. 
Angels, or any other Beings of the fpiritual and in* 
vifible World, who have aftumed vifible Shapes for 
a Seafon, can hardly be reckoned among this Order 
of compounded Beings; becaufe they drop their 
Bodies, and diveft themfelves of thofe vifible Shapes* 
when their particular Meflagc is performed, and 
thereby mew that thefe Bodies do not belong to their 
Natures. 

SECT. III. 

Of Modes, and their, various Kinds, and firft of 
eflential and accidental Modes, 

THE next fort of Objects which are reprd- 
fented in our Ideas, are called Modes ^ or 
Manners of Being \. 

* Note, Vegetables as well as Animals, have gotten the Name' 
of animated Subftances, becaufe fome of the Ancients fuppofeel 
Herbs and Plants, Beafts and Birds, &c. to have a fort of Souls 
cliftmcr. from Matter, or Body. 

f Note, The Term Mode is by fome Authors applied chiefly to 
the Relations, or relative Manners of Being. But in logical 

Treutifes 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 17 

A Mode is that which cannot fubfift in and of 
itfelf, but is always efteemed as belonging to, and 
fubfi fling by the Help of fome Sub fiance, which 
for that Reafon is called its Sub j eel. A Mode 
muft depend on that Subftance for its very Exig- 
ence and Being ; and that not as a Being depends 
on its Caufe (for fo Sub/lances themfelves depend 
on God their Creator ;) but the very Being of a 
Mode depends on fome Subftance for its Subjecl, in 
which it is, or to which it belongs ; fo Motion, 
Shape, Quantity, weight, are Modes of the Body ; 
Knowledge, Wit, Folly, Love, Doubting, Judg- 
ing, are Modes of the Mind; for the one cannot 
fublifl without Body, and the other cannot fubfift 
without Mind. 

Modes have their feveral Divifions, as well as 
Subftances. 

I. Modes are either ejfential or accidental. 

An ejfential Mode ox Attribute, is that which be- 
longs to the very Nature or Eflence of the Subject 
wherein it is ; and the Subject can never have the 
fame Nature without it ; fnch is Roundnefs in a 
Bowl, Hardnefs in a Stone, Softnefs in Water, vital 
Motion in an Animal, Solidity in Matter, Thinking 
in a Spirit ; for though that Piece of Wood which 
is now a Bowl may be made fquare, yet if Round- 
nefs be taken away, it is no longer a Bowl : So that 
very Flefh and Bones, which is now an Animal, 
may be without Life or inward Motion ; btf t if all 
Motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an Ani- 
mal, but a Carcafs : So if a Body or Matter be 
divcfted of Solidity , it is a mere void Space, or No- 
thing ; and if Spirit be intirely without Thinking, 
I have no Idea of any Thing that is left in it; 

therefore 

Treatifes it is often ufed in a larger Senfe, and extends to all 
Attributes whatfoever, and includes the moft effential and inward 
Properties, as well as outward Refpe&s and Relations, and 
reaches to Anions themfelves as well as Manners oi Action. 



IS LOGICK : OR, THE [PART !, 

therefore fo far as I am able to judge, Confcioufnefs 
muit be its effential Attribute*. Thus all the 
Perfections of God are called his Attributes^ for he 
cannot be without them. 

An ejjtntial Mode is either primary or fee 'ondary. 

A primary ejfential Mode, is the firft or chief 
Being that conftitutes any Being in its particular 
Effence or Nature, and makes it to be that which 
it is, and diftinguifbes it from all other Beings : 
This is called the Difference in the Definition of 
Things, of which hereafter : So Roundnefs is the 
primary effential Mode or Difference of a Bowl ; 
the Meeting of two Lines is the primary effential 
Mode, or the Difference of an Angle ; the Perpen- 
dicularity of thefe Lines to each other, is the Dif- 
ference of a right Angle : Solid Extenfion is the pri- 
mary Attribute or Difference of Matter ; Confciouf 
fiefs, or at lcaft a Power of Thinking, is the Differ- 
ence or primary Attribute of a Spirit^; and to 
fear and love God, is the primary Attribute of a 
pious Alan. 

Afecondary effential Mode, is any other Attribute 
of a Thing, which is not of primary Confedera- 
tion : This is called a Property: Sometimes indeed 
it goes towards making up the Effence, efpeclally 
of a complex Being, fo far as we are acquainted with 
it ; foraetimes it depends upon, and follows from 
the Effence of it ; fo Volubility or Aptnefs to roll, 
is the Property of a Bowl, and is derived from its 
Roundnefs. Mobility, and Figure, or Shape, are 

Properties 

* Note, When I call folid Extenfion an effential Mode or At- 
tribute of Matter, and a Power of Thinking an eflential Mode 
or Attribute of a Spirit, I do it in Compliance with common 
Forms of Speech : but perhaps in Reality thefe are the very 
Ejettces or Subftances themielves, and the moft fubftantial Jdeas 
that we can form of Body and Spirit, and have no need of any 
(we know not what) Subfiratum, or unintelligible Subftance, 
to fupport them in their Exigence or Being. 

+ See the Note in the foregoing Page. 



CH. II.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. I9 

Properties of Matter ; and it is the Property of a 
pious Man to love his Neighbour. 

An accidental Mode, or an Accident, is fuch a 
Mode as is not necejjary to the Being of a Thing, 
for the Subject may be without it, and yet re- 
main of the fame Nature that it was before ; or it 
is that Mode which may be feparated or aholifbed 
from its Subject : So Smoothnefs or Roughnefs, 
Blacknefs or Whitenefs, Motion or Reft, are the Ac- 
cidents of a Bowl ; fbr thefe may be all changed, 
and yet the Body remain a Bowl ftill : Learning, 
Jiiftice, Folly, Sicknefs, Health, are the Accidents 
of a Man ; Motion, Squarenefs, or any particular 
Shape or Size, arc the Accidents of Body : Yet 
Shape and Size in general are evTential Modes of 
it ; for a Body muft have fome Size and Shape, 
nor can it be without them : So Hope, Fear, Wijh- 
ing, AJfeating, and Doubting, are Accidents of the 
Mind, though Thinking in general feems to be 
ejfential to it. 

Here obferve, that the Name of Accident has 
been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetick Phi- 
lofophers to all Modes 3 whether efTential or acci- 
dental ; but the Moderns confine this Word Acci- 
dent to the Senfe in which I have defcribed it. 

Here it fhould be noted alfo, that though the 
Word Property be limited fometimes in logical 
Treatifes to the Jecondary ejfential Mode, yet it is 
ufed in common Language to fignify thefe four 
forts of Modes \ of which fome are effeutial, and 
fome accidental. 

1. Such as belong to every Subject of that Kind, 
but not only to thofe Subjects. So yellow Colour and 
Duclility are Properties of Gold ; they belong to 
all Gold, but not only to Gold i For Saffron is alio 
yellow, and Lead is duclile. 

2. Such as belong only to o%e Kind of SubjecT, 
but not to every Subject of that Kind. So Learning, 

Reading^ 



20 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART 1. 

Readings and Writings are Properties of human Na- 
ture ; they belong only to Man, but not to all Men. 

3. Such as belong to every Subject of one Kind, 
and only to them, but not always. So Speech or 
Language is a Property of Man, for it belongs to 
fill Men, and to Men only ; but Men are not always 
fpeaking. 

4. Such as belong to every Subjecl of one Kind, 
and to them only and always. So Shape and Divi- 

Jibility are Properties of Body ; fo Omnifcience and 
Omnipotence are Properties of the Divine Nature ; 
for in this Senle Properties and Attributes are the 
fame; and, except in logical Treat ifes, there is 
fcarce any Diftinction made between them. Thefe 
are called Propria quarto modo in the Schools, or 
properties of the fourth Sort. 

Note, Where there is any one Property or ejjential 
Attribute fo fuperior to the reft, that it appears 
plainly that all the reft are derived from it, and 
fuch as is fufficient to give a full Diftinclion of that 
Subjecl: from all other Subjects, this Attribute 
or Property is called the effe?itial Difference, as is 
before declared ; and we commonly fay, the Ef- 
fence of the Thing confifts in it ; fo the Effence of 
Matter in general feems to confift in Solidity, or 
folid Extension. But for the moft Part we are fo 
much at a lofs in finding out the intimate Eflcnce 
of particular natural Bodies, that we are forced to 
diftinguifh the ejfential Difference of moft Things 
by a Combination of Properties. So a Sparrow is a 
Bird which has fuch coloured Feathers, and fuch 
a particular Size, Shape, and Motion. So Worm- 
wood is an Herb which has fuch a Leaf of fuch a 
Colour, and Shape, and Tafte, and fuch a root 
and Stalk. So Beafts and Fifties, Minerals, Me- 
tals, and Works of Art fometimes, as well as of 
Nature, are diftinguifhed by fuch a Collection of 
Properties. , 

SECT- 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. %l 

SECT. IV. 

The farther Divifions of Mode. 

THE fecond Divifion of Modes is into abfoluie 
and relative. An abfolute Mode is that which 
belongs to its Subject, without Refpecl to any 
other Beings whatfoever : But a relative Mode is 
derived from the Regard that one Being has tQ 
others. So Roundnefs and Smoothnefs are the abfo- 
luie Modes of a Bowl ; for if there were nothing 
elfe exifting in the whole Creation, a Bowl might 
be round and fmooth : But Greatnefs and Smallnejs 
are relative Modes ; for the very Ideas of them 
are derived merely from the Comparifon of one 
Being with others : A Bowl of four Inches Diame- 
ter is very great, compared with one of an Inch 
and a half; but it is very f mall, in Companion of 
another BqwI, whofe Diameter is eighteen or twen- 
ty Inches. Motion is the abfolute Mode of a Body, 
but Swiftnefs or Slownefs are relative Ideas ; for 
the Motion pf a Bowl on a Bowling-green \sfwift, 
when compared with a Snail ; and it \sflow when 
compared with a Cannon-bullet. 

Thefe relative Modes are largely treated of by 
fome logical and metaphyseal Writers, under the 
Name of Relations : And thefe Relations themfelves 
are farther fubdivided into fucli as arife from ihs 
Nature of Things, and fitch as arife merely from 
the Operation of our Minds ; one Sort are called 
real Relations, the other mental*, fo the Likenefs of 
one Egg to another is a real Relation, becaufe it 
arifes from the real Nature of Things ; for whe- 
ther there was any Man or Mind to conceive it or 
no, one Egg would be like another : But when 
we confider an Egg as a Noun Subjlantive in Gram- 
mar, or as fignified by the Letters egg, thefe 
are mere mental Relations^ and deriye their very 

Nature 



%% . LOGICK *. OK, THE f PART T. 

Nature from the Mind of Man. Thcfc fort of 
Relations are called by the Schools Enila Rationis, 
or fecond Notions, which have no real Being, but 
depend intirely on the Operation of the Mind. 

III. The third Divifion of Modes (hew us they 
are either intrinfical or extrinfical. Intrinfical Modes 
axe conceived to be in the Subject or Subftance, as 
when we fay a Globe is rounds or fwift, rolling, or 
at reft : Or when we fay, a Man is tall, or learned \ 
thefe are intrinfick Modes: But extrinfick Modes axe 
liich as arife from fomething that is not in the 
Subject or Subftance itlelf ; but it is a Manner of 
Being which fome Subftances attain by Reafon of 
fomething that is external or foreign to the Sub- 
ject ; as, This Globe lies within two Yards of the 
Wall-, or, This Man is beloved, or hated. Note> 
Such Sort of Modes as this laft Example, are called 
external Denominations. 

IV. There is a fourth Divifion much akin to 
this, whereby Modes are laid to be Inherent, or 
Adherent, that is. Proper or Improper. Adherent 
ox improper Modes, arife from the joining of fome 
accidental Subftance to the chief Subject, which 
yet may be feparated from it ; fo when a Bowl is 
wet, or a Boy is clothed, thefe are adherent Modes ; 
for the Water and the Clothes are diftinct Sub- 
ftances, which adhere to the Bowi, or to the Boy : 
But when we fay, the Bowl is fwift or round; when 
we fay, the Boy is flrong or witty, thefe axe proper 
or inherent Modes, for they have a fort of In-being 
in the Subftance itfelf, and do not arife from the 
Addition of any other Subftance to it. 

V. Aclion and PaJJion arc Modes or Manners 
which belong to Subftances, and fhould not in- 
tirely be omitted here. When a Smith with a 
hammer ftrikes a Piece of Iron, the Hammer and 

the 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 23 

the Smith are both Agents or Subjects of Action ; 
the one is the Prime or Supreme, the other the Sub- 
ordinate : The Iron is the Patient, or the Subject 
of Paflion, in a philofophical Senfe, becaufe it re- 
ceives the Operation of the Agent : Though this 
Senfe of the Words Pqffion and Patience differs 
much from the vulgar Meaning of them.* 

VI. The Jtxth Divifion of Modes may be into 
Phyfical, that is* Natural, Civil, Moral, and Su- 
pernatural. So when we confider the Apoftle Paul, 
who w r as a little Man, a Roman by the Privilege of 
his Birth, a Man of Virtue or Honefty* and an in- 
ferred Apoftle; his low Stature is a. phyfical Mode, 
his being a Roman is a civil Privilege, his Honejly 
is a moral Consideration, and his being infpired is 
fupernatural. 

VII. Modes belong either to Body or to Spirit, 
or to both. Modes of Body belong only to Matter 
or to corporeal Beings ; and thefe are Shape, Size, 
Situation, or Place, &c. Modes of Spirit belong 
only to Minds;, fuch are Knowledge, AJfent, Dif- 

fent, Doubting, Reafoning, he. Modes which be- 
long to both have been fometimes called mixt 
Modes, or human Modes, for thefe are only found 
in human Nature, which is compounded both of 
Body and Spirit ; fuch are Senfation, Imagination, 
Pqffion, &c. in all which there is a Concurrence of 
the Operations both of Mind and Body, that is, . 
of animal and intellectual Nature. 

But the Modes of Body may be yet farther dif- 
tinguifhed. Some of them are primary Modes ox 
Qualities, for they belong to Bodies confidered in 

* Note, Agent fignifies the Doer, Patient the Sufferer, Aftion is 
Doing, PaJJion is Suffering: Agent and Action have retained their 
original and philofophical Senfe, though Patient and Pailion 
have acquired a very different Meaning in common Language. 

C them- 



24 LOGICK J OR, THE [pART I. 

themfelves, whether there were any Man to take 
Notice of them or no ; fuch are thofe before-men- 
tioned, namely, Shape, Size, Situation, &c. Se- 
condary Qualities, or Modes, are fuch Ideas as we 
afcribe to Bodies on account of the various Impref- 
fions which are made on the Senfes of Men by 
them; and thefe are called fenfible Qualities, which 
are very numerous ; fuch are all Colours, as Red, 
Green, Blue, &c. fuch are all Sounds, as Sharp, 
Shrill, Loud, Hoarfe ; all Tajles, as Sweet, Bitter, 
Sour ; all Smells, whether Plea/ant, Offenfive, or 
Indifferent ; and all Taclile Qualities, or fuch as 
affecl the Touch or Feeling, namely, Heat, Cold, 
Sec. Thefe are properly cnUedfecondary Qualities ; 
for though we are ready to conceive them as exift- 
ing in the very Bodies themfelves which afTecl: our 
Senfes, yet true Philofophy has moft undeniably 
proved, that all thefe are really various Ideas or 
Perceptions excited in human Nature, by the dif- 
ferent Impreffions that Bodies make upon our 
Senfes by their primary Modes ; that is, by means 
of the different Shape, Size, Motion, and Pofition 
of thofe little invilible Parts that compofe them. 
Thence it follows, that afecondary Quality, confi- 
dered as in the Bodies themfelves, is nothing elfe 
but a Power or Aptitude to produce fuch Senfa- 
tions in us ; See Locke's EJfay on the Underjlanding, 
Book II. Ch. 8. 

VIII. I might add, in the laft Place, that as 
Modes belong to Sub/lances, fo there are fome alfo 
that are but Modes of other Modes : For though 
they fubfift in and by the Sub/lance, as the original 
Subjecl of them, yet they are properly and directly 
attributed to fome Mode of that Subftance. Motion 
is the Mode of a Body ; but the Swiftnefs, or Slow- 
nefs of it, or its Direclion to the North or South, 
are but Modes of Motion. Walking is the Mode 

or 



CH. II.] UIGHT USE OP REASON. 25 

or Manner of a Man or of a Bead ; but Walking 
gracefully implies a Manner or Mode fuperadded 
to that Action. All comparative and fuperlative 
Degrees of any Quality, are the Modes of a Mode, 
as Swifter implies a greater Meafure of Swiftnefs. 

It would be too tedious here to run through all 
the Modes, Accidents, and Relations at large, that 
belong to various Beings, and are copioufly treated 
of in general, in the Science called Metaphyftcks, 
or more properly Ontology : They are alfo treated 
of in particular in thofe Sciences which have af- 
fumed them fcverally as their proper Subjedls* 



SECT. V, 

Of the ten Categories. Of Subjlance modified. 

TYJE have thus given an Account of the two 
V V chief Objects of our Ideas, namely, Sub- 
fiances and Modes, and their various Kinds : And 
in thefe laft Sections we have briefly comprifed the 
greateft Part of what is neceflary in the famous 
ten Ranks of Being, called the ten Predicaments, 
or Categories of Arifiotle, on which there are end- 
Jefs Volumes of Difcourfes formed by feveral of 
his Followers. But that the Reader may not ut- 
terly be ignorant of them, let him know the Names 
are thefe : Subjlance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, 
Aclion, PaJJion, Where, When, Situation, and Cloth- 
ing* It would be mere Lofs of Time to fhew how 
loofe, how injudicious, and even ridiculous this 
ten-fold Divifion of Things is : And whatsoever 
farther relates to them, and which may tend to 
improve ufeful Knowledge, fhould be fought in 
Ontology, and in other Sciences. 

Befides Subjlance and Modes, fome of the Mo- 
derns would have us confider the Subftance modified, 

C2 a* 



26 LOGICK I OR, THE [PART T. 

as a diftincl: object of our Ideas ; but I think there 
is nothing more that need be faid on this Subje6r, 
than this, namely, There is feme Difference be- 
tween a Sub (la nee when it is considered with all 
its Modes about it, or clothed in all its Manners of 
Exigence, and when it is diftinguifhed from them, 
and considered naked without them. 



SECT. VI. 

Of Not-Being. 

AS Being is divided into Subftance and Mode, 
fo we may confider Not-Being with regard to 
both thefe. 

I. Not-Being is confklered as excluding all Sub- 
ftance, and then all Modes are alfo neceilarily ex- 
cluded ; and this we call pure Nihility, or mere 
Nothing. 

This Nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a phi- 
lofophical Senle; fo we fay, there is nothing in the 
Cup, in a vulgar Scnfe, when we mean there is no 
Liquor in it ; but we cannot fay, there is nothing in 
the Cup, in a ftricl philofophical Scnfe, where there 
is Air in it, and perhaps a Million of Rays sf Light 
are there, 

II. Not-Being, as it has Relation to Modes or 
Manners of Being, maybe confidercd either as a 
mere Negation, or as a Privation. 

A Negation is the Abfence of that which does 
not naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeak- 
ing of, or which has no Right, Obligation, or 
Neceffity to be prefent with it ; as when wc fay, 
a Sto?ie is inanimate, or Blind, or Deaf, that is, it 
has no Life, nor Sight, nor Hearing ; nor when 
we fay a Carpenter or a Fiflierman is unlearned, thefe 
are mere Negations. 

But 



CH. II.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 27 

But a Privation is the Abfence of what does 
naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeaking of, 
or which ought to be prefent with it ; as when a 
Man or a Horje is deaf, or blind, or dead ; or if a 
Phyfician or a Divine be unlearned, thefe are called 
Privations : So the Sinfulness of any human Aclion 
is faid to be a Privation ; for Sin is that Want of 
Conformity to the Law of God, which ought to be 
found in every Action of Man. 

Note, There are fome Writers who make all 
forts of relative Modes or Relations, as well as all 
external Denominations, to be mere Creatures of the 
Mind, and Entia Rationis, and then they rank 
them alio under the general Head of Not-Beings ; 
but it is my Opinion, that whatfoever may be 
determined concerning mere ?nental Relations and 
external Denominations, which feem to have fome- 
thing lefs of Entity or Being in them, yet there are 
many real Relations, which ought not to be reduced 
to fo low a Clafs ; fu*h are the Situation of Bodies, 
their mutual Dijlances, their particular Proportions 
and Meafures, the Notions of Fatherhood, Brother- 
hood, So?ifhip, &c. all which are relative Ideas. The 
very Efience of Virtues or Holinefs confifts in the 
Conformity of our Actions to the Rule of Right 
Reaibn, or the Law of God : The Nature and E{- 
fence of Sincerity is the Conformity of our Words 
and Actions to our Thoughts, all which are but 
mere Relations ; and I think we mud not reduce 
fuch politive Beings as Piety, and Virtue, and 
Truth, to the Rank of Non- Entities, which have 
nothing real in them, though Sin, (or rather the 
Sinfulnefs of an Aclion) may be properly called a 
Not-Being ; for it is a Want of Piety and Virtue. 
This is the moft ufual, and perhaps the juileft Way 
of reprefenting thefe Matters. 

C 3 CHAP, 



28 LOGICK : OR, THE [PAItT I, 

CHAP. III. 

Of thefeveral Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas. 

IDEAS may be divided with Regard to their 
Original, their Nature, their Objecls, and their 
Qualities. 

SECT. I. 

Offenjible, fpiritual, and abjlracled Ideas. 

THERE has been a great Controversy about 
the Origin of Ideas, namely, whether any of 
our. Ideas are innate or no, that is, born with us, 
and naturally belonging to our Minds. Mr. Locks 
utterly denies it ; others as pofitively affirm it. 
Now, though this Controverfy may be compro- 
mifed, by allowing that there is a Senfe wherein 
our firft Ideas of fome Things may be faid to be 
innate ) (as I have fhewn in fome Remarks on Mr> 
Locke 's EJfay, which have lain long by me) yet it 
does not belong to this Place and Bufinefs to have 
that Point debated at large, nor will it hinder our 
Purfuit of the prefent Work to pafs oyer it in Si- 
lence. 

There is fufficient Ground to fay, that all our 
Ideas, with regard to their Original, may be di- 
vided into three Sorts, namely, fenfible, fpiritual, 
and abjlracled Ideas. 

I. Sen/ible or corporeal Ideas, are derived origi- 
nally from our Senfes, and from the Communica- 
tion wh ; ch the Soul has with the animal Body in 
this prefent State ; fuch are the Notions we frame 
of all Colours, Sounds, Tajles, Figures, or Shapes 

and 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 2Q 

and Motions ; for our Senfes being converfant about 
particular fenfible Objects, become the Occafions 
offeveral diftinct Perceptions in the Mind ; and 
thus we come by the Ideas of Yellow, Wliite, Heat, 
Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all thofe which 
we call fenfible Qualities. All the Ideas which we 
have of Body, and the fenfible Modes and Proper- 
ties that belong to it, feem to be derived from 
Senfation. 

And howfoever thefe may be treafured up in 
the Memory, and by the Work of Fancy, may be 
increafed, diminifhed, compounded, divided, and 
diverfified, (which we are ready to call our Inven- 
tion) yet they all derive their firft Nature and Be- 
ing from fomething that has been let into our 
Minds by one or other of our Senfes. If I think 
of a golden Mountain, or a Sea of liquid Fire, yet 
the lingle Ideas of Sea, Fire, Mountain, and Gold, 
came into my Thoughts at flrft by Senfation ; the 
Mind has only compounded them. 

II. Spiritual* or Intellectual Ideas, are thofe 
which we gain by reflecting on the Nature and 
Actions of our own Souls, and turning our 
Thoughts within ourfelves, and obferving what is 
tranfacted in our own Minds. Such are the Ideas 
we have of Thought, AJfent, Diffent, Judging, Rea- 
fon, Knowledge, Under/landing, Will, Love, Fear, 
Hope. 

By Senfation the Soul contemplates Things (as 
it were) out of itfelf, and gains corporeal Repre- 
fentations oxfenfille Ideas : By Refleclion the Soul 
contemplates itfelf, and Things within itfelf, and 
by this Means it gains fpiritual Ideas, or Reprefen- 
tations of Things intellectual. 

* Here the. Word Spiritual is ufed in a mere natural, and 
«ot in a religious Senfe. 

C 4 Here 



30 LOGICK ! OK, THE [PART I. 

Here it may be noted, though the firft Original 
of thefe two Sorts of Ideas, namely, Senfible and 
Spiritual, may be entirely owing to thefe two Prin- 
ciples, Senfation and Reflection, yet the Recollection 
and frefh Excitation of them may be owing to a 
thoufand other Occafions and Occurrences of Life. 
We could never inform a Man who was born 
Blind or Deaf, what we mean by the Words Yel- 
low, Blue, Red, or by the Words Loud or Shrill, 
nor convey any juft Ideas of thefe Things to his 
Mind, by all the Po^vers of Language, unlefs he 
has experienced thofe Senfations of Sound and Co- 
lour ; nor could we ever gain the Ideas of Thought, 
Judgment, Reafon, Doubting, Hoping, &c. by all the 
Words that Man could invent, without turning 
our Thoughts inward upon the Actions of our own 
Souls. Yet when once we have attained thefe Ideas 
by Senfation and Reflection, they may be excited 
afrefh by the Ufe of Names, Words, Signs, or by 
any Thing elfe that has been connected with them 
in our Thoughts ; for when two or more Ideas 
have been affociated together, whether it be by 
Cuftom, or Accident, or Defign, the one prefently 
brings the other to Mind, 

III. Befides thefe two which we have named, 
there is a third Sort of Ideas, which are commonly 
called abflraCted Ideas, becaufe though the original 
Ground or Occafion of them may be Senfation, or 
Reflection, or loth, yet thefe Ideas are framed by 
another Act of the Mind, which we ufually call 
AbflraCtion. Now the Word AbflraCtion fignifies 
a withdrawing fome Parts of an Idea from other 
Parts of it, by which 'Means fuch abflracled Ideas 
are formed, as neither reprefent any Thing corpo- 
real or fpiritual, that is, any Thing peculiar or 
proper to Mind or Body, Now thefe are of twQ 
Kinds. 

Some 



CH. III.] KIGHT USE OF REASON. 31 

Some of thefe dbflraSed Ideas are the moft abfor 
lute, general and univerfal Conceptions of Things, 
confklered in themfelves, without Refpect to 
others ; fuch as Entity or Being, and Not-Being, 
Effence, Exigence, Aft, Power, Subftance, Mode, 
Accident, he. 

The other Sort of abftrafted Ideas are relative, as 
when we compare feveral Things together, and 
confider merely the Relations -of one Thing to 
another, entirely dropping the Subject of thofe 
Relations, whether they be corporeal or fpiritual ; 
fuch are our Ideas of Caufe, Ejfeft, Likenefs, Vn- 
likenefs, Subjeft, Objeft, Identity, or Samenefs, and 
Contrariety, Order, and. other Things which are 
treated of in Ontology. 

Moft of the Terms of Art in feveral Sciences 
may be ranked under this Head of ' abftrafted Ideas, 
as Noun, Pronoun, Verb, in Grammar, and the- 
feveral Particles of Speech, as wherefore, therefore, 
when, how, although, howjbever, he. So Connec- 
tions, Tranfitions, Similitudes, Tropes, and their va- 
rious Forms in Rhetorick. 

Thefe abftrafted Ideas, whether abfolute or re- 
lative, cannot fo properly be faid to derive their 
immediate, complete, and diftincl Original, either 
from Senfation, or Reflection, ( 3 ) Becaufe the Na- 
ture and the Actions both of Body and Spirit give 
us Occafion to frame exactly the fame Ideas of 
Effence, Mode, Caufe, Ejfeft, Likenefs, Contrariety, 
he. Therefore thefe cannot be called either fenftble 
or fpiritual Ideas, for they are not exact Reprefen- 
tations either of the peculiar Qualities or Aftions of 
Spirit or Body, but feem to be a diftinct Kind of 
Idea framed in the Mind, to reprefent our moft 
general Conceptions of Things, or their Relations to 
one another, without any Regard to their Natures, 
whether they be corporeal or fpiritual. And, ( 2 ) 
i^ae fame general Ideas, of Caufe and Ejfeft, Like- 
nefs, 



32 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I* 

nefs, &c. may be transferred to a thoufand other 
Kinds of Being, whether bodily or fpi ritual, be- 
fides thofc from whence we firft derived them ; 
Even thofe abfiracled Ideas, which might be firft 
occafioned by Bodies, may be as properly afterward 
attributed to Spirits. 

Now, though Mr. Locke fuppofes Senfation and 
Refleclion to be the only two Springs of all Ideas, 
and that thefe two are fufficient to furnifh our 
Minds with all that rich Variety of Ideas which 
we have ; yet Ahftrattion is certainly a different 
Act: of the Mind, whence thefe abfiracled Ideas 
have their Original ; though perhaps Senfation or 
Reflection may furnifh us with all the firft Objects 
and Occafions whence thefe abfiracled Ideas are 
excited and derived. Nor in this Senfe and View 
of Things, can I think Mr. Locke himfejf would 
deny my Reprefentation of the Original of ab-* 
firacled Ideas, nor forbid them to Hand for a dif- 
tinct. Species. 

Note, Though we have divided Ideas in this 
Chapter into three Sorts, namely, fenfible, fpiri- 
tual, and abfiracled, yet it may not be amifs juft 
to take Notice here, that a Man may be called a 
compound Subfiance, being made of Body and Mind, 
and the Modes which arife from this Compofition 
are called mixed Modes, fuch as Senfation, Pajfion, 
Difcourfe, &c. fo the Ideas of this Subitance or 
Being, called Man, and of thefe mixed Modes, 
may be called ?nixed Ideas, for they are not pro* 
perly and firictly Jpiritual, fenfible, or abfiracled* 
See a much larger Account of every Part of this 
Chapter in the Philofophical EJfajs, by /. Watte* 
Effay III, IV, &e. 



sect! 



£H. HI.] RIGHT USE OF REASOST, S3 

SECT. II. 

Of fimple and complex, compound and collecJhe Ideas* 

IDEAS confidered in their Nature, arc either 
fimple or complex, 

K fimple Idea is one uniform Idea, which cannot 
be divided or diftinguifhed by the Mind of Man 
into two or more Ideas ; fuch are a multitude of 
our Senfations ; as the Idea of Sweet, Bitter, Cold, 
Heat, White, Red, Blue, Hard, Soft, Motion, Rejt, 
and perhaps Extenfion and Duration : Such are alio 
many of our fpiritual Ideas ; fuch as Thought , 
Will, Wifh, Knowledge, &c. 

A complex Idea is made by joining two or more 
fimple Ideas together ; as a Square, a Triangle, a 
Cube, a Pen, a Table, Reading, Writing, Truth, 
Fal/hood, a Body, a Man, a Horfe, an Angel, a heavy 
Body, afwift Horfe, &c. Every Thing that can 
be divided by the Miqd into two or more Ideas is 
called complex. 

Complex Ideas are often conlidered as Jingle and 
dijlincl Beings, though they may be made up of 
feveral fimple Ideas ; (b a Body, a Spirit, a Houfe 9 
a Tree, a Flower. But when feveral of thefe Ideas 
of a different Kind are joined together, which are 
wont to be confidered as diftinet fingle Beings, 
this is called a compound Idea, whether thefe united 
Ideas be fimple or complex. So a Man is com- 
pounded of Body and Spirit, fo Milhridate is a 
compound Medicine, becaufe it is made of many 
different Ingredients : This I have fhewn under 
the Doclrine of Subftances. And Modes alfo may 
be compounded ; Harmony is a compound Idea 
made up of different Sounds united : So feveral dif- 
ferent Virtues mud be united to make up the com- 
pounded 



34 LOGICK : OK, THE [PAKT I. 

pounded Idea or Character, either of a Hero, or a 
Saint. 

But when many Ideas of the fame Kind are 
joined together and united in one Name, or under 
.one View, it is called a colleclive Idea ; fo an Army 
or a Parliament, is a Collection of Men ; a D/V- 
tionary or Nomenclature, is a Collection of Words, 
a -F/tf£/£ is a Collection of Sheep ; a jPbr^ or Grove, 
2. Collection of Trees ; an Heap, is a Collection of 
Sand, or Corn, or Duft, &c. a. City, is a Colleclion 
of Houfes ; a Nofegoy, is a Collection of Flowers ; 
a Month, or a IW, is a Collection of Days ; and a 
Thoufand, is a Colleclion of Units. 

The precife Difference between a compound and 
collective Idea is this, that a compound Idea unites 
Things of a different Kind, but a colleclive Idea 
Things of the fame Kind : Though this Difti tac- 
tion in fome Cafes is not accurately obfervcd, and 
Cuftom . oftentimes ufes the Word compound for 
colleclive. 

SECT. III. 

Of univerfal and particular Ideas, real and ima- 
ginary. 

IDEAS, according to their Objecls, may firfl bo 
divided into particular or univerfal. 
A particular Idea is that which reprefents one 
Thing only. 

Sometimes the one Thing is reprefented in a 

loofe and indeterminate Manner, as when we fay, 

fome Man, any Man, one Man, another Man ; fome 

Horfe, any Horfe ; one City, or another ; which is 

called by the Schools Individuum Fagum. 

Sometimes the particular Idea reprefents one 
Thing in a determinate Manner, and then it is 

called 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 35 

called 'ajinguhr Idea ; fuch is Bucephalus, or Alex- 
ander $ Horfe, Cicero the Orator, Peter the Apoftle, 
the Palace of Verf allies, this Book, that River, the 
New Fur eft, or the City of London: That Idea 
which reprefents one particular determinate Thing 
to me, is called a fngidar Idea, whether it be 
fimple, or complex, or compound. 

The Objecl of any particular Idea, as well as 
the Idea itfelf, is fometimes called an Individual: 
So Peter is an individual Man, London is an indi- 
vidual City. So this Book, one Horfe, another Horfe 'j 
are all Individuals ; though the Word Individual i3 
more ufually limited to one fingular^ certain, and 
determined Objecl. 

An univ erf al Idea, is that which reprefents a com- 
mon Nature agreeing to feveral particular Things ; 
lb a Horfe, a Man, or a Book, are called univ erf al 
Ideas, becaufe they agree to 'dWHorfes, Men, or Books. 

And I think it not amifs to intimate in this 
Place, that thefe Univ erf al Ideas are foraned by that 
Acl of the Mind which is called Abftraclion, that 
is, a withdrawing fome Part of an Idea from other 
Parts of it : For when fmgular Ideas are firlt let 
into the Mind by Senfation or Reflection, then, 
in order to make them univerfal, we leave out, or 
drop all thofe peculiar and determinate Characters, 
Qualities, Modes, or Circumftances, which belong 
merely to any particular individual Being, and by 
which it differs from other Beings ; and we only 
contemplate thofe Properties of it, wherein it agrees 
with other Beings. 

Though it inuft be confeffed, that the Name of 
abftracled Ideas is fometimes attributed to univer- 
fal Ideas, both fenftble or fpiritual, yet this Ab- 
ftraclion is not ib great, as when we drop out of 
£>ur Idea every fenftble or fpiritual Reprefentation, 
and retain nothing but the moft general and abfolute 

Conceptions 



36 logics: or, Titfc [parti. 

Conceptions of Thing??, or their mere Relations to 
one another, without any Regard to their particu- 
lar Natures, whether they be fenfible or fpirituah 
And it is to this Kind of Conceptions we more 
properly give the Name of abftracled Ideas, as in 
the firft Section of this Chapter. 

An univerfal Idea is either general or fpirituah 

A general Idea is called by the Schools a Genus ; 
and it is one common Nature agreeing to feveral 
other common Natures. So Animal is a Genus, 
becaufe it agrees to Horfe, Lion, Whale, Butterfly, 
which are alfo common Ideas ; fo Fijh is a Genus, 
becaufe it agrees to Trout, Herring, Crab, which 
are common Natures alfo. 

Afpecial Idea is called by the Schools a Species ; 
it is one common Nature that agrees to feveral 
fingular individual Beings ; fo Horfe is a fpecial 
Idea, or a Species, becaufe it agrees to Bucephalus, 
Trott and Snowball. City is a fpecial Idea, for it 
agrees to London, Paris, Briftol. 

Note, Ift. Some of thefe Univerfals are Genufes, 
if compared with lefs common Natures ; and they 
are Species, if compared with Natures more com- 
mon. So Bird is a Genus, if compared with Eagle, 
Sparrozv, Raven, which are alfo common Natures : 
But it is a Species, if compared with the more ge- 
neral Nature, Animal. The fame may be faid of 
Fifh, Beafl, &c. 

This Sort of univerfal Ideas, which may either 
be confidered as a Genus, or a Species, is called 
Subaltern ; But the higheft Genus, which is never 
a Species, is called the mqfi general-, and the loweft 
Species, which is never a Genus, is called the mofi 
fpeciaL 

It may be obferved here alfo, that that general 
Nature or Property wherein one Thing agrees with 
inoft other Things, is called its more remote Genus : 

So 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 3? 

So Subftance is the remote Genus of Bird, Or Beaft, 
becaufe it agrees not only to all Kinds of Animals, 
but alfo to Things inanimate, as Sun, Stars, 
Clouds, Metals, Stones, Air, Water, &c. But 
Animal is the 'proximate or neareji Genus of Bird, 
becaufe it agrees to fewer other Things. Thofe 
general Natures which itand between the neareft 
and moft remote, are called intermediate. 

Note II. In univerfal Ideas it is proper to con- 
fider their Comprehenfion and their Extenfion *. 

The Comprehenfion of an Idea regards all the ef- 
lential Modes and Properties of it : So Body in its 
Comprehenfion takes in Solidity, Figure, Quantity, 
Mobility, &c. So a Bozvl in its Comprehenfion in- 
cludes Roundnefs, Volubility, &c. 

The Extenfion of an univerfal Idea regards all 
the particular Kinds and iingle Beings that are 
contained under it. So a Body in its Extenfion £a- 
cludes Sun, Moon, Star, Wood, Iron, Plant, Animal, 
&c. which are feveral Species, or Individuals, under 
the general Name of Body. So a Bowl, in its Ex- 
tenfion, includes a wooden Bowl, a Brafs Bowl, a 
white and black Bowl, a heavy Bowl, £sfc. and all 
Kinds of Bowls, together with all the particular 
individual Bowls in the World. 

Note, The Comprehenfion of an Idea is fometimes 
taken in fo large a Senfe, as not only to include 
the eflential Attributes, but all the Properties, 
Modes and Relations whatfoever, that belong to 
any Being, as will appear, Chap. VI. 

This Account of Genus and Species is Part of 
that famous Doclrine of Univerfals, which is taught 
in the Schools, with* divers other Formalities be- 
longing to it ; for it is in this Place that they in- 
troduce Difference, which is the primary eflential 

Mode, 

* Note, The Word Extenfion here Is taken in a mere logical 
Senfe, and not in zphyfical and mathematical Senfe. 



38 LOGTCK. : OR, THE [pAK* V 

Mode, and Property, or the fecondary cfTentia! 
Mode, and Accident,, or the accidental Mode ; and 
ihefe they call the five Predicables, beeaufe every 
Thing that is affirmed concerning any Being muffi 
be either the Genus, the Species, the Difference, 
ibme Property, fome Accident : But what farther is 
neceflary to be faid concerning thefe Things will 
be mentioned when we treat of Definition. 

Having finifhed the Doctrine of univerfal and 
particular Ideas, I fhould take Notice of another 
Divifion of them, which alfo hath Refpeet to their 
Objecls 5 and that is, they are either real or ima- 
ginary. 

Real Ideas are fuch as have a juft Foundation irt 
Nature, and have real Objecls, or Exemplars* 
which did, or do, or may actually exift, according 
to the prefent State and Nature of Things ; fuch 
are all our Ideas of Long, Broad, Swift, Slow, 
Wood, Iron, Men, Horfes, Thoughts, Spirits, a cruel 
Mafier, a proud Beggar, a Man feven Feet hrgh. 

Imaginary Ideas, which are alfo called fantafii- 
cal, or chimerical, are fuch as are made by enlarg- 
ing, diminifhing, uniting, dividing real Ideas in 
the Mind, in fuch a manner, as no Objecls, or 
Exemplars, did or ever will exift, according to 
the prefent Courfe of Nature, though the feveral 
Farts of thefe Ideas are borrowed from real Ob- 
jects ; fuch are the Conceptions we have of a Cen- 
taur, a Satyr, a golden Mountain, a fiying Horfe^ 
a Dog without a Head, a Bull lefs than a Moufe, or 
a Moufe as big as a Bull, and a Man twenty Feet 
high. 

Some of thefe fantafiic Ideas are poffible, that 
is, they are not utterly inconfiftent in the Nature 
of Things; and therefore it is within the Reach 
of Divine Power to make fuch Objects; fuch are 
inoft of the Inftances already given ; But Impoffi- 

bles 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 3Q 

hies to carry an utter Inconfiftence in the Ideas 
which are joined; fuch aw f elf -aclive Matter, and 
infinite or eternal Men, a pious Man without Honefiy^ 
or Heaven without Holinefs. 



SECT. IV. 

The Divifion of Ideas, with Regard to their Qualities. 

IDEAS, with Regard to their Qualities, afford 
us thefe feveral Divifions .of them. 1. They 
are either clear and difiincl, or ohfcure and confuted. 
2. They are vidgar or learned. 3. They are jvr- 
fecl or imperfecl. 4. They are true ovfalfe. 

I. Our Ideas are either clear and difiincl, or oh- 
fcure and confufed. 

Several Writers have diftinguifhed the clear 
Ideas from thofe that are difiincl ; and the confufed, 
Ideas from thofe that are ohfcure ; and it muft be 
acknowledged, there may be fome Difference be- 
tween them ; for it is the Clearnefs of Ideas for 
the moft part makes them difiincl ; and the Oh- 
JcurityofldeQs is one Thing that will always bring 
a fort of Confufioyi into them. Yet when thefe 
Writers come to talk largely upon this Subject, 
and to explain and adjuft their Meaning with great 
Nicety, I have generally found that they did not 
keep up the Diftinclion they iirfl deligned, but 
they confound the one with the other. I (hall 
therefore treat of clear ox difiincl Ideas, as one and 
the fame Sort, and ohfcure or confufed Ideas, as 
another. 

A clear and difiincl Idea, is that, which reprefents 
the Objccl of the Mind with full Evidence and 
Strength, and plainly diftinguifhes it from alLother 
Object s w hat foevcr. 

D An 



40 LOGICK : OR, THE [>ART I. 

An oh/cure and confufed Idea reprefents the Ob- 
ject either fo faintly, fo imperfe6tly, or fo mingled 
with other Ideas, that the Obje6t of it doth not 
appear plain to the Mind, nor purely in its own 
Nature, nor fufficiently diflinguifhed from other 
Things. 

When we fee the Sea and Sky nearer at Hand, 
Ave have a clear and diftincl Idea of each ; but 
when we look far toward the Horizon, efpccially 
in a mifty Day, our Ideas of both are but obfcure 
and confufed \ for we know not which is Sea and 
which is Sky. So when we look at the Colours of 
the Rainbow, we have a clear Idea of the red, the 
Hue, the green in the Middle of their feveral Arches, 
and a diftincl Idea too, while the Eye fixes there ; 
but when we confider the Border of thofe Colours, 
they fo run into one another, that it renders their 
Ideas confufed and obfcure. So the Idea which we 
have of our Brother, or our Friend, whom we fee 
daily, is clear and diftincl ; but when the Abfence 
of many Years lias injured the Idea, it becomes 
obfcure and confufed. 

Note here. That fome of our Ideas may be vtry 
clear and diftincl in one Refpeet, and very obfcure 
and confufed in another. So when we fpeak of a 
Chiliagonum, or a Figure of a thoufand Angels, we 
in ay have a clear and diftincl rational Idea of the 
Number o?ie thoufand Angels ; for we can demon- 
it rate various Properties concerning it by Reafon : 
But the Image, or fenftble Idea, which we have of 
the Figure, is but confufed and obfcure ; for wc 
cannot precifely diftinguifh it by Fancy from the 
Image of a Figure thai has nine hundred Angels, or 
nine hundred and ?iinety. So when we fpeak of the 
infinite Divifibiliiy of Matter, we always keep in 
our Minds a very clear and difiincl Idea of Divi- 
ft on and Diviftbdity ; but after we have made a 
little Progreis in dividing, and come to Parts 

that 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON - . 41 

that are far too fmall for the Rea'bh of otir Senfes, 
then our Ideas, or fenfible Images of thefe little 
Bodies, become obfcure and indifilncl, and the Idea 
of Infinite is very obfcure, hnperfecl, and confufed. 

II. Ideas are either vulgar or learned. A vulgar 
Idea reprefents to us the moil obvious and fenfible 
Appearances that are contained in the Object of 
them : But a learned idea penetrates farther into 
the Nature, Properties, Reafons, Caufes, and Ef- 
fects of Things. This is bed illufirated by fome 
Examples* 

It is a vulgar Idea that we have of a Rainbow ^ 
when we conceive a large Arch in the Clouds, 
made up of various Colours parallel to each other; 
But it is a learned Idea which a Philofopher has* 
when he confiders it as the various Reflections and 
Refra6tions of Sun-beams, in Drops of falling 
Rain. So it is a vulgar Idea which we have of 
the Colours offolid Bodies, when we perceive them 
to be, as it were, a red, or blue., or green Tinc- 
ture of the Surface of thofe Bodies : But it is a phi- 
lofoph'ical Idea when we con fid er the various Colours 
to be nothing elfe but different Senfations excited 
in us by the varioufly refracted Rays of Light, 
reflected on our Eyes in a different Manner, ac- 
cording to the different Size, or Shape, or Situa* 
tion of the Particles of which the Surfaces of thofe 
Bodies are comoofed. It is a vulvar Idea which 
we have of a Watch or Clock, when we conceive 
of it as a pretty Inftrument, made to (hew us the 
Hour of the Day : But it is a learned Idea which 
the Watchmaker has of it, who knows all the feve- 
ral Parts of it, the Spring, the Balance, the Chain, 
the Wheels, their Axles, tsc. together with the 
various Connections and Adjustments of each Part, 
whence the exact and uniform Motion of the In- 
dex is derived, which points to the Minute or the 

D 2 Hour. 



42 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART I. 

Hour. So when a common Underftanding reads 
VirgiVs iMneid, he has but a vulgar Idea of that 
Poem, yet his Mind is naturally entertained with 
the Story, and his Ears with the Verfe : But when 
a Critick, or a Man who has Skill in Poefy, reads 
it, he has a learned Idea of its peculiar Beauties, 
he taftes and relifhes a fuperior Pleafure ; he ad- 
mires the Roman Poet, and willies he had known 
the Chriflian Theology, which would have furnifhed 
him with nobler Materials and Machines than all 
the Heathen Idols. 

It is with a vulgar Idea that the World beholds 
the Cai'toons of Raphael at Hampton-Court ; and 
every one feels his Share of Pleafure and Entertain- 
ment : But a Painter contemplates the Wonders 
of that Italian Pencil, and fees a thoufand Beau- 
ties in them which the vulgar Eye neglected : His 
learned Ideas give him a tranfcendent Delight, and 
yet, at the fame Time, difcover the Blemifhes 
which the common Gazer never obferved. 

III. Ideas are either perfe3 or imperfett, which 
are otherwife called adequate or inadequate, 

Thofe are adequate Ideas which perfectly repre- 
fent their Archetypes or Objects. Inadequate Ideas 
are but a partial, or incomplete Reprefentation of 
thofe Archetypes to which they are referred. 

All our fimple Ideas are in fome Senfe adequate 
or perfect, becaufe^///>/^ Ideas, considered merely 
as our fir ft Perceptions, have no Parts in them : So 
we may be faid to have a perfect idea of White, 
Blacky Sweet, Sour, Length, Light, Motion, Reft, 
&c\ We have alio a. perfect Idea of- various Fi- 
gures, as a Triangle, a Square, a Cylinder, a Cube, 
a Sphere, which are complex Ideas : But our Idea 
or Image of a Figure of a thoujand Sides, our Idea 
of the City of London, or the Powers of a Load- 
Jlone, are very •imperfect, as well as all our Ideas 

of 






CH. Ill/] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 43 

of infinite Length or Breadth, infinite Power, Wif- 
dom, or Duration ; for the Idea of infinite is endleis 
and evergrowing, and can never be completed. 

Note, i . When we have a perfect Idea of any 
Thing in all its Parts, it is called a complete laea ; 
when in all its Properties, it is called comprehenjjve. 
Bat when we have bat an inadequate and imperfeS 
Idea, we are only faid to apprehend it ; therefore 
we ufe the Term Apprehenfion when we fpeak of 
our Knowledge of God, who can never be compre~ 
hended by his Creatures. 

Note 2. Though there are a Multitude of Ideas 
which may be called perfeel, or adequate in a vul- 
gar Senfe, yet there are fcarce any Ideas which are 
adequate, comprehenfive, and complete in a philofo- 
phical Senfe ; for there is fcarce any Thing in the 
World that we know, as to all the Parts and 
Powers and Properties of it, in Perfection. Even 
fo plain an Idea as that of a Triangle has, perhaps, 
infinite Properties belonging to it, of which we 
know but a ihw. Who can tell what are the 
Shapes and Pofitions of thofe Particles, which 
caufe all the Variety of Colours that appear on the 
Surface of Things ? Who knows what are the 
Figures of the little Corpufcles that compofe and 
diftinguifh different Bodies ? The Ideas of Brafs, 
Iron, Gold, Wood, Stone, Hyjop, and Rojemary, have 
an infinite Variety of hidden Myfteries contained 
in the Shape, Size, Motion, and Poiition of the 
little Particles of which they are compofed ; and, 
perhaps, alfo infinite unknown Properties and 
Powers, that may be derived from them. And if 
we arife to the Animal World, or the World of 
Spirits, our Knowledge of them mud be amazingly 
im perfect, when there is not the lead Grain of 
Sand, or empty Space, but has too many Queftions 
and Difficulties belonging to it for the wifeft Phi- 
lofopher upon Earth to anfwer and refolve. 

D 3 IV. Our 



44 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

IV. Our Ideas are either true or falfe ; for an 
Idea being the Reprefentation of a Thing in the 
Mind, it muft be either a true or a falfe Reprefen- 
tation of it. If the Idea be conformable to the 
Object or Archetype of it, it is a true Idea ; if 
not, it is a falfe one. Sometimes our Ideas are 
referred to Things really exiting without us, as 
their Archetypes. If I fee Bodies in their proper 
Colours, I have a true Idea : But when a Man 
under the Jaundice fees all Bodies Yellow, he has 
a falfe Idea of them. So if we fee the Sun or Moon 
rlfing or fitting, our Idea reprefents them bigger 
than when they are on the Meridian : And in this 
Senfe it is a falfe Idea, becaufe thofe heavenly 
Bodies are all Day and all Night of the fame Big- 
nefs. Or when I fee ajlraight Staff appear crook* 
ed while it is half under the Water, I fay, the 
Water gives me a falfe Idea of it. Sometimes our 
Ideas refer to the Ideas of other Men, denoted 
by fuch a particular Word, as their Archetypes : 
So when I hear a P rot eft ant ufe the Words Church 
and Sacraments, if I underftand by thefe Words a 
Congregation of Faithful Men who profefs Chrijlia- 
nity, and the two Ordinances, Baptilrn and the 
Lord's Supper, I have a true Idea of thofe Words 
in the common Senfe of Proteflants : But if the 
Man who fpeaks of them be a Papifl, he means 
the Church of Rome and the feven Sacraments, and 
then I have a m'iftaken Idea of thofe Words, as 
fpoken by him, for he has a different Senfe and 
Meaning : And in general whenfoever I miflake 
the Senfe of any Speaker or Writer, I may be faid 
to have a falfe Idea of it. 

Some think that Truth or Falfliood properly be- 
longs only to Proportions, which (hall be the Sub- 
ject of Difcourfe in the fecond Part of Logick ; for 
if we confider Ideas as mere Impreffions upon the 
Mind, made by outward Objects, thofe Impref- 
fions 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 45 

lions will ever be conformable to the Laws of Na- 
ture in fuch a Cafe : The Water will make a Stick 
appear crooked, and the horizontal Air will make 
the Sun and Moon appear bigger. And generally 
where there is Falfhood in Ideas, there- feems to be 
{oinefecret or latent Proportions ; whereby we judge 
falfely of Things. This is more obvious where we 
take up the Words of a Writer or Speaker in a 
miftaken Senfe, for we join his Words to our own 
Ideas, which are different from his. But after all, 
lince Ideas are Pictures of Things, it can never be 
very improper to pronounce them to be true or 
falfe, according to their Conformity, or Nonconfor- 
mity to their Exemplars. 



CHAP. IV. 

Of Words and their feveral Dlvifions, together 
with the Advantage and Danger of them. 



SECT. I. 

Of Words in general, and their Ufe. 

THOUGH our Ideas are flrft acquired by the 
Perception of Objecls, or by various Senfa- 
tions and Reflections,- yet we convey them to each 
other by the means of certain Sounds, or written 
Marks, which we call Words ; and a great Part of 
our Knowledge is both obtained and communi- 
cated by thefe Means, which are called Speech or 



Language. 



D 4 But 



46 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

But as we are led into the Knowledge of Things 
by Words, fo we are oftentimes led into Error or 
Miitake by {he Ufe or Abufe of Words alfo. And 
in order to guard again ft fuch Miftakes, as well 
as to promote our Improvement in Knowledge, it 
is neceflary to acquaint ourfelves a little with 
Words and Terms. We fhall begin with thefe 
Obfervations. 

Obfervation 1. Words (whether they are fpoken 
or written) have no natural Connection with the 
Ideas they, are deiigned to iignify, nor with the 
Things which are reprefcnted in thofe Ideas. There 
is no manner of Affinity between the Sounds white 
in EngliJJi, or blanc in French, and that Colour 
which we call by that Name ; nor have the Letters, 
pf which thefe Words are compofed, any natural 
Aptnefs to fignify that Colour rather than red or 
green. Words and Names therefore are mere arbi- 
trary Signs invented by Men to communicate their 
Thoughts or Ideas to one another. 

Obferv. 2. If one fingle Word were appointed 
to exprefs but one iimple Idea, and nothing elfe, 
as White, Black, Sweet, Sour, Sharp, Bitter, Ex- 
ten/ion, Duration, there would be fcarce any Mif- 
take about them. 

But alas ! It is a common Unhappinefs in Lan- 
guage, that different fimple Ideas are fometimes 
exprcfled by the fame Word , fo the Words fweet 
and Jharp are applied both to the Objecls of hear- 
ing and tailing, as we fhall fee hereafter ; and this, 
perhaps, may be one Caufe or Foundation of Gb- 
Jcurity and Error arifing from Words. 

Objerv. 3. In communicating our complex Ideas 
to one another, if we could join as many pe- 
culiar and appropriated Words together in one 
Sound, as we join fimple Ideas to make one com- 
plex one^ we fhould feldom be in danger of mis- 
taking ; 



CH. IV.} RIGHT USE OF REAS'ON. 4? 

taking : When I exprefs the tafte of an Apple, 
which we call the Bitter-Sw^et, none can miltake 
what I mean. 

Yet this Sort of Compojition would make all Lan- 
guage a molt tedious and unweildy Thing, fince 
moil of our Ideas are complex, and many of them 
have eight or ten limple Ideas in them ; fo that the 
Remedy would be worie than the Difeafe ; for what 
is now expreffed in one fhort Word, as Month, or 
Year, would require two Lines to exprefs it. It is 
necefTary, therefore, thvxjl-ngle- Words be invented 
to exprefs complex Ideas, in order to make Lan- 
guage fbort and ufeful. 

But here is our great Infelicity, that when Jingle 
Words fignify complex Ideas, one Word can never 
diliinclly manifeft all the Parts of a complex Idea ; 
and thereby it will often happen, that one Man 
includes more or UJs in his Idea, than another does, 
while he affixes the fame Word to it. In this Cafe 
there will be Danger of Miflake between them, for 
they do not mean \hefa?ne Objecl, though they ufe 
Xhejame Name. So if one Perfon or Nation, by 
the Word Year, mean twelve Months of thirty 
Days each, that is, three hundred and fixty Days, 
another intend a Solar Year of three hundred iixty 
five Days, and a third mean a Lunar Year, or 
twelve Lunar Months, that is three hundred fifty 
four Days, there will be a great Variation and Er- 
ror in their Account of Things, unlefs they are 
well apprized of each other's Meaning beforehand. 
This is iuppoled to be the Reafon,^ why ibme an- 
cient Hijlories, and Prophecies, and Accounts of 
Chronology, are fo hard to be ad juried. And this 
is the true Reai'on of fo furious and endlefs De- 
bates on many Points in Divinity; the Words 
Church, JVorJhip, Idolatry, Repentance, Faith, 
Ehclion, Merit, Grace, and many others which 
fignify very complex Ideas, are not applied to in- 
clude 



48 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

elude juit the fame fimple Ideas, and the fame 
Number of them, by the various contending Par- 
ties; thence arife Confu (ion and Conteft. 

Obferv.- 4. Though a fingh Name does not cer- 
tainly manifefl to us all the Parts of a complex Idea, 
yet it mufl be acknowledged, that in many of our 
complex Ideas the fingle Name may point out to 
us fome chief Property which belongs to the Thing 
that the Word fignifies ; efpecially when the Word 
or Name is traced up to the Original, through fe- 
veral Languages from whence it is borrowed. So 
an Apoflle fignifies one who is fent forth. 

But this tracing of a Word to its Original, 
(which is called Etymology) is fometimes a very 
precarious and uncertain Thing : And after all, 
we have made but little Progrefs towards the At- 
tainment of' the full Meaning of a complex Idea, by- 
knowing fome one chief Property of it. We know 
but a fmall Part of the Notion of an Apoflle, by 
knowing barely that he \*> fent forth. 

Obferv. 5. Many (if not mofr) of our Words 
which are applied to moral and intellectual Ideas, 
when traced up to their Original in the learned 
Languages, will be found to fignify fenfibh and 
corporeal Things. Thus the Words Apprehenfion, 
Under ft anding^ Abftracl-wn, Invention, Idea, Infe- 
rence, Prudence, Religion, Church, Adoration, &c. 
have all a corporeal Signification in their Original. 
The Name Spirit itfelf figq|fies Breath or Air, in 
Latin, Greek, and Hebrew : Such is the Poverty of 
all Languages, they are forced to ufe thefe Names 
for incorporeal Ideas, which Thing has a Tendency 
to Error and Confnfion. 

Obferv. (3. The lad thing I fhall mention that 
leads us into many a Miftake is, the Multitude of 
( ;!)jcdts that one Name fometimes fignifies : There 
is almoft an infinite Variety of Things and Ideas 

both 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. £§ 

both fimple and complex, beyond all the Words 
that are invented in any Language ; thence it be- 
comes almoft necefiary that one Name fhould fig- 
nify feveral Things. Let us but confider the two 
Colours of Yellow and Blue, if they are mingled 
together in any considerable Proportion they make 
a Green : Now there may be infinite Differences of 
the Proportions in the Mixture of Yellow and Blue ; 
and yet we have only thefe three Words, Yellow, 
Blue, and Green, to fignify all of them, at leaft by 
one fingleTerm. 

When I ufe the Word Shore, I may intend there- 
by a Coajl of Land near the Sea, or a Drain to carry 
vff. Water, or a Prop to fupport a Building ; and 
by the Sound of the Word Porter, who can tell 
whether I mean a Man who bears Burdens, or a 
Servant who wails at a Nobleman s Gate? The 
World is fruitful in the Invention of UtenfJs of 
Life, and new Characters and Offices of Men, yet 
Names intirely new arefeldom invented ; therefore 
old Names are almofi: necelfarily ufed to fignify 
new Things, which may occafion much Confufion 
and Error in the receiving and communicating of 
Knowledge. 

Give me leave to propofe one fingle In fiance, 
wherein all thefe Notes fhall be remarkably exem- 
plified. It is the Word Bifliop, which in French 
is called Evique ; upon which I would make thefe 
feveral Obfervations. 1. That there is no natural 
Connection between the (acred Office hereby Signi- 
fied, and the Letters or Sound which fignify this 
Office ; for both thefe Words, Evique or BiJIiop, 
fignify the fame Office, though there is not one 
Letter alike in them ; nor have the Letters which 
compofe the Enghjh or the French Word any Thing 
facred belonging to them, more than the Letters 
that compofe the Words King or Soldier, 2. It 

the 



50 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

the Meaning of the Word could be learned by its 
Derivation or Etymology, yet the original Deri- 
vation of Words is oftentimes very dark and un- 
fearchable ; for wbo would imagine that each of 
tbefe Words are derived from the Latin Epifcopus, 
or the Greek Ema-no'n-og ? Yet in this Inftance we 
happen to know certainly the true Derivation ; 
the French being antiently writ Evefque, is bor- 
rowed from the firft Part of the Latin Word ; and 
the old Englifh Bifcop from the Middle of it. 
3. The original Greek Word fignifies an Over- 
looker, or one who Hands higher than his Fellows, 
and overlooks them : It is a compound Word, 
that primarily fignifies fenfible Ideas, tranflated to 
fignify or include fcveral moral ox intelleclual Ideas ; 
therefore all will grant that the Nature of the 
Office can never be known by the mere Sound or 
Senfe of the Word Overlooker. 4. I add farther, 
the Word Biflwp or Epifcopus, even when it is thus 
tranflated from a fenfible Idea, to include feve- 
ral intelleclual Ideas, may yet equally fignify an 
Overfeer of the Poor, an Infpeclor of the Cuftoms ; 
a Surveyor of the Highways ; a Supervijor of the 
Excife, &cl But by the Confcnt of Men, and the 
Language of Scripture, it is appropriated to fig- 
nify a f acred Office of the Church. 5. This very 
Idea and Name, thus tranflated from Things fen- 
fible, to fignify a fpiritual and facred Thing, con- 
tains but one Property of it, namely, one that has 
the Oversight, or Care over others : But docs not 
tell us whether it includes a Care over one Church 
or many ; over the Laity, or the Clergy. 8. 
Thence it follows, that thofe who in the complex 
Idea of the Word Bijfop include an Overfightover 
the Clergy, or over a whole Diocefe of People, a 
Superiority to Prcfbyters, a diflinct Power of Or- 
dination, &c, EKMiS neeetiarily difagrec with thofe 

who 



CH. IV.] , RIGHT USE OF REASON. 5! 

who include in it only the Care of a (ingle Congre- 
gation. Thus according to the various Opinions 
of Men, this Word fignifies a Pope, a Galilean 
BiJJiop, a Lutheran Superintendent, an Engl/Jh Pre- 
late, a Paftor of a Jingle AJfembly, or a Prefiyter 
or Elder, Thus they quarrel with each other per- 
petually ; and it is well if any of them all have 
hit precifely the Senfe of the facred Writers, , and 
included juft the fame Ideas in it, and no others. 

I might make all the fame Remarks on the 
Word Church or Kirk, which is derived from 
Kv£i8 otxog, or the Houfe of the Lord, contracted in- 
to Kyrioick, which fome fuppofe to iignify an Af~ 
Jembly vf Chrijlians, fome take it for all the World 
that profejfes Chrijiianity, and fome make it to 
mean only the Clergy ; and on thefe Accounts it 
has been the occafion of as many and as furious 
Controverfies as the Word Bijhop which was men- 
tioned before. 



SECT. II. 
Of negative and pojitive Terms*. 

FROM thefe and other Confiderations it will 
follow, that if we could avoid Error in out 8 
Purfuit of Knowledge, we muft take good Heed to 
the Ufe of Words and Terms, and be acquainted 
with the various Kinds of them. 

•1. Terms are either pojitive or negative. 

Negative Terms are fuch as have a little Word 
or Syllable of denying joined to them, according 
to the various Idioms of every < Language ; as 
Unpleafant, Imprudent, Immortal, Irregular, Ignorant, 

Infinite it 



52 lOGICK J OR, THE [PART I. 

Infinite, Endlefs, Lifelefs, Deathlefs, Nonfenfe, Abyfs, 
Anonymous, where the Prepofitions Urn, Im, In i 
Non, A, An, and the Termination lefs, fignify a Ne- 
gation, either in Englifh, Latin, or Greek. 

Pofitive Terms are thofe which have no fiich 
negative Appendices belonging to them, as Life, 
Death, End, Senfe, Mortal. 

But fo unhappily are our Words and Ideas link- 
ed together, that we can never know which are 
pofitive Ideas, and which are negative, by the 
Word that is ufed to exprefs them, and that for 
thefe Reafons. 

\Ji, There are fome pofitive Terms which are 
made to fignify a negative Idea ; as Dead is pro- 
perly a Thing that is deprived of Life; Blind im- 
plies a Negation or Privation of Sight ; Deaf a 
Want of Hearing ; Dumb a Denial of Speech. 

idly, There are alfo fome negative Terms which 
imply pofitive Ideas, fuch as Immortal and Death- 
lefs, which fignify ever-living, or a Continuance in 
Life : Infolent, fignifies rude and haughty ; Indem- 
nify, to keep fafe ; and Infinite, perhaps, has a po- 
fitive Idea too, for it is an Idea ever-growing ; and 
when it is applied to God, it Signifies his complete 
Perfection. 

odly, There are both pofitive and negative Terms, 
invented to fignify the fame, inftcad of contrary 
Ideas ; as Unhappy and Miferable, Sin lefs and Holy, 
Pure and Undefiled, Impure and Filthy, Unkind and 
Cruel, Irreligious and Profane, Unforgiving and Re- 
vengeful, &c. and there is a great, deal of Beauty 
and Convenience derived to any Language from 
this Variety of Expreffion ; though fometimes it a 
little confounds our Conceptions of Being and Not- 
being, our pofitive and negative Ideas. 

4<hly, I may add alfo, that there are fome Words 
which are negative in their original Language, but 

feem 






CH. IV.] RIGHT USE GP REASON. 55 

feem pofitive to an EngUJhman, becaufe the Nega- 
tion is unknown ; an Abyfs, a Place without a Bot- 
tom ; Anodyne, an eafing Medicine ; Amnefiy, an 
Unremcmbrance or general Pardon; Anarchy , a 
State without Government ; Anonymous, that is, 
namelcfs ; Inept, that is, not fit ; Iniquity, that 
is, Unrighteoufnefs ; Infant, one that cannot fpeak, 
namely, a Child ; Injurious, not doing Juiiice or 
Right! 

The Way therefore to know whether any Idea 
be negative or not, is to confider whether it pri- 
marily imply the Ab fence of any pofitive Being or 
Mode of Being; if it doth, then it is a Negation, 
or negative Idea ; otherwife it is a pofitive one, 
whether the Word that cxpreifcs it be pofitive or 
negative. Yet after all, in many Cafes this is 
very hard to determine, as in Amnefiy, Infinite, 
Abyfs, which are originally relative Terms, but 
they fignify Pardon, &c. which feem to be pofi- 
tive. So Darknefs, Madnefs, Clown, are pofitive 
Terms, but they imply the Want of Light, the 
Want of Reafon, and the Want of Manners ; and 
perhaps thefe may be ranked among the negative 
Ideas. 

Here note, That in the Rnglifii Tongue two ne~ 
gative Terms are equal to one pofitive, and fignify 
the fame Thing, as not unhappy \ fignifies happy ; 
not immortal, fignifies mortal ; he is no imprudent 
Man, that is, he is a Man of Prudence : But the 
Senfe and Force of the Word in fuch a negative 
Way of Expreffion, feem to be a little dimkiiihedi 



sect: 



54 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

SECT. III. 

Of fimple and complex Terms. 

II. r | AERMS are divided in to firnple or complex. 
J^ A Jimple Term is one Word, a complex 
Term is when more Words are ufed to fignify one 
Thing. 

Some Terms are complex in Words, but not in 
Senfe, fuch is the fecond Emperor of Rome ; for it 
excites in our Mind only the Idea of one Man, 
namely, Augufius. 

Some Terms are complex in Senfe, but not in 
Words ; fo when I fay an Army, a Foreft, I mean 
a Multitude of Men or Trees f and almoft all our 
moral Ideas, as well as many of our natural ones, 
are expreffed in this Manner ; Religion, Piety, Loy- 
alty, Knavery, Theft, include a Variety of Ideas, 
in each Term. 

There are other Terms which are complex both 
in Words and Senfe ; fo when I fay a fierce Dog, 
or a pious Man, it excites an Idea, not only of thofe 
two Creatures, but of their peculiar Characters 
alfo. 

Among the Terms that are complex in Senfe but 
not in Words, we may reckon thofe iimple Terms 
which contain a primary and a fecondary Idea in 
them ; as when I hear my Neighbour fpeak that 
which is not true, and I fay to him, this is not 
true, or this is fa If; I only convey to him the 
naked Idea of his Error ; this is the primary Idea : 
But if I fay it is a Lie, the Word Lie carries alfo 
a fecondary Idea in it, for it implies both the Falf- 
hood of the Speech, and my Reproach and Cen- 
fure of the Speaker. On the other Hand, if I fay 
it is a Miflake, this carries alfo afecondary Idea with 

it; 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. S 5 

it ; for it not only refers to the Falfhood of his 
Speech, but includes my Tendernefs and Civility 
to him at the fame Time. Another Inftance may 
be this ; when I ufe the Word, Incefl, Adultery, 
and Murder, I convey to another not only the 
primary Idea of thofe Actions, but I include alfo 
the fecondary Idea of their Unlawfulnefs, and my 
Abhorrence of them. 

Note, \fl, Hence it comes to pafs, that among 
Words which fignify the fame principal Ideas, fome 
are clean and decent, others unclean ; fome chafe, 
others ohfcene ; fome are kind, others are affronting 
and reproachful, becaufe o£ the fecondary Idea which 
Cuftom has affixed to them. And it is the Part of 
a wife Man, when there is a NeceiTity of expreffirig 
any evil Aclions, to do it either by a Word that has 
a fecondary Idea of Kindnefs or Softnefs ; or a Word 
that carries with it an Idea of Rebuke and Severity, 
according as the Cafe requires : So when there is a 
Neceffity of expreffing Things unclean or ohfcene, a 
wife Man will do it in the moft decent Language, 
to excite as few uncleanly Ideas as poflible in the 
Minds of the Hearers. 

Note, 'idly, In Length of Time, and by the 
Power of Cuftom, Words fometimes change their 
primary Ideas, as fhall be declared, and fometimes 
they have changed their fecondary Ideas, though the 
primary Ideas may remain : So Words that were 
once chafte, by frequent Ufe grow ohfcene and un- 
cleanly ; and Words that were once honourable may, 
in the next Generation, grow mean and contemptible. 
So the Word Dame originally fignified a Miftrefs 
of a Family, who was a Lady, and it is ufed ftill 
in the Englifh Law to fignify a Lady ; but in com- 
mon Ufe nowadays it reprefents a Farmer s Wife, 
or a Mifrefs of a Family of the lower Rank in the 
Country. So thofe Words of Rabfliakeh, Ifa. xxxvi, 
12. in our Tranflation, (Eat their own Dung, &c.) 

E w 7 cre 



56 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

were doubtlefs decent and clean Language, when 
our Tranilators wrote them, above a hundred Years 
ago. The Word Eat has maintained its old fecon- 
dary Idea and inoffenfive Senfe, to this Day ; but 
the other Word in that Sentence has by Cuftom ac- 
quired a more uncleanly Idea, and fhould now ra- 
ther be changed into a more decent Term, and fo 
it fhould be read in publick, unlefs it fhould be 
thought more proper to omit the Sentence.* 

For this Reafon it is that the Jewifh Rabbins 
have fupplied other chaile Words in the Margin of 
the Hebrew Bible, where the Words of the Text, 
through Time and Cuftom, are degenerated, fo as 
to carry any bafe and unclean fecondary Idea in them ; 
and they read the Word which is in the Margin^ 
which they call Keri, and not that which was writ- 
ten in the Text, which they called Chetib, 



SECT. IV. 

Of Words common and proper, 

III. JJ/ORDS and Names are either common or 
proper. Common Names are fuch as ftand 
for univerfal Ideas, or a whole Rank of Beings, 
whether general or fpecial. Thefe are called Ap- 
pellatives - 9 fo Flflt, Bird, Man, City, River, are 
common Names; and fo are Trout, Eel, Lobfler, 
for they all agree to many Individuals, and fome of 
them to many Species : But Cicero, Virgil \ Bucepha- 
lus, London,' Rome, Mtna, the Thames, are proper 
Names, for each of them agrees only to one fmgh 
Being. 

* So in fome Places of the facred Hiftorians, where it is 
written. Every one that pijjdh againjl the Watt, we fhould read, 
fverj Male, 

Note 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 5/ 

Note here, firfi, That a^ro^rName may become 
in fome Senfe common, when it hath been given to 
ieveral Beings of the fame Kind ; fo - Ctefar, which. 
was the proper Name of the firfT Emperor, Julius, 
became alfo a common Name to all the following 
Emperors. And Tea, which was the proper Name 
of one fort of Indian Leaf, is now-adays, become 
a common Name for many Infufions of Herbs, or 
Plants, in Water; as Sage-Tea, Alehoof-Tea^ Limon- 
Tea, &c. So Peter, Thomas, John, William, may 
be reckoned common Names alfo, becaufe they 
are given to many Perfons, itnlefs they are deter- 
mined to fignify a fingle Perfon at any particular 
Time or Place. 

Note in the fecond Place, that a common Name 
may become proper by CufTom, or by the Time^ 
or Place, or Perfons that ufe it ; as in Great-Bri- 
tain, when we fay the King, we mean our prefent 
rightful Sovereign King George, who now reigns; 
when we fpeak of the Prince, we intend his Royal 
Highnefs George Prince of Wales : If we mention 
the City, when we are near London, we generally 
mean the City of London : when in a Country 
Town, we fay the Parjon, or the Efquire, all the 
Parifh knows who are the Angle Perfons intended 
by it; fo when we are fpeaking of the Hiftory of 
the New Teftament, and ufe the Words Peter, 
Paul, John, we mean thofe three Apoitles. 

Note, in the third Place, That any co?7imon~N&mQ 
whatfoever is made proper, by Terms of Particu- 
larity added to it, as the common Words Pope, 
King, Horfe, Garden, Book, Knife, &c. are deiigned 
to iignify a fingular Idea, w 7 hen we fay the prejhit 
Pope ; the King of Great Britain ; the Horfe that 
won the lajl Plate at Newmarket ; the Royal Garden 
at Kenfingion ; this Book, that Knife, &c. 



E 2 SECT, 



58 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I* 

SECT. V. 
Of concrete and abftracl Terms, 

IV. Jj^rORDS or Terms are divided into abflracl 

and concrete, 

Abftracl Terms fignify the Mode or Quality of a 
Being, without any Regard to the Subject, in which 
it is ; as Whitenefs, Roundnefs, Length, Breadth, 
Wifdom, Mortality, Life, Death, 

Concrete Terms, while they exprefs the Quality, 
do alfo either exprefs or imply, or refer to fome 
Subject to which it belongs ; as white, round, long, 
broad, wife, mortal, living, dead. But thefe are not 
always Noun Adjeclives in a grammatical Senfe, 
for a Fool, a Knave, a Philofopher, and many other 
Concretes, are Subjlantives, as well as Knavery, 
Folly, and Philofophy, which are the abflracl Terms 
that belong to them. 

SECT. VI. 

Of Univocal and Equivocal Words, 

V. JJ/ r ORDS and "Terms are either univocal or 

equivocal, Univocal Words are fuch as fig- 
nify but one Idea, or at leaft but one Sort of Thing ; 
equivocal Words are fuch as fignify two or more 
different Ideas, or different Sorts of Objecls. The 
Words Book, Bible, F'ifJi, Houfe, Elephant, may be 
called univocal Words ; for I know not that they 
fignify any Thing elfe but thofe Ideas to which 
they are generally affixed ; but Head is an equi- 
vocal Word, for it fignifies the Head of a Nail, or 

of 






CH. IV.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 5Q 

of a Pin, as well as of an Animal : Nail is an equi- 
vocal Word, it is ufed for the Nail of I he Hand, or 
Foot, or for an Iron Nail to fatten any Thing. 
Poft is equivocal, it is a Piece of Timber, or afwift 
Mejfenger. A Church is a religious Affembly, or the 
large fair Building where they meet; and fome- 
tiines the fame Word means a Synod of Bifhops, or 
of Prefbyters, and in fome Places it is the Pope and 
a general Council. 

Here let it be noted, that when two or more 
Words fignify the fame Thing, as Wave and Bil- 
low, Mead and Meadow, they are ufually cailed 
fynonymous Words : But it feems very ftrange, that 
Words, which are directly contrary to each other, 
fhould fometimes reprefent almoft the fame Ideas ; 
yet thus it is in fome few Inftances ; a valuable, or 
an invaluable Bleffing ; a fliameful, or a fnamelefs 
Villain ; a thick Skull, or a thin fiuWd Fellow, a 
mere Paper Skull; a Man of a large Confcience, 
little Confcience, or no Confcience ; a famous Rafcal, 
or an infamous one. So uncertain a Thing is hu- 
man Language, whofe Foundation and Support is 
Cuftom ! 

As Words fignifying the fame Thing are called 
fynonymous, fo equivocal Words, or thofe which 
iignify feveral Things, are called homonymous, or 
ambiguous ; and when Perfons ufe fuch ambiguous 
Words, with a Deiign to deceive, it is called Equi- 
vocation. 

Oxxx Jimple Ideas, and efpecially the fenfible Qua- 
lities, furnifh us with a great Variety of equivocal 
or ^ambiguous Words ; for thefe being the firft, and 
moft natural Ideas we have, we borrow foine of 
their Names, to Iignify many other Ideas, both 
fimple and edmplex. The Word Sweet exprefles 
the pleafant Perceptions of almoft every Sen fe ; 
Sugar is fweet, but it hath not the fame Sweetnefs 

E 3 as 



60 LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART I; 

as Miifick ; nor hath Muiick the Sweetnefs of a 
Rofe; and a fweet Profpecl differs from them all : 
Islor yet have any of thefe the fame Sweetnefs as 
Difcourfe, Counfel, or Meditation hath ; yet the 
Royal Pfalmift faith of a Man, We took fweet 
Counfel together ; and of God, My Meditation of 
him Jhall be fweet. Bitter is alfo fuch an equivocal 
Word ; there is bitter Wormwood ', there are bitter 
Words, there are bitter Enemies, and a bitter cold 
Morning. So there is a Sharpnefs in Vinegar, and 
there is a Sharpnefs in Pain, in Sorrow, and in 
Reproach ; there is a fharp Eye, a (harp Wit, and 
a fharp Sword : But there is not one of thofe {even 
Sharpneffes the fame as another of them, and a 
fharp Eaft Wind is different from them all. 

There are alfo Verbs or Words of Action, which 
are equivocal, as well as Nouns or Names. The 
Words to bear, to take, to come, to get, are fuffi- 
cient Inftances of it ; as when we fay, to bear a 
Burden, to bear Sorrow or Reproach, to bear a 
Name, to bear a Grudge, to bear Fruit, or to bear 
Children; the Word bear is u fed in very different 
Senfes : And fo is the Word get, when we fay, to 
get Money, to get in, to get off to get ready, to 
get a Stomach, and to get a Cold, Sec. 

There is alfo a great deal of Ambiguity in many 
of the Englidi Particles ; as, but, before, befide, with, 
without, that, then, there, for, forth, above, about, 
«kc. of which Grammars and Dictionaries will fuf- 
iicicntly inform us. 



SECT, 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 6l 

SECT. VII. 

Parlous Kinds of equivocal Words, 

IT would be endlefs to run through all the Va- 
rieties of Words and Terms, which have differ- 
ent Senfes applied to them ; I (hall only mention 
therefore a few of the mo(t remarkable and moil 
ufeful Diftinetions among them. 

ly?, The firft Divifion of equivocal Words lets 
us know that fome are equivocal only in their Sound 
or Pronunciation ; others are equivocal only in Wri- 
ting, and others, both in Writing and in Sound. 

Words equivocal in Sound only, are fuch as 
thefe ; the Rein of a Bridle, which hath the fame 
Sound with the Reign of a King, or a Shower of 
Rain ; but all three have different Letters, and 
diftmcl fpelling. So Might, or Strength, is equi- 
vocal in Sound, but differs in Writing from Mite, 
a little Animal, or a finall Piece of Money. And 
the Verb to write, has the fame Sound with Wright 
a Workman, Right or Equity, and Rite or Cere- 
mony ; but it is fpelled very differently in them all. 

Words equivocal in Writing only, are fuch as 
thefe ; to tear to pieces, has the fame Spelling with 
a Tear : To lead, or guide, has the fame Letters as 
Lead, the Metal : And a Bowl for Recreation, is 
written the fame Way as a Bowl for Drinking ; but 
the Pronunciation^for all thefe is different. 

But thofe Words which are moft commonly and 
juftly called equivocal, are fuch as are both writ- 
ten and pronounced the fame Way, and yet have 
different Senfes or Ideas belonging to them ; iiich 

E 4 are 



62 # LQGICK : OR, THE [p£KT. I. 

are all the InfTances which were given in the pre- 
ceding Section. 

Among the Words which are equivocal in Sound 
only, and not in Writing, there is a large Field for 
Peribns who delight in Jefts and Puns, in Riddles 
and Quibbles, to fport themfelves. This Sort of 
Words is alfo ufed by wanton Perfons to convey 
lewd Ideas, under the covert of Expreffions capable 
of a chafte Meaning, which are called double En- 
iendres ; or when Perfons fpeak Faljliood with a 
Defign to deceive, under the Covert of Truth, 
Though it muft be confeffed, that all Sorts of 
equivocal Words yield fufficient Matter for fuch 
Purpofes. 

There are many Cafes alfo, wherein an equivo- 
cal Word is ufed, for the fake of Decency, to cover 
afoul Idea : For the mod chafte and modevT, and 
well-bred Perfons, having fometimes a NecefHty 
to fpeak of the Things of Nature, convey their 
Ideas in the moft inoftenlive Language by this 
Means. And indeed, the mere Poverty of all 
Languages makes it necefiary to ufe equivocal 
Words upon many Occaflons, as the common Wri- 
tings of Men, and even the Holy Book of God 5 
fufriciently man i fed. 

idly, Equivocal Words are ufually diftinguifh- 
ed, according to their Original, into fuch, whole 
various Senfes arifc from mere Chance or Occident, 
and fuch as are made equivocal by Defign ; as the 
Word Bear fignifies &fhaggy Beajl, and it fignifies 
alfo to bear or carry a Burden ; this feems to be 
the mere 'Effect of Chance: But if I call my Dog 
Bear, becaufe he is fhaggy, or call one of the 
Northern Conftellations by that Name, from a 
fancied Situation of the Stars in the Shape of that 
Animal, then it is by Defign that the Word is 
made yet further equivocal, 

But 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 63 

But becaufe I think this common Account of 
the Spring or Origin of equivocal Words is too 
flight and imperfect, I (hall referve this Subject to 
be treated of by itfelr^ and proceed to the third 
Divifion. 

3dly, Ambiguous, or equivocal Words, are fuch 
as are fometimes taken in a large and general 
Senfe, and fometimes in a Senfe more firicl and li- 
mited, and have different Ideas affixed to them ac- 
cordingly. Religion, or Virtue, taken in a large , 
Senfe, includes both our Duty to God and our Neigh- 
bour ; but in a more ftricl, limited, and proper 
Senfe, Virtue fignifies our Duty tozvards Men, and 
Religion our Duty to God. Virtue may yet be taken 
in the ftricleft Senfe, and then it fignifies Power 
or Courage, which is the Senfe of it in fdme Places 
of the New Teftament. So Grace, taken in a 
large Senfe, means the Favour of God, and all the 
fpiritual Bleffings that proceed from it, (which is 
a frequent Senfe of it in the Bible) but in a limited 
Senfe it fignifies the Habit of Holinefs wrought in 
us by Divine Favour, or a complex Idea of the 
Chriflian Virtues. It may alio be given in the 
ftricleit Senfe ; and thus it fignifies any Jingle 
Chrifiian Virtue, as in 2 Cor.viu.6, 7- where it is 
ufed for Liberality. So a City, in a ftricl, and pro- 
per Senfe, means the Houjes inclofed within the. 
Walls ; in a larger Senfe, it reaches to all the 
Suburbs. 

This larger and ftrlBer Senfe of a Word is ufed 
in almoft all the Sciences, as, well as in Theology, 
and in common Life. The Word Geography, 
taken in a Jiricl Senfe, fignifies the Knowledge of 
the Circles of the earthly Globe, and the Situation 
of the various Parts of the Earth ; when it is taken 
in a little larger Senfe, it includes the Knowledge 
of the Seas alfo ; and in the largefi Senfe of all, 

it 



$4 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

it extends to the various Cufloms, Habits, and 
Governments of Nations. "When an Aflronomer 
ufes the Word Star in its proper and Uriel Senfe, 
it is applied only to the fixed Stars, but in a large 
Senfe it includes the Planets alio. 

This equivocal Senfe of Words belongs alfo to 
many proper Names : So Afia, taken in the largefl 
Senfe, is one Quarter of the World ; in a more 
limited Senfe it fignifies Natolia, or the leffer Afia ; 
but in the ftricleft Senfe it means no more than one 
little Province in Natolia, where flood the Cities 
of Ephefus, Smyrna, Sardls, &c* And this is the 
moil frequent Senfe of it in the New Teflament. 
Flanders and Holland, in a Uriel Senfe, are but two 
fingle Provinces among the feventeen, but in a 
large Senfe Holland includes feven of them, and 
Flanders ten. 

There are alfo fome very common and little 
Words in all Languages, that are ufed in a more 
exlenfive, or more limited Senfe ; fuch as all, every , 
whatfoever, &c. When the Apoftle fays, all Men 
have finned, and all Men muft die, all is taken in 
its moil uniyerfal and extenfive Senfe, including 
all Mankind, Rom. v. 1'2. When he appoints 
Prayer to be made for all Men, it appears by the 
following: Verfes, that he reftrains the Wprd all to 
fignify chiefly all Ranks and Degrees of Men, 
] Tim. ii. ]. But when St. Paul fays, I pleafe all 
Men in all Things, 1 Cor. x. 33. the Word all is 
exceedingly limited, for it reaches no farther than 
trot he pi en fed all thofe Men whom, he converfed 
with in 0// Things that were lawfnl. 

<U'hly, Equivocal Words are, in the fourth Place, 
fliftinguifhed by their literal or figurative Senfe. 
Words' are ufed in a proper or literal Senfe, when 
they are defigned to fignify thofe Ideas for which 
they were originally made, or to which they are 

primarily 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. <33 

primarily and generally annexed; but they are ufed 
in a figurative or tropical Senfe, when they are 
made to fignify fome Things, which only bear 
either a Reference or a Refemblance to the primary 
Ideas of them. So when two Princes contend by 
their Armies, we fay they are at War, in a proper 
Senfe ; but when we fay there is a War betwixt 
the Winds and the Waves in a Storm, this is called 
figurative, and the peculiar Figure is a Metaphor, 
So when the Scripture fays, Riches make them/elves 
Wings, and fly away as an Ragle toward Heaven, 
the Wings and the Flight of the Eagle are proper 
Expreffions ; but when Flight and Wings are ap- 
plied to Riches, it is only by way of Figure and 
Metaphor. So when a Man is faid to repent, or 
laugh, or grieve, it is literally taken ; but when 
God is faid to he grieved, to repent, or laugh, &c. 
thefe are all figurative Expreffions borrowed from 
a Refemblance to Mankind. And when the Words 
Job or Rfther are ufed to fignify thofe very Perfons, 
it is the literal Senfe of them ; but when they lig- 
nify thofe two Books of Scripture, this is a. figura- 
tive Senfe. The Names of Horace, Juvenal, and 
Milton, are ufed in the fame Manner, either for 
Books or Men. 

When a Word, which originally fignifies any 
particular Idea or Object, is attributed to feveral 
other Objecls, not fo much by way of 'Refemblance, 
but rather on the account of fome evident Reference 
or Relation to the original Idea, this is fometimes 
peculiarly called an analogical Word ; fo a found 
or healthy Pulfe ; a found Dig ft ion ; found Sleep ; 
are all fo called with Reference to a found and 
healthy Conftitution ; but if you fpeak of found 
Doclrine, or found Speech, this is by way of Refem- 
blance to Health ; and the Words are metaphorical: 
Yet many Times Analogy and Metaphor are ufed 

pro- 



66 LOGICK \ OR, THE [PART I. 

promifcuoufly in the fame Senfe, and not diftin- 



guifhed. 



Here note, That the Deflgn of metaphorical 
Language, and Figures of Speech, is not merely to 
reprefent our Ideas, hut to reprefent them with 
Vivacity, Spirit, Affection, and Power; and though 
they often make a deeper Impreflion on the Mind 
of the Hearer, yet they do as often lead him into 
a Miftake, if they are ufed at improper Times, 
and Places. Therefore, where the Defign of the 
Speaker or Writer is merely to explain, in/irucl, 
and to lead into the Knowledge of naked Truth, 
he ought for the moft Part to ufe plain and' proper 
Words, if the Language affords them, and not to 
deal much in figurative Speech. But this Sort of 
Terms is ufed very profitably by Poets and Orators, 
whofe bufinefs is to move, and perfuade, and work 
on the Paffions, as well as on the Underflanding. 
Figures are alio happily employed in proverbial 
moral Sayings by the wifefi and the he/l of Men, to 
imprefs them deeper on the Memory by fenfible 
Images ; and they are often ufed for other valuable 
Purpofes in the /acred Writings. 

bthiy, I might adjoin another Sort of equivocal 
Words ; as there are fome which have a different 
Meaning in common Language, from what they 
have in the Sciences ; the Word Pajfion fignifies the 
receiving any Aclion in a large philofophical Senfe ; 
in a more limited philofophical Senfe, it fignifies 
any of the slffeclions of human Nature, as Love, Fear, 
Joy, Sorrovj, &c. But the common People con- 
fine it only to dinger : So the Word Simple, philo- 
fophically, fignifies Single, but vulgarly it is ufed 
for FooliJJi. 

Gihly, Other equivocal Words are ufed fome- 
times in an ab/olute Senfe, as when God is called 
pgtfecJ ; which allows of no Defect ; and fome- 

times 






CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. Qj 

times in a comparative Senfe, as good Men are 
oftentimes called perfecl in Scripture, in Compa- 
nion of thofe who are much inferior to them in 
Knowledge or Holinefs : But I have dwelt rather 
too long upon this Subject already, therefore I add 
no more. 

SECT. VIII. 

The Origin or Caufes of equivocal Words. 

NOW, that we may become more fkilful in 
guarding ourfelves and others again ft the 
Danger of Miftakes which may arife frorn equivo- 
cal Words, it may not be amirs to conclude this 
Chapter with a fhort Account of the various Ways 
or Means whereby a Word changes its Significa- 
tion, or acquires any new Senfe, and thus becomes 
equivocal, efpecially if it keeps its old Senfe alfo. 

1 . Mere Chance fometimes gives the fame Word 
different Senfes ; as the Word Light fignifies a 
Body that is not heavy ; and it alfo fignifies the 
Effecl of Sun-BeaniS) or the Medium whereby we fee 
Objecls : This is merely accidental, for there feems 
to be no Connection between thefe two Senfes, nor 
any Reafon for them. 

1. Error and Miflake is another Occafion of 
giving various Senfes to the fame Word.; as when 
different Perfons read the Names of Priejl, Bifhop, 
Church, Eafter, Sec. In the New Teftament, they 
affix different ideas to them, for want of Acquaint- 
ance with the true Meaning of the facred Writer; 
though it it muft be confeffed, thefe various Senfes, 
which might arife at fir ft from honeft Miftake, 
may be culpably fupported ana* propagated by \n- 
tereft, Ambition, Prejudice, and a Party-Spirit on 
any Side, 

3. Tnre 



6S LOGICK t OR, THE [PART I; 

3 Time and Cufiom alters the Meaning of Word s> 
Knave heretofore fignified a diligent Servant (Gna- 
vus ;) and a Villain was an under Tenant to the 
Lord of the Manor (Fillicus ;) but now both thefe 
Words carry an Idea of Wickednefs and Reproach 
to them. A Ballad once fignified a folemn and 
facred Song> as well as one that is trivial, when 
Solomons Song was called the Ballad of Ballads : 
but now it is applied to nothing but trifling Verfe* 
or comical Subjects. 

4. Words change their Senfe- by Figures and 
Metaphors, which are derived from fomz real Ana- 
logy or Refemblance between feveral Things ; as 
when Wings and Flight are applied to Riches, it 
iignifies only, that the Owner may as eafily lofe 
them, as he would lofe a Bird who flew away with 
Wings. 

And I think, under this Head we may rank thofe 
Words, which Signify different Ideas, by a Sort of 
an unaccountable far- fetch t Analogy, or diftant 
Refemblance, that Fancy has introduced between one 
Thing and another ; as when we fay, the Meat is 
green, when it is half-roafted : We fpcak of airing 
Linen by the Fire, when we mean drying or warm- 
ing it : We call for round Coals for the Chimney* 
wdien we mean large fquare ones : And we talk of 
the Wing of a Rabbit , when we mean the Fore-leg : 
The true reafon of thefe Appellations we leave to 
the Criticks. 

5. Words alfo change their Senfe by the fpecial 
Occafion of ufing them, the peculiar Manner of 
Pronunciation, the Sound of the Voice, the Motion 
of the Face, or Geflures of the Body ; fo when an 
angry Matter fays to his Servant, it is bravely done ! 
or you are a fine Gentleman ! he means ju ft the con- 
trary ; namely, it is very ill done ; you are a firry 
Fellow ; It is one way of giving a fevere Reproach, 

for 



€H. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 6g 

for the Words are fpoken by way of Sarcafm, or 
Irony. 

6. Words are applied to various SenfeS, by new 
Ideas appearing or arifing fader than new Words are 
framed. So when Gunpowder was found out, the 
Word Powder, which before fignined only Duft^ 
was made then to fignify that Mixture or Compofi- 
film, of Nitre, Charcoal, ckc. And the Name Canon, 
which before fignified a Law or a Rule, is now alfo 
given to a great Gun, which gives Laws to Na- 
tions. So Footboys, who had frequently the com- 
mon Name of Jack given them, were kept to turn 
the Spit, or to pull off their Mailer's Boots; but 
when Inftruments were invented for both thofe Ser ■ 
vices, they were both called Jacks, though one 
was of Iron, the other of Wood, and very different 
in their Form. 

7. Words alter their Significations according to 
the Ideas of the various Perfons, Seels, or Parties 
who ufe them, as we have hinted before ; fo when 
a Papift ufes the Word Here ticks, he generally 
means the Prot eft ants ; when a P rot eft ant ufes the 
Word, he means any Perfons who are wilfully (and 
perhaps contentioufly) obflinate in fundamental Er- 
rors. When a Jew fpeaks of the true Religion, he 
means the Inflitution of Mofes ; when a Turk men- 
tions it, he intends the Doclrine of Mahomet ; but 
when a Chriftian makes ufe of it, he defigns to fig- 
nify Chriftia?iity, or the Truths and Precepts of the 
Gofpel. 

8. Words have different Significations accord- 
ing to the Book, Writing, or Difcourfe in which 
they Hand. So in a Treatife of Anatomy, a Foot 
fignifies that Member in the Body of a Man : But 
in a Book of Geometry or Menfuration, it fignifies 
twelve Inches. 

If I had room to exemplify moft of thefe Parti- 
culars in one (ingle Word, I know not where la 

choofe 



70 logick: OR; the [part i. 

c >fe a fitter than the Word Sound, which feems, 
as it were by Chance, to fignify three diftinct Ideas, 
namely, Healthy, (from Sanus) as a found Body ; 
No'ife (from Sonus) as a ^/ri// Sound ; and to found 
the Sea (perhaps. from the French Sonde, a Probe, 
or an Inftrument to find the Depth of Water.) 
From thefe three, which I may call original Senfes, 
various derivative Senfes arife; as found Sleep, found 
Lwigs, found Wind and Limb, a found Heart, a 
found. Mind, found Doclrine, a found Divine, found 
Reafon, a found Cafk, found Timber, a foAind Re- 
proof, to beat one fbundly, to found one's Meaning 
or Inclination, and a Sound or narrow Sea ; turn 
thefe all into Latin, and the Variety will appear 
plain. 

I confefs, fome few of thefe which I have men- 
tioned as the different Springs of equivocal Words, 
may be reduced in fome Cafes to the fame Origi- 
nal : But it muft alfb be granted, that there may be 
other Ways befides thefe whereby a Word comes 
to extend its Signification, to include various Ideas, 
and become equivocal. And though it is the Buli- 
nefs of a Grammarian to purfue thefe Remarks 
with more Variety and Particularity, yet it is alfo 
the Work of -a Logician to give Notice of thefe 
Things, left Darknefs, Confufion, and Perplexity, 
be brought into our Conceptions by the means of 
Words, and thence our Judgments and Reafonings 
become erroneous. 



CHAP. 



CH. V.] RIGHT USE OP REASON". 71 

SECT. V. 

General Directions relating to our Ideas. 

Di red ion I. TjVRNISH yourfehes with a rich Va- 
riety of Ideas ; acquaint y our 1 elves 
with Things ancient and modern , Things natural, 
civil and religious; Things domeftic and national ; 
Things of your native Land, and of foreign Coun- 
ties; Things prefent, pad, and future; and above 
all, be well acquainted with God and yourfelves ; 
learn animal Nature, and the Workings of your 
own Spirits. 

Such a general Acquaintance with Things will 
be of very great Advantage. 

Thtjhfi Benefit of it is this : it will affift the 
Ufe of Reafon in all its following Operations; it 
will teach you to judge of Things aright, to argue 
juftly, and to methodfe your Thoughts with Accu- 
racy. When you (hall find feveral Things akin to 
each other, and feveral different from each other, 
agreeing in fome Part of their Idea, and difagree^ 
ing in other Parts, you will range your Ideas in 
better Order, you will be more eafily led into a 
diftincl Knowledge of Things, and. will obtain a 
rich Store of proper Thoughts and Arguments 
upon all Oecafions. 

You wiil tell me, perhaps, That you deflgn the 
Study of the Law or Divinity ; and what Good 
can Natural Philofophy or Mathematicks do you, or 
any other Science, not directly fubordinate to your 
chief Deflgn ? But let it be contidered, that all 
Sciences have a Sort of mutual Connection ; and 
Knowledge of all Kinds fits the Mind to reafon and 
judge bettenconcerning any particular Subject. I 

F have 



fri LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

Jiave known a Judge upon the Bench betray his 
Ignorance, and appear a little confu fed in his Sen- 
timents about a Cafe of fufpecled Murder brought 
before him, for want of fome Acquaintance with 
a?iimal Nature and Philofophy. 

Another Benefit of it is this ; fuch a large and 
general Acquaintance with Things will fecure you 
from perpetual Admirations and Surprijes, and 
guard you againft that Weaknefs of ignorant Per- 
fons, who have never feen any Thing beyond the 
Confines of their own Dwelling, and therefore they 
wonder at almoft every Thing they fee ; every 
Thing beyond the Smoke of their own Chimney, 
and the Reach of their own Windows, is new and 
ftrange to them. 

A third Benefit of fuch an univerfal Acquaint- 
ance with Things, is this ; it will keep yon from 
being too pojitive and dogmatical, from, an Excefs 
of Credulity and Unbelief, that is, a Readinefs to 
believe, or to deny every Thing at 'flrft Hearing ; 
when you fhall have often feen, that ft range and 
uncommon Things, which often feemed incredi- 
ble, are found to be true ; and Things very com- 
monly received as true, have been found falfe. 

The Way of attaining fuch an extenfive Treafure of 
Ideas, is, with Diligence to apply yourfelf to read 
the beft Books ; converfe with the moft knowing 
and the wife ft of Men ; and endeavour to improve 
by every Perfon in whofe Company you are; fuffer 
ho Hour to pafs away in a lazy Idlenels, an im- 
pertinent Chattering, or ufelefs Trifles : Vifit other 
Cities and Countries when you have feen your own, 
under the Care of one who can teach you to profit 
by Travelling, and to make wife Obfervations ; 
indulge a juft Curiofity in feeing the Wonders of 
Art and Nature ; fearch into Things yourfelves, as 
well as learn them from others; be acquainted with 

Men 



CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASONV 73 

Men as well as Books ; learn all Things as much 
as you can at firft Hand; and let as many of your 
Ideas as pofiibie be the Reprefcntations of Things, 
and not merely the Reprefcntations of other Men's 
Ideas: Thus your Soul, like fome noble Building, 
fhall be richly furnifhed with original Paintings, 
and not with mere Copies. 

Direct IF. Ufe the mofi proper Methods to retain 
that Treafure of Ideas which you have acquired; for 
the Mind is ready to let many of them flip, unlefs 
fome Pains and Labour be taken to fix them upon 
the Memory. 

And more efpccially let thofe Ideas be laid up 
and preferved with the greater! Care, which are 
molt directly fuited. either to your eternal Welfare, 
as a Chriftian^ or to your particular Station and 
Profeffion in this Life ; for though the former Rule 
recommends an univerfal Acquaintance wi'hThings, 
yet it is but a more general and fuperflcial Know* 
ledge that is required or expected of any Man, in 
Things which are utterly foreign to his own Bufi- 
nefs : But it is neceflary you fhould have a more 
particular and accurate Acquaintance with thofe 
Things that refer to your peculiar Province and 
Duty in this Life, or your Happinefs in another. 

There are fome Perfons who never arrive at any 
deep, folid, or valuable Knowledge in any Science, 
or any Bufinefs of Life, becaufe they are perpetually 
fluttering over the Surface of Things, in a curious 
and wandering Search of infinite Variety ; ever 
hearing, reading, or afking after fomething new, 
but impatient of any Labour to lay up and pre- 
ferve the Ideas they have gained ; Their Souls may 
be compared to a Looking glafs, that wherefocver 
you turn it, it receives the Images of all Objects, 
but retains none. 

Fa In 



74 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

In order to preferve your Treafure of Ideas, and 
the Knowledge you have gained, pnrfue the follow- 
ing Advices, efpecially in your younger Yeats. 

J. Recollect every Day the Things you have feen, 
or heard, or read, which may have made an Addi- 
tion to your Underftanding : Read the Writings 
of God and Men with Diligence and perpetual 
Reviews : Be not fond of haftening to a new Book, 
or a new Chapter, till you have well fixed and 
eftablifhed in your Minds what was ufeful in the 
laft : Make ufe of your Memory in this Manner, 
and you will fenfibly experience a gradual Im- 
provement of it, while you take care not to load 
it to Excefs. 

2. Talk over the Things which you have feen, 
heard, or learnt, with Jome proper Acquaintance. 
This wdll make a frefh Impreffion upon your Me- 
mory ; and if you have no Fellow-Student at hand, 
none of equal Rank with yourfelves, tell it oyer to 
any of your Acquaintance, where you can do it 
with Propriety and Decency ; and whether they 
learn any Thing by it or no, your own Repetition 
of it will be an Improvement to yourfelf : And 
this Practice alfo will furnifh you with a Variety of 
Words, and copious Language to exprefs your 
Thoughts upon all Occafions. 

3. Commit to Writing fome of the mod confi- 
derable Improvements which you daily make, at 
lead fuch Hints as may recall them again to your 
Mind, when perhaps they are vanifhed and loft. 
And here I think Mr. Locke % Method of Adver- 

Jaria, or Common- Places, which he defcribes in the 
End of the firft Volume of his Poflhumous Works, 
is the beft ; ufing no learned Method at all, fet- 
ting down Things as they occur, leaving a dif- 
tincl Page for each Subject, and making an Index 
to the Pages. 



CH. V.] KIGHT USE OF REASON. *] O 

At the End of every Week, or Month, or Year, 
you may review your Remarks for thefe Reaibns : 
Firft, to judge of your own Improvement ; when you 
fhall fi.nd that many of your younger Collections 
are either weak and trifling; or if they are juft 
and proper, yet they are grown now fo familiar to 
you, that you will thereby fee your own Advance- 
ment in Knowledge. And in the next Place, what 
Remarks you find there worthy of your riper Ob- 
fervation, you may note them with a marginal Star, 
inftcad of tranfcribing them, as being worthy of 
your fecond Year's Review, when the others are 
neglected. 

To fhorten fomething of this Labour, if the 
Books which you read are your own, mark with a 
Pen or Pencil, the moft confiderable Things in 
them which you delire to remember. Thus you 
may read that Book the fecond Time over with 
half the Trouble, by your eye running over the 
Paragraphs which your Pencil has noted. It is 
but a very weak Objection againft this Practice to 
fay, 1 ' Jhall fpoil my Book; for I perfuade myfelf, 
that you did not buy it as a Bookfeller to fell it 
again for Gain, but as a Scholar, to improve your 
Mind by it; and if the Mind be improved, your 
Advantage is abundant, though your Book yields 
lefs Money to your Executors.* 

Direct:. III. As you proceed both in Learning and 
hi Life, make a wife Obfervation what are the Ideas, 

* Note, This A-dvice of Writing, Marking, and Reviewing 
your Marks, refers chiefly to thofe occajional Notions you meet 
with either in Reading or in Converfation : but when you are 
direttly 2.n& prcfejfedly purfuing any Subject of Knowledge in a 
good Syftcm in your younger Years, the Syjlem itfelf is your 
Common- pi ace-book, and muft be entirely reviewed. The fame 
may be faid concerning any Treatife which clofely, fucciu&ly, 
and accurately handles any particular Theme. 

F 3 what 



76 LoGieK ; or, th£ [parti. 

what the D'tfcourfes and the Parts of Knowledge that 
have been more or lefs ufefid to your f elf or others. In 
our younger Years, while we are furnishing our 
Minds with a Treafure of Ideas, our Experience is 
but fmall, and our Judgment weak ; it is therefore 
impoffible at that Age to determine aright con- 
cerning the real Advantage and Ufefidnefs of many 
Things we learn. But when Age and Experience 
have matured your Judgment, then you will gra- 
dually drop the more vjelefs Part of your younger 
Furniture, and be more folicitous to retain that 
which is rnofi: neceflary for your Welfare in this 
Life, or a better. Hereby you will come to make 
the fame Complaint thatalmoft every learned Man 
has done after long Experience in Study, and in 
the Affairs of human Life and Religion: Alas I 
how many Hours, and Days, and Months, have I 
loft in purfidng Jome Parts of Learning, and in read- 
ing fome Authors, which have turned to no other Ac- 
count, hut to inform me that they were not worth my 
Labour and Purfuit ! Happy the Man who has a 
wife Tutor to conduct him through all the Sciences 
in the firft Years of his Study ; and who has a pru- 
dent Friend always at hand to point out to him, 
from Experience, how much of every Science is 
worth his Purfuit ! And happy the Student that is 
\o wife as to follow fuch Advice. 

Direct: IV. Learn to acquire a Government over 
your Ideas and your Thoughts, that they may come 
when they are called, and depart when they are bid- 
den. There are fome Thoughts that rife and in- 
trude upon us while we fbun them ; there are 
others that fly from us, when we would hold and 
fix them. 

If the Ideas which you would willingly make the 
Matter of your prefent Meditation are ready to fly 

from 



GH. V.]- , RIG-HT USE OP REASONS $.? 

from you, you mud be obftinate in the Purfuit of 
them by an Habit of fixed Meditation ; you mult 
keep your Soul to the Work, when it is ready to 
ftart ailde every Moment, unlefs you will aban- 
don yourfelf to be a Slave to every wild Imagina- 
tion. It is a common, but it is an unhappy and 
a fhamefu! Thing, that every Trifle that comes 
acrofs the Senfes or Fancy mould divert us, that a 
buzzing Fly fhould teaze our Spirits and fcatter 
our beft Ideas : But we muft learn to be deaf to 
and regardlefs of other Things, befides that which 
we make the prefent Subject of our Meditation ; 
And in order to help a wandering and fickle Hu- 
mour, it is proper to have a Book or Paper in our 
Hands, which has fome proper Hints of the Sub- 
ject that we defign to purfue. We muft be refolute 
and laborious, and fometimcs conflict with our- 
felves, if we would be wife and learned. 

Yet I would not be too fevere in this Rule : It 
muft be confeiTed there are Seafons when the Mind, 
or rather the Brain, is over-tired or jaded with Study 
and Thinking ; or upon fome other Accounts ani- 
mal Nature may be languid or cloudy, and unfit to 
affift the Spirit of Meditation ; at fuch Seafons 
(provided that they return not too often) it is bet- 
ter fometimes to yield to the prefent Indifpofition : 
for if Nature entirely refill, nothing can be done 
to the Purpofc, at leaft in that Subject or Science. 
Then you may think it proper to give yourfelf up 
to fome Hours of Leifure and Recreation, or ufeful 
Idlenefs ; or if not, then turn your Thoughts to 
fome other alluring Subjecl, and pore no longer 
upon the frfi, till fome brighter or more favour- 
able Moments arife. A Student (hall do more in 
one Hour, when all Things concur to invite him 
to any fpecial Study, than in four Hours, at a dull 
and improper Seafon, 

F 4 I would 



73 LOGICK ! OB, THE [PART I. 

I would alfo give the fame Advice, if fomeiv?i;z, 
or worthlefs, or foolifh Idea, will croud itfelf into 
your Thoughts ; and if you find that all your La- 
bour and W refiling cannot defend yourfelf from 
it, then divert the Importunity of that which of- 
fends you by turning your Thoughts to fome en- 
tertaining Subject, that may amufe you a little, and 
draw you off from the troublefome and impofmg 
Gueft ; and many a Time alfo in fuch a Cafe, 
when the impertinent and intruding Ideas would 
divert from prefent Duty, Devotion and Prayer 
have been very fuccefsful to overcome fuch obfti- 
nate Troubles of the Peace and Profit of the Soul. 

If the natural Genius and Temper be too vola- 
tile, fickle, and wandering, fuch Perfons ought in 
a more efpecial Manner to apply themfclves to 
mathematical Learning, and to begin their Studies 
with Arithmetick and Geometry ; wherein new 
Truths continually afifiiig to the Mind, out of 
the plainefl and eafiefl Principles, will allure the 
Thoughts with incredible Plcaiure to the Purfuit : 
This will give the Student fuch a delightful Taile 
of reafoning, as will fix his Attention to the fingle 
Subject which he purfues, and by Degrees will cure 
the habitual Levity of his Spirit : But let him not 
indulge and purfue thefe ib far, as to negleel the 
prime Studies of his defigned Profefiion. 






CHAP. 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 79 

CHAP. VI. 

Special Rules to direcl our Conceptions of Things. 

A Great Part of what has been already written 
is defigned to lay a Foundation for thofe 
Rules which may guide and regulate our Concep- 
tions of Things ; this is our main Bufinefs and De- 
iign in the Jirft Part of Logick. Now if we can 
but direct our Thoughts to a juft and happy Man- 
ner in forming our Ideas of Things, the other Ope- 
rations of the Mind will not fo eafily be perverted ; 
beeaufe moil of our Errors in Judgment, and the 
Weaknels, Fallacy, and Miftakes of our Argu- 
mentation, proceed from the Darknefs, Confufion, 
Defect, or fome other Irregularity in our Concep- 
tions. 

The Rules to affift and direct our Conceptions 
are thefe : 

i. Conceive of Things clearly and dijlinclly in 
their own Natures, 

2. Conceive of Things completely in all their 

Parts. 

3. Conceive of Things comprehenfroely in all their 

Properties and Relations. 

A. Conceive of Things exienjively in all their 
Kinds. 

5. Conceive of Things orderly, or in a proper 

Method. 

SECT. 



60 LOGICK : ORj THE [t»ART I* 

SFXT. I. 

Of gaining clear and diftincl Ideas. 

THE fir (I Rule is this, Seek after a clear and dif- 
tincJ Conception of Things as they are in their 
ozvn Nature, and do not content yourf elves with ohfcure 
and conjufcd Ideas, where clearer are to he attained. 
There are fome Things indeed whereof diftincl: 
Ideas are fcarce attainable, they feem to furpafs the 
Capacity of the Underftanding in our prefent State ; 
fuch are the Notions of Eternal, Immenfe, Infinite, 
whether this Infinity be applied to Number, as an 
infinite Multitude ; to Quantity, as infinite Length, 
or Breadth ; to Powers and Perfections, as Strength, 
Wifdom, or Goodnefs, infinite, &c. Though 
Mathematicians in their Way demonftrate feveral 
Things in the Doclrine of Infinites, yet there are 
flill fome infolvable Difficulties that attend the Ideas 
of Infinity, when it is applied to Mind or Body \ 
and while it is in Reality but an Idea ever growing, 
we cannot have fo clear and diflincl: a Conception 
of it as to fecure us from Miflakes in fome of our 
Reafonings about it. 

There are many other Things that belong to the 
material World, wherein the fharpefi Philofophers 
have never yet arrived at clear and diftincl: Ideas ; 
fuch as the particular Shape, Situation, Contexture, 
and Motion of the J mall Particles of Minerals, Me- 
tals, Plants, &c. whereby their very Natures and 
Eflences are diftinguifhed from each other. Nor 
have we either Senfes or Infiruments fufficiently 
nice and accurate to find them out. There arc 
other Things in the World of Spirits wherein our 
Ideas are very dark and confufed, fuch as their 
Union with animal Nature, the Way of their acling on 

material 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON - . 81 

material Beings, and their Converfe with each other. 
And though it is a laudable Ambition to fearch 
what may be known of thefe Matters, yet it is a 
vaft Hindrance to the Enrichment of our Under- 
ftandings if we fpend too much of our Time and 
Pains among Infinites and Unfearchables, and thofe 
Things for the Inveftigation whereof we are not 
furnifhed with proper Faculties in the prefent ; State. 
It is therefore of great Service to the true Improve- 
ment of the Mind, to diftinguifh well between 
Knowables and Unknowables. 

As far as Things are know ah J e by us, it is of ex- 
cellent Ufe to accuftom ourfelves to clear and diftind 
Ideas. Now among many other Occailons of the 
Darknefs and Miftakes of our Minds, there are 
thefe two Things which mod remarkably bring Con- 
fufion into our Ideas. 

1. That from our Infancy we have had the Ideas 
of Things fo far connected with the Ideas of Words 9 
that we often miftake Words for Things, we mingle 
and confound one with the other. 

2. From our youngeft Years we have been ever 
ready to confider Things not fo much in their own 
Natures, as in their various Refpecls to ourfelves, 
and chiefly to our Senfes ; and we have alfo joined 
and mingled the Ideas of fome Things, with many 
other Ideas ,to which they were not akin in their own 
Natures. 

In order therefore to a clear and difiincl Know- 
ledge of Things, we mufl: unclothe them of all thefe 
Relations and Mixtures, that we may contemplate 
them naked, and in their own Natures, and dif- 
tinguifh the Subject that we have in View from all 
other Subjects whatfoever : Now to perform this 
well, we mufl: here confider the Definition of Words, 
and the Definition of Things. 



SECT. 



82 logick : or, the [part ?. 

SECT. If. 

Of the Definition of Words or Names. 

IF we could conceive of Things as Angels and 
unbodied Spirits do, without involving them 
in thofe Clouds which Words and Language throw 
upon them, we mould feldom be in Danger of fiich 
Mifiakes as are perpetually committed by us in the 
prefent State ; and indeed it would be of unknown 
Advantage to us to accuftom ourfelves to form 
Ideas of Things without Words, that we might know 
them in their own proper Natures. But (ince wc 
mud ufe Words, both to learn and to communi- 
cate moft of our Notions, we fhould doit with jud 
.Rules of Caution. I have already declared in Part, 
how often and by what Means our Words become 
the Occafion of Errors in our Conceptions of 
Things. To remedy fuch Inconveniencies, wc 
muft get an exact Definition of the Words wc make 
ufe of, that is, we muft determine precifely the 
Senfe of our Words, which is called the Definition 
of the Name. 

Now a Definition of the Name being only a De- 
claration in what Senfe the Word is ufed, or what 
Idea or Object we mean by it, this may be ex- 
prefTed by any one or more of the Properties, 
Effects, or Circumftanccs of that Object which do 
fufficiently diftinguifh it from other Objects : As 
if I were to tell what I mean by the Word Air, I 
may fay, it is that thin Matter which we breathe in 
and breathe out continually ; or it is that fluid Body 
in which the Birds fiy a little above the Earth ; or 
it is that invifible Matter which fills all Places near 
the Rarih y or which immediately ericompaffcs the Globe 



CH. VI*] EIGHT USE OF REASON. 83 

of Earth and Water. So if I would tell what I 
mean by Light, I would fay it is that Medium zvhere- 
by we fee the Colours and Shapes of Things ; or it is 
that which diftinguiJJies the D,ay from the Night, If 
I were afked what I mean by Religion, I would 
an Aver, it is a Colleclion of all our Duties to God, 
if taken in a ftricl and limited Senfe ; but if taken 
in a large Scnfe, it is a Colleclion of all our Duties 
both to God and Man. Thefe are called the Defi- 
nitions of the Name. 

Note, In defining the Name there is no Necef- 
fity that we fhould be acquainted with the intimate 
EfTence or Nature of the Thing ; for any Manner 
of Description that will but fufficiently acquaint an- 
other Perfon what we mean by fuch a Word, is a 
fufficient Defnitio?ifor the Name. And on this Ac- 
count a fynonymous Word, or a mere Negation of 
the contrary, a Tranflation of the Word \x\to another 
Tongue, or a Grammatical Explication of it, is fome- 
times fufficient for this Purpofe ; as if one would 
know what I mean by a Sphere, I tell him it is a 
Globe ; if he afk what is a Triangle, it is that which 
has three dingles ; or an Oval is that which has the 
Shape of an Egg. Dark is that which has no Light ; 
Afihma is a Difficulty of Breathing ; a Diaphor click 
Medicine, or a Sudorifick, is fomething that will 
provoke Sweating ; and an Infolveut, is a Man that 
cannot pay his Debts, 

Since it is the Defign of Logick, not only to 
affift us in Learning but in Teaching alfo, it is ne- 
ceflary that we fhould be furnifhed with fome parti- 
cular Directions relating to the Definition of Names, 
both in Teaching and Learning. 



SECT. 



84 LOGICK t OR, THE ['PART I. 

SECT. III. 

Directions concerning the Definition of Names. 

Direct. I. TTAVE a Care of mailing ufe of mere 
Words, injlead of Ideas, that is, fuch 
Words as have no Meaning, no Definition belong- 
ing to them : Do not always imagine that there are 
Ideas wherefoever there are Names : For though 
Mankind hath fo many Millions of Ideas, more 
than they have Names, yet fo foolifh and lavifh are 
we, that too often we ufe fome Words in mere 
Wafte, and have no Ideas for them ; or at leafl, 
our Ideas are fo exceedingly (battered and confut- 
ed, broken and blended, various and unfettled, 
that they can fignify nothing toward the Improve- 
ment of the Underftanding. You will find a great 
deal of Keafon for this Remark, if you read the 
fop'ifli Schoolmen, or the myftic Divines. 

Never reft fatisfied therefore with mere Words 
which have no Ideas belonging to them, or at lead 
no fettled and determinate Ideas. Deal not in fuch 
empty Ware, whether you are a Learner or a 
Teacher ; for hereby fome Perfons have made 
themfclves Rich in Words, and learned in ttteir 
own Eftcem ; whereas in Reality, their Under- 
ftandings have been poor, and they knew nothing. 

Let me give, for Inftance, fome of thofe Writ- 
ers or Talkers who deal much in the Words Na- 
ture, Fate, Luck, Chance, Perfection, Power, Life, 
Fortune, Inftincl, &c. and that even in the moft 
calm and inftruclive Parts of their Difcourfe ; 
though neither they thcmfelves nor their Hearers 
have any fettled Meaning under thofe Words ; and 

thus 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 85 

thus they build up their Reafonings, and infer what 
they pleafe, with an Ambition of the Name of 
Learning, or of .-fublime Elevations in Religion ; 
whereas in Truth, they do but amufe themfelves 
and their Admirers with /welling Words of Vanity r , 
under/landing neither what they /ay, nor whereof 
they affirm. But this Sort of Talk was reproved of 
old by the two chief Apoftles, St. Peter, and St 
Paul, I Tim. i. 7. and 2 Pet. ii. 18. 

When Pretenders to Philofophy or good Senfe 
grow fond of this Sort of Learning, they dazzle 
and confound their weaker Hearers, but fall un- 
der the Neglect of the Wife. The Epicureans are 
guilty of this Fault, when they afcribe the Forma- 
tion of the World to Chance : The Ariflotelians, 
when* they fay, Nature ahlmrs a Vacuum: The 
Stoics, when they talk of Fate, which is fuperior 
to the Gods : And the Gamefters, when they curfe 
their Ill-luck, or hope for the Favours of Fortune. 
Whereas, if they would tell us, that by the Word 
Nature they mean the Properties 0/ any Being ', or 
the Order 0/ Things efiablijhed at the Creation ; that 
by the Word Fate, they intend the Decrees 0/ God, 
or the necef/ary Conneclion and Influence 0/ /econd 
Cau/es and Effecls ; if by the Word Luck or Chance 
they fignify the ab/olute Negation 0/ any Determi- 
nate Cau/e, or only their Ignorance 0/ any /uch 
Cau/e, we (hould know how to converfe with 
them, and to affent to, or diffent from their Opi- 
nions. But while they flutter in the Dark, and 
make a Noife with Words which have no fixed 
Ideas, they talk to the Wind, and never can 
profit. 

I would make this Matter a little plainer dill, 
by Inftances borrowed from the Perifaietick Phi- 
lofophy, which was once taught in all the Schools. 
The Profeflbr fancies he has ailigned the true Rea- 

ibn 3 



86 LOGICK : OR, THE . [PART r. 

fon, why all heavy Bodies fetid downward, why 
Amber will draw Feathers or Straws, and the Load- 
Jlone drazv Iron, when he tells you, that this is 
done by certain gravitating and attractive Quali- 
ties, which proceed from the fubjlantial Forms of 
thofe various Bodies. He imagines that he has 
explained why the Loadflones * North Pole JJiall 
repel the North End of a magnetick Needle, and at- 
tract the South, when he affirms that this is done 
by its Sympathy with one End of it, and its Anti- 
pathy againft the other End. Whereas in Truth, 
all thefe Names of Sympathy, Antipathy, fubftanlial 
Forms and Qualities, when they are put for the 
Caufes of thefe Effects in Bodies, are but hard 
Words, which only exprefs a learned and pompous 
Ignorance of the true Caufe of natural Appear- 
ances ; and in this Senfe they are mere Words 
without Ideas, 

This will evidently appear, if one afk me, Why 
a concave Mirror or convex Glafs will burn Wood in 
the Sun-beams, or why a Wedge will cleave it ? 
And I fhould tell him, it is by an uflorious Qua- 
lity in the Mirror or Glafs, and by a cleaving 
Power in the Wedge, arifing from a certain un- 
known fubjlantial Form in them, whence they de- 
rive thefe Qualities ; or if he fhould afk me, Why 
a Clock flakes, and points to the Hour? and I fhould 
fay, it is by an indicating Form and Sonorifick Qua- 
lity ; whereas I ought to tell him how the Sun- 
beams are collected and united by a Burning-Glafs ; 
whence the mechanical Force of a Wedge is de- 
rived ; and what are the Wheels and Springs, the 
Pointer, and Hammer, and Bell, whereby a Clock 
gives Notice of the Time, both to the Eye and 

the 

* Note, Some Writers cull that the South-Pole of a Load-ftone 
which attra&s the South-End of the Needle ; but I choolc to 
follow thoic who call it the North-pole. 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 87 

the Ear. But thefe ujiorious and cleaving Pozvers, 
fonorous and indicating Forms and Qualities, do 
either teach the Inquirer nothing at all but what 
he knew before, or they are mere Words without 
Ideas *. 

And there is many a Man in the vulgar and in 
the learned World, who imagines himfelf deeply 
fkilled in the Controverfies of Divinity, whereas he 
has only furnifhed himfelf with a Parcel of fcho- 
laftick or myftick Words, under fome of which the 
Authors themfelves had no juft Ideas ; and the 
Learner when he hears, or pronounces them, hath 
fcarce any Ideas at all. Such Sort of Words fome- 
times have become Matters of immortal Contention, 
as though the Gofpel could not ftand without them ; 
and yet the Zealot perhaps knows little more of 
them than he does of Shibboleth, or Higgaion, Selah> 
Judges xii. 6. Pfal. ix. 10. 

Yet here I would lay down this Caution, that 
there are feveral Objedls of which we have not a 
clear and difnncl Idea, much lefs an adequate or 
comprehend ve one, and yet we cannot call the 
Names of thefe Things, Words without Ideas ; 

G fuch 

* It may be ohjefied here, "And what does the modern Phi- 
•I lofopher, with all his Detail of mathematical Numbers, and 
" Diagrams, do more than this toward the Solution of thefe 
" Difficulties ? Does he not defcribe Gravity by a certain un- 
" bwnjon Force, <whereby Bodies tend doavmvard to the Center f 
** Hath he found the certain and mechanical Reafons of At-* 
" fraction, Magnetifm, &e. ? I anfvjer, That the Moderns 
have found a thoufand Things by applying Mathematicks to 
Natural Philofophy, which the Antients were ignorant of; and 
when they ufe any Names of this Kind, vix. Gravitation, At- 
traction, &c. they ufe them only to fignify, that there are fuch 
Effects and fuch Caufes, with a frequent Confeffion of their 
Ignorance of the true Springs of them : They do not pretend to, 
make thefe Words ftand for the real Caufes of Things, as though 
they thereby affigned the true philoibphical Solution of thefe 
Difficulties ; for in this Senfe they will lull be Wards without 
Ideas, whether in the Mouth of an old Philofopher or a ncvj 



88 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

fuch are the Infinity 'and Eternity of God himfelf, 
and Union of our own Soul and Body, the Union of 
the divine and ■ * human Natures in Jefus Chrifl, the 
Operation of the Holy Spirit on the Mind of Man, &c. 
Thefe ought not to be called Words without Ideas, 
for there is fufEcient Evidence for the Reality and 
Certainty of the Exiftence of their Objects ; though 
there is fome Confufion in our cleared Concep- 
tions of them ; and our Ideas of them, though 
imperfect, are yet fufficient to converfe about 
them, fo far as we have Need, and to determine 
fo much as is neceffary for our own Faith and 
Practice. 

Direct. II. Do not fuppofe that the Natives or 
EJfences of Things always differ from one another, 
as much as their Names do. There are various 
Purpofes in human Life, for which we put very 
different Names on the fame Thing, or on Things 
whofe Natures are near akin ; and thereby often- 
times, by making a new nominal Species, we are 
ready to deceive ourfelves with the Idea of another 
real Species of Beings : And thofe whofe Under- 
standings are led away by the mere Sound of 
Words, fancy the Nature of thofe Things to be very 
different whofe Names are fo, and judge of them 
accordingly. 

I may borrow a remarkable Inftance for my 
Purpofe almoft out of every Garden, which con- 
tains a Variety of Plants in it. Moft or all Plants 
agree in this, that they have a Root, a Stalk, 
Leaves, Buds, Bloffoms, and Seeds : But the Gar- 
dener ranges them under very different Names, as 
though they were really different Kinds of Beings, 
merely becaufe of the different Ufe and Service to 
which they are applied by Men ,: As for Inftance, 
thofe Plants whofe Roots are eaten, ihall appro- 
priate 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REAS6N. 8Q 

priate the Name of Roots to themfelves ; fa cb are 
Carrots, Turnips, RadiJJies, &b. If the Leaves are 
of chief Ufe to us, then we call them Herbs ; as 
Sage, Mint, Thyme : If the Leaves are eaten raw, 
they are termed Sallad ; as Lettuce, Pur/lain:' If 
boiled they become Pot-herbs ; as Spinage, Cole- 
worts ; and fome of thofe fame Plants, which are 
Pot-herbs in one Family, are Sallad in another. 
If the Buds are made our Food, they are called 
Heads, or Tops \ fo Cabbage Heads, Heads of Af- 
paragus and Artichokes. If the Blojfom be of mofl 
Importance, we call it a Flower ; fuch are Daijies, 
Tulips, and Carnations, which are the mere Blof- 
foms of thofe Plants. If the Hujk or Seeds are 
eaten, they are called the Fruits of the Ground, 
as Peas* Beans, Strawberries, &c. If any Part of 
the Plant be of known and common Ufe to us in 
Medicine, we call it a phyfical Herb, as Carduus 9 
S curvy -grajs ; but if we count no Part ufcful, we 
call it a Weed, and throw it out of the Garden ; 
and yet perhaps our next Neighbour knows fome 
valuable Property and Ufe of it; he plants it in his 
Garden, and gives it the Title of an Herb or a 
Flower. You fee here how fmall is the real Difc' 
tinction of thefe feveral Plants, confidered in their 
general Nature as the lejjer Vegetables : Yet what 
very different Ideas we vulgarly form concerning 
them, and make different Specks of them, chiefly 
becaufe of the different Names given them. 

Now when Things are fet in this clear Light, 
it appears how ridiculous it would be for two Per- 
fons to contend, whether Dandelion be an Herb or 
a Weed ; whether it be a Pot-herb or Sallad ; when 
by the Cuftom or Fancy of different Families, this 
one Plant obtains all thefe Names according to 
the feveral Ufes of it, and the Value that is put 
•upon it. 

G 2 Note 



90 logick: ok, the [part j. 

Note here, that I find no manner of Fault with 
the Variety of Names which are given to feveral 
Plants, according to the various Uies we make of 
them. But I would not have our Judgments im- 
pofed upon hereby, to think that thefe mere nomi- 
nal Species, viz. Het'bs, Sallad, and Weeds , become 
three really different Species of Beings, on this Ac- 
count, that they have different Names and Ufes. 
But I proceed to other Infiances. 

It has been the Cuftom of Mankind, when they 
have been angry with any Thing, to add a new ill 
Name to it, that they may convey thereby a hate- 
ful Idea of it, though the Nature of the Thing ftill 
abides the fame. So the Papifls call the Prote/lants, 
Hereticks : A profane Perfon calls a Man of Piety , 
a Prectfian: And in the Times of the Civil War in 
the laft Century, the Royalijls called the Parlia* 
mentarians, Fanaticks, Roundheads, and Sectaries*. 
And they in Requital called the Royalijls, Malig- 
nant s : but the Partizans on each Side were really 
neither better nor worfe for thefe Names. 

Is has alfo been a frequent Practice, on the other 
Hand, to put new favourable Names upon ill Ideas, 
on purpofe to take off the Odium of them. But 
notwithstanding all thefe flattering Names and 
Titles, a Man of profufe Generofity is but a Spend- 
thrift ; a natural Son is a Bajlard flill ; a Gallant 
is an Adulterer ; and a Lady of Pleafure is a 
Whore. 

Direcl. III. Take heed of believing the Nature 
and EJfence of two or more Things tq be certainly the 
fame, becaufe they may have the fame Name given 
them. This has been an unhappy and fatal Occa- 
fion of a thoufand Miftakes in the natural, in the 
civil, and in the religious Affairs of Life, both 
amongft the Vulgar and the Learned. I fhall give 

two 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON". 9*1 

two or three Inftances, chiefly in the Matters of 
Natural Phdofphy, having hinted feveral Dangers 
of this Kind relating to Theology, in the foregoing 
Difcourfe concerning equivocal Words. 

Our elder Philofophers have generally made ufe 
of the Word Soul to iignify that Principle where- 
by a Plant grows, and they call it the vegetative 
Soul: The Principle of the animal Motion of a 
Brute has been likewife called a Soul, and we have 
been taught to name it the fenji 'five Soul : They 
have alio given the Name Soul to that fuperior 
Principle in Man, whereby he thinks, judges, rea- 
fons, &c. and though they diflinguifhed this by 
the honourable Title of the rational Soul, yet in 
common Difcourfe and Writing we leave out the 
Words vegetative .fenfitive, and rational-, and make 
the Word Souliervc for all thefe Principles: Thence 
we are led early into this Imagination, and there 
is a Sort offpirilual Being in Plants and in Brutes 9 
like that in Men. Whereas if we did but abftracl 
and feparate thefe Things from Words, and com- 
pare the Caufe 6f Growth in a Plajit, with the 
Caufe of Reafoning in Man, (without the Word 
Smd) we mould never think that thefe two Prin- 
ciples were at all like one another ; nor mould we 
perhaps fo eaflly and peremptorily conclude, that 
Brutes need an intelligent Mind to perform their 
animal Actions. 

Another Inftance may be the Word Life, which 
being attributed to Plants, to Brutes, and to Men, 
and in each of them afcribed to the Soul, has very 
eafily betrayed us from our Infancy into this Mis- 
take, that the Spirit or Mmd, or thinking Principle, 
in Man, is the Spring of vegetative and animal Life 
to his Body : Whereas it is evident, that if the 
Spirit or thinking Principle of Man gave Life to his 
animal Nature, the way to fave Men from dying 

G 3 would 



9^ logick: or, this [parti, 

would not be to ufe Medicines, but to pcrfuade 
the Spirit to abide in the Body. 

I might derive a third Instance from the Word 
Heat, which is ufed to fignify the Senfation we 
have when we are near the Fire, as well as the 
Caufe of that Senfation, which is in the Fire itfelf ; 
and thence we conclude from our Infancy, that 
there is a Sort of Heat in the Fire refembling our own 
Senfation, or the Heat which we feel : Whereas in 
the Fire there is nothing but little Particles of 
Matter, of fuch particular Shapes, Sizes, Situa- 
tions, and Motions, as are fitted to imprefs fuch 
Motion on our Flefh or Nerves as excite the Senfe 
of Heat. Now if this Caufe of our Senfation in 
the Fire had been always called by a diftinct Name, 
perhaps we had not been fo rooted in this Miftake, 
that the Fire is hot with the fame Sort of Heat that 
vje feel. This will appear with more Evidence, 
when we confider that we are fecure from the fame 
Miftake where there have been two different Names 
allotted to our Senfation, and to the Caufe of it ; 
as, we do not fay, Fain is in the Fire that burns 
us, or in the Knife that cuts and wounds us. ; for 
we call it hurtling in the Fire^ cutting in the Kwfe, 
and Fain only when it is in ourfelves. 

Numerous Inftanccs of this Kind might be de- 
rived from the Words fweet, four, loud, flirill, and 
almoft all the fenfible Qualities, whofe real Natures 
we miftake from our very Infancy, and we are 
ready to fuppofe them to be the fame in us, and 
in the Bodies that caufe them ; partly becaufe the 
Words which fignify our own Senfations are ap- 
plied alfo to fignify thofe unknown fhapes and Mo- 
tions of the little Corpufcles, which excite and 
caufe thofe Senfations. 



Direct 



CH. VI.]' RIGHT USE OP REASON. Q3 

Direct. IV. In Converfation or Reading he diligent 
to find out the true Senfe, or diflincl Idea, which the 
Speaker or Writer affixes to his Words, and efpecially 
to thofe Words which are the chief Sub j eel of his Dif- 
courfe. As far as poffible take heed, left you put 
more or fewer Ideas into one Word, than the Per- 
fon did when he wrote or fpoke ; and endeavour 
that your Ideas of every Word may be the fame as 
his were : Then you will judge better of what he 
fpeaks or writes. 

It is for want of this that Men quarrel in the 
Dark ; and that there are fo many Contentions in 
the feveral Sciences, and efpecially in Divinity. 
Multitudes of them arife from a Miftakeofthe 
true Senfe or complete Meaning in which Words 
are ufed by the Writer or Speaker ; and hereby 
fometimes they Je em to agree, when they really differ 
in their Sentiments; and fometimes they feemto 
differ when they really agree. Let me give an In- 
fiance of both. 

When one Man by the Word Church mall un- 
derftand all that believe in Chrifl ; and another by 
the Word Church means only the Church of Rome ; 
they may both afTent to this Proportion, There is 
no Salvation cut of the Church, and yet their inward 
Sentiments may be widely different. 

Again, if one Writer mall affirm that Virtue added 
to Faith is fufficient to make a Chrifiian, and another 
fhall as zealoufly deny this Proportion, they feem 
to differ widely in Words, and yet perhaps they 
may both really agree in Sentiment : If by the 
Word Virtue, the affirmer intends our whole Duty 
to God and Man ; and the t)enier by the Word 
Virtue means only Courage, or at mod our Duty 
towards our Neighbour, without including in the 
Idea of it the Duty which we owe to God. 

G 4 Many 



94 LOGICK : Oil, TH2 [pAKT I. 

Many fuch Sort of Contentions as thefe are, if 
traced to their Original, will be found to be mere 
Logomachies •, or Strifes and Quarrels about Names 
and Words, and vain JaftgUngs, as the Apoftle calls 
them in his firft Letter of Advice to Timothy. 

In order therefore to attain clear and difimel Ideas 
of what we read and hear, we muft fearch the Senfe 
of Words ; we muft confider what is the Original 
and Derivation in our own or foreign Languages ; 
what is their common Senfe amongft Mankind, or 
in other Authors, efpecially fuch as wrote in the 
fame Country, in the fame Age, about the fame 
Time, and upon the fame Subjects : We mud 
confider in what fenfe the fame Author nfes any 
particular Word or Phrafc, and that when he is 
difconrting on the fame Matter, and efpecially 
about the fame Parts or Paragraphs of his Writing : 
We mult confider whether the Word be ufed in a 
ftrict and limited, or in a large and general Senfe ; 
whether in a literal, in a figurative, or in a pro- 
phetick Senfe ; whether it has any fecondary Idea 
annexed to it befides the primary or chief Senfe. 
We muft inquire farther, what is the Scope and 
Defign of the Writer ; and what is the Connection 
of that Sentence with thofe that go before it, and 
thofe which follow it. By thefe and other Methods 
we are to Search out the Definition of 'Names ■, that 
is, the true Senfe and Meaning in which any Au- 
thor or Speaker ufes any Word, which may be the 
chief Subject of Difcourfe, or may carry any con- 
fiderable Importance in it. 

Direct. V. When we communicate our Notions to 
others, merely with a Defign to inform and improve 
their Knowledge, let us in the Beginning of our Dif- 
courfe take Care to adjufi the Definition of Names 
wherefoever there is Need of it ; that is, to determine 
• • • • _ flairdj 



CH. VI,} EIGHT USE OF REASON. 95 

plainly what we mean by the chief Words which are 
the Suhjecl of our Difcourfe ; and be fare always to 
keep the fame Ideas, whenfoever we ufe the fame 
Words, unlefs we give due Notice of the Change, 
This will have a very large and happy Influence, 
in fecuring not only others but ourfelves too from 
Confufion and Miflake; for even Writers and 
Speakers themfelves, for Want of due Watchful- 
nefs, are ready to affix ^different ideas to their own 
Words, in different Parts of their Difcourfes, and 
hereby bring Perplexity into their own Reafonings, 
and confound their Hearers. 

It is by an Obfervation of this Rule that Mathe~ 
maticians have fo happily fecured themfelves, and 
the Sciences which they have profefled, from Wrang- 
ling and Controverfy ; becaufe whenfoever in the 
Progrefs of their Treatifes they have Occafion to 
ufe a new and unknown Word, they always define 
it, and tell in what Senfe they fhall take it; and 
in many of their Writings you find a Heap of 
'Definitions at the very Beginning. Now if the 
Writers of Natural Philofophy and Morality had 
ufed the fame Accuracy and Care, they had effec- 
tually fecluded a Multitude of noify and fruitlefs 
Debates out of their feveral Provinces : Nor had 
that facred Theme of Divinity been perplexed with 
fo many intricate Difputes, nor the Church of 
Chrifl been torn to pieces by fo many t Sects and 
Factions, if the Words Grace, Faith, Right eoufnefs t 
Repentance, Juftification, Worfliip, Church, Bifliop, 
Prefbyter, &c. had been well defined, and their 
Significations adj Lifted, as near as poffible, by the 
Ufe of thofe Words in the New Teftament ; or at 
leaft, if every Writer had told us at firfl in what 
Senfe he would ufe thofe Words. 

Direct. VI. In your own Studies, as well as hi 
the Communication of your Thoughts to others merely 

for 



Q6 logick : or, the [part i. 

for their Information, avoid ambiguous and equivo- 
cal Terms as much as pojfible. Do not ufe fuch 
Words as have two or three Definitions of the Name 
belonging to them, that is, fuch Words as have 
two or three Senfes, where there is any Danger of 
Miftake. Where your chief Bufinefs is to inform 
the Judgment, and to explain a Matter, rather 
than to perfuade or affect, be not fond of exprefs- 
ing yourfelves in figurative Language, when there 
are any proper Words that fignify the fame Idea in 
their literal Senfe. It is the Ambiguity of Names, 
as we have often faid, that brings almoft infinite 
Confufion into our Conceptions of Things. 

But where there is a Neceffity of ufing an am- 
biguous Word, there let double. Care be ufed in 
defining that Word, and declaring in what Senfe 
you take it. And be fure to fuffer no ambiguous 
Word ever to come into your Definitions. 

Direct. VII. In communicating your Notions, rift 
every Word as near as pojfible in the fame Senfe in 
which Mankind commonly ufe it ; or which Writers 
that have gone before you have ufually affixed to it, 
upon Condition that it is free from Ambiguity. 
Though Names are in their Original merely arbi- 
trary, yet we fhould always keep to the eflablifhed 
Meaning of them, unlefs great Neceffity requires 
the Alteration ; for when any W r ord has been ufed 
to fignify an Idea, that old Idea will recur in the 
Mind when the Word is heard or read, rather 
than any new Idea which we may fallen to it. 
And this is one Reafon why the received Defini- 
tion of Names fhould be changed as little as pof- 
fiblc. 

But I add farther, that though a Word intirely 
new, introduced into a Language, may be affixed 
to what Idea you plcafe, yet an old Word ought 
never to be fixed to an unaccuflomed Idea, with- 
out 



CH. VI.]) RIGHT USE OF REASON. 9? 

out juft and evident Neceffity, or without prefent 
or previous Notice, left we introduce thereby a 
Licence for all Manner of pernicious Equivocations 
and Faljhoods ; as for Inftance, when an idle Boy 
who has not feen his Book all the Morning, (hall 
tell his Mailer that he has learned his Leffon, he 
can never excufe himfelf by faying, that by the 
Word Lejfon he meant his Breakfafl, and by the. 
Word learn he meant eating ; furcly this would be 
connrued a downright Lie, and his fancied Wit 
would hardly procure his Pardon. 

In ufing an ambiguous Word, which has been 
ufed in different Senfes, we may choofe what we 
think the moil proper Senfe, as I have done, p. 86. 
in naming the Poles of the Loadflone, North or 
South. 

And when a Word has been ufed in two or 
three Senfes, and has made a great Inroad for 
Error upon that Account, it is of good Service to 
drop one or two of thofe Senfes, and leave it only 
one remaining, and fix the other Senfes or Ideas 
to other Words. So the modern Philofophers, 
when they treat of the human Soul, they call it the 
Mind, or Mens humana, and leave. the Word Anima, 
Qr Soul, to fignify the Principle of Life and Motion. 
in mere Animal Beings. 

So the Poet Juvenal has long ago given us a Hint 
of this Accuracy and Diftinclion, when he fays of 
Brutes and Men, 

Indulfit mundi communis Condiior illis 
Tantam Animas ; ?iohis Animum quoque. 

Sat. ix. v.- 1.34. 

Exception. There is one Cafe, wherein fame of 
thefe laft Rules concerning the Definition of Words, 
may be in fome meafure difpenfed with; and that 

is* 



Q% LOGICK : OK, THE [PART t. 

is, when ftrong and rooted Prejudice hath eftab- 
Jil'hed fon^e favourite Word or Phrafe, and long 
ufed it to exprefs fomc miftaken Notion, or to 
finite Tome inconfittent Ideas ; for 'then it is forne- 
times much calier to lead the World into Truth 
by indulging their Fondncfs for a Phrafe, and by 
aiiigning and applying new Ideas and Notions to 
their favourite Word ; and this is much fafer alfo 
than to awaken all their Paffions by rejecting both 
their old Words, and Ph rales, and Notions, and 
introducing all new at once : Therefore we con- 
tinue to fay, there is Heat in the Fire, there is Cold- 
nefs in Ice, rather than invent new Words to ex- 
prefs the Powers which are in Fire or Ice, to ex- 
cite the Sen fat ions of Heat or Cold in us. For 
the fame fteafon fome Words and Phrafes which 
are lefs proper, may be continued in Theology y 
while People are led into clearer Ideas with much 
more Eafe and Succefs, than if an Attempt were 
made to change all their beloved Forms of Speech. 

In other Cafes, thefe logical Directions fhould 
generally be obferved, and different Names affixed 
to different Ideas. 

Here I cannot but take Occafion to remark, 
that it is a confiderable Advantage to any Lan- 
guage to have a Variety of new JVords introduced 
into it, that when in Courfe of Time new Objecls 
and new Ideas arife, there may be new Words and 
Names afligned to them : And alfo where one fin- 
gle Name has fuftained two or three Ideas in Time 
pail, thefe new Words may remove the Ambiguity 
by being affixed to fome of thofe Ideas. This 
Practice would, by Degrees, take away Part of the 
Uncertainty of Language. And for this Rcafon I 
cannot but congratulate our Englifli Tongue, that 
it has been abundantly enriched with the Tranfla- 
tion of Words from ail our Neighbour Nations, as 

well 



CH. VI.3 HIGHT USE OF REASON. §() 

well as from ancient Languages, and thefe Words 
have been as it were enfranchifed amongft us; for 
French, Latin, Greek, and German Names will Sig- 
nify Englijh Ideas, as well as Words that are an- 
ciently and intirely Englijh. 

It may not be amifs to mention in this Place, 
that as the D: termination of the particular Senfe 
in which any Word is ufed, is called the Defim* 
tion of the Nairn, fo the Enumeration of the vari- 
ous Senfes of an equivocal Word, is fomctimes 
called the Divifion or Diftinclion of the Name ; and 
for this Pnrpofe good Dictionaries are of excellent 
life. 

This Diftinclion of the Name or Word is greatly 
neceflary in Argumentation or Difpute ; when a 
fallacious Argument is ufed, he that anfwers it 
diitinguifhes the feveral Senfes of fome Word or 
Phrafe in it, and (hews in what Senfe it is trzi£ % 
#nd in what Senfe it is evidently fal& 



SECT, 



100 10G1CK : OR, THE [p&RT I, 

SECT. IV, 

Of the Definition of Things. 

AS there is much Confufion introduced into 
our Ideas, by the Means of thofe Words to 
which they are affixed, fo the mingling our Ideas 
with each other without Caution, is a farther Oc- 
cafion whereby tl?ey become confufed. A Court 
Lady, born and bred up amongft Pomp and Equi- 
fage, and the vain Notions of Birth and Quality, 
conftantly joins and mixes all thefe with the Idea 
of herfelf, and (he imagines thefe to be effential to 
her Nature, and as it were neceffary to her Being : 
thence (lie is tempted to look upon menial Servants, 
and the loweft Rank of Mankind, as another Spe- 
cies of Beings, quite diftincl from herfelf. A Plow- 
hoy > that has never travelled beyond his own Vil- 
lage, and has feen nothing but thatched Houfes and 
his Parifh Church, is naturally led to imagine that 
Thatch belongs to the very Nature of a Houfe, 
and that that muft be a Church which is built of 
Stone, and efpecially if it has a Spire upon it. A 
Child whofe Uncle has been exceffive fond, and his 
$choolmafler very fevere, eafily believes that Fond- 
pefs always belongs to Uncles, and that Severity is 
effential to Mafiers or hiftmclors. He has feen alfo 
Soldiers with red Coats, or Minifters with long black 
Gowns, ana 1 therefore he pcrfuades himfclf that 
thefe Garbs are effential to the Characters, and that 
he is not a Minifter who has not a long black Gown, 
nor can he be a Soldier who is not dreffed in red. 
It would be well if all fuch Miflakes ended with 
Childhood. 

It 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 101 

It might be alfo fubjoined, that our complex 
Ideas become conf'ufed, not only by muting or 
blending together more fimple or fingle Ideas than 
really belong to them, as in the Inftances juft 
mentioned ; but Obicurity and Confufion fome- 
times come upon our Ideas alio, for want of unit- 
ing a fuffic'mit Number of Jingle Ideas to make the 
complex one : So if I conceive of a Leopard only 
as a fpotted Beafi, this does not diftinguifh it from 
a Trger or a Lynx A nor from many Dogs or Ho?fes, 
which are fpotted too ; and therefore a Leopard 
muft have fome more Ideas added to complete 
and diftinguifh it. 

I grant that it is a large and free Acquaintance 
with the World, a watchful Obfervation and dili- 
gent Search into the Nature of Things, that muft 
fully correct this Kind of Errors : The Rules of 
Logick are not fufficient to do it : But yet the Rides 
of Logick may inrtrucl us by what Means to diftin- 
guifh one Thing from another, and how to fearch 
and mark out, as far as may be, the Contents and 
Limits of the Nature of diftinct Beings, and thus 
may give us great Aftiftance towards the Remedy 
of thefe Miftakes. 

As the Definition of Names frees us from that 
Confufion which Words introduee, fo the Defini- 
tion of Things will in fome meafure guard us again ft 
that Confufion which mingied Ideas have intro- 
duced: For as a Definition of the Name explains 
what any Word means, fo a Definition of the Thing 
explains what is the Nature of that. Thing. 

In order to form a Definition of any Thing, we 
muft put forth tnefe three Acts of the* Mind. 

Firft, Compare the Thing to be defined with 
other Things that are moft like to ittelf, and iee 
wherein its Eflence or Nature agrees with them ; 
and this is called the general Nature or Genus in a 

Definition : 



102 . LOGICK : OK, THE [PART I, 

Definition : So if you would define what Wine is, 
firft compare it with other Things like itfelf, as 
Cyder \ Ferry, &c. and you will find it agrees 
erfentially with them in this, that it is a Sort of 
Juice. 

Secondly, Confider the moft remarkable and 
primary Attribute, Property, or Idea wherein this 
Thing differs from thofe other Things that are 
moft like it; and that is its ejfential or fpecifick 
Difference : So Wine differs from Cyder and Perry , 
and all other Juices ; in that it is preffed from a 
Grape. This may be called its fpecial Nature, 
which diftinguifhes it from other Juices. 

Thirdly, Join the general and fpecial Nature 
together, or (which is all one) the Genus and the 
Difference, and thefe make up a Definition. So the 
Juice of a Grape, or Juice prejfed from Grapes, is 
the Definition of Wine. 

So if I would define what Winter is, I confider 
firft wherein it agrees with other Things which 
are moft like it, namely, Summer, Spring, ^utmnn, 
and I find they are all Seafons of the Year ; there- 
fore a Seafon of the Year is the Genus. Then I 
obferve wherein it differs from thefe, and that is 
in the Shorinefs of the Days ; for it is this which 
does primarily diftinguifh it from other Seafons ; 
therefore this may be called its fpecial Nature, or 
its Difference. Then by joining thefe together I 
make a Definition. Winter is that Seafon of the Year 
wherein the Days are Jhorteji. I confefs indeed this 
is but a ruder Definition of it, for to definp it as 
an accurate Aftronomer, I muft limit the Days, 
Hours and Minutes. 

After the fame Manner, if we would explain or 
define what the Picture of a Man is, we confider 
firft the Genus, or general Nature of it, which is 
a Reprefentation ; and herein it agrees with many 

other 



CH. VI.] fclGHT USE OP REASON; 103 

other Things, as a Statue, a Shadow, a Print, a 
verbal Defcription of a Man, &c. Then we con- 
fider wherein it differs from thefe, and we find it 
differs from a verbal Defcription, in that it is a 
Reprefentation to the Eye, and not to the Ear : It 
differs from a Statue, in that it is a Reprefentation 
upon a flat Surface, and not in a folid Figure : It 
differs from a Shadow, in that it is an abiding Re* 
prefentation, and not a fleeting one : It differs from 
a Print or Draught, becaufe it reprefents the Go- 
lours by Paint, as well as the Shape of the Object 
by Delineation. Now fo many, or rather fo few 
of thefe Ideas put together, as are juft fuffrcient to 
diftinguifh a Piclure from all other Reprefentations, 
make up its eflential Difference, or its Jpecial Na- 
ture; and all thefe are included in its being painted 
on a plain Surface. Then join this to the Genus, 
which is a Reprefentation ; and thus you have the 
complete Definition of the Piclure of a Man, name- 
ly, it is the Reprefentation of a Man in Paint upon 
a Surface, (or a Plane.) 

Here it muft be obferved, that when we fpeak of 
the Genus and Difference as com poling a Definltion 9 
it mud be always underftood that the neareft Genus, 
and the fpecifick Difference are required. 

The next general Nature, or the neareft Genus, 
muft be ufed in a Definition, becaufe it includes all 
the reft as Parts of its complex Idea ; as if I would 
define Wine, I muft fay, Wine is a Juice, which is 
the neareft Genus ; and not fay } Wine is a Liquid, 
which is a remote general Nature ; or, Wine is a 
Subftance, which is yet more remote, for Juice in- 
cludes both Subftance and Liquid. Beiides, neither 
of thefe two remote general Natures would make 
any Diftinction between Wine and a thoufand 
other Subftances, or other Liquids, a remote Genus 
leaves the Thing too much undiftinguifhed. 

H The 



104 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I, 

The fpec'ifick Difference is that primary Attribute 
which diftinguifhes each Species frdm one another, 
while they ftand ranked under the fame general 
Nature or Genus. Though Wine differs from 
other Liquids, in that it is the Juice of a certain 
Fruity yet this is but a general or generick Differ- 
ence, for it does not diftinguifh Wine from Cyder 
or Perry ; the fpecifick Difference of Wine therefore 
is its Prejfure from the Grape ; as Cyder is preffed 
from Apples, and Perry from Pears, 

In Definitions alfo we muft ufe the primary At- 
tribute that diftinguifhes the Sfecies or fpecial Na- 
ture, and not attempt to define Wine by its parti- 
cular Taftes, or Effects, or other Properties, which 
are but feco?tdary or consequential, when its Prejfure 
from the Grape is the moft obvious and primary 
Distinction of it from all other Juices. I confefs 
in fome Cafes it is not fo eafily known, which is 
the primary Idea that diftinguifhes one Thing from 
another ; and therefore fome would as foon define 
Winter by the Coldnefs of the Sea/on, as by the 
Shortnefs of the Days : though the Shortnefs of the 
Days is doubtlefs the moft jufl, primary, and phi- 
lofophical Difference betwixt that and the other 
Seafons of the Year, fince Winter Days are always 
Jliortejl, but not always the coldejl ; I add alfo, that 
the Shortnefs of the Days is one Caufe of the Cold- 
rufs, but the Cold is no Caufe of their Shortnefs. 



SECT. 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 105 

SEGT. V, 

Rules of Definition of the Thing. 



T 



H E fpecial Rules of a good Definition are 
thefe : 



Rule I. A Definition mufi he univerfal, or as fome 
call it adequate ; that is, it muft agree to all the 
particular Species or Individuals that are included 
under the fame Idea ; fo the Juice of a Grape agrees 
to all proper Wines, whether Red, White, French, 
Spanijh, Florence, &c. 

Rule II. It muft he proper and peculiar to the 
Thing defined \ and agree to that alone ; for it is the 
very Delign of a Definition effectually to diftin- 
guifh one Thing from all others : So the Juice of 
a Grape agrees to no other Subfiance, to no other 
Liquid, to no other Being but Wine. 

Thefe two Rules being obferved, will always 
render a Definition reciprocal with the Thing de- 
fined; which is a fcholaflick Way of Speaking, to 
flgnify that the Definition may be ufed in any Sen- 
tence in the Place of the Thing defined ; or they 
may be mutually affirmed concerning each other, 
or fubftituted in the Room of each other. The 
Juice of the Grape is Wine, or Wine is the Juice of 
the Grape. And wherefoever the Word Wine is 
ufed, you may put the Juice of the Grape in (lead 
of it, except when you conlider Wine rather as a 
Word than a Thing, or when it is mentioned in, 
fuch logical Rides. 

H 2 Rule 



106 EOGICK : OR, TfiTE [[PART 1. 

Rule III. A Definition ought to be clear and plain'; 
for the Defign of it is to lead us into the Know- 
ledge of the Thing defined. 

Hence it will follow, that the Words ufed in a 
Definition ought not to be doubtful, or equivocal 
and obfcure,- bat as plain and eafy as the Language 
will afford : And indeed it is a general Rule con- 
cerning the Definition both of Names and Things, 
that no Word fhould be ufed in either of them, 
which has any Darknefs or Difficulty in it, unlefs 
it has been before explained or defined. 

Hence it will follow alio, that there are manv 
Things wbi*cb cannot well be defined either as to 
the Name or the. Thing, unlefs it be by fynony- 
mous Words, or by a Negation of the contrary 
Idea, &c. for learned Men know not how to make 
them more evident, or more intelligible, than the 
Ideas which every Man has gained by the vulgar 
Methods of Teaching. Such are the Ideas of Ex- 
ten/ion, Duration, Thought, Confcioufnefs, and mod 
of our flmple Ideas, and particularly fenfible Qua- 
lities, as White, Blue, Red, Cold, Heat, Shrill, Bit- 
ter, Sour, &c. 

We can fay of Duration, that it is a Continuance 
in Being, or a not ceafing to be ; we can fay of 
Confcioufnefs, that it is as it were a Feeling within 
our/elves ; we may fay Heat is that which is not 
Cold; or Sour is that which is like Vinegar ; or we 
may point to the clear Sky, and fay, that is Blue. 
Thefe are the vulgar Methods of teaching the De- 
finitions of Names, or Meaning of Words. But 
there are fome Philofophcrs, whofe Attempts to de- 
fine thefe Things learnedly, have wrapt up their 
Ideas in greater Darknefs, and expofed themfelvcs 
to Ridicule and Contempt ; as when they define 
Heat, they fay, it is Qualitas congregans homogenea 
& fegregans heterogenea, that is, a Quality gather- 
ing 



•CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 107 

ing together Things of the fame Kind, and fepa- 
rating Things of a different Kind. So they define 
White, a Colour arlfing from the Prevalency of 
Brightnefs : Bat every Child knows Hot and White 
better without thefe Definitions. 

There are many other Definitions given by the 
Peripatetick Philofophers, which are very faulty by 
Reafon of their Obfcurlty ; as Motion is defined by 
•them the Acl of a Being in Pozver, fo far forth as it 
is in Power. Time is the Meafure or Number of 
Motion according to pafl, prefent and future. The 
Soul is the Acl of an organlcal natural Body, hav- 
ing Life in Power ; and feveral others of the fame 
Stamp. 

Rule IV. It is alfo commonly prefcribed amongft 
•the Rules of Definition, that itfliouldbefJiort, fo 
that it mufl have no Tautology in it, nor any Words 
fuperfluous. I confefs, Definitions ought to be ex- 
•pref&d in as few Words as is confident with a 
clear and juft Explication of the Nature of the 
Thing defined, and a Diftinction of it from all 
other Things befide : But it is of much more 
Importance, and far better, that a Definition mould 
explain clearly the Subject we treat of, though the 
Words be many, than to leave Obfcurities in the 
•Sentence, by confining it within too narrow Li- 
mits. So in the Definition which we have given 
of Loglck, that it is the Art of ufing Reafon zvell in 
the Search -after Truth, and the Communication of it 
toothers, it has indeed many Words in it, but it 
could not well be fhorter. Art is the Genus where- 
in it agrees with Rhetorick, Poefy, Arlthmetlck, 
Wreftling, Sailing, Building, &c. For all thefe are 
Arts alfo: But the Difference or fpecial Nature 
of it is drawn from its Object, Reafo?i ; from the 
Acl:, ufmg it well, and from its two great Ends or 

H 3 Defigns, 



108 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

Defigns, namely, the Search after Truth, and the 
Communication of it ; nor can it be juftly defcribed 
and explained in fewer Ideas. 

V, If we add a fifth Rule, it mull be, that neU 
ther the Thing defined, nor a mere fynonymous Na?ne, 
Jhould make a Part of the Definition, for this would 
be no Explication of the Nature of the Thing ; and 
a fynonymous Word at bed could only be a Defi- 
nition of the Name. 



SECT. VI. 

Obfervations concerning the Definition of Things. 

BEFOFE I part with this Subject, I muft pro- 
pofe feveral Obfervations which relate to the 
Definition of Things. 

\fi Obfervat. There is no Need that in Defini- 
tions we (hould be confined to one fingle Attribute 
or Property, in order to cxprefs the Difference of 
the Thing defined., for fometimes the effential Dif- 
ference confifts in two or threeldeas or Attributes. 
So a Grocer is a Man who buys and fells Sugar, and 
Plumbs, and Spices for Gain. A Clock is an En- 
gine with Weights and Wheels, and Jhews the Hour 
of the Day both by pointing andfiriking : And if I 
were to define a Repeating Clock, I muft add an- 
other Properly, namely, that it alfo repeats the 
Hour. So that the true and primary effential Dif- 
ference of fome complex Ideas confiftingin feveral 
diftin6t Properties, cannot be well exprefled with- 
out conjunctive Particles of Speech. 

'id Objervat. There is no Need that Definitions 
fhould always be pofitive, for fome Things differ 
from others merely by a Defect of what others 

have; 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 10$ 

have ; as if a Chair be defined a Seat for a Jingle 
P erf on with a Back belonging to it, then a Stool is a 
Seat for afingle Perfon without a Back ; and a Form 
is a Seat for fever al Perfons without a Back : Tbefe 
are negative Differences. So Sin is Want of Con- 
formity to the Law of God ; Blindnefs is a Want of 
Sight ; a Vagabond is a Perfon without a Home, 
Some Ideas are negative, and their Definitions 
ought to be fo too. 

3d Obfervat. Some Things may have two or 
more Definitions, and each of them equally jufl 
and good ; as a Mile is the Length of eight Fur- 
longs, or it is the third Part of a League, Eternal 
is that which ever was, and ever fttall be ; or it is 
that which has no Beginning, and fhall have no End, 
Man * is ufually defined a rational Animal : But 
it may be much better to define him a Spirit united 
to an Animal offuch a Shape, or an Animal offuch 
a peculiar Shape united to a Spirit, or a Being com- 
pofed offuch an Animal and a Mind, 

4th Obfervat. Where the EJfences of Things are 
evident, and clearly diftinc! from each other, there 
we may be more exacl and accurate in the Defini- 
tions of them : But where their EJfences approach 
near to each other, the Definition is more difficult. 
A Bird may be defined a feathered Animal with 
Wings, a Ship may be defined a large hollow Build- 
ing made to pafs over the Sea with Sails : But if you 
afk me to define a Bat, which is between a Bird 

* The common Definition of Man, namely, a rational Ani- 
mal, is very faulty ; 1 . Becaufe the AnimalAs not rational ; the 
Rationality of Man arifes from the Mind to which the Animal 
is united. 2. Becaufe if a Spirit mould. be united to a Horfe 
and make it a rational Being, furely this would not be a Man; 
It is evident therefore that the peculiar Shape mud enter into 
the Definition of a Man to render it juft and perfect ; and for 
want of a full Defcription thereof, all our Definitions are de- 
fective. 

H4 and 



110 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

and a Beqft, or to define a Barge and Hoy, which 
are between a Boat and a SZ?//>, it is much harder 
to define them, or to adjuft the Bounds of their 
Effence. This is very evident in all monftrous 
Births, and irregular Produclions of Nature, as well 
as in many Works of Art. which partake fo much 
of one Species and fo much of another, that we 
cannot tell under which Species to rank them, or 
how to determine their fpecifick Difference. 

The feveral Species of Beings are feldom precife- 
ly limited in the Nature of Things by any certain 
and unalterable Bounds : The Effences of many 
Things do not conflft in indivijihili, or in one evi- 
dent indivifible Point, as fome have imagined ; 
but by various Degrees they approach nearer to, 
or differ more from others that are of a kindred 
Nature. So (as I have hinted before) in the very 
Middle of each of the Arches of a Rainbow, the 
Colours of green, yellozv, and red, are fufficiently 
dirtinguifhed ; but near the Borders of the feveral 
Arches they run into one another, fo that you 
hardly know how to limit the Colours, nor whe- 
ther to call it red or yellow, green or blue. 

5th Obfervat. As the highejl or chief Genus *s, 
namely, Being and Not-Being, can never be defined, 
becaufe there is no Genus fuperior to them ; fo 
neither can fmgle Ideas or Individuals be well de- 
fined, becaufe either they have no ejfential Dif- 
ferences from other Individuals, or their Differ- 
ences are not known ; and therefore Individuals 
are only to be defcribed by their particular Cir- 
cumflances : So King George is diftinguifhed from 
all other Men and other Kings, by defcribing him 
as the firfi King of Great-Britain of the Houfe of 
Brunfwick ; and Wejlminfter-Hall is defcribed by 
its Situation and its Vk 3 &c. 

That 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. Ill 

.That individual Bodies can hardly have any 
eflential Difference, at lead within the Reach of 
our Knowledge, may be made thus to appear; 
Methufelah, when he was nine hundred and iixty 
Years old, and perhaps worn out with Age and 
Weaknefs, was the fame Perfon as when he was 
in his full Vigour of Manhood, or when he was an 
Infant, newly born ; but how far was his Body the 
fame ? Who can tell whether there was any Fibre 
of his Flefh or his Bones that continued the fame 
throughout his whole Life ? Or who can determine 
which were thofe Fibres ? The Ship in which Sir 
Francis Drake failed round the World, might be 
new built, and refitted fo often, that few of the 
fame Timbers remained ; and who can fay whether 
it mufl be called the fame Ship or no ? And what 
is its efTential Difference ? How fhall we define 
Sir Francis Drakes Ship, or make a Definition for 
Methufelahf. 

To this Plead belongs that mod difficult Quef- 
tion, What is the Pr'mciple of Individuation? Or 
what is it that makes any one thing the fame as it 
was fome Time before ? This is too large and la- 
borious an inquiry to dwell upon in this Place : Yet 
I cannot forbear to mention this Hint, namely, 
Since our own Bodies mufl rife at the lafl Day for 
us to receive Rewards or Punifhments in them, 
there may be perhaps fome original Fibres of each 
human Body, fome Stamina Vita, or primeval Seed 
of Life, which may remain unchanged through all 
the Stages of Life, Death, and the Grave; thefe 
may become the Springs and Principles of a Refur- 
reclion, and fufficient to denominate it the fame 
Body. But if there be any fuch conftant and vital 
Atoms which diftinguifh every human Body, they 
#re known to God only. 

6ik 



112 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

6th Obfervat. Where we cannot find out the 
Effence or effential Difference of any Species or Kind 
of Beings that we would define, we muft content 
ourfelves with a Collection of fuch chief Parts or 
Properties of it, as may belt explain it fo far as 
it is known, and beft diftinguifh it from other 
Things : So a Marigold is a Flower which hath 
many long yellow Leaves, rowul a Utile Knot of Seeds 
in the Midfi, with fuch a peculiar Stalky &c. So if 
we would define Silver, we fay it is a white and 
hard Metal, next in Weight to Gold : If we would 
define an Elder-Tree, we might fay it is one among 
the leffer Trees, whofe younger Branches are J oft and 
full of Pith, whofe Leaves are jagged or indented, 
and of fuch a particular Shape,, and it hears large 
Clufters offmall black Berries : So we muft define 
Water, Earth, Sto??e, a IJon, an Eagle, a Serpent, 
and the greateft Part of natural Beings, by a Col- 
lection of thofe Properties, which according to 
our Obfervation diftinguifh them from all other 
Things. This is what Mr. Locke calls nominal 
Effences, and nominal Definitions. And indeed, 
fince the effential Differences of the various na- 
tural Beings or Bodies round about us arife from 
a peculiar Shape, Size, Motion, and Situation of 
the ftnall Particles of which they are compofed, 
and fince we have no 'fufficient Method to in- 
form us what thefe are, we muft be contented 
with fuch a Sort of Definition of the Bodies they 
compofe. 

Here note, That this Sort of Definition, which 
is made up of a mere Collection of the moft re- 
markable Parts or Properties, is called an imperfeel 
Definition, or a Defcription ; whereas the Definition 
is called perfefl, when it is compofed of the effen- 
tial Difference, added to the general Nature or 
Genus. 

7th 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 113 

7 th Obfervat. The p erf "eel Definition of any Being 
always includes the Definition of the Name whereby 
it is called, for it informs us of the Senfe or Mean- 
ing of that Word, and (hews us what Idea that 
Word is affixed to : But the Definition of the Name 
does by no Means include a per fed Definition of 
the Thing ; for as we have faid before, a mere 
fynonymous Word, a Negation of the contrary, 
or the mention of any one or two diftinguifhing 
Properties of the Thing, may be a fufficient Defi- 
nition of the Name. Yet in thofe Cafes where the 
eflential Difference or EfTence of a Thing is un- 
known, there a Definition of the Name by the chief 
Properties, and a Defcription of the Thing, are much 
the fame. 

And here I think it necefTary to take Notice of 
one general Sentiment, that feems to run through 
that excellent Performance, Mr. Locke 's EJfay of 
human Underfianding, and that is, " That the Ef- 
" fences of Things are utterly unknown to us, and 
" therefore all our Pretences to diftinguifli the Ef- 
" fences of Things, can reach no farther than mere 
" nominal Effences ; or a Collection of fuch Pro- 
* perties as we know ; to fome of which we affix' 
tc particular Names, and others we bundle up, 
" feveral together, under one Name : And that 
" all our Attempts to rank Beings into different 
" Kinds or Species, can reach no -farther than to 
" make mere nominal Species ; and therefore our 
fC Definition of Things are but mere nominal De~ 
" fcnptions or Definitions of the Name." 

Now that we may do Juftice to this great Au- 
thor ; we ought to confider that he confines this 
Sort of Difcourfe only to the Effence offimple Ideas, 
and to the Effence of Subfiances, as appears evident 
in the fourth and fixfh Chapters of his Third 
Book ; for he allows the Names of mixed Modes 

always 



114 logick: or, the [parti. 

always to fignify the real Effences of their Species, 
Chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial Things to 
have real dlflincl Species ; and that in the Diftinc- 
tion of their Effences, there is generally lejs Confur- 
fion and Uncertainty than in natural, Chap. VT. 
Sect. 40, 4i. though it mud be confeffed, that he 
fcarce makes any Diftinction between the Defini- 
tion of the Name and the Definition of the Thing, as 
Chap. IV. and fometimes the Current of his Dif- 
eourfe decries the Knowledge of Effences in fuch 
general Terms, as may juftly give Occasion to 
Miftake. 

It muft be granted, that the Eflence of mod of 
our fimple Ideas, and the greatest Part of particular 
natural Subflances, are much unknown to us ; and 
therefore the eflential Difference of fenfible Qua- 
lities and of the various Kinds of Bodies, (as I have 
faid before) lie beyond the Reach of our Under- 
standings : We know not what makes the primary 
real inward Diftinclions between Red, Green, Sweet, 
Sour, &c. between Wood, Iron, Oil, Stone, Fire, 
Water, Flefih, Clay, in their general Natures, nor 
do we know what are the inward and prime Dis- 
tinctions between all the particular Kinds or Species 
in the Vegetable, Animal, Mineral, Met a Hick, or 
Liquid World of Things. See Philofoph. Effays, 
Effay xi. Se&. 1. 

But ftill there is a very large Field for the Know- 
ledge of the Effences of Things, and for the Ufe 
of per feci Definitions amongft our complex Ideas, the 
modal Appearances and Changes of Nature, the Works 
of Art, the Matters of Science, and all the Affairs 
of the civil, the moral, and the religious Life ; 
And indeed it is of much more Importance to alt 
Mankind, to have a better Acquaintance with the 
Works of Art for their own Livelihood and daily 
Ufe, with the,. Affairs of Morality for their Behar 

viour 



Cti. ' ViJ] EIGHT USE OF REASON. 115 

viour in this World, and with the Matters of Re- 
ligion, than we may be prepared for the World to 
come than to be able to give a perfect Definition of 
the Works of Nature. 

If the particular EfTences of Natural Bodies are 
unknown to us, we may yet be good Philofophers, 
good Artifts, good Neighbours, good Subjects, and 
good Chriftians without that Knowledge, and we 
have juft Reafon to be content. 

Now that the Ef fences of fome of the modal Ap~ 
pearances and Changes in Nature, as well as Things 
of Art, Science, and Morality, are fufficiently known 
to us to make perfecl Definitions of them, will ap- 
pear by the Specimen of a few Definitions of thefe 
Things. 

Motion is a Change of Place. Swiftnefs is the paf- 
fing over a long Space in a fhort Time. A natural 
Day is the Time of one alternate Revolution of 
Light and Darknefs, or it is the Duration of twenty- 
four Hours. An Eclipfe of the Sun is a Defect in 
the Sun's Tranfmiffion of Light to us by the Moon 
interpofing. * Snow is congealed Vapour. * Had 
is congealed Rain. An * ljland is a Piece of Land 
riling above the furrounding Water. An * Hill is 
an elevated Part of the Earth, and a * Grove is a 
Piece of Ground thick fet with Trees. An Houfe 
is a Building made to dwell in. A Cottage is a mean 
Houfe in the Country. A Supper is that Meal 
which we make in the Evening. A, Triangle is a 
Figure compofed of three Sides. A Gallon is a 
Meafure containing eight Pints. A Porter is a Man 
who carries Burdens for Hire. A King is the chief 

Ruler 

* Note, I/land, Hill, Grove, are not deiigned here in their 
more remote ana '' Jubjlantial Natures, (if I may fo exprefs it) or as 
the Matter of them is Earth ; for in this Senfe we know not 
their Effence, but only as considered in their modal Appearances, 
whereby one Part of Earth As diftincniifhed from another. The 
fame may be faid of Snow, Hail, ISc. 



116 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 

Ruler in a Kingdom. Veracity is the Conformity 
of our Words to our Thoughts. Covet oufnefs is an 
exceffive Love of Money, or other Poflcilions. 
Killing is the taking away the Life of an Animal. 
Murder is the unlawful killing of a Man. Rhetorick 
is the Art of fpeaking in a Manner fit to perfuade. 
Natural Philofophy is the Knowledge of the Pro- 
perties of Bodies, and the various Effects of them, 
or it is the Knowledge of the various Appearances 
in Nature, and their Caufes ; and Logick is the Art 
of ufing our Reafon well, &c. 

Thus you fee the efTential Differences of various 
Beings may be known, and are borrowed from their 
Qualities and Properties, their Caufes, Effecls, Ob- 
jecls, Adjuncl, E?ids, &c. and indeed as infinitely 
various as the EJfences of Things are, their Defini- 
tions mull: needs have various Forms. 

After all, it mull; be confeffed, that many Logi- 
cians and Philofophers in the former Ages, have 
made too great a Buftle about the Exactnefs of their 
Definitions of Things, and entered into long fruit- 
lefs Controverfies, and very ridiculous Debates in 
the feveral Sciences, about adjuding the Logical 
Formalities of every Definition ; whereas that Sort 
of wrangling is now grown very juftly contemptible, 
fince it is agreed that true Learning and the Know- 
ledge of Things depends much more upon a large 
Acquaintance with their various Properties, Caufes, 
Effects, Subject:, Object, Ends, and Defigns, than 
it does upon the formal and fcholaftick Niceties of 
Genus and Difference. 



SECT. 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 117 

SECT. VIL 

Of a complete Conception of Tilings. 

HAVING dwelt To long upon the firft Rule 
to direct our Conceptions, and given an Ac- 
count of the Definition both of Names and Things , 
in order to gain clear and diftincl Ideas, we make 
hade now to ihe fecond Rule to guide our Concep- 
tions, and that is, Conceive of Things completely in 
all their Parts. 

All Parts have a Reference to fome Whole: 
Now there is an old Diftinction which logical 
Writers make of a Whole and its Parts into four 
feveral Kinds, and it may be proper juit to mention 
them here. 

1 . There is a metaphyfical Whole, when the Ef- 
fence of a Thing is faid to coniift of two Parts, the 
Genus and the Difference, that is, the general and 
the fpecial Nature, which being joined together 
make up a Definition. This has been the Subject 
of the foregoing Sections. 

2. There is a mathematical Whole, which is better 
called integral, when the feveral Parts which go to 
make up the Whole are really diftinct from one 
another, and each of them may iubliit apart. So 
the Head, the Limbs, and the Trunk, are the in- 
tegral Parts of an animal Body; fo Units are the 
integral Parts of any large Number ; fo thefe Dif- 
courfes which I have written concerning Perception, 
Judgment, Reafoning, and Difpofition, are the four 
integral Parts of 'Logic 'k. This Sort of Parts goes 
to make up the Compktenefs of any Subject, and 
this is the chief and moft direct Matter of our Dif- 
courfe in this Section. 

3. There 



118 LOGlCKi OR, THE! [PAR? I* 

3. There is a phyfical or effential Whole, which 
is ufually made to fignify and include only the two 
ejfential Parts of Man, JWyand Soul : But I think 
the Senfe of it may better be altered, or at leaft 
inlarged, and fo include all the efTential Modes, 
Attributes, or Properties, which are contained in 
the Comprehenfion of any Idea. This (hall be the 
Subject of Difcourfe under the third Rule to direB 
our Conceptions. 

4. There is a logical Whole, which is alfo called 
an Univerfal \ and the Parts of it are all the par- 
ticular Ideas to which this univerfal Nature ex- 
tends. So a Genus is a Whole in refpecl of the fe- 
veral Species which are its Parts. So the Species is 
a Whole, and all the Individuals are the Parts of it. 
This fhall be treated of in the fourth Rule to guide 
our Conceptions. 

At prefent we confider an Idea as an integral 
Whole, and our fecond Rule directs us to contem- 
plate it in all its Parts : But this can only refer to 
complex Ideas, for fimple Ideas have no Parts. 



SECT. VIII. 

Of Divifion, and the Rules of it. 

SINCE our Minds are narrow in their Capa- 
city, and cannot furvey the fevcral Parts of any 
complex Being, with one tingle View, as God fees 
all Things at once ; therefore we muft, as it were, 
take it to Pieces, and confider of the Parts fepa- 
rately, that we may have a more complete Concep- 
tion of the Whole. So if I would learn the Na- 
ture of a Watch ; the Workman takes it to Pieces 
and fhews me the Spring, the Wheels, the Axles, 
the Pinions, the Balance, the Dial-plate, the Point- 
er, the Cafe, &c. and defcribes each of thefc Things 

to 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 11Q 

to me apart, together with their Figures ^and their 
Ufes. If I would know what an Animal is, the 
Anatomift. confiders the Head, the Trunk, the 
Limbs, the Bowels, apart from each other, and 
gives me diftincl Lectures upon each of them. So 
a Kingdom is djvided into its feveral Provinces ; a 
Book into its feveral Chapters, and any Science is 
divided according to the feveral Subjecls of which 
it treats. 

This is what we properly call the Divifion of an 
Idea, which is an Explication of the Whole of its 
feveral Parts, or an Enumeration of the feveral Parts 
that go to eompofe any Whole Idea, and to render 
it complete. And I think when Man is divided 
into Body and Soul, it properly comes under this 
Part of the Doctrine of integral Divifion, as well 
as when the mere Body is divided into Head, Trunks 
and Limbs ; This Divifion is fometimes called 
Partition. 

When any of the Parts of any Idea are yet far- 
ther divided in order to a clear Explication of the 
Whole, this is called a Subdivifion ; as when a Year 
is divided into Months, each Month into Days, and 
each Day into Hours, which may alfo be farther 
fubdivided into Minutes and Seconds, 

It is necefiary, in order to the full Explication 
of any Being, to confider each Part, and the Pro- 
perties of it, diftincl: by itfelf as well as in its Rela- 
tion to the Whole : For there are many Properties 
that belonp; to the feveral Parts of a Being which 
cannot properly be afcribed to the Whole, though 
t4iefe Properties may fit each Part for its proper 
Station, and as it (lands in that Relation to the 
whole complex Being : As in a Houfe, the Doors 
are moveable, the Rooms lquare, the Cietings white, 
the Windows tranfparent, yet the Houfe is neither 
moveable, nor fquare. nor white, nor transparent. 

I the. 



120 LOSICK : OR, THE [pART U 

Thefpecial Rules for a good Divifion are theje : 

I. Rule. Each Part fingly taken muft contain lefs 
than the Whole, but all the Parts taken collectively 
{or together) mnfi contain neither more nor lefs than- 
the Whole. Therefore if in difeourfing of a Tree 
you divide it into the Trunk and Leaves, it is an im* 
perfecl Divifion, becaufe the Root and the Branches 
are needful to make up tfre Whole. So Logick 
would be ill divided into Apprehenfion, Judgment, 
and Reafoning ; for Method is a confiderable Part 
of the Art which teaches us to ufe our Reafon 
right, and fhould by no Means be omitted. 

Upon this Account, in every Divifion wherein 
we defign a perfecl: Exact ncis, it is neeefiary to 
examine the whole Idea with Diligence, left we 
omit any Part of it through Want of Care ; though 
in fome Cafes it is not poffible, and in others it is 
not neceffary, that we fhould defcend to the mi- 
nute ft Parts. 

II. Rule. In all Diroifions we fhould firfl confder 
the larger and more immediate Parts of the SubjecJ, 
and not divide it at once into the more minute^ and re- 
mote Parts. It would by no Means be proper to 
divide a Kingdom firfl: into Streets, and Lanes, and 
Fields % but it muft be firfl: divided into Provinces 
or Counties, then thofe Counties may be divided 
into Towns, Villages, Fields, &c. and Towns into 
Streets and Lanes. 

III. Rule. The fever al Parts of a J)lvlfion ought 
to he oppojile, thai is, one Part ought not to contain 
another. It would be a ridiculous Divifion of an 
Animal into Head, Limbs, Body, and Brains, for 
the Brains arc contained in the Head. 

Yet 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASOtf » 121 

Yet here it muft be noted, that fometimes the 
Subjects of any Treatife, or the Objects of any 
particular Science, may be properly and necefla- 
rily fo divided, that the fecond may include the 
firft, and the third may include the firft and fecond, 
without offending againft this Rule, becaufe in the 
fecond or following parts of the Science orDifcourfe, 
thefe Objects are not confidered in the fame Man- 
ner as in the urn 1 ; as for Inftance, Geometry divides 
its Objects into Lines, Surfaces, and Solids : Now 
though a Line be contained in a Surface, or a Solid, 
yet it is not confidered in a Surface feparate and 
alone, or as a mere Line, as it is in the firft Part of 
Geometry, which treats of 'Lines. So Logick is rightly 
divided into Conception, Judgment, Reafoning, and 
Method. For though Ideas or Conceptions are con* 
tained in the following Parts of Logick, yet they 
are not there treated of as feparate Ideas, which are 
the proper Subject of the firft Part. 

IV. Rule. Let not Subdivifions he too numerous 
without Neceffiiy : For it is better many Times to 
diftinguith more Parts at once, if the Subject will 
bear it, than to mince the Difcourfe by exceffive 
dividing and fubdividing. It is preferable there- 
fore in a Treatife of Geography, to fay that in a 
City we will confider its Walls, its Gates, its Build- 
ings, its Streets, and Lanes, than to divide it formally 
firft into the encamp ajjing wad. the ettcompa/fedFavts ; 
the encompaffing Parts are the Walls and Gates ; 
the encompaffed Parts include the Ways and the 
Build'mgs ; the Ways are the Streets and the Lanes ; 
Buildings confift of the Foundations and the Super- 
flruclure, &c. . 

Too great a Number of Subdivifions has been 
affected by fome Perfons in Sermons, Treatifes, In- 
ftructions, &c. under Pretence of greater Accu- 

I 2 racy : 



Ill hOGICKi OR, THE [PART L 

racy : But this Sort of Subtilties hath often caufed 
great Confufion to the Underftanding, and fomc- 
times more Difficulty to the Memory. In thefe 
Cafes it is only a good Judgment can determine 
what Suhdivifions are ufeful. 

V. Rule. Divide every Subjecl according to the 
fpecial Defignyou have in view. One and the fame 
Idea or Subject may be divided in very different 
Manners, according to the different Purpofes we 
have in difcourfing of it. So if a Printer were to 
confider the feveral Parts of a Book, he muft divide 
it into Sheets, the Sheets into Pages, the Pages into 
Lines, and the Lines into Letters. But a Gram- 
marian divides a Book into Periods, Sentences, and 
JVords, or Parts of Speeeh 5 ?.s Noun, Pronoun, Verh, 
he. A Logician coniulers a Book as divided into 
Chapters, Sections, Arguments, Proportions, Ideas ; 
and, with the help of Ontology, he divides the Pro- 
portions into Subjecl; Objecl, Property, Relation, 
ABion, Paffwn, Caufc, Effecl, &c. But it would 
be very ridiculous for a Logician to divide a Booh 
into Sheets, Pages, and Lines ; or for a Printer to 
divide it into Nouns and Pronouns, or into Propor- 
tions, Ideas, Properties, or Caufes. 

VL Rule. In ally our Divifions ohferve with great 'eft 
ExaBnefs the Nature of Things. And here I am 
constrained to make a Subdivision of this Rule into 
two very neceiiary Particulars. 

(] ) Let the Parts of your Divifion hefuch as are 
properly dijiinguijlicd in Nature. Do not divide 
afunder thofe Parts of the Idea which are intimately, 
united in Nature, nor unite thofe Tilings into one 
Part which Nature has evidently disjoined : Thus 
it would be very improper, in treating of an animal 
Body, to divide it into the juperior and inferior 

Halves ^ 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 123 

Halves ; for it would be hard to fay how much be- 
longs by Nature to the inferior Half, and how 
much to thzfuperior. Much more improper would 
it be ftiil to divide the Animal into the right hand 
Tarts and left hand Parts, which would bring greater 
Confufion. This would be as unnatural as if a 
Man mould cleave a Hafel-nut in Halves through 
the Hufik, the Shell, and the Kernel, at once, and 
fay, a Nut is divided into thefe two Parts ; whereas 
Nature leads plainly to the three-fold Diflinction 
of Hujk, Shell, and Kernel, 

(2) . Do not affecl Duplicities, nor Triplicities -, nor. 
any certain Number of Parts inyourDivifion of Things ; 
for we know of no fuch certain Number of Parts 
which God the Creator has obferved in forming all 
the Varieties of his Creatures ; nor is there any 
uniform determined Number of Parts in the various 
Subjects of human Art or Science ; yet fome Pcr- 
fons have diflurbed the Order of Nature, and abufed 
their Readers, by an Affectation of 'Dichotomies, Tri- 
chotomies, Sevens, Twelves, &c. Let the Nature 
of the Subject, confidered together with the Defign 
which you have in View, always determine the 
Number of Parts into which you divide it. 

After all, it muft be confeifed that an intimate 
Knowledge of Things, and a judicious Obfervation, 
will affift in the Bufinefs of Divifion, as well as of 
Definition, better than too nice and curious an At- 
tention to the mere Formalities of logical Writers, 
without a real Acquaintance with Things. 



I 3 SECT. 



124 ^ogick: or, the [part 



SECT. IX, 



Of a comprehenjive Conception of Things, and of 
Abflraclion. 

THE third Rule to direct our Conceptions, re- 
quires us to conceive of Things comprehenfively. 
As we muft furvey an Object in all its Parts to 
obtain a complete Idea of it, fo we muft con(ider it 
in all its Modes, Attributes, Properties, and Rela- 
tions, in order to obtain a comprehenjive Conception 
of it. 

The Comprehenjion of an Idea, as it was explain- 
ed under the Doclrine of Univerfals, includes only 
the effential Modes or Attributes of that Idea ; but 
in this Place the Word is taken in a larger Senfe; 
and implies alfo the various occafional Properties, 
accidental Modes •, and Relations. 

The Neceflity of this Rule is founded upon the 
fame Reafon as the former, namely, That our Minds 
are narrow and fcanty in their Capacities ; and as 
they are not able to confider all the Parts of a 
complex Jdca at once, fo neither can they at once 
contemplate all the different Attributes and Circum- 
Jlances of it : We muft therefore confider Things 
fucceffively and gradually in their various Appear- 
ances and Circumftances : As our natural Eye can- 
not at once behold the fix Sides of a Dye or Cube, 
nor take cognizance of all the Points that are mark- 
ed on them, and therefore we turn up the Sides 
fucccftiveiy, and thus furvey and number the Points 
that are marked on each Side, that we may know 
the Whole. 

In 



CH. VI.] RHJHT USE OP REASON-. 125 

Jn order to a comprehenjivc View of any Idea, 
we muft flrft confider, whether the Object of it 
has an Exigence as well as an Effence ; whether it 
be a Jimple or complex Idea ; whether it be a &*#- 
fiance or a Mode.; if it be a Subflance, then we muft 
inquire what are the efjeniial Modes of it which are 
neceftary to its Nature, and what are thofe Proper- 
ties or Accidents of it which belong to it, occasion- 
ally, or as it is placed in fome particular Circum- 
ftances : We muft view it in its internal and abso- 
lute Modes, and obferve it in thofe various exter- 
nal Relations in which it ftands to other Beings : 
We muft coniider it in its Powers and Capacities 
either to do or fuffer ; We muft trace it up to its 
various Caufes, whether fupreme or fubordinate e 
We muft defcend to the Variety of its Effecls, and 
take Notice of the feveral Ends and Dejigns which 
are to be attained by it. We muft conceive of it 
as it is either an Objecl or a SubjecJ, what are the 
Things that are akin to it, and what are the Oppo- 
Jites or Contraries of it ; for many Things are to 
be known both by their contrary and their kindred 
Ideas. 

If the Thing we difcourfe of be a mere Mode, we 
muft inquire whether it belongs to Spirits or Bodies.; 
whether it be a phyfical or moral Mode : If moral, 
then we muft coniider its Relation to God, to our 
Selves, to our Neighbours ; its Reference to this 
Life, or the Life to come. If it be a Virtue, we 
muft feek what are the Principles of it, what are 
the Rules of it, wfcat are the Tendencies of it, and 
what are the falfe Virii&s that counterfeit it, and 
what are the real Vices that oppofe it, what are 
the Ev Us which attend the Neg lecl of it, and what 
are the Rewards of the Praclice of it, b oth here 
and hereafter* 

I 4 If 



126 LOGIGK *. OR, THE [PART I. 

If the Subject be hiftorical, or a Matter of Facl^ 
we may then inquire whether the action was done at 
all; whether it was done in fuck a Manner, or by 
fuck Perfons as is reported ; at wkat Time it was 
done; in wkat Place, by what Motive, and for 
what Defgn ; what is the Evidence of the Facl, who 
are the WitneJJes ; what is their Characler and Cre- 
dibility ; what Signs there are of fuch a Facl ; what 
concurrent Circwnftances which may either fupport 
the Truth of it, or render it doubtful. 

In order to make due Inquiries into all thefe, 
and many other Particulars which go towards the 
complete and comprehenfive Idea of any Being, the 
Science of Ontology is exceeding necefiary. This is 
•what was wont to be called the firfl Part of Met a- 
phyficks in the Peripateiick Schools. It treats of 
Being in its mofi general Nature, and of all its Af- 
feclions and Relations. I confefs the Old Popifh 
Schoolmen have mingled a Number of ufelefs Sub- 
tilties with this Science ; they have exhaufted their 
own Spirits, and the Spirits of their Readers, in 
many laborious and intricate Trifles ; and fome of 
their Writings have been fruitful of Names without 
Ideas, which have done much Injury to the facred 
Study of Divinity. Upon this Account many of 
the Moderns have mofl unjuflly abandoned the 
whole Science at once, and thrown Abundance of 
Contempt and Raillery upon the very Name of 
Metapkyficks ; but this Contempt and Cenfure is 
very unreafonable, for. this Science, fcparated from 
fome Ariftotelian Fooleries, and fcholaftick Subtil- 
ties, is fo necefiary to a diftfnet Conception, folid 
Judgment, and juft Reafoning on many Subjects., 
that fometimes it is introduced as a Part ofLogick, 
ami not without Reafon. And thofe who utterly 
defpife and ridicule it, either betray their own Ig- 
norance, or will be fuppofed to make their Wit 

and 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 127 

and Banter a Refuge and Excufe for their own 
Lazincfs. Yet thus much I would add, that the 
later Writers of Ontology are generally the Deft on 
this Account, becaufe they have left out much of 
the ancient Jargon, See the Brief Scheme of Onto- 
logy in the Philofophical E/fays, by I. Watts. 

Here let it be noted, that it is neither ufeful, ne- 1 
ceflary, or poffible to run through all the Modes, 
Circumjlances, and Relations of every Subject we 
take in Hand ; but in Ontology we enumerate a 
great Variety of them, that fo a judicious Mind 
may choofe what are thofe Circumjlances, Relations 9 
and Properties of any Subject, which are mod ne- 
ceffary to the prefent Defign of him that fpeaks or 
writes, either to explain, to illuftrate, or to prove 
the Point. 

As we arrive at the complete Knowledge of an, 
Idea in all its Parts, by that Acl of the Mind 
which is called Divi/ion, fo we come to a compre- 
henfive Conception of a Thing in its feveral Pro- 
perties and Relations, by that Acl of the Mind 
which is called Abftraclion ; that is, we confider 
each (ingle Relation or Property of the Subject 
alone, and thus we do as it were withdraw and fe- 
parate it in our Minds, both from the Subjecl itfelf, 
as well as from other Properties and Relations, in 
order to make a fuller Observation of it. 

This Acl of Abftraclion is faid to be twofold, 
either Precifive or Negative. 

Precifive Abftraclion is, when we confider thofe 
Things apart which cannot really exifl apart ; as 
when we confider a Mode, without confidering its 
Sub/lance and Subjecl, or one ejfential Mode, with- 
out another. Negative Ab/lraclion is, when we 
confider one Thing feparate from another, which 
may alfo exifl without it ; and when wc conceive of 
a Subjecl without conceiving of its accidental Modes 

or 



128 logick: or, the £part r. 

or Relations ; or when we conceive of .one Accident 
without thinking of another. If I think of read- 
ing or writing without the exprefs Idea of fome 
Man, that is precifive Abjlraclion ; or if I think of 
the Attraction of Iron , without the exprefs Idea of 
fome particular magnetick Body. But when I think 
of a Needle without any Idea of its Sharpnefs, this 
is negative Abftraclion ; and it is the fame when I 
think of its Sharpnefs without considering its 
Length 



SECT. X. 



Of the exienfive Conception of Things, and of 
Diflribution. 



AS the Completenefs of an Idea refers to the fe- 
veral Parts that compofe it, and the Compre- 
henfion of an Idea includes its various Properties, 
fo the Extenfion of an Idea denotes the various Sorts 
or Kinds of Beings to which the fame Idea belongs : 
And if we would be fully acquainted with a Sub- 
jec% we muft obferve, 

This fourth Rule to direct our Conception?, 
namely, Conceive of Things in all their Extenfion ; 
that is, we muft fcarch out the various Species, or 
Special Natures which are contained under it, as a 
Genus or gener<d JS'ature. If we would know the 
Nature of an Animal perfectly, we muft take Cog- 
nizance of Beafls, Birds, FiJJies, and Infecls, as well 
as Men, all which are contained under the general 
Nature and Name of Animal. 

As 



€H. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 120 

As an integral Whole is diftinguifhed into its fe- 
veral Parts by Divifion, fo the Word Diftribution 
is moil properly ufed when we ctfftinguifh an uni- 
verfal Whole into its feveral Kinds or Species : And 
perhaps it had been better if this Word had been 
always confined to this Signification, though it 
mufl be confeffed, that we frequently fpeak of the 
Divifion of an Idea into its feveral Kinds, as well as 
into its feveral Parts. 

The Rules of a good Diftribution are much the 
fame with thofe which we have before applied to 
Divifion j which may be juft repeated again in the 
briefeft Manner, in order to give Examples of 
them. 

I. Rule. Each Part fmgly taken muft contain lefs 
than the Whole, but all the Parts taken collectively, 
or together, mufl contain neither more nor lefs 
than the Whole ; or, as Logicians fometimes ex- 
prefs it, the Parts of the Divifion ought to exhaujl 
the whole Thing which is divided. So Medicine is 
juflly diftributed into Prophylaclick, or the Art of 
preferving Health ; and Therapeutick, or the Art of 
reftoring Health; for there is no other Sort of 
Medicine befides thefe two. But Men are not well 
diftributed into tall or Jhort, for there are fome of 
a middle Stature. 

II. Ride. In all Diftribution s we iliould firft con- 
fider the larger and more immediate Kinds or Spe- 
cies, or Ranks of Being, and not divide a Thing 
at once into the more minute and remote. A Ge- 
nus iliould not at once be divided into Individuals, 
or even into the low eft Species, if there be a Species 

fuperior. Thus it would be very improper to di- 
vide Animal into Trout, Lobfter, Eel, Dog, Bear, 
Eagle, Dove, Wormy and Butterfly, for thefe are 

inferior 



130 logick: oe, the [past i. 

inferior Kinds ; whereas Animal ought firft to be 
difiributed into Man, Beaft, Bird, Fijh, Infecl; and 
then Beaft mould be diiiributed IntoDog, Bear, 8tc. 
Bird into Eagle, Dove, 8cc. Fijh into Trout, Eel, 
hobjler, he. 

It is irregular alfo to join any inferior Species in 
the fame Rank or Order with the fuperior ; as if 
we fhould diftinguifh Animals into Birds, Bears, and 
Oyjlers, &c. it would be a ridiculous Diftribution. 

III. Rule. The feveral Parts of a Diftribution 
ought to be oppofite ; that is, one Species or Clafs 
of Beings in the fame Rank of Division, ought not 
to contain or include another; fo Men ought not 
to be divided into the Rich, the Boor, the Learned, 
and the Tall; for poor Men may be both learned 
and tall, and fo may the Rich. 

But it will be objected, are not animated Bodies 
rightly diftributcd into Vegetative and Animal, or 
(as they are ufually called) Senfitive? Now the 
fenfitive contains the vegetative Nature in it, for 
Animals grow as Well. as Plants. I anfvver, that in 
this, and all fuch Diftributions, the Word vegeta- 
tive fignifies merely vegetative ; and in this Senfe 
Vegetative will be fufficiently oppofite to Animal, 
for it cannot be faid of an Animal, that it contains 
mere Vegetation in the Idea of it. 

IV. Rule. Let not Subdivisions be. .too numerous, 
without Neceffity ; therefore I think Quantity is 
better diflinguiflied at once into & Line, a Surface, 
and a Solid ; than to fay, as Ramus does, that Quan- 
tity is either a Line, or a Thing lined-, and a Tiling 
lined is either a Surface or a Solid. 

V. Rule. Diflribute every Subject according to 
the fpecial pcfign you have in View, fo far as is 

neceffary 



CH. VI.] EIGHT USE OF REASON. 131 

neceftary or ufeful to your prefent Inquiry. Thus 
a Politician distributes Mankind according to their 
civil Characters into the Riders and the Ruled: 
and a Fhyfician divides them into the Sick or the 
Healthy, but a Divine distributes them into Turks, 
Heathens, Jews, or Christians. 

Here note, That it is a very ufelefs Thing to dif- 
tribute any Idea into fuch Kinds or Members as 
have no different Properties to be fpoken of; as it is 
mere trifling to divide right .Angles into fuch whoje' 
Legs are equal, and whqfe Legs are unequal, for as 
to the mere right Angles they have no different 
Properties. 

"VI. Rule. In all your Distributions obferve the 
Nature of Things with great Exactnefs ; and do 
not affect any particular Form of Distribution, as 
fome Perfons have done, by dividing every Genus 
into two Species, or into three Species ; whereas Na- 
ture is infinitely various, and human Affairs and 
human Sciences have as great a Variety, nor is there 
any one Form of Distribution that will exactly fuit 
with all Subjects. 

Note, It is to this Doctrine of Distribution of a 
Genus into its fever at Species, we muft alfo refer the 
Distribution of a Caufe according to its feveral Ef» 
feels, as fome Medicines are heating, fame are cooling ; 
or an Effecl, when it is distinguished by its Caufes ; 
as Faith is either halt upon divine Teftirnony or hu- 
man. It is to this Head we refer particular artifi- 
cial Bodies, when they are diStinguiStied according 
to the Matter they are made of, as a Statue is either 
of Brafs, of Marble, or Wood, &c. and any other 
Beings, when they are diitinguifhed according to 
their End and Defign, as the Furniture of Body or 
is d; her for Ornament or Ufe. To this Head 

alio 



332 iogick: or, the [part i. 

alfo we refer Subjecls when they are divided accord- 
ing to their Modes or Occidents ; as Men are either 
merry, or grave, or fad ; and Modes, when they are 
divided by their Subjects, as Dijlempers belong to the 
Fluids, or to the/olid Parts of the Animal, 

It is alfo to this Place we reduce the Propofals of 
a Difficulty under its various Cafes, whether it be in 
Speculation or Practice : As, to (hew the Reafon 
of Sunbeams burning Wood, whether it be done by a 
convex Glafs or a concave : or to (hew the Conjlruc- 
tion and Menfuration of Triangles, whether you have 
two Angles and a Side given, or two Sides and an 
Angle, or only three Sides. Here it is neceflary 
to diftribute or divide a Difficulty in all its Cafes, in 
order to gain a perfect Knowledge of the Subject 
you contemplate. 

It might be obferved here, that Logicians have 
fometimes given a Mark or Sign to diftinguifti when 
it is an integral Whole, that is divided into its Parts 
or Members, or when it is a Genus, an univerfal 
Whole, that is diftributed into its Species and Indi- 
viduals. The Rule they give is this: Whenfoever 
the whole Idea can be directly and properly affirmed 
of each Part, as a Bird is an Animal, a Fifli is an 
Animal, Bucephalus is a Horfe, Peter is a Man, then 
it is a Diftribution of a Genus into its Species, or a 
Species in its Individuals ; But when the Whole 
cannot be thus directly affirmed concerning every 
Part, then it is a Divifion of an Integral into its 
feveral Parts or Members-, as we cannot fay the 
Head, the Breaft, the Hand, or the Foot is an Ani- 
mal, but we fay, the Head is a Part of the Animal, 
and the Foot is another Part. 

This Rule may hold true generally in corporeal 
Beings, or perhaps in all Subftanccs : But when we 
fay the Fear of God is Wifdom, andfo is human Ci- 
vility, Criticifm is true Learning, and fo is P hilar 

fophy ; 



CH. V*.] RIGHT USE OF KEASXfrT. 133 

fopJty: To execute a Murderer is Jujlice, andtofave 
and defend the Innocent is Juftice too. In thefe Cafes 
it is not fo eafily determined, whether an integral 
Whole be divided into its Parts, or an Univerfal 
into its Species : For the Fear of God may be called 
either one Part or one Kind of Wifdom : Criticifm 
is one Part, or one Kind of Learning : And the 
Execution of a Murderer may be called a Species of 
Juftice, as well as a Part of it. Nor indeed is it 
a Matter of great Importance to determine this 
Controverfy. 



SECT. XI. 

Of an orderly Conception of Things. 

THE laft Rule to direct our Conceptions, is, that 
we fhould rank a?id place them in a proper Me- 
thod and juft Order. This is of neceflary Ufe to 
prevent Con m (ion ; for as a Trader who never 
places his Goods in his Shop or Warehoufe in a 
regular Order, nor keeps the Accounts ofiiis buy- 
ing^ and felling, paying and receiving, in a juft 
Method, is in the utmofi Danger of plunging all 
his Affairs into Confufion and Ruin : fo a Student 
who is in the Search of Truth, or an Author or 
Teacher who communicates Knowledge to others, 
will very much obftruct his Defign, and confound 
his own Mind or the Minds of his Hearers, unleffc 
he range his Ideas in juft Order. 

If we would therefore become fuccefsful Learners 
or Teachers, we mud not conceive of Th tugs in a 
confufed Heap ^ but difpofe our Ideas in fome ce?~tam 
Method, which may be moft eafy and ufeful both 
for the Underftanding and Memory ; and be fure, 

as 



134 LOGICKt OR, theJ ("part i. 

as much as may be, to follow the Nature of Things^ 
for which many Rules might be given, namely, 

1. Conceive as much as you can of the EJfent'iah 
of any Subject, before you confider its Accidentals. 

2. Survey the firft general Parts and Properties 
of any Subject, before you extend your Thought* 
to difcourfe of the particular Kinds or Species of it* 

3. Contemplate Things firft in their own Jimpk 
Natures, and afterwards view them in Compofition 
with other Things ; unlefs it be your prefent Pur- 
pofe to take a compound Being to Pieces, in order to 
find out, or to (hew the Nature of it, by fearching 
and difcovering of what Simples it is compofed. 

4. Confider the abfolute Modes or Affections of 
any Being as it is in itfelf, before you proceed to 
confider it relatively, or to furvey the various Rela- 
tions in which it ftands to other Beings, &c. 

Note, Thefe Rules chiefly belong to the Method 
of Inftruclions which the Learned called Syntheiick. 

But in the Regulation of our Ideas, there is fel- 
dom an abfolute NecefTity that we fhould place 
them in this or the other particular Method ;. It is 
poffible in fome Cafes that many Methods may be 
equally good, that is, may equally affift the Un- 
derftanding and the Memory : To frame a Method 
exquifitely accurate, according to the ft net Nature 
of Things, and to maintain this x\ccuracy from the 
beginning to the End of a Treatife, is moil rare 
and difficult Thing, if not impoflible. But a larger 
Account of Method would be very improper in this 
Place, left we anticipate what belongs to the fourth 
Part of Logic k. 



SECT. 



CH. VI. j RIGHT USE OP REASON, 13$ 

sect, m 

Thefe five Rules of Conception exemplified* 

IT may be ufeful here to give a Specimen of the 
five fpecial Rules to direelour Conceptions, which 
have been the chief Subject of this long Chapter 
and reprefent them practically at one View. 

Suppofe the Theme of our Difcourfe were the 
PaJJions of the Mind, 

lfi 9 To gain a clear and dijlincl Idea of PaJfion> 
we muft define both the Name and the Thing. 

To begin with the Definition of the Name. We 
are not here to underftand the Word Paffion in its 
vulgar and mod limited Senfe, as it fignifies merely 
Anger or Fury ; nor do we take it in its molt ex- 
teniive philosophical Senfe, for the fufaining the 
Aclion of an Agent ; but in the more limited phi !o- 
fophical Senfe, Pajfions lignify the various Affecliom 
of the Mind, fuch as Admiration, Love, or Hatted i 
this is the Definition of the Name. 

We proceed to the Definition of the Thing. Paf- 
fion is defined a Sen/at ion of forne fpecial Commotion 
in animal Nature, occafioned by the Minors Percef> + 
tion of fome ObjecJ fuited to excite that Commotion. 
* Here the Genus, or general Nature of Paffion ■, 

* Since this was written, I have puhliihed a ihort Treatife 
of the PaJJions, wherein I havefo far varied from this Definition 
as to call them fcnfille Commotions of our tubole Nature, both Soul 
and Body, occafumed by the Mind* s Perceptions of fome Objects, &c* 
I made this Alteration in the Defcription of the Faiiions'in that 
Book chiefly to include, in a more explicit Manner* the Paf- 
fions of Dffire and Aversion, which are A6ts of Folithn rather 
than Sevfntions. Yet fince fome Commotions of animal Mature 
attend all the Paffions, and iince there is always* a Senlation of 
thefe Commotions, I fhall not change the Definition i have 
written here ; for this will agree to all the Paffions, whether 
they include any Act of Volition or not ; nor indeed is the Mat- 
ter of any great Importance. Nov. 17, 1728, 

K i$ 



136 XOGICK ! OR, THE [PART £ 

is a Senfation of Jome Jpecial Commotion in animal 
Nature ; and herein, it agrees with Hanger, Thirft, 
Pain, &c. The ejfential Difference of it is, that 
this Commotion arijes from a Thought or Perception 
of the Mind) and hereby it is diftinguifhed from 
Hunger, Thirft, or Pain. 

Icily, We muft conceive of it completely, or fur- 
vey the feveral Parts that compofe it. Thefe are 
(1.) The Mind's Perception of Jome ObjecJ. (2.) The 
confequent Ruffle, or f pedal Commotion of the Nerves, 
and Blood, and animal Spirits* And (3.) The Sen- 
Jation of this inward Commotion* 

3dly, We mull confider it comprehenfively, in its 
various Properties, The moil effential Attributes 
that make up its Nature have been already men- 
tioned under the foregoing Heads. Some of the 
moil confiderable Properties that remain are thefe, 
namely, That Pajfion belongs to all Mankind, in 
greater or leflfer Degrees : It is not conjlantly prejent 
with us, but upon Jome certain Occajion: It is ap- 
pointed by our Creator for various ujeful Ends and 
Purpojes, namely, to give us Vigour in the Pur- 
fuit of what is good and agreeable to us, or in the 
Avoidance of what is hurtful : // is very proper 
for our State of Trial in this World : It is not utterly 
to be rooted out of our Nature, but to be moderated 
and governed according to Rules of Virtue and Reli- 
gion, &c. 

Athly, We muft take Cognizance of the various 
Kinds of it, which is called an 'extenjive Conception 
of it. If the Object which the Mind perceives be 
very uncommon, it excites the Paflion of Admira* 
tion : If the Object nppear agreeable, it raif'es Love i 
If the agreeable Object be abjent and attainable, it 
is Dejire : if likely to be attained, it excites Hope : 
If unattainable \ D.efpair : If it be prejent and pof- 
Jejfed, it is the Pajjion of Joy : If loji, it exe'ites 
Sofroitf : If the Object be dijagreeubk. it caufes in 

general 



Cft. VI.] RIGHT USS OP REASON. 137 

general Hatred or Averjion: If it be abfent, and 
yet we are in Danger of it, it raifes our Fear : If 
it be prefent, it is Sorrow and Sadnefs, 8cc. 

5^/y, All thefe Things, and many more which/ 
go to compofe a Treatife on this Subject, mufi be 
placed in their proper Order : A flight Specimen of 
which is exhibited in this fhort Account of '-Pa/fion, 
and which that admirable Author Defcartes has 
treated of at large ; though for want of Sufficient 
Experiments and Obfervations in natural Philofo- 
phy, there are fome few Miltakes in his Account 
of animal Nature. 

SECT. XIII. 

An lllujlratlon of thefe five Rules by Similitudes, 

THUS we have brought the firft Part of Logick 
to a Conclufion : And it may not be impro- 
per here to reprefent its Excellencies (Co far as we 
have gone) by general Hints of its chief Defign 
and Ufe, as well as by a various Companfon of it 
to thofe Inftruments which Mankind have invent- 
ed for their feveral Conveniencies and Improve- 
ments. 

The Dejign of Logick is not to furnifh us with 
the perceiving Faculty, but only to direcl and 
affift us in the Ufe of it : It doth not give us the 
Object of our Ideas, but only cafts fuch a Light 
on thofe Objects which Nature furnifhes us with, 
that they may be the more clearly and ditrinctly 
known : It doth not add new Parts or Properties 
to Things, but it difcovers the various Parts, Pro- 
perties, Relations, and Dependencies of one Thing 
upon another, and by ra?iking all Things under 
general and fpecial Heads, it renders the Nature, 
or any of the Properties, Powers, and Ufes of a 

K 2 Thing, 



138 LOGICK t OR, THE [PART I. 

Thing, more eafy to be found out, when we feek 
in what Rank of Beings it lies, and wherein it agrees 
with, and wherein it differs from others. 

If any Comparifons would illuftrate this, it may 
be thus reprefented. 

I. When Logick affifts us to attain a clear and 
diftincl Conception of the Nature of Things by De- 
finition, it is like thofe Glajfes whereby we behold 
fuch Objects diftinctly, as by Reafon of their 
Smallnefs, or their great Diftance, appear in Con- 
fulion to the naked Eye : So the Tele/cope difcovers 
to us diftant Wonders in the Heavens, and (hews 
the milky Way, and the bright cloudy Spots in a very 
dark Sky, to be a Collection of little Stars, which 
the Eye unaffifted beholds in mingled Confufion. 
So when Bodies are too fmall for our Sight to fur- 
vey them diftinctly, then the Micro/cope is at hand 
for our Affiftance, to {hew us all the Limbs and 
Features of the mojl minute Animals,, with great 
Clearnefs and Diftinction. 

II. When we are taught by Logick to view a 
Thing completely in all its Parts, by the Help of 
Divifion, it has the Ufe of an anatomical Knife , 
which difTects an animal Body, and feparates the 
Veins, Arteries, Nerves, Mufcles, Membranes, &c. 
and fhews us the feveral Parts which go to the Com- 
pofition of a complete Animal. 

III. When Logick inftructs us to furvey an 
Object comprehenfively in all the Modes, Properties, 
Relations, Faces, and Appearances of it, it is of the 
fame Ufe as a terreftrial Globe, which turning round 
on its Axis, reprefents to us all the Variety of Lands 
and Seas, Kingdoms, and Nations on the Surface of 
the Earth, in a very fhort Succeflion of Time 
fhews the fituations and various Relations of them 

to 



v. 



CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 139 

to each other, and gives a comprehenfive View of 
them in Miniature. 

IV. When this Art teaches us to dlfirtbute any 
extenfeve Idea into its different Kinds or Species, it 
may be compared to the prifmatick Glafs, that re-* 
ceives the Sun-beams or Rays of Light, which 
feem to be uniform when falling upon it, but it 
feparates and diftributes them into their different 
Kinds and Colours, and ranks them in their pro- 
per Succeffion. 

Or if we defcend to Sid>divifions and fubordinate 
Ranks of Being, then Diftribution may alfo be faid 
to form the Refemblance of a natural Tree, where- 
in the Genus or general Idea frauds for the Root or 
Stock, and the feveral Kinds or Species, and Indi- 
viduals, are diftributed abroad, and reprefented in 
their Dependence and Connection, like the feveral 
Boughs, Branches, and lejfer Shoots. For Inftance, 
let Animal be the Root of a logical Tree, the Re- 
femblance is feen by mere Infpeclion, though the 
Eoot be not placed at the Bottom of the Page. 



K 3 Animal 



140 



£0GICK t OR, THE 



[PART t, 



Man 



Philip. 
James. 
Peter. 
Thomas, &c. 



Horfe 



C Trot. 

£ Bayard, &c B 

Be^Sf" -ft"* 

• |^ J Spaniel. 

j Greyhound. 



l 



Bear. &fa. I n \ c ,' 
3 ^Beagle, &c. 



Animal^ Bird 



Fifli 



C Eagle 
1 Lark 

^ Durk — 
(^Gooie, &fc, 



Trout 
Whale 
Oyfler, SV. 



EnglifrT 
Mufcovy. 
Hook-Bill, &p, 



Infeft J 



f Flying- 



I 



Creeping- 



CWafp. 

£Bee, &c. 

C Worm. 

< Ant, 

C Caterpillar, &c. 



The fame Similitude will ferve alfo to illufTrate 
the Divifwn and Subdivifion of an integral Whole 
into its feveral Parts. 



When Logiek di reels us to place all our Ideas 
in a proper Method^ mofr convenient both for In- 
firuclion and Memory, it cloth the fame Service 
as the Cafes of well-contrived Shelves in a large Li- 



C VI,] KIGHT USE OF REASON. 141 

Irary, wherein Folios, Quartos, Oclavos, and lef- 
fer Volumes, are difpofed in fuch exact Order under 
the particular Heads of Divinity^ Hi/lory, Mathe- 
:ks, ancient and mifcellaneous Learning, &c. 
that the Student knows where to find every Book, 
and lias them all as it were within his Command at 
once 5 hecaufe of the exacl Order wherein they are 
placed. 

The Man who has fuch Afliftances as thefe at 
hand, in order to manage his Conceptions and regu- 
late his Ideas, is well prepared to improve his 
Knowledge 5 and to join thefe Ideas together in. a. 
regular Manner by Judgment, which is the fecond 
Operation of the Mind, and will be the Subject of 
fecond Part of Logick. 



K4 THE 



142 LOGICK : OK, THF [part lie 



• v-^ 



THE 

SECOND PART 



OF 



L O G I C K, 



Of Judgment and Profofitpn. 

WHEN the Mind has got Acquaintance with 
Things by framing Ideas of them, it pro- 
ceeds to the next Operation, and that is, to comr 
pare thefe Ideas together, and to join them by 
Affirmation, or disjoin then by Negation, according 
as we find them to agree or difagree. This Act of 
the Mind is called Judgment; as when we have by 
Perception obtained the Ideas of Plato, a Philofo- 
pher, Man, Innocent, we form thefe Judgments \ 
Plato was a Phdofopher ; no Man is innocent. 

Some Writers have aflerted, that Judgment con- 
iifts in a mere Perception of the Agreement or Dif- 
ftgreement of Ideas. But f rather think there is an 
Act of the Will (at lead in mod Cafes) neceflary 
to form a Judgment ; for though we do perceive or 
think we perceive Ideas to agree or difagree, yet 
we may fometimes refrain from judging or aflenting 

to 



RIGHT USE OP REASON; 14S 

to the Perception, for fear left the Perception 
(hould not be fufficiently clear, and we fhouid be 
miftaken : And I am well aflured at other Times^ 
that there are Multitudes of Judgments formed, and 
a firm Aflent given to Ideas joined or disjoined, 
before there is any clear Perception whether they 
agree or diftgree ; and this is the Reafon of fo many 
falfe Judgments or Miftakes among Men. Both 
'thefe Practices are a Proof that Judgment has fome- 
thing of the Will in it, and does net merely confift 
in Perception, fince we fometimes judge (though 
unhappily) without perceiving, and fometimes we 
perceive without immediate judging. 

As an Idea is the Refult of our Conception or 
Apprehenfion, fo a Proportion is the Effect of Judg- 
ment. The foregoing Sentences, which are Ex- 
amples of the Act of Judgment, are properly called 
proportions. Plato is a Philofopher, &c. 

Here let us confider, 

1 . The general Nature of a Propofition, and the 
farts of which it is compofed. 

2. The various Divi/ions or Kinds of Proportions. 

3. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the Doclrint 
of Prejudices. 

4. General Direclions to affift us in judging aright \ 

5. Special Rules to direel us in judging particular 
QbjecJs. 



CHAP, 



144 LOGiCK : (m, thj* [part ir. 



CHAP. I. 



Of the Nature of a Proportion, and its fever al 
Parts. 

A Proportion is a Sentence wherein two or more 
Ideas or Terms are joined or disjoined by one 
Affirmation .or Negation, as Plato was. a Philoso- 
pher : Every jingle is formed by two Lines meeting : 
]$o Man living on Earth can he completely happy. 
When there are ever fo many Ideas or Terms in 
the Sentence, yet if they are joined or disjoined 
merely by one Angle Affirmation or Negation, they 
may be refolved into feveral Propositions which are 
Implied therein, as will appear hereafter. 

In defcribing a Propofition, I ufe the Word Terms 
as well as Ideas., beeaufe when mere Ideas are join- 
ed in the Mind without Words, it is rather called 
a Judgment ; but when clothed with Words, it is 
called a Proportion, even though it be in the Mind 
only, as well as when it is exprefled by fpeaking 
or writing. 

There are three Things which go to the Nature 
and Conftitution of a Proportion,' namely, th&'Sub* 
jeel, the Predicate, and the Copula. 

The SubjecJ of a Proportion is that concerning 
which any Thing is affirmed or denied : So Plato, 
Angle, Man living on Earth, are the Subjects of the 
foregoing Proportions. 

The Predicate is that which is affirmed or de-r 
nied of the Subject ; fo Philofoplier is the Predicate 
of the fir ft Proportion ; formed by two Lines meet- 
ing, is the Predicate of the fecond ; capable of 

. being 



jEH. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 145 

being completely happy, the proper Predicate of the 
third. 

The Suhjecl and Predicate of a Propofition taken 
together, are called the Matter of it ; for thefe are 
the Materials of which it is rnade. 

The Copula is the Form of a Proportion ; it re- 
prefents the Acl of the Mind affirming or denying, 
and it is exprefled by the Words am, art, is, are, 
&c. or am not, art not, is not, are not, Sec. 

It is not a Thing of Importance enough to create 
a Difpute, whether the Words no, none, ?iot, never, 
&c. which disjoin the Idea or Terms in a negative 
Propoficion, fhall be called a Part of the Subject of 
the Copula, or of the Predicate. Sometimes per- 
haps they may feem moft naturally to be included 
jn one, and fometimes in another of thefe, though a 
Proportion is ufually denominated affirmative or. 
negative from its Copula, as hereafter. 

Note 1. Where each of thefe Parts of a Propor- 
tion is not exprefled diftinclly in lb many Words, 
yet they are all underftood, and implicitly contain- 
ed therein ; as Socrates difputed, is a complete Pro- 
portion, for it lignifies Socrates was difputing. So 
/ die, iignifies / am dying. I can write, that is, 
I am able to write. In Latin and Greek, one fingle 
Word is many Times a complete Proportion. 

Note 2. Thefe Words, am, art, is, &c. when 
they are ufed alone without any other Predicate, 
fignifying both the Acl of the Mind judging, which 
includes the Copula, and iignify alfo aclual Exig- 
ence, which is the Predicate of that Proportion. 
So Rome is, rgnires Rome is exiftent : There are 
fome Jirange Mo?ifters, that is, Jomejlrange Monfters 
are exiftent : Carthage is no more, that is, Carthage 
has no Being. 

Note 3. The Subject and Predicate of a Propo- 
rtion, are not always to be known and diftinguifti- 

ed 



146 LOGICKt OR, THE [PART ir, 

,ed by the placing of the Words in the Sentence, 
but by reflecting duly on the Senfe of the Words, 
and on the Mind or Pefign of the Speaker or 
Writer : As if I fay, in Africa there are many Lions, 
I mean many Lions are exiStent in Africa : Many 
JLions is the Subject, and exiflent in Africa is the 
Predicate. It is proper for a Philofopher to under- 
Jiand Geometry ; here the Word proper is the Pre- 
dicate., and all the Reft is the Subject, except Is 
the Copula. 

Note A. The Subject and Predicate of a Proposi- 
tion ought always to be two different Ideas, or two 
.different Terms •; for where both the Terms and 
Ideas are the fame, it is called an identical Propor- 
tion, which is mere trifling, and cannot tend to 
promote Knowledge ; fuch as, a Ride is a Ride, or 
good Man is a good Man. 

But there are fome Proportions, wherein the 
Terms of the Subject and Predicate feem to be the 
fame ; yet the Ideas are not the fame ; nor can 
thefe be called purely identical or trifling Propo- 
rtions ; fuch as Home is Home ; that is Home is a 
convenient or delightful Place ; Socrates is Socrates 
fiill ; that is, the Man Socrates isflill a Philofopher : 
The Hero was not a Hero ; that is, the Hero did not 
Jhew his Courage: What I have written, I have 
written; that is, what I wrote 1 Jlill approve, and 
ivill not alter it : What is done, is done ; that is, it 
cannot he undone. It may be ealily obferved in thefe 
Propositions the Term is equivocal, for in the Pre- 
dicate it has a different Idea from what it has in the 
Subjecl. 

There are alfo fome Proportions wherein the 
Terms of the Subject and Predicate differ, but the 
Ideas are the fame ; and thefe are not merely iden- 
tical ox trifling Propositions; as impudent is ffiame- 
fefs j a Bdlow is a Wave j or Fluclus (in Latin) is a 

Wave ; 



CH. II.] HIGKT USE OF REASON"; l4f 

Wave ; a Globe is a round Body, In thefe Propofi- 
tions either the Words are explained by a Defini- 
tion of the Name, or the Ideas by a Definition of 
the Thing, and therefore they are by no Means 
ufelefs, when formed for this Purpofe. 



CHAP. II. 

Of the various Kinds of Propojitiom. 

PRopofitions may be diirributed into various 
Kinds, according to their Subjecl, their Copula , 
their Predicate, their Nature or Compofition, their 
Senfe, and their Evidence, which Diftributions will 
be explained in the following Sections. 

SECT. I. 

Of univerfal, particular, indefinite, andfmgular 
Propojitions. 

PRopofitions may be divided according to their 
Subjecl into univerfal and particular ; this is 
lifually called a Divifton, arifing from the Quantity. 
An univerfal Proportion is when the Subjecl: is 
taken according to the whole of its Extenfion ; fo 
if the Subjecl: be a Genus, or general Nature, it 
includes all its Species or Kinds : If the Subject be 
a Species, it includes all its Individuals. This 

Univerfality 



146 tOGICK i OR, THg [PART lL 

Univerfality is ufually fignifled by tnefe Words, 
all, every, no, none, or the like ; as, All Men mufi 
die : No Man is Almighty : Every Creature had a 
Beginning. 

A particular Proportion is when the Subject is 
not taken according to its whole Extenfion ; that 
is, when the Term is limited and retrained to 
fame one or more of thofe Species or Individuals, 
whofe general Nature it exprefies, but reaches not 
to all ; and this is ufually denoted by the Words, 
fome, many % a few, there are which, &c. as, Some 
Birds can fmg well : Few Men are truly wife : There 
are Parrots which will talk a hundred Things. 

Under the general Nameofuniverfal Proportions, 
we may juftly include thofe that arefingular, and 
for the moft Part thofe that are indefinite alfo. 

Kfingidar Proportion is when the Subject is a 
lingular or individual Term or Idea ; as, Defcartes 
was an ingenious Philofopher : Sir lfaac Newton has 
far exceeded all his Predeceffors : The Palace at 
Hampton Court is a pleafant Dwelling : This Day 
is very cold. The Subject here muft be taken ac- 
cording to the whole of its Extenfion, becaufe be- 
ing an Individual, it can extend only to one, and 
it muft therefore be regulated by the Laws of uni- 
verfal Propofilmis. 

An indefinite Propofition, is when no Note, either 
of Univerfality or Particularity, is prefixed to a 
Subject, which is in its own Nature general ; as a 
Planet is ever changing its Place : Angels are noble 
Creatures. Now this Sort of Propofition, efpecially 
when it defcribcs the Nature of Things, is ufually 
counted univerfal alfo, and it fuppofes the Subject 
to be taken in its whole Extenfion : For if there 
were any Planet which did not change its Place, or 
any Angel that were not a noble Creature, thefe 
Proportions would not be flriclly true. 

Yet 



CH. II.] EIGHT USE 0£ HEASON"." 1£Q 

Yet in order to fecure us againft Miflakes in 
judging of univerfal, particular, and indefinite Pro- 
portions, it is necefTary to make thefe following 
Remarks. 

I. Concerning univerfal Proportions, 

Note I. Univerfal Terms may either denotes 
metaphyfical, a phyfical, or a moral Univerfality. 

A metaphyfical or mathematical U?iiverfality, is 
when all the Particulars contained under any ge- 
neral Idea have the fame Predicate belonging to 
them without any Exception whatfoever ; or when 
the Predicate is fo eiTential to the univerfal Subject, 
that it deftroys the very Nature of the Subject 
to be without it ; as, All Circles have a Center and 
Circumference : All Spirits in their ozvn Nature are 
immortal, 

A phyfical oi 1 natural Univerfality, is when ac- 
cording to the Order and common Courfe of Na- 
ture, a Predicate agrees to all the Subjects of that 
Kind, though there may be fome accidental and 
preternatural Exceptions ; as, All Men ufe Words 
to exprefs their Thoughts, yet dumb Perfons are ex- 
cepted, for they cannot fpeak. All Beqfis have four 
Feet, yet there may be fome Monfiers with five ; 
or maimed, who have but three. 

A moral Univerfality, is when the Predicate agrees 
to the greater!: Part of the Particulars which are 
contained under the univerfal Subject. ; as, All 
Negroes are fiupid Creatures : All Men are govern- 
ed by Affeclion ra :her than by Reafon : All the old 
Romans loved their Country : And the Scripture 
ufes this Language, when St. Paul tells us, The 
Cretes are always Liars. 

Now it is evident, that the fpecial or lingular 
Conclufion cannot be inferred from a moral Uni- 
verfality, nor always and infallibly , from a phyfical 



1 50 ioGick: ok, the [paiit : ii* 

one, though it may always be inferred from a 
Univerfality which is metaphyseal, without any 
Danger or Poffibility of a Miftake. 

Let it be obferved alfo, that ufually we make 
little or no Di (Unction in common Language, be- 
tween a Subject that is phyfeeally or meta^hyfically 
univerfal. 

Note 2. An univerfal Term is fometimes taken 
collectively for all its particular Ideas united toge- 
ther, and fometimes diftributively, meaning each of 
them jingle alone. 

Inftances of a eolleclive Univerfal are fuch as 
thefe : All thefe Apples will Jill a Bujhel ; All the 
Hours of the Night are fufficient for Sleep : All the 
Rules of Grammar overload the Memory. In thefe 
Proportions it is evident, that the Predicate be- 
longs not to the Individuals fepar at ely, but to the 
whole eolleclive Idea ; for we cannot affirm the 
fame Predicate if we change the Word all into one 
or into every, we cannot fay one Apple or every 
Apple will fill a Bujhel) &c. Now fuch a eolleclive 
Idea, when it becomes the Subject of a Propofition, 
ought to be efteemed as one (ingle Thing, and this 
renders the Propofition Jingular or indefinite, as we 
fhall fhew immediately. 

A diflrihutive Univerfal will allow the Word all 
to be changed into every, or into one, and by this 
Means is diftinguifhed from a eolleclive. 

Inftances of a difiributive Univerfal are the mofi 
common on every Occaiion ; as, all Men are mor- 
tal : Every Man is a Sinner, &c. But in this Sort 
of Univerfal there is a Diftribution to be made, 
which follows in the Remark. 

Note 3. When an univerfal Term is taken difi 
tributively, fometimes it includes all the Individu- 
als contained in its inferior Species: As when I 
fay every Sieknefs has a Tendency to Death ; I mean 

every 



GH. II.] RlGkT USE OF REASON. 151 

Every individual Sicknefs, as well as every Kind. 
But fometimes it includes no more than merely 
each Species or Kind ; as when the Evangelift lays, 
Chrift healed every Difeafe, or every Difeafe was 
healed by Chrift ; that is, every Kind of Difeafe. 
The frft of thefe, Logicians call the Diftribiition 
of an Univerfal in jingula Generum ; the lafi is a 
Difcribution in genera fmgulorum. But either of 
them joined to the Subject render a Proportion 
univerfal. 

Note A. The Univerfality of a Subject is often 
reftrained by a Part of the Predicate ; as when we 
fay, All Men learn Wifdom by Experience : The lini* 
verfal Subject, all Men, is limited to fignify only* 
all thofe Men who learn Wifdom. The Scripture 
alfo ufes this Sort of Language, when it fpeaks of 
all Men being juflified by the Right eoufnefs of one, 
Rom. v. J 8. that is 3 all Men who are juflified ob- 
tain it in this Way. 

Obferve here, That not only a metaphyfical or na- 
tural, but a moral Univerfality alfo is oftentimes 
to be reftrained by~ a Part of the Predicate ; as 
when we fay, Ail the Dutch are good Seamen i All 
the Italians are fubtll Politicians ; that is, thofe 
among the Dutch that are Seamen are good Sea^ 
men ; and thofe among the Italians who are Poli- 
ticians, are fubtil Politicians, that is : they are ge- 
nerally fo. 

Note 5. The Univerfality of a Term is many 
Times reftrained by the particular Time, Place, Cir- 
cumflance, &c. or the Defign of the Speaker ; as 
if we were in the City of London, and (ay, All the 
Weavers went to present their Petition ; we mean 
only Ail the Weavers who dwell in the Oily. So 
when it is faicl in the Gofpel, All Men did marvel, 
Mark v. 20. it reaches only to All thofe Men who 
heard of the Miracles of onr Saviour. 

L Here 



152 LOGICK : OR, THE [p ART II, 

Here alio it fhould be obferved, that a moral 
Univerfality is retrained by Time, Place, and other 
Circum (lances, as well as a natural-, Co that by 
thefe Means the Word all fometimes does not ex- 
tend to a tenth Part of thofe who at firft might feem 
to be included in that Word. 

One Occafion of thefe Difficulties and Ambi- 
guities that belong to univerfal P r op o fit ions, is the 
common Humour and Temper of Mankind, who 
generally have an Inclination to magnify their Ideas, 
and to talk roundly and ' univ erf ally concerning any 
Thing they fpeak of"; which has introduced uni- 
verfal Terms of Speech into Cuftom and Habit,, in 
all Nations, and ail Languages, more than Nature 
or Reafon would diclate ; yet when this Cuitom is 
introduced, it is not at ail improper to ufe this 
Sort of Language in Solemn and facred Writings, 
as well as in familiar Difcourfe. 

II. Remarks concerning indefinite Propofitions. 

Note J. Proportions carrying in them univerfal 
Forms of Exprefiion, may fometimes drop the 
Note of Oinverfality, and become indefinite, and 
yet retain the fame univerfal Senfe, whether meta- 
phyfical, natural, or moral ; whether collective or 
dijiributive, 

We may give Inftances of each of thefe. 

Metaphyseal ; as, A Circle has a Center and Cir- 
cumference, Natural ; as, Beafls have four Feet. 
Moral ; as, Negroes are fiupid Creatures. Collec- 
tive ; as, The Apples will fill a Bufhel. Diftributive ; 
as, Men are mortal. 

Note 2. There are many Cafes wherein a collec- 
tive Idea is expreffed in a Proportion by an indefi- 
nite Term, and that where it deferibes the Nature 
or Quality of the Subject, as well as when it de- 
clares (bine pafi Matters of Fa 61 -, as, Fir-trees fiet 

in 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 153 

in good Order will give a charming Profpedl: this 
muft fignify a Collection of Fir-trees, for one makes 
no Profpecl. In Matters of Fact this is more evi- 
dent and frequent ; as, The Romans overcame the 
Gauls : The Robbers fur rounded the Coach : The wild 
Geefe flew over the Thames in the Form of a Wedge. 
All thefe are collective Subjects. 

Note 3, In indefinite Propofitions the Subject is 
often retrained by the Predicate, or by the fpecial 
Time, Place, or Circumftances, as well as in Pro- 
pofitions which are exprefsly univerfal ; as, The 
Chinefes are ingenious Silk-Weavers ; that is, thofe 
Chinefes which are Silk-Weavers are ingenious at 
their Work. The Stars appear to us when the Twi- 
light is gone ; this can fignify no more than the 
Stars which are above our Horizon. 

Note 4. All thefe Reftrictions tend to reduce, 
fome indefinite Propofitions almoft into particular^ 
as will appear under the next Remarks. 

III. Remarks concerning particular Propofitions. 

Note 1. A particular Proposition may fometimes 
be exprefTed indefinitely, without any Note of Par- 
ticularity prefixed to the Subject ; as, In Times of 
Coufufion Laws are not executed: Men of Virtue are 
difgraced, and Murderers efcape ; that is, fome Laws, 
fome Men of Virtue, fome Murderers : Unlefs we 
fhould call this Language a moral Umverfality, 
though I think it can hardly extend fo far. 

Note 2. The Words fome, a few, &c. though 
they generally denote a proper Particularity, yet 
fometimes they exprefs a collective Idea ; as, Some 
of the Enemies befct the General around : A few 
Greeks would beat a thoufand Indians. 

I conclude this Section with a few general Re- 
marks on this Subject, namely, 



6 



L 3 Gen. 



154 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 

Gen. Rem. I. Since univerfal^ indefinite, and par- 
ticular Terms in the plural Number may either be 
taken in a collective or dlftrihutive Senfe, there is 
one fhort and eafy Way to find when they are col- 
lective and when dlftrihutive, namely, If the plural 
Number may be changed into the lingular, that is, 
if the Predicate will agree to one (ingle Subject, it 
is a dlftrihutive Idea ; if not, it is collective. 

Gen. Rem. II. Univerfal and particular Terms in 
the plural Number; fuch as, all, fame, few, many, 
&c. when they are taken in their dlftrihutive Senfe, 
reprefent fever al jingle Ideas ; and when they are 
thus affixed to the Subjecl of a Proportion, render 
that Proportion univerfal or particular, according 
to the Univerfality or Particularity of the Terms 
affixed. 

Gen. Rem. III. Univerfal and particular Terms in 
the plural Number, taken in their collective Senfe, 
reprefent generally one collective Idea. 

If this one collective Idea be thus reprefented 
(whether by univerfal or particular Terms) as the 
Subjecl: of a Proportion, which defcrihes the Nature 
of a Thing, it properly makes either afingular or an 
indefinite Propofition ; for the Words, all, fome, a few, 
&e. do not then denote the Quantity of the Propo- 
rtion, but are efteemed merely as Terms which 
conned! thelndividuals together in order to compofe 
one collective Idea. Obferve thefe In fiances ; All 
the Sycamores in the Garden would make a large 
Grove ; that is, this one Colledt ion of Sycamores, 
which is njingnlar Idea. Some of the Sycamores in 
the Garden would make a fine Grove: Sycamores would 
make a noble Grove : In thefe Lift the Subjecl is ra- 
ther indefinite thmfingular. But it is very evident, 
that in each of thefe Propofitiohs the Predicate can 

only 



€H. II.] EIGHT USE OF REASON'. 155 

only belong to a colleclive Idea, and therefore the 
Subject muft be efteemed a colleBlve. 

If this collective Idea (whether reprefented by 
univerfal or particular Terms) be ufed in defcribing 
pafi Matters of Fact, then it is generally to be 
efteemed ajtngular Idea, and renders the Propofi- 
tion fingular ; as, All the Soldiers of Alexander made 
hut a little Army ; A few Macedonians vanquifhed 
the large Army of Darius : Some Grenadiers in the 
Camp plundered all the neighbouring Towns. 

Now we have (hewn before, that if a Proportion 
defcribing the Nature of Things has an indefinite 
Subject, it is generally to be evteemed univerfal in 
its propofitional Senfe : And if it has a fingular 
SubjecJ, in its propofitional Senfe it is always ranked 
with Univerfals. 

After all, we muft be forced to confefs, that the 
Language of Mankind, and the Idioms of Speech, 
are fo exceeding various, that it is hard to reduce 
them to a few Rules ; and if we would gain a juft 
and precife Idea of every univerfal, particular, and 
indefinite Expreffion, we mud not only confider 
the peculiar Idiom of the Language, but the Time, 
the Place, the Occafion, the Circumftances of the 
Matter fpoken of, and thus penetrate as far as pof- 
fible into the Defign of the Speaker or Writer. 



I 3 SECT, 



J 56 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II t 

SECT. II. 

Of Affirmative and Negative Propositions. 

TT JHEN a Proportion is confidered with re- 
W gai'd to its Copula, it may be divided into 
affirmative and negative ; for it is the Copula joins 
or disjoins the two Ideas. Others call this a Divi- 
lion of Proportions according to their Quality, 

An Affirmative Prop ofit ion is when the Idea of the 
Predicate is fuppofed to agree to the Idea of the 
Subject, and is joined to it by the Word is, or are, 
which is the Copula : as, All Men are Sinners. But 
when the Predicate is not fuppofed to agree with 
the Subject, and is disjoined from it by the Particles 
is not, are not, &c. the Propofition is negative ; as, 
Man is not innocent ; or, no Man is innocent. In an 
Affirmative Propofition, we afiert one Thing to 
belong to another, and, as it were, unite them in 
Thought and Word : In Negative Proportions, we 
feparate one Thing from another, and deny their 
Agreement. 

It may feem fomething odd, that two Ideas or 
Terms are faid to be disjoined, as well as joined by 
a Copula : But if we can but fuppofe the negative 
Particles do really belong to the Copula of negative 
Proportions, it takes away the Harfhnefs of the 
expreffion : and to make it yet tofter, we may 
confider that the Predicate and Subject: may be 
properly faid to be joined in a Form of Words as a 
Propofition, by connective Particles in Grammar 
or Logick, though they are disjoined in their Senfe 
and Signification. Every Youth, who has learned 
his Grammar, knows there are fuch Words as 
disjunctive Proportions. 

Several 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON, 15/ 

Several Things are worthy our Notice on this 
Subject. 

Note lit, As there are ibme Terms, or Words, 
and Ideas, (as I have (hewn before) concerning 
which it is hard to determine whether they are 
negative or pojitive, \o there are fome Propofitions 
concerning which it may be difficult to fay, whe- 
ther they affirm or deny : As, when we fay, Plato 
was no Fool : Cicero was 710 unjkdful Orator : 
Cafar made no Expedition to ISlufcovy : An Ofler 
has 710 Part like an Eel : It is not necejfary for a 
Pliyjician to [peak French : and, for a Phyfician to 
/peak French is medlefs. The Senfe of theie Propo- 
rtions is very plain and eafy, though Logicians 
might fquabble perhaps a whole Day, whether they 
fhould rank them under the Names of Negative or 
Affirmative. 

Note 2d, In Latin and Englifh two Negatives 
joined in one Sentence make an Affirmative ; as 
when we declare No Man is 7iot mortal ; it is the 
fame as though we faid, Ma?i is mortal. But in 
Greek, and oftentimes in French, two Negatives 
make but a ftronger Denial. 

Note 3d, If the mere negative Term, not, be 
added to the Copula of an umverfal Affirmative 
Proposition, it reduces it to a particular Negative ; 
as, All Men are not wife, Ggnifies the lame as, Some 
Men are not wife. 

Note 4th, In all affirmative Proportions, the 
Predicate is taken in its whole Comprehenfion ; 
that is, every cffential Part and Attribute of it is 
affirmed concerning the Subject ; as when I fay, 
A true Clirlflian is an honefi Man, every Thing that 
belongs to Honefiy is affirmed concerning a true 
Chriftian. 

Note 5th. In all negative Proportions the Pre- 
dicate is taken in its whole Extenfion ; that is, 

L 4 every 



158 LOGTCK : OR, THE [p ART II. 

every Species and Individual that is contained in 
the general Idea of the Predicate, is utterly denied 
concerning the Subject ; fo in this Proportion, 
A Spirit is 120 1 an Animal, we exclude all Sorts and 
Kinds and particular Animals whatfoever from the 
Idea of a Spirit. 

From thefe two hit Remarks we may derive this 
Inference, that we ought to attend to the entire 
Comprehenfion of our Ideas, and to the univerfal 
JLxtenfio.1% of them, as far as we have proper Capa- 
city for it, before we grow too confident in our 
affirming or denying any Thing which "may have 
the leaf! Darknefs, Doubt, or Difficulty attending 
it : It is the want of this Attention that betrays us 
into many MHlakes. 



SECT. III. 

Of the Oppofition and Converjlon of Propositions* 

NY two Ideas being joined or disjoined in 
various Forms will afford us fcveral Propo- 
rtions : All thefe may bediffinguifhed according to 
their Quantity and their Quality* into four, which 
are marked or denoted by the Letters, A, E, I, O, 
thus : 

r Univerfal Affirmative. 
, J Univerfal Negative, 

denotes a < p articu)ar Affirmative. 

I Particular Negative. 

• The Reader fhould remember here, that a Propofition ac- 
cording to its Quantity is called Univerfal or Particular ; and ac- 
cording to its Quality •, it is either Affirmative or Negative. 



according 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 15Q 

according to thefc old Latin Rhimes — 

Afferit A, Negat E, verum generaliter Ambte. 
Afferit I, Negat O, fed particular iter Amho. 

This may be exemplified by thefe two Ideas, a 
Vine and a Tree. 

A, Every Vine is a Tree. 

E, No Vine is a Tree. 

I, Some Vine is a Tree. 

O, Some Vine is not a Tree. 

The Logicians of the Schools have written many 

large Trifles concerning the Oppofition and Conver- 

fion of Proportions. It will be fufficient here to 

grive a few brief Hints of thefe Things, that the 

Learner may not be utterly ignorant of them. 

Proportions which are made of the fame Subject 
and Predicate, are faid to be oppojite, when that 
which is denied in one is affirmed in the other, 
either in whole or in part, without any Conlidera- 
tion whether the Proportions be true or no. 

If they differ both in Quantity and Quality they 
are called Contradictory ; as, 

_ J ■ J a . | Thefe can never be both true 

J. ree 
~ " r/ . . ^ > or both falfe at the fame 
U borne V me is not ! m- 
cr> \ Time. 

a Tree. J 

If two Univerfals differ in Quality they are Con- 
traries ; as, 

A Every Vine is a^ T u r u u *u *. 

rr y f I hefe can never be both true 

J. ree . . 

E No 'Fine is a f !°f f th /, r ; but thc >' ma >' be 
rn J both falfe. 

If two particular Proportions differ in Quality 
they are Subcontraries ; as, 

I Some 



160 logick: or, the [part ii. 

I Some Vine is a^\ -p U r i_t.ii 

rp I Inele may be both true to- 

O Some Vine is not \ f 1 ^' )f f ^ can never 
rr j be both falfe. 

a Tree. J 

Both particular and univerfal Proportions which 
agree in Quality, but not in Quantity, are called 
Subaltern, though thefe are not properly oppofite ; 
as, 

A Every Vine is a Tree. 
I Some Vine is a Tree, 

Or thus : 

E No Vine is a Tree. 

O Some Vine is not a Tree. 

The Canons of Jubaltern Proportions are ufually 
reckoned thefe three ; namely, (i.) If an univerfal 
Proportion be true, the Particular will be true alfo, 
but not on the contrary. And, (2.) If a particular 
Proportion be falfe, the univerfal muft be falfe too, 
but not on the contrary. (3.) Subaltern Proportions, 
whether univerfal or particular, may fometimes be 
both true and fometimes both falfe. 

The Converfion of Proportions, is when the Sub- 
ject and Predicate change their Places with Pre- 
fervation of the Truth. This may be done with 
conftant Certainty in all univerfal Negatives and 
particular Affirmatives ; as, No Spirit is an Animal, 
jpiay be converted, No Animal is a Spirit; and, Some 
Tree is a Vine, may be converted, Some Vine is a 
Tree. But there is more of formal Trifling in this 
Sort of Difcourfe than there is of folid Improvement, 
becaufe this Sort of Converfion ariies merely from 
the Form of Words, as connected in a Proportion, 
rather than from the Matter. 

Yet it may be ufeful to obferve, that there are 
fome Proportions, which by Rcafon of the Ideas 
or Matter of which they are compofed, may be 

converted 



CH. II.] BIGHT USE OP REASON. l6l 

converted with conftant Truth : Such are thofe 
Proportions whofe Predicate is a nominal or real 
Definition of the Subject, or the Difference of it, 
or a Property of the fourth Kind, or a fuperlative 
Degree of any Property or Quality whatfoever ; or 
in fhort, wherefoever the Predicate and the Subject 
have exactly the fame extension, or the fame Com- 
prehenfion ; as, Every Vine is a Tree bearing 
Grapes : and every Tree hearing Grapes is a Vine ; 
Religion is the trueft Wifdom ; and, The trueft Wif- 
dom is Religion : Julius Cafar was the fir ft Emperor 
of Rome ; and The firft Emperor of Rome was Julius 
Ccefar. Thefe are the Proportions which are pro- 
perly convertible, and the'y are called reciprocal 
Propofitions. 



SECT. IV. 

Of pure and modal Propositions. 

ANOTHER Divifion of Proportions among the 
fcholaftick Writers, is into pure and modal. 
This may be called (for Difii net ion -fake) a Divifion 
accord'mg to the Predicate. 

When a Proportion merely exprefles that the 
Predicate is connected with the Subject, it is called 
a pure Propofition ; as, Every true Chriftian is an 
honeft Man. But when it includes alfo the Way. 
and Manner wherein the Predicate is connected 
with the Subject, it is called a modal Propofition ; 
as, when I fay, It is neceffary that a true Chriftian 
Jhould he an honeft Man. 

Logical Writers generally make the Modality of 
this Propofition to belong to the Copida, becaufe it 
fhews the Manner of the Connection between the 
Subject and Predicate, jBut if the Form of the. 

Sentence 



162 logick: or, the [part ir. 

Sentence as a logical Proportion be duly confider- 
ed, the Mode itfelf is the very Predicate of the 
Proposition, and it muft run thus : That a true 
Chriflian Jhould he an honeji Man is a necejfary Things 
and then the whole primary Proportion is included 
in the Subjecl of the modal Propofition. 

There are four Modes of connecting the Predi- 
cate with the Subjecl, which are ufually reckoned 
up on this Occafion, namely, Neceffity and Con- 
tingency, which are two Oppolites ; PoJJibility and 
Impoffibility, which are alio Oppofites ; as, // is 
necejfary that a Globe fliould be round : That a Globe 
he made of Wood or Glajs, is an nnnecejfary or con- 
tingent Thing : It is impojfible that a Globe fnould 
lefquare : It is pojfible that a Globe may be made of 
Water. 

With Regard to the modal Proportions which the 
Schools have introduced, I would make thefe two 
Remarks. 

Remark I. Thefe Proportions iri Englifh are 
formed by the Resolution of the Words, muft fre> 
might not be, can be, and cannot be, into thofc more 
explicate Forms of a logical Copula and Predicate, 
is necejfary, is contingent, is pojfible, is impojfible : 
For it is necejfary that a Globe Jhould be round, fig 
niiies no more than that a Globe mi ft be round. 

■ Remark 2. Let it be noted, that this quadruple 
Modality is only an Enumeration of the natural 
Modes or Manners wherein the Predicate is con- 
nected with the Subjecl: : We might alfo defcribe 
fevcral moral and civil Modes of connecling two 
Ideas together, namely, Lawfulnefs and Unlaw- 
fulnefs, Convenience, and hiconvenicncy, <kc. whence 
we may form fuel) modal Proportions as thefe : 7/ 
is unlawful for any Perfon to kill an innocent Man : 

It 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. l6$ 

It is unlawful for Chriftians to eat Flejh in Lent : To 
tell all that we think is inexpedient : For a Man to be 
affable to his Neighbour is very convenient, &c. 

There are feveral other Modes of fpeaking where- 
by a Predicate is connected with a Subjecl : Such 
as, it is certain, it is doubtful, it is probable, it is ini- 
probable, it is agreed, it is granted, it is f aid by the 
Ancients, it is written, &cc. all which will form other 
Kinds of modal Proportions. 

But whether the Modality be natural, moral, &c. 
yet in all thefe Proportions it is the Mode is the 
proper Predicate, and all the reft of the Proportion, 
except the Copula (or Word is) belongs to the Sub- 
jecl; and thus they become pure Proportions of a 
complex Nature, of which we (hall treat in the next 
Section ; fo that there is no great Need of making 
Modals of a diftincl: fort. 

There are many little Subtilties which the 
Schools acquaint us with concerning the Converfion 
and Oppojition and Equipollence of thefe modal Pro- 
portions fuited to the Latin or Greek Tongues, 
rather than the Englifh, and fit to pafs away the 
idle Time of a Student, rather than to enrich his 
Undemanding. 



SECT. V. 

Of Jingle Propositions, whether Simple or Complex. 

WHEN we confider the Nature of Proportions, 
together with the Formation of them, and 
the Materials whereof they are made, we divide 
them into fngle and compound. 

A Single Proportion is that which has but one 
Subjecl: and one Predicate ; but if it has more 
Subjects, or more Predicates, it is called a Compound 

Pro- 



164 logick : ok, Tttfi [part ii. 

Propofition, and indeed it contains two or more 
Propofitions in it. 

A Single Propofition (which is alfo called cate- 
gorical) may be divided again into Jimple and com- 
plex*. 

A purely Jimple Proportion is that whofe Subject 
and Predicate are made up of fingle Terms ; as, 
Virtue is deferable : Every Penitent is pardoned : No 
Man is innocent. 

When the Subject or Predicate, or both, are 
made up of complex Terms, it is called a complex 
Propofition ; as, Every fine ere Penitent is pardoned : 
Virtue is deferable for its own Sake : No Man alive 
is perfeclly innocent. 

If the Term which is added to the Subject of a 
complex Propofition be either effential or any way 
neceflary to it, then it is called explicative, for it 
only explains the Subject ; as, Every mortal Man 
is the Son of Adam. But if the Term added to 
make up the complex Subject, does not neceflarily 
or conftantly belong to it, then it is determinative, 
and limits the Subject to a particular Part of its 
Extenflon ; as, Every pious Man feiall be happy. 
In the firft Propofition the Word mortal is merely 
explicative: In the fecond Propofition the Word 
pious is determinative. 

Here note, that whatfoever may be affirmed or 
denied concerning any Subject with an explicative 
Addition, may be alfo affirmed or denied of that 
Subject without it, as we may boldly fay, Every 
Man is the Son of Adam, as well as every mortal 
Man : But it is not fo, where the Addition is 



* As Jimple Ideas are oppofed to complex, and Jingle Ideas to 
<ompound, fo Propofitions are diftingrufhed in the fame Manner : 
The Knglifh Tongue, in this refpect, having iome Advantage 
above the lea led Languages, which have no ufual Word to 
di (ting uifh Jingle from Jimple. 

deter- 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 165 

determinative, for we cannot fay, Every Manjhall 
be happy, though every pious Man (hall be fo. 

In a complex Proportion the Predicate or Sub- 
ject is ibmetimes made complex by the Pronouns 
who, which, whofe, to whom, &c. which make ano- 
ther Proportion ; as, Every Man who is pious 
Jhall he faved: Julius, whofe Sir name was C<efar 9 
overcame Pompey : Bodies, which are tranfparent, 
have many Pores. Here the whole Proportion is 
called the primary or chief, and the additional Pro- 
portion is called an incident Proportion. But it is 
(till to be efteemed in this Cafe merely as a Part of 
the complex Term ; and the Truth or Falfhood of 
the whole complex Proportion is not to be judged by 
the Truth or Falfhood of the incident Proportion, 
but by the Connection of the whole Subject with 
the Predicate. For the incident Proportion may 
be falfe, and abfurd, or impoffible, and yet the 
whole complex Proportion may be true ; ds,AHorfe 
which has Wings might fly over the Thames. 

Berde this Complexion which belongs to the Sub- 
ject or Predicate, logical Writers ufed to fay, there 
is a Complexion which may fall upon the Copula alfo : 
But this I have accounted for in the Section con- 
cerning modal Propofitions ; and indeed it is not of 
much importance whether it were placed there or 
here. 



SECT. VI. 

Of 'compound Propositions. 

yd Compound Propofition is made up of two or more 
Subjedts or Predicates, or both ; and it con- 
tains in it two or more Proportions, which are 
either plainly exprejfed, or concealed and implied. 

The 



l66 LbdiCK: OR, the [part if, 

The ftrft Sort of compound Proportions are thofe 
wherein the Compofition is exprejjed and evident, 
and they are diffinguifhed into thefe fix Kinds, 
namely, Copulative, Disjunctive, Conditional, Caufal, 
Relative, and Difcretive. 

I. Copulative Propositions are thofe which have 
more Subjects, or Predicates connected by affirma- 
tive or negative Conjunctions ; as, Riches and Honour 
are Temptations to Pride : Ctefar conquered the Gauls 
and the Britons : Neither Gold nor Jewels w'dlpur* 
chafe Immortality. Thefe Proportions are evidently 
compounded, for each of them may be refolved into 
two Propositions, namely, Riches are Temptations 
to Pride ; and Honour is a Temptation to Pride ; and 
ib the reft. 

The Truth of copulative Proportions depends 
upon the Truth of all the Parts of them ; for if Cae- 
far had conquered the Gauls, and not the Britons, 
or the Britons, and not the Gauls, the fecorid copu- 
lative Proportion had not been true. 

Here note, Thofe Proportions, which cannot be 
refolved into two or more rmple Proportions, are 
not .properly copulative, though two or more Ideas 
be connecled and coupled by fuch Conjunctions, 
either in the Subject or Predicate ; as, Two and 
three make jive : Majefty and Meeknefs do not often, 
meet : The Sun, Moon, and Stars, are not all to be 
feen at once. Such Proportions are to be efteemed 
merely complex, becau'fe the Predicate cannot be 
affirmed of each fingle Subject, but only of all of 
them together as a co lie dive Subject. 

II. Disjunctive Proportions, are when the Parts 
arc disjoined or oppoied to one another by disjunc- 
tive Particles ; as, // is either Day or Night : The 

Weather 



OH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. l67 

Weather is either jhimng or rainy : Quantity is either 
Length, Breadth^ or Depth. 

The Truth of Disjunctives depends on the neccf* 
fary and immediate Oppofition of the Parts ; there • 
fore only the lad of thefe Examples is true ; but 
the two firft are not ftriclly true, becaufe Twilight 
is a Medium between Day and Night ; and dry 
•cloudy Weather is a Medium between Jiihnng and 



raining. 



III. Conditional or hypothetical Proportions, are 
thofe whofe Parts are united by the conditional 
Particle if; as, If the Sun be fixed, the Earth mufi 
move : If there he no Fire, there will he no Smoke. 

Note, The firft Parts of thefe Proportions, or 
that wherein the Condition is contained, is called 
the Antecedent, the other is called the Confequeiit. 

The Truth of thefe Proportions depends not at 
all on the Truth or Falfhood of their two Parts, 
but on the Truth of the Connection of them ; for 
each Part of them may be falfe, and yet the whole 
Propofition true ; as, if there he no Providence, there 
will he no future Punijhment. 

IV. Caufal Proportions, are where two Propofi- 
tions are joined by caufal Particles ; as, Houfes were 
not built that they might be dejlroyed : Rehoboam was 
unhappy becaufe he followed evil Counfel. 

The Truth of a caufal Propofitio?i arifes not from 
the Truth of the Parts, but from the caufal Influence 
that the one Part of it has upon the other ; for both 
Parts may be true, yet the Proportion falfe, if one 
Part be not the Caufe of the other. 

Some Logicians refer reduplicative Proportions to 
this Place ; as, Men, confdered as Men, are rational 
Creatures, that is, becaufe they are Men. 

M V. Re- 



l68 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART II. 

V. Relative Propojitio?is have their Parts joined 
by fuch Particles as exprefs a Relation or Com- 
parifon of one Thing to another ; as, When you are: 

Jilent, I will /peak : As much as you are worthy Jo 
much Jkall you be ejleemed : As is the Father, Jo is 
the Son: Where there is no Tale-Shearer, Contention 
will ceaje. 

Thefe are very much akin to conditional Propo- 
rtions, and the Truth of them depends upon the 
juftnefs of their Connection. 

VI. Di/cretive Propofitions are fuch wherein va- 
rious and feemingly opposite Judgments are made, 
whofe Variety or Distinction is noted by the Par- 
ticles but, though, yet, <kc. as, Travellers may change 
their Climate, but not their Temper ; Job was patient, 
though his Grief was great. 

The Truth and Goodnefs of a difcretive Propo- 
Jition, depends on the Truth of both Parts, and 
their Contradiftindtion to one another; for though 
both Parts fhould be true, yet if there be no feem- 
ing Oppofition between them, it is an ufelefs 
AfTertion, though we cannot call it a falfe one ; 
as, Dejcartes was a PhiloJopher,yet he was a French- 
man : The Romans were valiant, but they Jpoke 
Latin ; both which Propofitions are ridiculous 
for want of a feeming Oppofition between the 
Parts. 

Since we have declared wherein the Truth and 
Faljliood of thefe compound Propositions confift, it is 
proper alfo to give fome Intimations how any of 
thefe Propofitions, when they are falfe, may be op-< 
pojed or contradicled. 

All compound Propofitions, except Copulatives 
and Dijcretives, arc properly denied or contra- 
dicled when the Negation arYecls their conjunctive 
Particles 5 as, if the disjunctive Propofitiop allerts, 

// 



CK. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 1 6() 

It is either Day or Night ; the Opponent fays, // 
is not either Day or Night ; or, // is not necejfary that 
it fhould be either Day or Night : So the hypothetical 
Propofltion is denied, by faying, // does not follow 
that the Earth muft move if the Sun he fxt. 

A disjunctive Propofltion may be contradicted alfo 
by denying all the Parts ; as, It is neither Day nor 
Night. 

And a caufal Propofltion may be denied or op- 
pofed indirecliy and improperly, when either Part of 
the Propofltion is denied ; and it muft be falfe if 
either Part be falfe ; butihe Defign of the Propo- 
sition being to (hew the caufal Connection of the two 
Parts, each Part is fuppofed to be true, and it is 
not properly contradicted as a caufal Propofltion, 
unlefs one Part of it be denied to be the Caufe of 
the other. 

As for Copulatives and Difcretives, becaufe their 
Truth depends more on the Truth of their Parts, 
therefore they may be oppofed or denied, as many- 
Ways as the Parts of which they are compofed may 
be denied ; fo this copulative Proportion, Riches 
and Honour are Temptations to Pride, may be denied 
by faying, Riches are not Temptations, though Ho- 
nour may he : or, Honour is not a Temptation, though 
Riches may he ; or, Neither Riches nor Honour are 
Temptations, &c. 

So this difcretive Propofltion, Job was patient, 
though his Grief was great, is denied by faying, Job 
was not patient, though his Grief was great : or, Job 
was patient, but his Grief was not great : or, Job was 
?wt patient, nor was his Grief great. 

We proceed now to the fecond Sort of compound 
Proportions, namely, fuch whofe Compofition is not 
expreffed, but latent or concealed ; yet a fmall Atten- 
tion will find two Proportions included in them. 
Such are thefe that follow. 

M 2 1. Ex~ 



1/0 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 

1. Exclufives ; as, The pious Man alone is happy, 
It is only Sir Ifaac Newton could find out true Philo- 

fophy. 

2. Exceptives ; as, None of the Ancients but Plato 
well defended the SouVs Immortality, The Protejlants 
worfhip hut one God. 

3. Comparatives ; as, Pain is the great eft Afflic- 
tion. No Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards at 
Mexico. 

Here note, That the comparative Degree does not 
always imply the poftive ; as if I fay, A Fool is bet- 
ter than a Knave, this does not affirm that Folly k 
good, but that it is a lefs £w/than Knavery. 

4. Inceptives and Deceptives, which relate to the 
beginning or ending of any Thing ; as, The Latin 
Tongue is not yet forgotten. No Man before Orpheus 
wrote Greek Perfe. Peter Czar of Mufcovy began to 
civilize his Nation. 

To thefe may be added Coniinuatives ; as, Rome 
remains to this Day, which includes at lead two 
Propositions, namely, Rome was, and Rome is. 

Here let other Authors fpend Time and Pains in 
giving the precife Definitions in all thefe Sorts of 
Propofitions, which may be as well underftood by 
their Names and Examples : Here let them tell 
what their Truth depends upon., and how they are 
to be oppofed or contradicted ; but a moderate 
Share of common Senfe, with a Review of what is 
faid on the former Compounds, will fuffice for all 
thefe Purpofes, without the Formality of Rules. 



sect; 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 171 

SECT. VIL 

Of true andfaJfe Proportions. 

PRopofitions are next to be confidered according 
to their Senfe or Signification, and thus they 
are diftributed into true and falfe. A true Propo- 
rtion reprefents Things as they are in themfelv r es ; 
but if Things are reprefented otherwife than they 
are in themfelves, the Propofition is falfe* 

Or we may defcribe them more particularly thus : 
a true Propofition joins thofe Ideas and Terms toge- 
ther whofe Objects are joined and agree, or it dis- 
joins thofe Ideas and Terms, whofe Objects dis- 
agree, or are disjoined ; as, Every Bird has Wings ; 
Si Brute is not immortal. 

A falfe Propofition joins thofe Ideas or Terms 
whofe Objects clifagree, or it disjoins thofe whofe 
Objects agree ; as, Birds have no Wings ; Brutes 
are immortal. 

Note, It is impoffible that the fame Propofition 
fhould be both true and falfe at the fame Time, in 
the fame Senfe, and in the fame Refpect ; becaufe a 
Propofition is but the Reprefentation of the Agree- 
ment or Difagreement of Things : Now it is im- 
poffible that the fame Thing fhould be and not be, or 
that the fame Thing fhould agree and not agree, at the 
fame Time, and in the fame Refpecl. This is a firft 
Principle of human Knowledge. 

Yet fome Proportions may feem to contradict 
one another, though they may be both true, but 
in different Senfes, or Refpects, or Times ; as, 
Man was immortal in Paradife, and Man was mor- 
tal in Paradife. But thefe two Proportions mud 
be referred to different Times ; as, Man hfore his 

M 3 Fall 



17'2 LOGtCK: OR, THE [PART II. 

Fall was immortal, but at the Fall he became mor- 
tal. So we may fay now, Man is mortal, or Man 
is immortal, if we take thefe Proportions in dif- 
ferent Refpecls ; as, Man is an immortal Creature 
as to his Soul, but mortal as to his Body. A great 
Variety of Difficulties and feeming Contradictions, 
both in holy Scripture and other Writings, may 
be folvedand explained in this Manner. 

The moft important Queftion on this Subject is 
this, What is the Criterion, or dijlinguijh'mg Mark of 
Truth t How (hall we know when a Proportion is 
really true or falfe ? There are fo many Difguifcs 
of Tm*h in the World, fo many falfe Appearances 
of Truth, that fome Seels have declared there is no 
Poffibility of diftinguifhing Truth from Faljhood ; 
and therefore they have abandoned all Pretences to 
Knowledge, and maintain ftrenuoufly that nothing 
is to he known. 

The firit Men of this Humour made themfelves 
famous in Greece by the Name of Sceptics, that 
is, Seekers : They were alfo called Academicks, 
borrowing their Name from Academia, their School, 
or Place of Study. They taught that all Things 
are uncertain, though they allowed that fome are 
more probable than others. After thefe arofe the 
Seel of Fyrrhonicks, fo named from Fyrrho their 
Mafter, who would not allow one Proportion to 
be more probable than another ; but profefTed that 
all Things were equally uncertain. Now all thefe 
Men (as an ingenious Author expreflcs it) were 
rather to be called a Seel of Liais than Philosophers, 
and that Cenfurc is juft for two Reafons : (1 .) Bc- 
caufe they determined concerning every Propor- 
tion that it was uncertain, and believed that as a 
certain Truth, while they profeflcd there was no- 
thing certain, and that nothing could be determined 
concerning Truth or Falfhood ; and thus their very 

Doctrine 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE Otf REASON. 173 

Doctrine gave itfelf the Lie. (2.) Becaufe they 
judged and acted as other Men did in the common 
Affairs of Life ; they would neither run into Fire 
nor Water, though they profefled Ignorance and 
Uncertainty, whether the one would burn, or the 
other drown them. 

There have been fome in all Ages who have too 
much affected this Humour, who difpute agairift 
every Thing, under Pretence that Truth has no 
certain Mark to dift'mguijli it. Let us therefore in- 
quire what is the general Criterion of Truth f And 
in order to this, it is proper to confider what is the 
Reafon why we affent to thofe Propofitions which 
contain the molt certain and indubitable Truths ; 
fuch as thefe, The Whole is greater than a Part ; 
Two and three make five. 

The only Reafon why we believe thefe Propo- 
fitions to be true, is becaufe the Ideas of the Sub- 
jects and Predicates appear with fo much Clearnefs 
and Strength of Evidence to agree to each other, 
that the Mind cannot help difcerning the Agree* 
ment, and cannot doubt of the Truth of them, but 
is conftrained to judge them true. So when we 
compare the Ideas of a Circle and a Triangle^ or 
the Ideas of an Oyjler and a Butterfly , we fee fuch 
an evident Difagreement between them, that we 
are fure that a Butterfly is not an Oyjler ; nor is a 
Triangle a Circle* There is nothing but the Evi- 
dence of the Agreement or Difagreement between 
two Ideas, that makes us affirm or deny the one or 
the other. 

Now it will follow from hence, that a clear and 
diftincl Perception, or fall Evidence of the Agreement 
a?id Difagreement of our Ideas to one another , or to 
Things, is a certain Criterion of Truth : For fince 
our Minds are of fuch a Make, that where the 
Evidence is exceeding plain and llrong, we cannot 
M 4 withhold 



\*]A logick; or, the [part it. 

withhold our Allen t, we fhould then be neceffarily 
expofcd to believe Fa 1 (hood, if complete Evidence 
ihould be found in any Proportions that are not 
true. But furely the God of perfect Wifdom, 
Truth, and Goodnefs, would never oblige his 
Creatures to be thus deceived ; and therefore he 
would never have conftituted us of fuch a Frame, 
as would render it naturally impoffible to guard 
again ft Error. 

Another Confequence is naturally derived from 
the former ; and that is, that the only Reafon why 
we fall into Mi flake, is becaufe we are impatient 
to form a Judgment of Things before we have a 
clear and evident Perception of their Agreement or 
Difagreement ; and if we will make hafle to judge 
while our Ideas arc obfeured or confufed, or before 
we fee whether they agree or difagree, we fhall 
plunge ourfelves into perpetual Errors. See more 
on this Subject in an Effay on the Freedom of U r ill 
in God and Man: Publifhed in 1732. Section 1. 
page 13. 

Note, What is here aflerted concerning the Ne- 
ceffity of clear and diflinct Ideas, refers chiefly to 
Propofitions which we form ourfelves by our own 
Powers : As for Propofitions which we derive from 
the Tefthnony of 'other s 3 they will be accounted for 
in Chap. IV. 



SECT. VIII. 

Of certain and dubious Propofitions, of Knowledge 
and Opinion, 

SINCE we have found that Evidence is the great 
Criterion, and the furc Mark of Truth ; this, 
leads us directly to confider Propofitions according 

to 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON: lfo 

to their Evidence ; and here we mu,ft take Notice 
both of the different Degrees of Evidence, and the 
different Kinds of it. 

Proportions according to their different Degrees 
of Evidence are diftinguifhed into certain and 
tjkibious*. 

Where the Evidence of the Agreement or Dif- 
agreement of the Ideas is fo ftrong and plain, that 
we cannot forbid nor delay our Aflent ; the Pro^ 
pofition is called certain, as, Every Circle hath a 
Center ; The World did not create it/elf. An Aflent 
to fuch Proportions is honoured with the Name of 
Knowledge, 

But when there is any Obfcurity upon the Agree- 
ment or Difagreement of the Ideas, fo that the 
Mind does not clearly perceive it, and is not com- 
pelled to afTent or diftent, then the Proportion, in 
a proper and philofophical Senfe, is called dotd^tful 
or uncertain ; as, The Planets are inhabited ; The 
Souls of Brutes are mere Matter ; The World will 
not ftand a thou/and Years longer ; Dido built the 
City of Carthage, &c. Such uncertain Proportions 
are called Opinions, 

When we conrder ourfelves as Philofophers, or 
Searchers after Truth, it would be well if we always 
fufpended a fullJudgment or Determination about 
any Thing, and made farther Inquiries, where this 
plain and p erf eel Evidence is wanting ; but we are 

fo 



* It may be objected, that this Certainty and U?icertainiy being 
©nly in the Mind, the Divifion belongs to Proportions rather 
according to the Degrees of our djfent, than the Degrees of Evi- 
dence. But it may well be anfwered, that the Evidence here in- 
tended is that which appears fo to the Mind, and not the mere 
Evidence in the Nature of Things : Befides, (as we dial] ftievv im- 
mediately) the Degree of jQJJent ought to be exactly proportionable 
to the Degree of Evidence : And therefore the Difference is no- 
great, whether Proportions be called certain or uncertain y accord- 
ing to the Meafure of Evidence, or of JJJent. 



1.76 LOGrCK 5 OR, THE [PART IT. 

fo prone of ourfelves to judge without full Evi- 
dence, and in fome Cafes the Neceffity of Aclion 
in the Affairs of Life, conftrains us to judge and 
determine upon a tolerable Degree of Evidence, 
that we vulgarly call thofe Proportions certain, 
where we have but very little Room or Reafon to 
doubt of them, though the Evidence be not com- 
plete and reliftlefs. 

Certainty, according to the Schools, is difh'n-t 
guifhed into Objeclive and Subjective. Objeclive 
Certainty, is wheiKthe Proportion is certainly true 
in itfclf ; and Subjeclive, when we are certain of 
the Truth of it. The one is in Things, the other 
is in our Minds. 

But let it be obferved here, that every Propor- 
tion in itfelf is certainly true or certainly falfe. For 
though Doubtfuhefs or Uncertainty feems to be a 
Medium between certain Truth and certain Falf- 
hood in our Minds, vet there is no fuch Medium 
in Things themfelves, no, not even in future 
Events : For now at this Time it is certain in it- 
felf, that Midfummer-Day /even Years hence will be 
ferene, or it is certain it will be cloudy, though we 
are uncertain and utterly ignorant what Sort of 
Day it will be : This Certainty of diftant Futurities 
is known to God only. 

Uncertain or dubious Proportions, that is, Opi- 
nions, arc diftinguifhed into probable, or impro* 
bable. 

When the Evidence of any Proportion is greater 
than the Evidence of the contrary, then it is a pro- 
bable Opinion : Where the Evidence and Argu- 
ments are (ironger on the contrary Side we call it 
improbable. But while the Arguments on either 
Side feera to be equally ftrong,- and the Evidence 
for and aga'wft any Proportion appears equal to 
the Mind, then in common Language we call it a 

doubtful 



CH. II.] HIGHT USE OP REASON. 177 

doubtful Matter. We alfo call it a dubious or doubt~ 
ful Proportion, when there are no Arguments on 
either Side, as, next Chrijimas-Day will be a very 
Jliarp Frofl. And in general, all thofe Proportions 
are doubtful, wherein we can perceive no mfficient 
Marks or Evidences of Truth or Faljhood. In fuch 
a Cafe, the Mind which is fearching for Truth 
ought to remain in a State of Doubt or Sufpenfe, 
until fuperior Evidence on one Side or the other 
incline the Balance of the Judgment, and determine 
the Probability or Certainty to the one Side. 

A great many Propofitions which we generally 
believe or difbelieve in human Affairs, or in the 
Sciences, have very various Degrees of Evidence, 
which yet arife not to complete Certainty , either of 
Truth or Falfhood. Thus it comes to pafs that 
there are fuch various and almoft infinite Degrees 
of Probability and Improbability. To a weak Pro- 
bability we fhould give a weak AvTent; and a 
ftrojiger Aflent is due where the Evidence is greater, 
and the Matter more probable. If we proportion 
our AJfent in all Things to the Degrees of Evidence? 
we do the utmoft that human Nature is capable of 
in a rational Way to fecure itfelf from Error. 



SECT. IX. 

Of Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reajon, Faith, 
a?id Infpiration. 

AFTER we have confidered the Evidence of 
Propofitions in the various Degrees of it, we 
come to furvey the * fever -a I Kinds of Evidence, or the 
different Ways whereby Truth is let into the Mind, 
and which produce accordingly feveral Kinds of 

Knowledge. 



17$ , LOGICK : OK, THE [PART If. 

Knowledge. We (hall diftribute them into thefc 
fix; namely, Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Rea- 
fotiy Faith , and Infpiration ; and then diftinguifh 
the Proportions which are derived from them. 

I. The Evidence of Senfe is, when we frame a 
Propofition according to the Dictates of any of our 
Senfes ; fo we judge that Grafs is green ; that a 
Trumpet gives a pleafant Sound; that Fire burns 
IVood ; Water is foft, and Iron is hard ; for we 
have feen, heard, or felt all thefe. It is upon this 
Evidence of Senfe, that we know and believe the 
daily Occurrences in human Life ; and almoft all 
the Hiftories of Mankind, that are written by 
Eye or Ear-Witneffes, are built upon this Prin- 
ciple. 

Upon the Evidence of Senfe we do not only, in- 
clude that Knowledge which is derived to us by 
our outward Senfes of Hearing ■, Seeing, Feeling, 
Taftingy and Smelling ; but that alfo which is de- 
rived from the inward Senfations and Appetites of 
Hunger, Thirfl, Eafe, Fleafure, Fain, Wearinefs, 
Refi t <kc. and all thofe Things which belong to the 
Body ; as, Hunger is a painful Appetite ; Light is 
pleafant ; Reft isfweet to the weary Limbs, 

Propofitions which are built on this Evidence, 
may be named fenjible Proportions, or the Di£tates 
of Senfe. 

IT. As we learn what belongs to the Body by 
the Evidence of Senfe, fo we learn what belongs to 
the Soul by an inward Confcioufnefs , which may 
be en lied a Sort of internal Feeling, or fpi ritual 
Sen fat ion of w hat pafles in the Mind ; as, 1 think 
before Ifpeak ; I defire large Knowledge ; I fufpeel 
my own Fraclice ; 1 Jludied hard To-day ; My Con- 
ference bears tVitnefs of my Sincerity ; My Soul hates 

vain 



€H. IlfJ EIGHT USE OF REASON. IJQ 

•vain Thoughts ; Fear is an unedfy FaJJlon ; Long 
Meditation on one Thing is tirefome. 

Thus it appears that we obtain the Knowledge 
of a Multitude of Proportions, as well as of lingle 
Ideas, by thofe two Principles which Mr Locke 
calls Senfation and Refleclion : One of them is a 
Sort of Confchufnefs of what affecls the Body, and 
the other is a Confcioufnefs of what gaffes in the 
Mind. 

Propositions which are built on this internal Con- 
fcioifnefs, have yet no particular or diftinguifhing 
Name affigned to them. 

III. Intelligence relates chiefly to thofe abftraeled 
Proportions which carry their own Evidence with 
them, and admit no Doubt about them. Our 
Perception of this Self Evidence in any Proportion 
is called Intelligence, It is our Knowledge of thofe 
firft Principles of Truth which are, as it were, 
wrought into the very Nature and Make of our 
Minds : They are fo evident in themfelves to every 
Man who attends to them, that they need no 
Proof. It is the Prerogative and peculiar Excel- 
lence of thefe Propofitions, that they can fcarce 
ever be proved or denied : They cannot early be 
proved, becaufe there is nothing fuppofed td be 
more clear or certain, from which an Argument 
may be drawn to prove them. They cannot well 
be denied, becaufe their own Evidence is fo bright 
and convincing, that as foon as the Terms are 
nnderftood, the Mind neceflarily aflents ; fuch are 
thefe, Whatfoever acleth hath a Being : Nothing has 
no Properties : A Fart is lefs 'than the Whole : No- 
thing can he the Caufe of iff elf 

Thefe Proportions are called Axioms, or Max-* 
tins, or firji Principles ; thefe are the very Foun- 
dations of all improved Knowledge and Reafon- 

ings, 



ISO logick: or, the [part it, 

ings, and on that* Account thefe have been thought 
to he. innate Proportions, or Truths born with us. 

Some fuppofe that a great Part of the Knowledge 
of Angels and human Souls in the feparate State 
is obtained in this Manner, namely, by fuch an 
immediate View of Things in their own Nature, 
which is called Intuition, 

IV. Reafoning is the next Sort of Evidence, and 
that is, when one Truth is inferred or drawn from 
others by natural and juft Methods of Argument ; 
as, if there be much Light at Midnight, I infer, 
it proceeds from the Moon ; becaufe the Sun is un- 
der the Earth *. If I fee a Cottage in a Foreft, I 
conclude, fome Man has been there and built it. 
Or when I furvey the Heavens and Earth, this 
gives Evidence to my Reafon, that there is a God 
who made them. 

The Proportions which I believe upon this Kind 
of Evidence, are called Conchfions or rational 
Truths ; and the Knowledge that we gain this 
Way is properly Science, 

Yet let it be noted, that the Word Science is 
ufually applied to a whole Body of regular or me- 
thodical Obfervations or Proportions, which learn- 
ed Men have formed concerning any Subject of 
Speculation, deriving one Truth from another by 
a Train of Arguments. If this Knowledge chiefly 
directs our Praclice, it is ufually called an Art, 
And this is the moil remarkable Diftinction be- 
tween an Art and a Science , namely, the one refers 
chiefly to Praclice, the other to Speculation, Nttr 
tural Philofophy, or- Phyficks, and Ontology, are 
Sciences ; Logick and Rhetorick are called Arts ; 
but Mathematics include both Art and Science ; 

for 

* Note, Since this Book was written, we have had fo many 
Appearances of the Aurora Borealis as reduces this Inference only 
to a Probability. 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 181 

for they have much of Speculation, and much of 
Practice in them. 

Obferve here, That when the Evidence of a 
Proportion derived from Senfe, Confdoufnefs, In- 
telligence, or Reafon, is firm and indubitable, it 
produces fuch Ailent as we call a natural Cer- 
tainty. 

V. When we derive the Evidence of any Pro- 
portion from the Teftimony of others, it is called 
the Evidence of Faith ; and this is a large Part of 
our Knowledge. Ten thoufand things there are 
which we believe merely upon the Authority or 
Credit of thofe who have fpoken or written of 
them. It is by this Evidence that we know there 
is fuch a Country as China , and there was fuch a 
Man as Cicero who dwelt hi Rome. It is by this 
that mod of the Tranfactions in human Life are 
managed : We know our Parents and our Kindred 
by this Means, we know the Perfons and Laws of 
our prefent Governors, as well as Things that are 
at a vail diilance from us in foreign Nations, or in 
ancient Ages. 

According as the Perfons that inform us of any 
Thing are many or few, or more or lefs wife, and 
faithful, and credible, fo our Faith is more or lefs 
firm or wavering, and the Propofition believed is 
either certain or doubtful ; but in Matters of Faith, 
an exceeding great Probability is called a moral 
Certainty. 

Faith is generally diftinguimed into Divine and 
Human, not with Regard to the Propofttions that 
are believed, but with Regard to the Teftimony 
upon which we believe them. When God reveals 
any Thing to us, this gives us the Evidence of 
divine Faith ; but what Man only acquaints us 
with, produces a human Faith in us; the one 

being 1 



182 LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART H. 

being biSi'It upon the Word of Man, arifes but to 
moral Certainly ; but the other being founded on 
the Word of God, arifes to an abfolute and infaRU 
hie AJfuravce, fo far as we underfland the Mean- 
ing of this Word. , This is called j r up >er -natural Cer- 
tainty. 

Proportions which we believe upon the Evidence 
of human Teilimony, are called Narratives, Rela- 
tions, Reports, Hijlorical Obfervations, &c. but 
fuch as are built on Divine Teftimony, are termed 
Matters of Revelation ; and if they are of great Im- 
portance in Religion, they are called Articles of 
Faith. 

There are fome Proportions or Parts of Know- 
ledge which are faid to be derived from Obferva- 
tion and Experience, that is, Experience in our- 
felves, and the Obfervations we have made on 
other Perfons or Things ; but thefe are made up 
of fome of the former Springs of Knowledge joined 
together, namely, Senfe, Confcioufnefs , Reafon, Faith, 
&c. and therefore are not reckoned a diftincl Kind 
of Evidence. 

VI. Infpiration, is a Sort of Evidence diftmcV 
from all the former, and that is, when fuch an 
overpowering Impreffion of any Proportion is made 
upon the Mind by God him f elf y that gives a con- 
vincing and indubitable Evidence of the Truth and 
Divinity of it : So were the Prophets and the 
Apoftles infpired *. 

Sometimes God may have been pleafed to make 
ufe of the outward Scnfes, or the inward Work- 
ings of the Imagination, of Dreams, Apparitions, 
Vifions, and Voices, or Reafoning, or perhaps 
human Narration, to convey divine Truths to the 
Mind of the Prophet ; but none of thefe would be 

fufficicnt 

* Ntfe here, I fpeak chiefly of the higheit Kind of Infpirahon* 



CH. II.] EIGHT USE OF REASON. 183 

fufficient to deferve the Name of Infpiration, with- 
out a fuperior or divine Light and Power attending 
them. 

This Sort of Evidence is alfo very diftincl: from 
what we ufually call divine Faith ; for every com- 
mon Chriitian exercifes divine Faith when he be- 
lieves any Proportion which God has revealed in 
the Bible upon this Account, becaufe God has /aid 
it, though it was by a Train of Reafonings that he 
was led to believe that this is the Word of God : 
Whereas in the Cafe of Infpiration^ the Prophet 
not only exercifes divine Faith, in believing what 
God reveals, but he is under a fuperior heavenly 
Impreffion, Light, and Evidence, whereby he is 
allured that God reveals it. This is the moil emi- 
nent Kind offupernatural Certainty. 

Though Perfons might be afTured of their own 
Infpiration, by fome peculiar and inexpreffible Con- 
fcioufnefs of this divine Infpiration and Evidence in 
their own Spirits, yet it is hard to make out this 
Infpiration to others, and to convince them of it, 
except by fome antecedent or confequent Prophe- 
cies or Miracles, or fome publick Appearances 
more than human. 

The Propofitions which are attained by this Sort 
of Evidence are called infpired Truths. This is 
divine Revelation at firfr. Hand, and the Dictates of 
God in an immediate Manner, of which Theolo- 
gical Writers difcourfe at large : But fince it be- 
longs only to a few Favourites of Heaven to be 
infpired, and not the Bulk of Mankind, it is not 
neceflary to fpeak more of it in a Treatife of Lo- 
gick, which is defigned for the general Improve- 
ment of human Reafon. 

The various Kinds of Evidence upon which we 
believe any Proportion , afford us thefe three Re- 
marks : 

N Remark 



1£4 tOGrcK i OK, THE [pAET II. 

Remark I. The fame Propofition may be known 
to us by different Kinds of Evidence : That the 
Whole is bigger than a Tart is known by our Senfes, 
and it is known by the Self-Evidence of the Thing 
to our Mind. That God created the Heavens and 
the Earth is known to us by Reafon, and is known 
alio by divine Teflimony or Faith. 

Remark II. Among thofc various Kinds of Evi- 
dence, fome are generally ftrongcr than others in 
their own Nature, and give a better Ground for 
Certainty. Inward Confciouftiefs and Intelligence, as 
well as divine Faith and lnfpiration, ufually carry 
much more Force with them than Senfe or human 
Faith, which are often fallible ; though there are 
Inftances wherein human Faith, Senfe, and Reafon- 
ing, lay a Foundation alfo for complete AfTurance, 
and leave no Room for Doubt. 

Reafon in its own Nature would always lead U3 
into the Truth in Matters within its Compafs, if 
it were ufed aright, or it would require us to fuf- 
pend our Judgment where there is want of Evi- 
dence. But it is our Sloth, Precipitancy, Senfe, 
Paffion, and many other Things, that lead our Rea- 
fon aftray in this degenerate and imperfect State : 
Hence it comes to pafs that we are guilty of fo many 
Errors in Reafoning, efpecially about divine Things, 
becaufe our Reafon either is bufy to enquire, and re- 
folved to determine about Matters that are above 
our prefent Reach ; or becaufe we mingle many 
Prejudices and fecret Influences of Senfe, Fancy, 
Puff on, Inclination, &c. with our Excrcifes of Rea- 
fon, and judge and determine according to their 
irregular Inftances. 

Div/ne Faith would never admit of any Contro- 
verfies or Doubtings, if we were but allured that 
God had fpoken, and that wc rightly understood his 
Meaning. 

Remark 



e&. ii. j Right use of reason. 185 

Remark III. The greater Evidence and Certainty 
of any Proportion does not depend upon the Va- 
riety of the Ways or Kinds of Evidence, whereby 
it is known, but rather upon the Strength and De- 
gree of Evidence, and the Clearnefs of that Light 
in or by which it appears to the Mind. For a Pro- 
portion that is known only one Way may be much 
more certain, and have itronger Evidence, than 
another that is fuppofed to be known many Ways. 
Therefore thefe Proportions, Nothing has no Pro- 
perties ; Nothing can make it/elf; which are known 
only by Intelligence, are much furer and truer than, 
this Proportion, The Rainbow has real and inherent 
Colours in it ; or than this, The Sun rolls round the 
Earth ; though we feem to know both thefe lad 
by our Senfes, and by the common Tejlimony of our 
Neighbours. So any Proportion that is clearly evi- 
dent to our own Confcioufnefs or divine Faith, is 
much more certain to us than a thoufand others 
that have only the Evidence of feeble and obfcure 
Sen/a tions, of mere probable Reafonings and doubtful 
Arguments, or the Witnefs of fallible Men, or even 
though all thefe fhould join together; 



N 2 CHAR 



180 



kOGIGK: OR, THE [pARTH. 



CHAP, III, 

The Springs offalfe Judgment, or the Doclrhie 
of Prejudices. 

Introduction. 

IN the End of the foregoing Chapter, we havfr 
furveyed the feveral Sorts of Evidence on which 
we build our Attent to Propofitions. Thefe are 
indeed the general Grounds upon which we form 
our Judgments concerning Things. What remains 
in this Second Part of Logick, is to point out 
the feveral Springs and Caufes of our Mijlakes in 
judging, and to lay down fome Rules by which we 
fhould conduct ourfelves in patting a Judgment on 
every Thing that is propofed to us. 

I confefs many Things which will be mentioned 
in thefe following Chapters, might be as well re- 
ferred to the Third Part of Logick, where we 
fhall treat of Reafoning and Argument ; for moft of 
our falfe Judgments feem to include a fecret bad 
Reafoning in them : and while we (hew the Springs 
of Error, and the Rules of true Judgment, we do 
at the fame Time difcover which Arguments are 
fallacious, which Reafonings are weak, and which 
are jutt and ftrong. Yet fince this is ufually called 
a judging HI or judging well, I think we may with- 
out any Impropriety treat of it here ; and this will 
lay a furer Foundation for all Sorts of Ratiocination 
and Argument. 

Ra(h Judgments are called Prejudices, and fo 
are the Springs of them. This Word in common 
Life figniiies an ill Opinion which we have conceived 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 187 

offome other Per/on, or fome Injury done to him. But 
when we ufe the Word in Matters of Science, it 
fignifies a Judgment that is formed concerning any 
Per/on or Thing before fufficient Examination ; and 
generally we fuppofe it to mean a falfe Judgment or 
Miftake: At leaft it is an Opinion taken up without 
folid Reaibn for it, or an AfTent given to a Propo- 
rtion before we havejufi: Evidence of the Truth of 
it, though the Thing itfelf may happen to be true. 

Sometimes thefe rafh Judgments are called Pre* 
foJfe.ffions ; whereby is meant, that fome particular 
Opinion has poflefied the Mind, and engaged the 
AfTent, without fufficient Search or Evidence of 
the Truth of it. 

There is a vail Variety of thefe Prejudices and 
Prepojfejfions, which attend Mankind in every Age 
and Condition of Life ; they lay the Foundations 
of many an Error, and many an unhappy Praclice, 
both in the Affairs of Religion, and in our civil 
Concernments, as well as in Matters of Learning. 
It is neeeflary for a Man who purfues Truth to in- 
quire into the Springs of Error, that as far as pof- 
fible he may rid himfelf of old Prejudices, and watch 
hourly again ft new ones. 

The Number of them is fo great, and they are 
fo interwoven with each other, as well as with the 
Powers of human Nature, that it is fometimes hard 
to diltinguifh them apart ; yet for Method's Sake 
we fhall reduce them to thefe four general Heads, 
namely, Prejudices arifing from Things, or from 
Words, from our/elves^ or from other Perfons ; and 
after the Defcription of each Prejudice, we fhall 
propofe one or more Ways of curing it. 



N 3 SECT. 



188 LOGICK: OK, THE [PART II. 

SECT. L 

Prejudices ariftng from Things. 

THE firjl Sort of Prejudices are thofe which arife 
from the Things themfelves about which we 
judge. But here let it be obferved, that there is 
nothing in the Nature of Things that will neceftarily 
lead us into Error, if we do but ufe our Reaibn 
aright, and withhold our Judgment till there ap- 
pear fufflcient Evidence of Truth. But fince we 
are fo unhappily prone to take Advantage of every 
doubtful Appearance and Circumflance of Things 
to form a wrong Judgment, and plunge ourfelves 
into Mivlake, therefore it is proper to confider what 
there is in the Things themfelves that may occafion 
our Errors. 

I. The Obfcu-rity offome Truths, and the Difficulty 
offearching them out, is one Occafion of rath and 
miitaken Judgment. 

Some Truths are difficult becaufe they lie remote- 
from the firft Principles of Knowledge, and want a 
long Chain of Argument to come at them : Such 
are many of the deep Things of Algebra and Geo- 
metry, and fome of the Theorems and Problems of 
moil Parts of the Mathematicks. Many Things 
alio in Natural Philojbphy are dark and intricate 
upon this Account, becaufe we cannot come at any 
certain Knowledge of them without the Labour of 
many and difficult, as well as chargeable Expert 
ments. 

There are other Truths which have great Dark-, 
nefs upon them, becaufe we have no proper Means 
%v Medium to come at the Knowledge of therm 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. ISC) 

Though in our Age we have found out many of 
the deep Things of Nature by the AfTiftance of 
dalles and other Inftruments ; yet we are not hi- 
therto arrived at any fufficient Methods to difcover 
the Shape of thofe little Particles of Matter which 
diflinguifh thefeveral Sapours, Odours, arid Colours 
of Bodies ; nor to find what Sort of Atoms corn- 
pole Liquids or Solids, and diftinguifh Wood, Mi- 
nerals, Metals, Glafs, Stone, &c. There is a Dark- 
nefs alfo lies upon the Aelions of the intelleclual 
or angelical World ; their Manners of Subfiftence 
and Agency, the Power of Spirits to move Bodies, 
and the Union of our Souls with this animal 
Body of ours, are much unknown to us on this 
Account. 

Now in many of thele Cafes., a great Part of 
Mankind is not content to be entirely ignorant ; 
but they rather choofe to form ra(h and hafty 
Judgments, to guefs at Things without "juft Evi- 
dence, to believe fomething concerning them be- 
fore they can know them ; and thereby they fall 
into Error. 

This Sort of Prejudice, as well as molt others, is 
cured by Patience and Diligence in Inquiry and 
Reafoning, and a Sujpenfwn of Judgment, till we 
have attained fome proper Mediums of Knowledge^ 
and till we fee fuflicient Evidence of the Truth, 

II. The Appearance of Things in a Difguife, is 
another Spring of Prejudice, or rafh Judgment. 
The Outfide of Things, which firft ftrikes us, is 
oftentimes different from their inward Nature ; 
and we are tempted to judge fuddenly according 
to outward Appearances. If a Piclure is daubed 
with many bright and glaring Colours, the vulgar 
Eye admires it as an excellent Piece ; whereas 
the fame Perfon judges very contemptuoufly of 
N 4 fome 



190 LOGICK : OR, THE [pAKT II. 

fome admirable Defign, fketched out only with a 
black Pencil on a coarfe Paper, though by the 
Hand of Raphael. So the Scholar fpies the Name 
of a new Book in a publick News-Paper ; he is 
charmed with the Title, he purchafes, he reads 
with huge Expectations, and finds it all Trafli 
and Impertinence : This is a Prejudice derived from 
the appearance ; we are too ready to judge that 
Volume valuable which, had fo good a Frontif- 
piece. The large Heap of Encomiums and fwell- 
ing Words of Affurance that are beftowed on 
Quack- Medicines in publick Advertifements, tempt 
many a Reader to judge them infallible, and to 
ufe the Pills or the Flaifter, with vail; Hope, and 
frequent Difappointment. 

We are tempted to form our Judgment of Per- 
fans as well as Things by thefe outward Appearances. 
Where there is Wealthy Equipage, and Splendor, 
we are ready to call that Man happy ; but we fee 
not the vexing Difquietudes of his vSoul : And 
when we fpy a Perfon in ragged Garments, we 
form a dcfpicable Opinion of him too fuddenly ; 
we can hardly think him either happy or wife, our 
Judgment is fo itrangely biafTed by outward and 
fenfible Things. It was through the Power of 
this Prejudice that the Jews rejected our bleflcd 
Saviour ; they could not fufFer themfelves to be- 
lieve that the Man who appeared as the Sou of a 
Carpenter was al fo the Son of God. And becaufe 
St. Paul was of little Stature, a mean Pretence, 
and his Voice contemptible, fome of the Corinthi- 
ans were tempted to doubt whether he was infpired 
or no. 

This Prejudice is cured by a longer Acquaintance 
with the Worlds and a jufl Obfervatiou that Things 
are fome limes better and fome times worfe than they 
appear to be. We ought therefore to red rain our 

exceffive 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. i()l 

exceffive Forwardnefs to form our Opinion of Per- 
fons or Things before we have Opportunity to fearch 
into them more perfectly. Remember that a grey 
Beard does not make a Philofopher ; all is not Gold 
that glifters ; and a rough Diamond may he worth an 
immenje Sum. 

III. A Mixture of different Qualities in the fame 
Thing, is another Temptation to judge amifs. 
We are ready to be carried away by that Quality 
which ftrikes the firfl or the ftrongeft Impreffions 
upon us, and we judge of the whole Object accord- 
ing to that Quality, rcgardlefs of all the reft ; or 
fometimes we colour over all the other Qualities 
with that one Tincture, whether it be bad or 
good. 

When we have juft Reafon to admire a Man for 
his Virtues ', we are fometimes inclined not only 
to negledt his Weakneffes, but even to put a good 
Colour upon them, and to think them amiable. 
When we read a Book that has many excellent 
Truths in it, and divine Sentiments, we are tempt- 
ed to approve not only that whole Book, but even 
all the Writings of that Author. When a Poet, 
an Orator, or a Painter, has performed admirably 
in feveral illuftrious Pieces, we fometimes alfo ad- 
mire his very Errors, we miftake his Blunders for 
Beauties, and are fo ignorantly fond as to copy 
after them. 

It is this Prejudice that has rendered fo many 
great Scholars perfect Bigots, and inclined them to 
defend Homer or Horace, Livy or Cicero, in their 
Miftakes, and vindicate all the Follies of their fa- 
vourite Author. It is this that tempts fome great 
Writers to fupport the Sayings of almoft all the 
ancient Fathers of the Church, and admire them even 
jn their v^ry Reveries. 

On 



1Q% LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 

On the other Hand, if an Author has profefTed 
heretical Sentiments in Religion, we throw out- 
Scorn upon every Thing he writes, we defpife even 
his critical or mathematical Learning, and will 
hardly allow him common Senfe. If a Poem has 
fome Blemifh in it, there is a fet of falfe Criticks 
who decry it univerfally, and will allow no Beauties 
there. 

This Sort of Prejudice is relieved by learning 
to diftinguifh Things well, and not to judge in the 
Lump. There is fcarce any Thing in the World 
of Nature or Art, in the World of Morality or 
Religion, that is perfectly uniform. There is a 
Mixture of Wifdom and Folly, Vice and Virtue, 
Good and Evil, both in Men and Things. We 
fhould remember that fome Perfons have great 
Wit and little Judgment ; others are judicious, but 
not witty. Some are good humoured without Co?n- 
fliment ; others have all the Formalities of Com- 
plaifance, but no good Humour. We ought to 
know that one Man may be vicious and learned, 
while another has Virtue without Learning. That 
many a Man thinks admirably well, who has a poor 
Utterance ; while others have a charming Manner 
of Speech, but their Thoughts are trifling and im- 
pertinent. Some are good Neighbours, and cour- 
teous, and charitable toward Men, who have no 
Piety towards God ; others are truly religious, but 
of morofe natural Tempers. Some excellent Sayings 
are found in very 'filly Books* and fome (illy Thoughts 
appear in Books of Value. We fhould neither 
fraife nor difpraife by Wholefale, but feparate the 
Good from the Evil, and judge of them apart: The 
Accuracy of a good Judgment confiits much in 
making fuch Diftinctions. 

Yet let it be noted too, that in common Dif-* 
courfe we ufuaily denominate Perfons and Things 

according 






CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 1Q3 

according to the major Part of their Character. 
He is to be called a wife Man who has but few 
Follies : He is a good Philofopher who knows much 
of Nature, and for the moil Part reafons well in 
Matters of human Science : And that Book JhouJd 
be esteemed well written, which has more of good 
Senfe in it than it has of Impertinence. 

IV. Though a Thing be uniform in its own 

Nature, yet the different Lights in which it may he 
placed, and the different Views in which it appears 
to us, will be ready to excite in us miftaken Judg- 
ments concerning it. Let an ereel Cone be placed 
on a horizontal Plane, at a great Di fiance from the 
Eye, and it appears a plain Triangle ; but we (hall 
judge that very Cone to be nothing but a flat Cir- 
cle, if its Bafe be obverted towards us. Set a 
common round Plate a little obliquely before our 
Eyes afar off, and we fhall think it an oval Fi* 
gure : But if the very Edge of it be turned towards 
us, we (hall take it for a Jiraight Line. So when 
we view the feveral Folds of a changeable Silk, we 
pronounce this Part red, and thnXyellow, becaufe 
of its different Pofition to the Light, though the 
Silk laid fmooth in one Light appears all of one 
Colour. 

When we furvey the Miseries of Mankind, and 
think of the Sorrows of Millions, both on Earth 
and in Hell, the divine Government has a terrible 
4 f peel, and we may be tempted to think hardly 
even of God himfelf : But if we view the Proftw 
fion of his Bounty and Grace amongft his Crea-. 
tures on Earth, or the happy Spirits in Heaven, 
we fhall have fo exalted an Idea of his Goodnefs as 
to forget his Vengeance. Some Men dwell en-, 
tirely upon the Promifes of his Gofpel, and think 
him all Mercy ; Others, under a melancholv Frame* 

* dwell 



1Q4 LOGICK : OR, THE [p ART II. 

dwell upon his Terrors and his Threatening, and 
are overwhelmed with the Thoughts of his Severity 
and Vengeance, as though there were no Mercy in 
him. 

The true Method of delivering ourfelves from 
this Prejudice, is to view a Thing on all Sides, to 
compare all the various Appearances of the fame 
Thing with one another, and let each of them have 
its full Weight in the Balance of our Judgment, 
before we fully determine our Opinion. It was by 
this Means that the modern Aftronomers came to 
find out that the Planet Saturn hath a flat broad 
Circle round its Globe, which is called its Ring, by 
obfervingthe different Appearances as a narrow or 
a broader Oval, or, as it fometimes feems to be, a 
Jlraiglit Line, in the different Parts of its twenty- 
nine Years Revolution through the Ecliptic, And 
if we take the fame juft and religious Survey of the 
great and blejfed God in all the Difcoveries of his 
Vengeance and his Mercy, we (hall at laft conclude 
him to be both juft and good. 

V. The cafual Affociation of many of our Ideas 
becomes the Spring of another Prejudice or rafh 
Judgment, to which we are fometimes expofed. 
If in our younger Years we have taken Medicines 
that have been naufeous, when any Medicine w hat- 
foe ver is afterward propofed to us under Sicknefs, 
wc immediately judge it naufeous : Our Fancy has 
fo clofely joined thefe Ideas together, that we know 
not how to feparate them : Then the Stomach feels 
the Difguft, and perhaps refufes the only Drug 
that can preferve Life. So a Child who has been 
let Blood joins the Ideas of Pain and the Surgeon 
together, and he hates the Sight of the Surgeon, 
becaufe he thinks of his Pain : Or if he has drank 
a bitter Potion, he conceives a bitter Idea of the 

Cup 



CH. III.] RIGHt USE OP REASON. 1Q5 

Cup which held it, and will drink nothing out of 
that Cup. 

It is for the fame Reafon that the Bulk of the 
common People are fo fuperftitioufly fond of the 
Pfalms tranflated by Hopkins and Sternhold, and 
think them facred and divine/ becaufe they have 
been now for more than an hundred Years bound 
up in the fame Covers with our Bibles. 

The belt Relief againil this Prejudice of Ajfocid- 
tion is to confider, whether there be any natural 
and neceffary Connection between thofe Ideas, 
which Fancy, Cujlom, or Chance hath thus joined 
together ; and if Nature has not joined them, let 
our Judgment correct the Folly of our Imagination^ 
and feparate thefe Ideas again. 



SECT. II. 

Prejudices arifing from Words, 

OUR Ideas and Words are fo linked together, 
that while we judge of Things according to 
Words, we are led into feveral Miflakes. Thefe 
may be diftributed under two general Heads, 
namely, fuch as arife from Jingle Words or Phrafes, 
or fuch as arife from Words joined in Speech, and 
compojing a Difcourfe. 

I. The mod imminent and remarkable Errors, 
of the firit Kind, are thefe three, (l.) When our 

Words are infignificant, and have no Ideas ; as when 
the myftical Divines talk of the Prayer of Silence \ 
the fupernatural a?id pajfive Night of the Soul, the 
Vacuity of Powers, the Sufpenfion of all Thoughts : 

Or 



jg6 LOGICS! OR, THE ["FART It* 

Or (2.) When our Words are equivocal, and fig- 
nify two or more Ideas, as the Words Law, Light, 
Flefli, Spirit, Right eoufnefs, and many other Terms 
in Scripture : Or (3.) When two or three Words 
are jfynonymous, and fignify one Idea, as Regenera- 
tion and new Creation in the New Teftament ; 
both which mean only a Change of the Heart from 
Sin to Holinefs ; or, as the Eleclor of Cologn and the 
BiJJiop of Colo gn are two Titles of the fame Man. 

Thefe Kinds of Phrafes are the Occafion of va^ 
rious Miftakes ; but none fo unhappy as thofe in 
Theology : For both Words without Ideas, as well 
as fynonymous and equivocal Words, have been ufed 
and abufed by the Humours, Paflions, Interelts, or 
by the real Ignorance and Weaknefs of Men* to 
beget terrible Contends among Chriftians. 

But to relieve us under all thofe Dangers, and 
to remove thefe Sorts of Prejudices which arife from 
Jingle Words or Phrafes, I muft remit the Reader 
to Part I. Chap. IV. where I have treated about 
Words, and to thofe DirecJions which I have given 
concerning the Definition of Names, Part l. Chap. 
VI. Sed. 3. 

II. There is another Sort of falfe Judgments or 
Miftakes which we are expofed to by W^ords ^ and 
that is, when they are joined in Speech, and compofe a 
Difcourfe ; and here we are in Danger two Ways. 

The one is, when a Man writes good Senfe, or 
fpeaks much to the Purpofe, but he has not a 
happy and engaging Manner of Expreffion. Per- 
haps he ufes coarfe or vulgar Words, or old, 
obfolete, and unfafhionablc Language, or Terms 
and Phrafes that are foreign, latinized, fcholaftick, 
very uncommon, and hard to be underftood : 
And this is ftill worfe, if his Sentences are long and 
intricate, or the Sound of them harfh and grating 

to 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON* 1<}7 

to the Ear. All thefe indeed are Defecls in Style, 
and lead fome nice and unthinking Hearers or 
Readers into an ill Opinion of all that fuch a Perfon 
fpeaks or writes. Many an excellent Difcourfe of 
our Forefathers has had Abundance of Contempt 
cad upon it by our modern Pretenders to Senfe, for 
Want of their diftinguifhing between the Language 
and the Ideas. 

On the other Hand, w r hen a Man of Eloquence 
fpeaks or writes upon any Subject, we are too 
ready to run into his Sentiments, being fweetly 
and infenfibly drawn by the Smoothnefs of his 
Harangue, and the pathetick Power of his Lan- 
guage. Rhetorick will varnifh every Error^ fo 
that it fhall appear in the Drefs of Truth, and put 
fuch Ornaments upon Vice, as to make it look 
like Virtue : It is an Art of wondrous and exten- 
five Influence ; it often conceals, obfcures, or over- 
whelms the Truth, and places fometimes a grofs 
Falfhood in a moft alluring Light. The Decency 
of Action, the Mufick of the Voice, the Harmony 
of the Periods, the Beauty of the Style, and all the 
engaging Airs of the Speaker, have often charmed 
the Hearers into Error, and perfuaded them to 
approve whatfoever is propofed in fo agreeable a 
Manner. A large Aflembly Hands expofed at once 
to the Power of thefe Prejudices, and imbibes them 
all. So Cicero and Demofthenes made the Romans 
and the Athenians believe almoft whatfoever they 
pleafed. 

Te beft Defence againit both thefe Dangers, is 
to learn the Skill (as much as poffible) offeparat- 
ing our Thoughts and Ideas from Words and Phrafes, 
to judge of the Things in their own Natures, and 
in their natural or juft Relation to one another, 
abftradted from the Ufe of Language, and to 
maintain a (teady and obftinate reiblution, to 

hearken 



1<JS LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART IT. 

hearken to nothing but Truth, in whatfoever Style 
or Drefs it appears. 

Then we mall hear a Sermon of pious and juft 
Sentiments with Efteem and Reverence, though 
the preacher has but an unpolifhed Style, and 
many Defects in the Manner of his Delivery. 
Then we fhall neglect and difregard all the flatter- 
ing Infin nations, whereby the Orator would make 
Way for his own Sentiments to take Pofleflion of 
our Souls, if he has not folid and inftructive Senfe 
equal to his Language. Oratory is a happy Ta- 
lent when it is rightly employed, to excite the 
Paffions to the Practice of Virtue and Piety ; but, 
to fpeak properly, this Art has nothing to do in 
the Search after Truth. 



SECT. III. 

"Prejudices arifing from ourf elves. 

NEITHER Words nor Things would fo often 
lead us aftray from Truth, if we had not 
within ourfelves fuch Springs of Error as thefe that 
follow. 

I. Many Errors are derived from our Weahiefs 
of Reafon, and Incapacity to judge of Things in our 
Infant State. Thefe are called the Prejudices of 
Infancy. We frame early Miftakes about the com- 
mon Objccls which furround us, and the common 
Affairs of Life: We fancy the Nurfe is our hefl- 
Friend, becaufe Children receive from their Nurfes 
their Food and other Conveniencies of Life. We 
judge that Books are very unp!eafantThings,bccaufe, 
perhaps, we have been driven to them by the 

Scourge 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 1 QQ 

Scourge. We judge alfo that the Sky touches the 
diftant Hills, becaufe we cannot inform ourfelves 
better in Childhood. We believe the Stars ars 
not rifen till the Sun is fet, becaufe we never fee 
them by Day. But fome ofthefe Errors may fee m 
to be derived from the next Spring. 

The way to cure the Prejudices of Infancy is to 
diftinguifh, as far as we can, which are thofe Opi- 
nions which we framed in perfect Childhood ; to 
remember that at that Time our Reafon was inca- 
pable of forming a right Judgment, and to bring 
thefe Proportions again to be examined at the Bar 
of mature Reafon. 

II. Our Senfes give us many a falfe Information 
of Things, and tempt us to judge amifs. This is 
called the Prejudice of Senfe ; as when we fuppofe 
the Sun and Moon to be flat Bodies, and to be but a 
few Inches broad, becaufe they appear fo to the 
Eye. Senfe inclines us to judge that Air has no 
Weight i becaufe w 7 e do not feel it prefs heavy upon 
us ; and we judge only by our Senfes that Cold 
and Heat, Sweet and Sour, Red and Blue, &tc. are 
fuch real Properties in the Objects themfelves, 
and exactly like thofe Senfations which they excite 
in us. 

Note i Thofe Miflakes of this Sort which all 
Mankind drop and lofe in their advancing Age, 
are called mere Prejudices of Infancy ; but thofe 
which abide with the vulgar Part of the World, 
and generally with all Men, till Learning and Phi- 
lofophy cure them, more properly attain the Name 
of Prejudices of Senfe. 

Thefe Prejudices are to be removed feveral 
Ways, (l.) By the Afli fiance of one Senfe we 
cure the Miftakes of another ; as when a Stick 
thrift into the Water feems crooked, we are prevent- 

O ed 



200 LOGICK i OR, THE [PART II. 

cd from judging it to be really fo in itfelf, for 
when we take it out of the Water, both our Sight 
and our Feeling agree and determine it to be 
ftraight. (2.) The Exercife of our Reafon, and 
an Application to mathematical and philofopbical 
Studies, cures many other Prejudices of Senfe, both 
with relation to the heavenly and earthly Bodies. 
(3.) We fhouM remember that our Senfes have 
often deceived us in various Inflances, that they 
give but a confufed and imperfect Reprefentation 
of Things in many Cafes, that they often repre- 
fent falfely thofe very Objects to which they feem 
to be fuited, fuch as the Shape, Motion, Size, and 
Situation, of grofs Bodies, if they are but placed 
at a Diftance from us ; and as for the minute Par- 
ticles of which Bodies are compofed, our Senfes 
cannot diflinguifh them. (4.) We fhould remem- 
ber alfo, that one prime and original Defign of our 
Senfes/ is to inform us what various Relations the 
Bodies that are round about us bear to our own ani- 
mal Body, and to give us notice what is pleafant 
and ufeful, or what is painful and injurious to us; 
but they are not fufficient of themfelves to lead us 
into a philofopbical Acquaintance with the inward 
Nature of Things. It mud be confefTed, it is by 
the Affiftance of the Eye and the Ear efpecially 
(which are called the Senfes of Difcipline) that our 
Minds are furni died with various Parts of Know- 
ledge, by reading, hearing, and observing Things 
divine and human ; yet Reafon ought always to 
accompany the Exercife of our Senfes, whenever 
we would form a jufi Judgment of Things pro- 
pofed to our Enquiry. 

Here it is proper to obferve alfo, that as the 
Weaknefs of Reafon in our Infancy, and the Dic- 
tates of our Senfes, fometimes in advancing Tears , 
lead the wifer Part of Mankind aftray from Truth ; 

fo 



CH. Ill ] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 201 

fo the meaner Parts of our Species, Perfons whofe 
Genius is very low, whofe Judgment is always 
weak, who are ever indulging the Dictates of Senfe 
and Humour, are but Children of a larger Size, they 
ftand expofed to everlafting Miftakes in Life, and 
live and die in the Mid ft of Prejudices* 

III. Imagination is another fruitful Spring of 
falfe Judgments. Our Imagination is nothing elfe 
but the various Appearances of our fenfible Ideas 
in the Brain, where the Soul frequently works in 
uniting, disjoining, multiplying, magnifying, di~ 
minifhing and altering the feveral Shapes, Colours, 
Sounds, Motions, Words and Things, that have 
been communicated to us by the outward Organs 
of Senfe. It is no wonder therefore if Fancy leads 
us into many Miftakes, for it is but Senfe at fecond 
hand. Whatever is ftrongly impreffed upon the 
Imagination, fome PerfonS believe to be true. 
Some will choofe a particular Number in a Lottery^ 
or lay a large Wager on a fingle Chance of a Dye, 
and doubt not of Succefs, becaufe their Fancy feds 
fo powerful an Impreffion, and allures them it will 
be profperous. A thoufand pretended Prophecies 
and Infpirations , and all the Freaks of Fnthufiafm, 
have been derived from this Spring. Dreams are 
nothing elfe but the Deceptions of Fancy : A De* 
lirium, is but a fhort Wildnefs of the Imagination ; 
and a fettled irregularity of Fancy, is Diftraclion 
and Madnefs. 

One Way to gain a VicTory over this unruly 
Faculty, is to fet a WatQh upon it perpetual ly, 
and to bridle it in all its Extravagancies ; never to 
believe any thing merely becaufe Fancy dictates 
it, any more than I would believe a Midnight* 
Dream, nor to truft Fancy any farther than it is 
attended with fevere Rcafon. It is a very ufeful 

O 2 and 



202 LOGICK I OR, THE [pA-RT. II. 

and entertaining Power of human Nature in Mat- 
ters of Illuflration^ Perfuqfeon, Oratory , Poefy, Wit y 
Converfation, &c. but in the calm inquiry after 
Truth, and the final Judgment of Things, Fancy 
fhould retire, and ftand afide, unlefs it be called 
in to explain or illuilrate a difficult Point by a Si- 
militude. 

Another Method of Deliverance from the Pre- 
judices of Fancy , is to compare the Ideas that arife 
in our Imaginations with the real Nature of Things ^ 
as often as we have occafion to judge concerning 
them ; and let calm and fedate Reafon govern and 
determine our Opinions, though Fancy fhould fhew 
never fo great a Reluctance. Fancy is the inferior 
Faculty, and it ought to obey. 

IV. The various Pajfions or Affections of the Mind 
are numerous and endlefs Springs of Prejudice, 
They difguife every Objecl they con verfe with, 
and put their own Colours upon it, and thus lead 
the Judgment aftray from Truth. It is Love that 
makes the Mother think her own Child the faircft, 
and will fometimes perfuade us that a Blemifh is a 
Beauty. Hope and Defire make an Hour of De- 
lay fcem as long as two or three Hours ; Hope 
inclines us to think there is nothing too difficult 
to be attempted ; Defpair tells us that a brave 
Attempt is mere Rafhnefs, and that every Diffi- 
culty is unfurmountable. Fear makes us imagine 
that a Bufh fhaken with the Wind, has fome fa- 
vage Beafl in it, and multiplies the dangers that 
attend our Path ; But ftill there is a more unhappy 
Effect of Fear when it keeps Millions of Souls in 
Slavery to the Errors of an eftablifhed Religion : 
What could perfuade the wife Men and Philofo- 
phcrs of a Popifh Country to believe the grofs 
Abfurdities of the Romijh Church, but the Fear 

of 






CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 203 

of Torture, or Death, the Galleys, or the biquifition? 
Sorrow and Melancholy tempt us to think our Cir- 
cumftances much more difmal than they are, that 
we may have fame Excufe for Mourning : And 
Envy represents the Condition of our Neighbour 
better than it is, that there may be fame Pretence 
for her own Vexation and Uneafinefs. Anger, and 
Wrath, and Revenge, and all thofe hateful Paffions, 
excite in us far worfe Ideas of Men than they de~ 
ferve, and perfuades us to believe all that is ill of 
them. A Detail of the evil Influence of the Af- 
fections of the Mind upon our Judgment, would 
make a large volume. 

The Cure of thefe Prejudices is attained by a 
eonftant Jealoufy of ourfelves, and Watchfulnefs 
over our Pajfions, that they may never interpofe 
when we are called to pafs a Judgment of any 
Thing : And when our Affections are warmly en- 
gaged, let us abftain from judging. It w r ould be 
alfa of great Ule to us to form our deliberate 
Judgments of Perfons and Things in the calmeft 
and fereneft Hours of Life, when the Pajfions of 
Nature are all filcnt, and the Mind enjoys its mod: 
perfect Compofure : And thefe Judgments fa form- 
ed fhould be treaiured up in the Mind, that we 
might have recourfe to them in Hours of Need. 
See many more Sentiments and Directions relating 
to this Subject, in my Doclrine of the Pajfions, 
Second Edition enlarged. 

V. The Fondnefs we have for Self, and the Re* 
la t ion which other Perfons and Th'mgs have to our- 
f elves, furnifh us with another long Lift of Pre- 
judices, This indeed might be reduced to the 
Pajfion of Self Love, but it is fa copious an Head 
that I choofe to name it as a diftincl Spring of falfe 
Judgments. We are generally ready to fancy 

O 3 every 



204 LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART. II, 

every Thing of our own has fomething peculiarly 
valuable in it, when indeed there is no other Rea- 
fon, but becaufe it is our own. Were we born 
among the Gardens' of Italy * the Rocks of SwiU 
zerland, or the Ice and Snows of Rujjla and Swe* 
den, (till we fhould imagine peculiar Excellencies 
in our native Land. We conceive a good Idea of 
the Town and Village where we firft breathed, and 
think the better of a Man for being born near us. 
We entertain the bed: Opinion of the Perfons of 
our own Party, and eafily believe evil Reports of 
Perfons of a different Seel or Faclion. Our own 
Sex, our Kindred, our Houfes, and our very Names y 
feem to have fomething good and defirable in 
them. We are ready to mingle all thefe with our* 
/elves, and cannot bear to have others think meanly 
of them. 

So good an opinion have we of our own SentU 
ments and Praclices, that it is very difficult to be- 
lieve what a Reprover fays of our Conduct: and 
we are as ready to affent to all the Language of 
Flattery. We fet up our own Opinions in Religion 
and Philofophy, as the teds of Orthodoxy and Truth ; 
and we are prone to judge every practice of other 
Men either a Duty or a Crime > which we think 
would be a Crime or a Duty in us, though their 
Circumftances are vaftly different from our own. 
This Humour prevails fometimes to fuch a Degree, 
that we would make our own Tqfte and Inclination 
the Standard by which to judge of every Difh of 
Meat that is fet upon the Table, every Book in a 
Library, every Employment, Study, and Bufinefs, 
oi Life, as well as every Recreation. 

It is from this evil Principle of fetting up Self 
for a Model what other Men ought to be, that the 
Aniichrijlian Spirit of Impofition and Perfecution 
had us original : Though there is no more Rca- 

fon 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 205 

ion for it than there was for the Practice of that 
Tyrant, who having a Bed fit for his own Size, was 
reported to ftretch Men of low itature upon the 
Rack, till they were drawn out to the Length of 
his Bed ; and fome add alfo, that he cut off the 
Legs of any whom he found too long for it. 

It is alfo from a Principle near akin to this, that 
we pervert and ftrain the Writings of many vene- 
rable Authors, and efpecially the facred Books of 
Scripture, to make them fpeak our own Senfe. 
Through the Influence which our own Schemes or 
Hypothefes have upon the Mind, we fometimes be- 
come fo fharp-fighted as to find thefe Schemes in 
thofe Places of Scripture where the Holy Writers 
never thought of them, nor the Holy Spirit in- 
tended them. At other Times, this Prejudice 
brings fuch a Dimnefs upon the Sight, that we can- 
not read any thing that oppofes our own Scheme, 
though it be written as with Sun-beams, and in 
the plainefl Language ; and- perhaps we are in 
Danger in fuch a Cafe of winking a little againfl 
the Light. 

We ought to bring our Minds free, unbiavled, 
and teachable, to learn our Religion from the Word 
of God ; but we have generally formed all the 
lefler as well as the greater Points of our Religion 
beforehand, and then we read the Prophets and 
Apoftles only to pervert them to confirm our own 
Opinions. Were it not for this Influence of Self, 
and a Bigotry to our own Tenets, we could hardly 
imagine that fo many ftrange, abfurd, inconfiftent, 
wicked, mifchievous, and bloody Principles, fhould 
pretend to fupport and defend themfelves by the 
Go/pel of Chrift. 

Every learned Critick has his own Hypothecs ; 
and if the common Text be not favourable to his 
Opinion, a various Leclion fhall be made authen- 

O 4 tick. 



206 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART. II. 

tick. The Text muft be fuppofed to be defective, 
or redundant, and the Senfe of it (hall be literal, 
or metaphorical, according as it beft fupports his 
own Scheme. Whole Chapters or Books (hall be 
added or left out of the facred Canon, or be turned 
into Parables, by this Influence. Luther knew not 
well how to reconcile the Epiftle of St. James to 
the Doctrine of *J unification by Faith alone, and fo 
he could not allow it to be divine. The Papifts 
bring all the Apocrypha into their Bible, and ftainp 
Divinity upon it ; for they can fancy Purgatory is 
there, and they find Prayers for the Dead. But 
they leave out the fecond Commandment, becaufe it 
forbids the Worfhip of Images,, Others fuppofe the 
Mofaick Hiftory of the Creation, and the Pall of Man, 
to be oriental Ornaments, or a mere Allegory, be- 
caufe the literal Senfe of thofe three Chapters of 
Genefis do not agree with their Theories. Even 
an honeft plain-hearted and unlearned Chrijlian is 
ready to find fomething in every Chapter of the 
Bible to countenance his own private Sentiments ; 
but he loves thofe Chapters beft which fpeak his 
own Opinions plainelt : This is a Prejudice that 
flicks very clofe to our Natures : the Scholar is 
infefted with it daily, and the Mechanick is not 
free. 

Self has yet a farther and a more pernicious In- 
fluence upon our Underflandings, and is an un- 
happy Guide in the Search after Truth. When 
our own Inclination, or our Eafe, our Honour, or 
our Profit, tempts us to the Practice of any Thing 
of fufpected Lawfulnefs, how do we ftrain our 
Thoughts to find Arguments for it, and pcrfuadc 
ourfelves it is lawful ? We colour over Iniquity 
and finful Compliance with the Names of Virtue 
and Innocence, or at lead of Conflraint and Neceffi^ 
ty. All the different and oppolite Sentiments and 

Practices 



CH. III.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 20? 

Practices of Mankind are too much influenced by 
this mean Bribery, and give too juft Occafion for 
fatyrical Writers to lay, that Self -Inter eft governs, 
all Mankind, 

When the Judge had awarded due Damages to 
a Perfon into vvhofe Field a Neighbour's Oxen had 
broke, it is reported that he reverfed his own Sen- 
tence, when he heard that the Oxen which had 
clone this Mifchief were his own. Whether this 
be a Hi/lory or a Parable^ it is frill a juft Reprefen- 
tation of the wretched Influence of Self to corrupt 
the Judgment. 

One way to amend this Prejudice, is to thru ft 
Selfib far out of the Qucftion that it may have no 
Manner of Influence whenfoever we are called to 
judge and confider the naked Nature, Truth, and 
Juftice of Things. In Matters of Equity between 
Man and Man, our Saviour has taught us an ef- 
fectual Means of guarding againft this Prejudice, 
and that is, to put my Neighbour in the Place of 
Tnyfelf and myfeif'm the Place of my Neighbour, ra- 
ther than be bribed by this corrupt Principle of 
Self-Love to do Injury to our Neighbours. Thence 
arifes that Golden Rule of dealing with others as we 
would have others deal with us. 

In the Judgment of Truth and Faljhood, .Right 
and Wrong, Good and Evil, we ought to confider 
that every Man has a Self as well as we ; and 
that the Tafl.es, Paffions, Inclinations and Interefts 
of different Men are very different, and often con- 
trary, and that they dictate contrary Things : Un- 
Jefs therefore all Manner of different and contrary 
Proportions could be true at once, Self can never 
be a juft Teft or Standard of Truth and Falfhood, 
Good and Evil. 

YL The 



S08 logick: or the [part. ii. 

Vic The Tempers, Humours, and peculiar Turns 
of the Mind, whether they be natural or acquired, 
have a great Influence upon our Judgment, and 
become the Occafion of many Mi/lakes. Let us 
furvey a few of them. 

(l.) Some Perfons are of an eafy and credulous 
Temper, while others are perpetually difcovering a 
Spirit of Contradiclion. 

The credulous Man is ready to receive every 
Thing for Truth, that has but a Shadow of Evi- 
dence ; every new Book that he reads, and every 
ingenious Man with whom he converfes, has Power 
enough to draw him into the Sentiments of the 
Speaker or Writer. He has fo much Complaifance 
in him, or weaknefs of Soul, that he is ready to 
refign his own Opinion to the firft Objection which 
he hears, and to receive any Sentiments of another 
that are afTcrted with a pofitive Air and much Af- 
furance. Thus he is under a Kind of Neceflity, 
through the Indulgence of this credulous Humour, 
either to be often changing his Opinions, or to be- 
lieve Inconfiftencies. 

The Man of Contradiclion is of a contrary Hu- 
mour, for he {lands ready to oppofe every Thing 
that is faid • He gives a flight Attention to the 
Reafoos of other Men, from an inward fcornful 
Prefumption that they have no Strength in them. 
When he reads or hears a Difcourfe different from 
his own Sentiments, he does not give himfelf 
Leave to confider whether that Difcourfe may be 
true ; but employs all his Powers immediately 
to confute it. Your great Di/puters, and your 
Men of Controverfy, are in continual Danger of 
this Sort of Prejudice: They contend often for 
Victory, and will maintain whatfoever they have 
aflerted, while Truth is loft in the Noife and Tu- 
mult 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE ©F EEASON. 10Q 

mult of reciprocal Contradiction;: ; and it frequent- 
ly happens, that a Debate about Opinions is turned 
into a mutual reproach of Perfons. 

The Prejudice of Credulity may in fome Meafure 
be cured, by learning to let a high Value on Truth, 
and by taking more Pains to attain it ; remember^ 
ing that Truth oftentimes lies dark and deep, and 
requires us to dig for it as hid Treafure ; and that 
Falfhood often puts on a fair Difguife, and there- 
fore we fhould not yield up our Judgment to every 
plaufible Appearance. It is no Part of Civility or 
good Breeding to part with Truth, but to main- 
tain it with Decency and Candour. 

A Spirit of Contradiclion is fo pedantick and 
hateful, that a Man mould take much Pains with 
himfelf to watch againlt every Inftance of it: He 
fhould learn fo much good Humour, at lead, as 
never to oppofe any Thing without juft and folid 
Reafon for it : He fhould abate fome Degrees of 
Pride and Morcfenefs, which are never-failing In- 
gredients in this Sort of Temper, and fhould feek 
after fo much Honejly and Confcience, as never to 
contend for Conqueft or Triumph ; but to review 
his own Reafon s, and to read the Arguments of his 
Opponents (if pofiible) with an equal IndifTerency, 
and be glad to fpy Truth, and to fubmit to it, 
though it appear on the oppofite Side. 

(2.) There is another Pair of Prejudices derived 
from two Tempers of Mind, near akin to thofe I 
have juft mentioned; -and thefe are the dogmatical 
and the fceptical Humour 3 that is, always pofitive? or 
always doubting. 

By what Means foever the Dogmaiifi came by 
his Opinions, whether by his Senfes, or by his 
Fancy, his Education or his own Reading, yet he 
believes them all with the fame Affurance that 
})e does a mathematical Truth \ he has fcarce any 

mere 



210 LOGICK, OR, THE [PART If, 

mere Probabilities that belong to him ; every Thing 
with him is certain and infallible , every punctilio 
in Religion is an Article of his Faith, and he an- 
iwers all Manner of Objections by a fovcreign 
Contempt. 

Perfons of this Temper are feldom to be con* 
vinced of any Miftake : A full Affurance of their 
own Notions makes all the Difficulties on their 
own Side vanifh fo entirely, that they think etfery 
Point of their Belief is written as with Sun Beams, 
and wonder any one fhould find a Difficulty in it. 
They are amazed that learned Men fhould make 
a Controverfy of what is to them fo perfpicuous and 
indubitable. The lowed Rank of People, both 
in learned and in vulgar Life, is very fuhje6l to 
this Obftinacy. 

Scepticifm is a contrary Prejudice. The Dogma- 
tijl is fure of every Thing, and the Sceptick believes 
Nothing. Perhaps he has found himfelf often 
mifraken in Matters of which he thought himfelf 
well affiured in his younger Days, and therefore he 
is afraid to give Aflent to any Thing again. He 
fees fo much Shew of Reafon for every Opinion, 
and fo many Objections alfo arifing againft every 
Doctrine, that he is ready to throw off the Belief 
of every Thing : He renounces at once the Purfuit 
of Truth, and contents himfelf to fay, There is 
nothing certain. It is well, if through the Influ- 
ence of fuch a Temper he does not cad away his 
Religion as well as his Philofophy, and abandon 
himfelf to a profane Courfe of Life, regardlefs of 
Hell or Heaven. 

Both thefe Prejudices lad mentioned, though 
they are fo oppofitc to each other, yet they arife 
from the fame Spring, and that is, Impatience of 
Study , and Want of diligent Attention in the Search 
of Truth. The Dogmatifl is in hade to believe 

fome- 



CH. III.]' RIGHT USE OF REASON. 211 

fomething; he' cannot keep himfelf long enough 
in Sufpenfe, till fome bright and convincing Evi- 
dence appear on one Side, but throws himfelf ca- 
fually into the Sentiments of one Party or another, 
and then he will hear no Argument to the con- 
trary. The Sceptick will not take Pains to fearch 
Things to the Bottom, but when he fees difficul- 
ties on both fides, refolves to believe neither of 
them. Humility of Soul, Patience in Study, Dili- 
gence in Inquiry, with an honeji Zeal for Truth, 
would go a great Way towards the Cure of both 
thefe Follies. 

(3.) Another Sort of Temper that is very inju- 
rious to a right Judgment of Things, is an incon- 
Jlant, fickle, changeable Spirit, and a very uneven 
Temper of Mind. When fuch Perfons are in one 
Humour, they pafs a Judgment of Things agree- 
able to it ; when their Humour changes, they re- 
verie their fhft Judgment, and embrace a new 
Opinion. They have no Steadinefs of Soul \ they 
want Firmnefs of Mind fufficientto eftablifh them-- 
felves in any Truth, and are ready to change it 
for the next alluring Falfhood that is agreeable to 
their Change of Humour. This Ficklenefs is fome- 
times fo mingled with their very Conftitution by 
Nature, or by Di item per of Body, that a cloudy 
Day and a lowering Sky (hall ftrongly incline them 
to form an Opinion both of themfelves, and of 
Perfons and Things round about them, quite diffe- 
rent from what they believe when the Sun Jhines, 
and the Heavens are ferene. 

This Sort of People ought to judge of Things 
and Perfons in their mo ft fedate, peaceful, and 
compofed Hours of Life, and refer ve thefe Judg- 
ments for their Conduct at more unhappy Seafons. 

(4.) Some Perfons have a violent amd turgid 
Manner both of Talking and Thinking j whatsoever 

they 



il2 logics: : or, $M [part, if, 

they judge of, it is always with a Tincture of this 
Vanity. They are always in Extremes, and pro- 
nounce concerning every Thing in the Superlative. 
If they think a Man to be learned, he is the chief 
Scholar of the Age : If another has low Parts, he is 
the great eft Blockhead in Nature : If they approve 
any Book on divine Subjects, // is the beft Book in 
the World next to the Bible : If they fpeak of a Storm 
cf Rain or Hail, it is the mofi terrible Storm that fell 
fince the Creation : And a cold Winter Day is the 
coldeft that ever was known. 

But the Men of this fwelling Language ought 
to remember, that Nature has ten thoufand mode- 
rate Things in it, and does not always deal in Ex- 
tremes as they do. 

(5.) I think it may be called another Sort of 
Prejudice derived from Humour, when fome Men 
believe a Doctrine merely bccaife it is ancient, and has 
been long believed ; others are fo fond of Novelty^ 
that nothing prevails upon their AfTent fo much 
as new Thoughts and new Notions. Again, there 
are fome who fet a high •Efteem upon every Thing 
that is foreign and farfetched ; therefore China 
Pictures are admired, how aukward foever : Others 
value Things the more for being of our own native 
Growth, Invention, or Manufacture, and thefe as 
much defpiic foreign Things. 

Some Men of Letters and Theology will not be- 
lieve a Proportion even concerning a fublime 
Subject, till every Thing myftertous, deep and 
difficult is cut off from it, though the Scripture 
averts it never fo plainly ; others are fo fond of a 
Myftery, and Things incomprehenfible, that they 
would fcarce believe the Do&rine of the Trinity, 
if it could be explained ; they incline to that 
foolifli Rant of one of the Ancients, Credo quia 

impojfibile 



CH. Ill] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 1\$ 

bntofftbile eft \ iC I believe it becaufe it is impof- 
fible." 

To cure thefe Miftakes, remember that neither 
antique nor novel, foreign nor native, myfterious nor 
plain, are certain Characters either of Truth, or 
Falihood. 

I might mention various other Humours of Men. 
that excite in them various Prejudices, and lead 
them into rain and miftaken Judgments; but 
thefe are fufficient for a Specimen. 

"VII. There are feveral other Weakneffes which 
belong to human Nature, whereby we are led into 
Miftakes, and indeed are rendered almoft inca- 
pable of paffing a folid Judgment in Matters of 
great Depth and great Difficulty. Some have a 
native Obfcurity of Perception, (or fhall I call it a 
want of natural Sagacity . ? ) whereby they are hin- 
dered from attaining clear and diitincl Ideas. Their 
Thoughts always feem to have fomething confufed 
and cloudy in them, and therefore they judge in 
the Dark. Some have a Defeclof Memory, and 
then they are not capable of comparing their pre- 
fent Ideas with a great Variety of others, in order 
to fecure themfelves from Inconiiftency in Judg- 
ment. Others may have a Memory large enough, 
yet they are fubjeel; to the fame Errors from a 
Narrownefs of Soul, and fuch a Fixation and Con- 
finement of Thought to a few Objecls, that they fcarce 
ever take a Survey of Things wide enough to judge 
wifely and well, and to fecure themfelves from all 
Ineonfiftencies. 

Though thefe are natural Defecls and Weakneffes, 
yet they may in fome Meafure be relieved by La- 
bour, Diligence, and a due Attention to proper 
Rules. 

But 



214 fcOGICK; OR, THE [p ART If* 

Bat among all the Caufes offalfe Judgment which 
are within our/elves, I ought by no Means to leave 
out that univerfal and original Spring of Error, 
which we are informed of by the Word of God ; 
and that is, the Sin and Defeclion of oiir jirft Parent s\ 
whereby all our heft natural Powers both of Mind 
and Body are impaired, and rendered very much 
inferior to what they were in a ftate of Innocence* 
Our Underftanding is darkened, our Memory con- 
tracted, our corrupt Humours and Palfions are 
grown predominant, our Reafon enfeebled, and 
various Diforders attend our Conflitution and ani- 
mal Nature, whereby the Mind is firangely im~ 
pofed upon in its Judgment of Things. Nor is 
there any perfect Relief to be expected on Earth* 
There is no hope of ever recovering from thefe 
Maladies, but by a fincere Return to God in the 
Ways of his own Appointment, whereby we (hall be 
kept fafe from all dangerous and pernicious Errors 
in the Matters of Religion ; and though Imperfec- 
tions and Mifiakes will hang about us in the prefent 
Life, as the Effects of our original Apoflacy from 
God, yet we hope for a full Deliverance from them 
when w r e arrive at Heaven. 

SECT. IV. 

Prejudices arifing from other Perfons. 

WERE it not for the Springs of Prejudice 
that are lurking in ourfelves, we fhould not 
be fubje6t to fo many Mifiakes from the Influence 
of others : But fince our Nature is fo fufceptive of 
Errors on all Sides, it is fit we fhould have Hints 
ond Notices given us, how far other Perfons may 
have Power over us, and become the Cauies of our 

falfe 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 215 

falfe Judgments. This might all be caft into one 
Heap, for they are all near akin, and mingle with 
each other; but for Diftinclion-fake let them be 
called the Prejudices of Education, of Cujlom, ot Au- 
thority, and iuch as arife from the Manner of Pro- 
pcfal. 

I. Thofe with whom our Education is intruded, 
may lay \k\zfirft Foundation of many Mijiakes in our 
younger Years. How many Fooleries and Errors 
are inltilled into us by our Nurfes, our Fellow- 
Children, by Servants or unfkilful Teachers, which 
are not only maintained through the following 
Parts of Life, but fometimes have a very unhappy 
Influence upon us 1 We are taught that there are 
Goblins and Bugbears in the , Dark ; our young 
Minds are crouded with the terrible Ideas ofGho/is 
appearing upon every Occafion, or with the pleafanter 
Tales of Fairies dancing at Midnight, We learn to 
prophefy betimes, to foretel Futurities by good or evil 
Omens, and to prefage approaching Death in a Fa- 
mily by Ravens and little Worms, which we there- 
fore term a Death-Watch. We are taught to know 
beforehand, for a Twelvemonth together, which 
Days of the Week will be fair or foul, which will be 
lucky or unlucky ; nor is there any Thing fo filly, 
but may be impofed upon our Underftandings in 
that early Part of Life ; and thefe ridiculous Sto- 
ries abide with us too long, and too far influence 
the Weaker Part of Mankind. 

We choofe our particular Seel and Party in the 
civil, the religious, and the learned Life, by the In- 
fluence of Education. In the Colleges of Learn- 
ing, fome are for the Nominals, and fome for the 
Realifts in the Science of Metaphyficks, becaufe 
their Tutors were devoted to thefe Parties. The 
eld Philofophy and the new have gained thousands 

P of 



216 logick : on, THE [part II. 

ofPartifans the fame Way: And t\ cry Religion 
has its Infant Votaries, who are born, live and die 
in the fame Faith, without Examination of any 
Article. The Turks arc taught early to believe in 
Mahomet', the jews in Mofes ; the Heathens wor- 
ffiip a Multitude of Gods, under the Force of their 
Educatoin. And it would be well if there were not 
Millions of Chri/lians, \sho have little more to fay 
for their Religion, than that they were born and 
bred up in it. The grtateft Part of the Chriftian 
World can hardly give any Rcafon why they be- 
lieve the Bible to be the Word of God, but becaufe 
they have always believed it, and they were taught 
fo from their Infancy. As Jews and Turks, and 
American Heathens, believe the mofl monftrous and 
incredible Stories, becaufe they have been trained 
up amongft them, as Articles of Faith ; fo the 
Papifts believe their Tranfiibftantiation, and make 
no Difficulty of aflenting to Impoffibilities, fince 
it is the current Doctrine of their Catcchifms. By 
the fame Means the feveral Seels and Parties in 
Chriflianity, believe all the Jlrained Interpretations 
of Scripture, by which they have been taught to 
fupport their own Tenets : They find nothing 
difficult in all the abfurd Gloffes and farfetched 
Senfes that are fometimes put upon the Words of 
the facrcd Writers, becaufe their Ears have been 
always accuflomed to thefe Gloffes ; and therefore 
they fet fo fmooth and eafy upon their Undcrdand- 
ihgs, that they know not how to admit the mod 
natural and eafy Interpretation in oppofition to 
them. 

In the fame Manner we are nurfed up in many 
filly and grofs Miflakcs about domtflick Affairs, as 
well as in Matters of political Concernment. It is 
upon the fame Ground that Children are trained up 
to be Whigs and Tories betimes; and every one 

learns 



CH. Ill ] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 2 17 

learns the diftinguifhed Terms of his own Party, as 
the Papifts learn to fay their Prayers in Latin, with- 
out any Meaning, Reafon, or Devotion. 

This Sort of Prejudice muft be cured by calling 
all the Principles of our young Years Jx> the Bar 
of more mature Reafon, that we may judge of the 
Things of Nature and political _ Affairs by jufter 
Rules of Philofophy and Obfervation : And even 
the Matters of Religion muft be firft inquired into 
by Reafon and, Confcience, and when thefe have led 
us to believe Scripture to be the Word of God, then 
that becomes our fovereign Guide, and Reafon 
and Confcience muft fubmit to receive its Dic- 
tates. 

IL The next Prejudice which I fhall mention, 
is that which arifes from the Cuftom or Fafhion of 
thofe amongft whom we live. Suppofe we have freed 
ourfelves from the younger Prejudices of our Edu- 
cation^ yet we are in Danger of having our Mind 
turned afide from Truth by the Influence of gene- 
ral Cuftom. 

Our Opinion of Meats and Drinks, of Garments 
and Forms of Salutation, are influenced much more 
by Cuftom, than by the Eye, the Ear, or the Talte. 
Cuftom prevails even over Senfe itfelf, and there- 
fore no wonder if it prevail over Reafon too. 
What is it but Cuftom that renders many of the 
Mixtures of Food and Sauces elegant in Britain, 
which would be aukward and naufeous to the In- 
habitants of China, and indeed were naufeous to 
us when we firft tailed them ? What but Cuftom 
could make thofe Salutations polite in Mufcovy, 
which are ridiculous in France or England? We 
call ourfelves indeed the politer Nations, but it is 
we who judge thus of ourfelves ; and that fancied 
Polltenefs is fometimes more owing to Cuftom than 

P 2 Reafon. 



218 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART II. 

Reafon* Why are the Forms of oar prefent Gar-* 
merit counted beautiful, and thofe Fafhions of our 
Anceftors the Matter of ScofFand Contempt, which 
in their Day were all decent and genteel ? It is 
Cuftom that forms our opinion of Drefs, and recon- 
ciles us by Degrees to thofe Habits which at firft 
feemed very odd and monftrous. It muft be grant- 
ed, there are fome Garments and Habits which 
have a natural Congruity or Incongruity, Modefly, 
or Immodefty, Decency or Indecency, Gaudery or 
Gravity ; though for the moil Part there is but 
little Reafon in thefe Affairs : But what little there 
is of Reafon or natural Decency -, Cuftom triumphs 
over it all. It is almoit iinpoilible to perfuade a 
gay Lady that any thing can be decent which is 
out ofFaftion : And it were well if Fajhion ftretched 
its Powers no farther than the Bufinefs of Drapery 
and the fair Sex. 

The Methods of our Education are governed 
by Cuftom, It is Cuftom^ and not Reafon, that 
fends every Boy to learn the Roman Poets, and be- 
gin a little Acquaintance with Greeks before he is 
bound an Apprentice to a Soapboiler or Leather- 
feller. It is Cuftom alone that teaches us Latin 
by the Rules of a Latin Grammar ; a tedious and 
abfurd Method ! And what is it but Cuftom that 
has for paft Centuries confined the brighteft Ge- 
niufes, even of the higheft Rank in the Female 
World, to the Bufinefs of the Needle only, and 
fecluded them moft unmercifully from the Plea- 
fures of Knowledge, and the divine Improvements 
of Reafon ? But we begin to break all thefe Chains, 
and Reafon begins to diclate the Education of 
Youth. May the growing Age be learned and 
wife ! 

It is by the Prejudice ariling from our own Cuf 
toms 9 that we judge of all other civil and religious 

Forms 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 1\g 

Forms and Praclices, The Rites and Ceremonies 
of War and Peace in other Nations, the Forms of 
Weddings and Funerals, the feveral Ranks of Ma- 
giflracy, the Trades and Employments of both Sexes, 
the. pub lick and the domejiick Affairs of Life \ and 
almoft every Thing of foreign Cuftoms, is judged ir- 
regular. It is all imagined to be unreafonable or 
unnatural, by thofe who have no other Rule to 
judge of Nature and Reafo?i 9 but the Cuftoms of 
their own Country, or the little Town w 7 here they 
dwell. Cufiom is called a fecond Nature? but we 
often miftake it for Nature iff elf. 

Befides all this, there is a Fafhion in Opinions, 
there is a Fafhion in Writing, and Printing, in Style 
and Language, In our Day it is the Vogue of the 
Nation, that Parliaments may fettle the Succejfion of 
the Crown, and that a People can make a King ; in 
the iaft Age this was a Doctrine akin to Treafon, 
Citations from the Latin Poets were an Embellifh-, 
ment of Style in the laft Century, and whole Pages 
in that Day were covered with them ; it is now 
forbidden by Cufiom, and expofed by the Name 
of Pedantry ; whereas in Truth both thefe are Ex- 
tremes. Sometimes our printed Books fhall abound 
in Capitals, and fometimes reject them all. Now 
we deal much in Effays, and moil unreafonably 
defpife fyflematick Learning, whereas our Fathers 
had a juit Value for Regularity and Syfiems ; then 
Folios and Quartos were the fafhionable Sizes, as 
Volumes in Octavo are now. We are ever ready 
to run into Extremes, and yet Cuftom flill per-* 
fnades us that Reafon and Nature are on our 
Side. 

This Bufinefs of the Faflnon has a mofl power- 
ful Influence on our Judgments ; for it employs 
thole two ilrong Engines of Fear and Shame to 
operate upon our Underftandings with unhappy 

P 3 Succefs, 



220 LOGICK : OR, THE [p ART IT. 

Succefs. We are afhamed to believe or profefs an 
unfashionable opinion in Philofophy, and a cow- 
ardly Soul dares not To much as indulge a Thought 
contrary to the e/iablijhed or fajhionahle Faith, nor 
act in Oppofition to Cuftom, though it be accord- 
ing to the Dictates of Reafon. 

I confefs, there is a Refpect due to Mankind, 
which fbould incline even the wifefl of Men to fol- 
low the innocent Cuftoms of their Country in the 
outward Practices of civil Life, and in fome mea- 
sure to fubmit to Fa fh ion in all indifferent Affairs, 
where Reafon and Scripture make no Remontf ran- 
ees againft it. But the Judgments of the Mind 
ought to be for ever free, and not biafTed by the 
Cuftoms and Fajhions of any Age or Nation what- 
foever. 

To deliver our Understandings from this Dan- 
ger and Slavery, we fhould confider thefe three 
Things. 

1. That the greater! Part of the civil Cuftoms of 
any particular Nation or Age, fpring from Humour 
rather than Reafon, Sometimes the Humour of 
the Prince prevails, and fometimes the Humour 
of the People. It is either the Great or the Many 
who dictate the Fafhion, and thefe have not al- 
ways the higher! Reafon on their Side. 

2. Confider alfo, that the Cuftoms of the fame 
Nation in different Ages, the Cuftoms of different 
Nations in the fame Age, and the Cuftoms of dif- 
ferent Towns and Villages in the fame Nation, 
are very various and contrary to each other. The 

fajhionahle Learning, Language, Sentiments, and 
Rules of Politenefs, differ greatly in different Coun- 
tries and Ages of Mankind; but Truth and Reafon 
are of a more uniform and fleady Nature, and 
do not change with the Fafhion. Upon this Ac- 
count, to cure the Prepoffefftons which arife from 

Cuftoni) 



CH. Ill] ' RIGHT USE OF REASON. 221 

'Cu/iom, it is of excellent Ufe to travel, and fee the 
Cuftoms of various Countries, and to read the Tra- 
vels of other Men, and the Hiftory of paft- Ages, 
that every Thing may not feem ftrange and un- 
couth which is not praclifed within the Limits of 
our own Parifh, or in the narrow Space of our own 
Life-time. 

3. Confider yet again, how often we onrfelvcs 
have changed our own Opinions concerning the 
Decency, Propriety, or Congruity of feveral Modes 
or Practices in the World, efpecially if we have 
lived to the Age of thirty or forty. Cujiom or 
Fajhion, even in all its Changes, has been ready to 
have fome Degree of Afcendency over our Un- 
der (landings, and what at one Time feemed decent , 
appears obfolete and difagreeable afterward, when 
the Fafhion changes. Let us learn therefore to 
abfiract as much as poilible from Cu/iom and 
Fafhion, when we would pais a Judgment con- 
cerning the real Value and intrinfick Nature of 
Things. 

II L The Authority of Men, is the Spring of ' ano* 
ther Rank of Prejudices. 

Among thefe, the Authority of our Forefathers 
and ancient Authors is mod remarkable. We pay 
Deference to the Opinion of others, merely becaufe 
they lived a thoufand Years before us ; and even 
the Trifles and Im pertinencies that have a Mark 
of Antiquity upon them, are reverenced for this 
Reafon, becaufe they came from the Ancients. 

It is granted, that the Ancients had many wife 
and great Men among them, and fome of their 
Writings, which Time hath delivered clown to us, 
are truly valuable : But thofe Writers lived rather 
in the Infant State of the World ; and the Phi/o- 
fophers, as well as the polite Authors of our Age, 

P 4 ar v * 



222 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART. II. 

are properly the Elders, who have fecn the Mif- 
takes of the younger Ages of Mankind, and cor- 
rected them by Obfervation and Experience. 

Some borrow all their Religion from the Fathers 
of the Chriftian-Church ; or from their Synods or 
Councils ; but he that will read Montieur Bailie 
on the Ufe of the Fathers, will find many Reaibns 
why they are by no Means fit to Didtate our Faith 
fince we have the Gofpel of Chri/l, and the Writ- 
ings of the Apoftles and Prophets in our own 
Hanc!s. 

Some Perfons believe every Thing that their 
Kindred, their Parents, and their Tutors believe. 
The Veneration and the Love which they have 
for their Ancejlors, incline them to fwallow down 
all their Opinions at once, without examining 
what Truth or Falfhood there is in them. Men 
take up their Principles by Inheritance, and de- 
fend them as , they would their Eftates, becaufe 
they are born Heirs to them. I freely grant, that 
Barents are appointed by God and Nature to teach 
us all the Sentiments and Practices of our younger 
Tears; and happy are thofe whofe Parents lead 
them into the Paths of Wifdom and Truth ! I 
grant farther, that when Perfons come to Years of 
Difcretion, and judge for themfelves, they ought 
to examine the Opinions of their Parents, With the 
greateft Modeily, and with an humble Deference 
to their fuperior Character; they ought, in Mat- 
ters perfectly dubious, to give the Preference to. 
their Parents Advice, and always to pay them the 
firft Refpecl, nor ever depart from their Opinions 
and Practice, till Rcafon and Conference make it 
necefiary. But after all, it is poflible that Parents 
may be miftaken, and therefore Reafon and Scrip- 
ture ought to be our final Rules of Determination 

in 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 223 

in Matters that relate to this World, and that 
which is to come. 

Sometimes a favourite Author, or a Writer of 
great Name, drags a thoufand Followers after him 
into his own Miftakes, merely by the Authority of 
his Name and Character. The Sentiments of Arif- 
totle were imbibed and maintained by all the Schools 
in Europe for feveral Centuries; and a ( Citation 
from his Writings was thought a iufficient Proof 
of any Proportion. The great Defcartes had alio 
too many implicit Believers in the lait Age, though 
he himfelf, in his Philofophy, difclaims all fuch 
Influence over the Minds of his Readers. Calvin 
and Luther , in the Days of Reformation from Po- 
pery, were learned and pious Men, and there have 
been a Succeflion of their Difciples even to this 
Day, who pay too much Reverence to the Words 
of their Mailers. There are others who renounce 
their Authority, but give themfelves up in too fer- 
vile a Manner to the Opinion and Authority of 
other Mailers, and follow as bad or worfe Guides 
in Religion. 

If only learned, and wife, and good Men had 
Influence on the Sentiments of others, it would 
be at leail a more excufable Sort of Prejudice, and 
there would be fome Colour and Shadow of Reafon 
for it: But that Riches, Ho?iours and outward 
Splendor fhould fet up Perfons for Dictators to all 
the reft of Mankind ; this is a mofl fhameful In- 
vafion of the Right of our Underflandings on the 
one Hand, and as fhameful a Slavery of the Soul 
on the other. The poor Man, or the Labourer, 
too often believes fuch a Principle in Politicks, or 
iu Morality, and judges concerning the Rights of 
the King and the People, juft as his wealthy Neigh- 
bour does. Half the Parifh follows the Opinion 
of the Efquire, and the Tenants of a Manor fall 

into 



224 LOGICK : OR, THE fpART IF. 

into the Sentiment of their Lord, efpecially if he 
lives amongil them. How unreafonable and -yet 
how common is this ! 

As for Principles of Religion, we frequently 
find how they are taken up and forfaken, changed 
and refumed by the Influences of Princes. In all 
Nations the Priefts have much Power alfo in dic- 
tating the Religion of the People, but the Princes 
dictate to them : And where there is a great Pomp 
and Grandeur attending the Pried hood in any 
Religion whatfoever, with fo much the more Re- 
verence and ftronger Eaith do the People believe 
whatever they teach them : Yet it is too often 
evident, that Riches, and Dominions, and high 
Titles, in Church or State, have no Manner of Pre- 
tence to Truth and Certainty, Wifdom and Good- 
nefs, above the reft of Mortals, becaufe thefe Supe- 
riorities in this World are not always conferred ac- 
cording to Merit. 

I confefs, where a Man of Wifdom and Tears, 
of Obfervation and Experience, gives us his Opi- 
nion and Advice in Matters of the civil or the mo- 
ral Life \ Reafon tells us we fhould pay a great 
Attention to him, and it is probable, he may be 
in the Right. Where a Man of long Exercife in 
Piety fpeaks of praclical Religion, there is a due 
Deference to be paid to his Sentiments : And the 
fame we may fay concerning an ingenious Man long 
verfed in any Art or Science, he may jufily expect 
due Regard when he fpeaks of his own Affairs and 
proper Bufinefs. But in other Things each of thefe 
may be ignorant enough, notwithstanding all their 
Piety and Years, and particular Skill : Nor even 
in their own proper Province are they to be believed 
in every Thing without Refcrvc, and without Exa- 
mination, 

Tq 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 225 

To free ourfelves from thefe Prejudices, it is 
fufficient to remember, that there is no Rank nor 
Character among Mankind, which has any juft 
Pretence to fway the Judgments of other Men by 
their Authority : For there have been Perfons of 
the fame Rank and Character who have maintained 
different and contrary Sentiments ; but all thefe 
can never be true, and therefore the mere Name or 
Reputation that any of them pofleffes, is not a fuf- 
ficient Evidence of Truth. 

Shall we believe the Ancients in Philofophy / 
But fome of the Ancients were Stoicks fome PerU 
patcticks, fome Plato?iicks, and fome Epicureans, 
fome Cynicks) and fome Scepticks. Shall we judge 
of Matters of the Chriftian Faith by the Fathers , 
or Primitive Writers for three or four hundred 
Years after Chrift? But they often contradicted 
one another, and themfelves too ; and what is 
worfe, they fometimes contradicted the Scripture 
itfelf. Now among all thefe different and con- 
trary Sentiments in Philofophy and Religion, which 
of the Ancients muft we believe, for we cannot be- 
lieve them all ? 

Again, To believe in all Things as our Predecef- 
fors did, is the ready Way to keep Mankind in an 
everlafting State of Infancy, and to lay an eter- 
nal Bar again ft all the Improvements of our Rea- 
fon and our Happinefs. Had the prefent Age of 
Philofophers fatisfled themfelves with the fubftan- 
tial Forms and occult Qualities of Ariftotle, with the 
/olid Spheres , Ecceniricks, and Epicycles of Ptolemy r , 
and the ancient Aftronomers ; then the great Lord 
Bacon, Copernicus, and Defcartes, with the greater 
Sir Ifaac Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle, had 
rifen in our World in vain. We mud have blun- 
dered on ftill in fucceflive Generations among 
Abfurdities and thick Darknefs, and a hundred 

ufeful 



226 LOGICK ; OK, THE jjPART in 

ufeful Inventions for the Happinefs of human Life 
had never been known. 

Thus it is in Matters of Philofophy and Science. 
But, you will fay^Jhall not our own Ancestors deter- 
mine our Judgment in Matters of civil or religious 
Concernment? If they muft, then the Child of a 
Heathen muft believe that Heathenifm is Truth ; 
the Son of a Papifi muft Aflent to all the Abfur- 
dities of Popery ; the Pofterity of the Jews and So- 
cinians muft for ever be Socinians and Jews ; and 
a Man whofe Father was of Republican Principles, 
muft make a Succeffion of Republicans in his Fa- 
mily to the End of the World. If we ought al- 
ways to believe whatfoever our Parents, or our 
Priefls, or our Princes believe, the Inhabitants of 
China ought to worfhip their own Idols, and the 
Savages of Africa ought to believe all the Non- 
fenfe, and pracTtife the Idolatry of their Negro Fa* 
thers and Kings* The Britifh Nation, when it was 
Jleathen, could never have become Chrijlian ; and 
when it was a Slave to Rome, it could never have 
been reformed. 

Belides, let us confider, that the great God, 
our common Maker, has never given one Man's 
Underftanding a legal and rightful Sovereignty 
to determine Truths for others, at leaft after they 
are paft the State of Childhood or Minority. No 
lingle Perfons, how learned and wife, and great 
foever, or whatfoever natural, or civil, or ecclefiaf- 
iical Relation he may have to us, can claim this 
Dominion over our Faith. St. Paul the Apoftle, 
in his private Capacity, would not do it; nor hath 
an infpired Man any fuch Authority, until he 
makes his divine Commifiion appear. Our Saviour 
himfclf tells the Jews, that if he had not done fuch 
wondrous Works among them, they had not finned 
in difbelieving his Doclrines, and refufing him 

for 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. < l r L t ] 

for the Mejfiah, No Bifhop or Prefbyter, no Sy- 
nod or Council, no Church or Afiembly of Men, 
iince the Days of Infpiration, hath Power derived 
to them from God, to make Creeds or Articles of 
Faith for us, and impofe them upon our Under- 
ilandings. We mult all act according to the bed 
of our own Light, and the Judgment of our own 
Confciences,,ufing the belt Advantages which Pro- 
vidence hath given us, with an honeft and im- 
partial Diligence to enquire and fearch out the 
Truth : For every one of us muji give an Account 
of himfelfto God. To believe as the Church, or the 
Court believes, is but a forry and a dangerous Faith : 
This Principle would make more Heathens than 
Chrijlians, and more Papijis than Protejiants ; and 
perhaps lead more Souls to Hell than to Heaven ; 
for our Saviour himfelf has plainly told us, that if 
the Blind will be led by the Blind, they mufi both fall 
into the Ditch. 

Though there be fo much Danger of Error arif- 
ing from the three Prejudices laft mentioned, yet 
before I difmifs this Head, I think it proper to take 
Notice, that as Education, Cujlom, and Authority, 
are no fure Evidences of Truth, fo neither are they 
certain Marks of Fal/hood; for Reafon and Scrip- 
ture may join to dictate the fame Things which 
our Parents, our Nurfes, our Tutors, our Friends, 
and our Country, believe and profefs. Yet there 
appears fometimes in our Age, a Pride and Petu- 
lancy in Youth, zealous to call: off the Sentiments 
of their Fathers and Teachers, on Purpofe to (hew 
that they carry none of the Prejudices of Education 
and Authority about them. They indulge all man- 
ner of licentious Opinions and Practices, from a 
vain Pretence of afferting their Liberty. But 
alas ! This is but changing one Prejudice for ano- 
ther ; and fometimes it happens by this Means, 

that 



228 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART II. 

that they make a Sacrifice both of Truth and 
Virtue to the vile Prejudices of their Pride and 

Senfuality, 

IV. There is another Tribe of Prejudices which 
are near akin to thofe of Authority ', and that is, 
when we receive a Doctrine becaufe of the Manner 
in which it is propofedto us by others i I have already 
mentioned the powerful Influence that Oratory and 
fine Words have to infmuate a falfe Opinion, and 
fometimes Truth is refufed, and fufFers Contempt 
in the Lips of a wife Man, for want of the Charms 
of Language : But there are feveral other Manners 
of Propofa/s, whereby miltaken Sentiments are pow- 
erfully conveyed into the Mind. 

Some Pcrfons are eafily perfuaded to believe what 
another diclates with a pqfitive Air, and a great De- 
gree of A fficrance : They feel the overbearing Force 
of a confident Dictator, efpecially if he be of a fu- 
pcrior Rank or Character to themfelves. 

Some are quickly convinced of the Truth of 
any Doctrine, when he that propofes it puts on all 
the Airs of Piety , and makes folemn Appeals to Hea- 
ven, and Protejiations of the Truth of it : The pious 
Mind of a weaker Chriftian is ready to receive 
any Thing that is pronounced with fuch an awful 
Solemnity. 

It is a Prejudice near akin to this, when a hum- 
ble Soul is frighted into any particular Sentiments 
of Religion, becaufe a Man of great Name or Cha- 
racter pronounces Herefy upon the contrary Sen- 
timents, calls the Diibclievcr out of the Church, 
-dud forbids him the Gates of Heaven. 

Others are allured into particular Opinions by 

gentler P radices on the Unclerftanding : Not only 

the foft Tempers of Mankind, but even hardy and 

;cd Souls, arc fometimes led away Captives to 

Error 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 12Q 

Error by the/oft Air of Addrefs, and the fweet and 
engaging Methods of Perfuajion and Kindnefs. 

I grant, where natural or revealed Religion plain- 
ly diclate to us the infinite and everlafiing Impor- 
tance of any facred Doctrine, it cannot be impro- 
per to ufe any of thefe Methods, to perfuade Men 
to receive and obey the Truth, after we have given 
fufficient Reafon and Argument to convince their 
UnderiTandings. Yet all thefe Methods, confi- 
dered in themfelves, have been often ufed to con- 
vey Falfhood into the Soul as well as Truth ; and 
if we build our Faith merely upon thefe Founda- 
tions, without Regard to the Evidence of Truth, 
and the Strength of Argument, our Belief is but 
the, Effecl of Prejudice-. For neither the pofitive, the 
awful ovfolemn, the terrible, or tht gentle Methods 
of Addrefs, carry any certain Evidence with them 
that Truth lies on that Side. 

There is another Manner of propofing our own 
Opinion, or rather oppojing the Opinions, of others, 
which demands a mention here, and that is when 
Perfons make a Jefi ferve inftead of an Argument ; 
when they refute what they call Error by a Turn of 
Wit, and anfwer every Objection againfl their own 
Sentiments, by catting a Sneer upon the Objector. 
Thefe Scoffers practife with Succefs upon weak and 
cowardly Spirits : Such as have not been well efta- 
blimed in Religion or Morality, have been laughed 
out of the beft Principles by a confident Buffoon ; 
they have yielded up their Opinions to a witty Ban- 
ter, and fold their Faith and Religion for a Jejt, 

There is no Way to cure thefe Evils in iuch a 
degenerate World as we live in, but bv learning 
to diftinguiih well between the Sub/lance of any 
Doclrine, and the Manner of Addrefs, either in 
propofing, attacking, or defending it ; and then 
by letting a juft and fevere Guard of Reafon and 

Conference 



230 tOGICK I OR, THE [pART II. 

Confcience over all the Exercifes of our Judg- 
ment, refolving to yield to nothing but the con- 
vincing Evidence of Truth, religioufly obeying the 
Light of Reafon in Matters of pure Reafon, and the 
Di elates of Revelation in Things that relate to our 
Faith. 

Thus we have taken a brief Survey of fome of 
the infinite Varieties of Prejudice that attend Man- 
kind on every tide in the prefent State, and the 
Dangers of Error or of rajh Judgment, we are 
perpetually expofed to in this Life : This Chapter 
fhall conclude with one Remark, and one Piece 
of Advice. 

The Remark is this : The fame Opinion, whether 
■falfe or true, may be diclated by many Prejudices 
at the fame Time ; for, as I hinted before, Prejudice 
may happen to dictate Truth fometimes as well as 
Error. But where two or more Prejudices oppofe 
one another, as it often happens, the flronger pre- 
vails and gains the Alien t : Yet how feldom does 
Reafon interpofe with fufficient Power to get the 
Afcendent of them all, as it ought to do 1 

The Advice follows, namely, Since we find fuch 
a Swarm of Prejudices attending us both within and 
without; fince we feel the Weaknefs of our Rea- 
fon, the Frailty of our Natures, and our Infuffi- 
ciency to guard ourfelves from Error upon this 
Account, it is not at all unbecoming the Character 
of a Logician or a Philofopher, together with the 
Advice already given, to direct every Perfon in his 
Search after Truth to make his daily Addrefles to 
Heaven, and implore the God of Truth to lead him 
into all Truth, and to afk Wifdom of Him who giveth 
liberally to them that aik it, and upbraideth us not 
with our own Follies. 

Such a devout Practice will be an excellent Pre- 
parative for the beft Improvement of-all the Di- 

reclions 



CH, IV.] EIGHT USE OF EEASON. 231. 

reclions and Rules propofed in the two following 
Chapters. 



CHAP. IV, 

■General Direffiions to affijl us in judging aright. 

THE chief Defign of the Art of Logick is to 
affift us in forming a true Judgment of 
Things ; a few proper Obfervations for this End 
have been dropt occafionally in fome of the forego- 
ing Chapters : Yet it is neceilary to mention them 
again in this Place, that we may have a rriore 
complete and fimultaneous View of the general 
Directions, which are neceilary in order to judge 
aright. A Multitude of Advices may be framed 
for this Purpofe ; the chief of them may, for Order 
Sake, be reduced to the following Heads. 

I. Direcllon. When We convlder oiirfelves as 
Philofophers, or Searchers after 'Truths we fhould ex- 
amine all our old Opinions afrejh, and enquire what 
was the Ground of them, and whether our Affent u)ere 
built on juft Evidence ; and then we fhould cajl off 
all thofe Judgments which were formed heretofore with* 
out due Examination. A Man in Purfuit of Know- 
ledge, mould throw off all thofe Prejudices which 
he had imbibed in Times pad, and guard againft 
all the Springs of Error, mentioned in the preced- 
ing Chapter, with the utmoft Watchfulnefs for 
Time to come. 

Ofrferve here, That this Rule of ' tafihig away all 
our former prejudicate Opinions and Sentiments, is not 
propofed to any of us to be practifed at oncej con- 
sidered as Men of Bufinefs or Religion, as Friends 

Q or 



232 LOGICK t OR, THE [PART XI. 

or Neighbours, as Fathers or Sons, as Magifirates, 
Subjects, or Christians \ but merely as Philofo.phcrs 
and Searchers after Truth : And though it may be 
well prefumed that many of our Judgments, both 
true and falfe, together with the Practices built 
thereon in the natural, the civil, and the religious 
Life, were formed without fufficient Evidence; yet 
an univerfal Rejection of all thefe might deftroy at 
once our prefent Senfe and Practice of Duty with 
regard to God, ourfehes, and our Fellow-Creatures* 
Mankind would be hereby thrown into fuch a State 
of Doubting and Indifference, that it would be too 
long ere they recovered any Principles of Virtue or 
Religion by a Train of Reafonings. 

Befides, the common Affairs of human Life often 
demand a much fpeedier Determination, and we 
muft many Times act upon prefent Probabilities : 
The Bulk of Mankind have not Time and Leifure 
and Advantages fufficient to begin all their Know- 
ledge anew, and to build up every fingle Opinion 
and Practice afrefh, upon the jufteft Grounds of 
Evidence. 

Yet let it be obferved alfo, that fo far as any Pcr- 
ion is capable of forming and correcting his No- 
tions, and his Rules of Conduct in the natural, ci- 
vil, and religious Life, by the ltrict Rules of ' Logicku 
and fo far as he hath Time and Capacity to review 
his old Opinions, to re-examine all thofc which are 
any ways doubtful, and to determine nothing with- 
out juft Evidence, he is likely to become fo much 
the wifer and the happier Man, and if divine Grace 
affiil him, fo much the better Chriftian. And 
though this cannot be done all at once, yet it may 
be done by prudent Steps and Degrees, till our 
whole Set of Opinions and Principles be in Time 
corrected and reformed, or at leaft cftablifhed upon 
jufter Foundations, 

II. Direct 



CH. IV.] BKJJH? USE OP REASON* 233 

II. Direct. Endeavour that all your Ideas of thofi , 
Objecls, concerning which you pafs any ^Judgment, be 
clear and Diflincl, complete, comp re-enfive, extenfeve 
and orderly, as far as you have Oct on to judge con- 
cerning them. This is the Sofeftance of the lajl 
Chapter of thefrf Part of Logick* The Rules which 
direcl our Conceptions mud be reviewed, if we would 
form our Judgments aright. But if we will make 
hafte to judge at all Adventures, while our Ideas 
are dark and confufed, and very Imperfecl, we fhall 
be in danger of running into many Miftakes. This 
is like a Perfon who would pretend to give the 
Sum total of a large Account in Arithmetick, with- 
out furvcying all the Particulars; or as a Painter* 
who profeffes to draw a fair and diflincl: Landfcape 
in the Twilight, when he can hardly diftinguifh a 
Houfe from a Tree. 

Obferve here, That this Direclion does not require 
us to gain clear, diflincl;, complete Ideas of Things 
in all their Parts, Powers and Qualities, in an ab* 
folute Senfe; for this belongs to God alone, and is 
impoffible for us to attain : But it is expreffed in a 
relative or limited Senfe ; that is, our Ideas fhould 
be clear, diflincl, and comprehenfive, &V. at leaft 
fo far as we have Occqfion at that Time to judge con- 
cerning them. We may form many true and certain 
Judgments concerning God, Angels, Animals, Men^ 
Heaven, Hell, EsV. by thole partial and very imper- 
fect Conceptions of them to which we have attaint- 
ed, if we judge no farther concerning them than 
our Conceptions reach. 

We may have a clear and diflinct Idea of the 
Ex'tftence of many Things in Nature, and affirm 
that they do exifl, though our Ideas of their intimate 
EJfences and Caufes, their Relations and Manners of 
Aclion, are very confufed and obfeure. We may 
judge well concerning feveral Properties of any 

Q. 1 Being 



'234 LOGICIC : OR, THE [PART H. 

Being, though other Properties are unknown \ for 
perhaps we know not all the Properties of any Be- 
ing whatfoever. 

Sometimes we have clear Ideas of the abfolute 
Properties of an Objecl: ; and we may judge of them 
with Certainty, while the relative Properties are very 
obfcure and unknown to us. So we may have a 
clear and juft Idea of the Area of a Parallelogram, 
without knowing what Relation it bears to the 
Area of a Triangle or a Polygon ; I may know the 
Length of the Diameter of a Circle, without know- 
ing what Proportion it has to the Circumference. 

There are other Things, whofe external relative 
Properties, with Refpecl: to each other, or whofe 
Relation to us, we know better than their own in- 
ward and abfolute Properties, or their elTential dif- 
tinguifhing Attributes. We perceive clearly, that 
Fire will warm or burn us, and will evaporate Watery 
and that Water will allay our Thirji, or quench the 
Fire, though we know not the inward diflingui/l)- 
ing Particles, or prime effential Properties of Fire or 
Water. We may know the King, and Lord Chan- 
cellor, and affirm many Things of them in their 
legal Characters, though we can have but a confufed 
Idea of their Perfons or natural Features, if we have 
never feen their Faces. So the Scripture has re- 
vealed God himfelf to us, as our Creator, Preferver, 
Redeemer, and Sanclifler, and as the Objecl of our 
Worfhip, in clearer Ideas than it has revealed many 
other abftrufe Queftions which may be railed about 
his own Divine Effence or Sub/lance, his Immcnjity 
or Omniprefcnce. 

This therefore is the general Obfervation in order 
to guide our Judgments, that we Jhould not allow 
ourf elves to form a ^Judgment concerning Things far- 
ther than our clear and diflinft Ideas reach, and then 
we are not in Danger of Error. 
But there is one cojifidcrablc Objeclion agninft this 

Rule, 



CH. iv.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 235 

Rule, which is necefTary to be anfwered ; and there 
is one juft and reafonable Exception? which is as 
needful to be mentioned. 

The Objection is this : May we not judge fafely 
concerning fame total or complete Ideas? when we 
have a clear Perception only of fome Parts or Pro- 
perties of them? May we not affirm, that All that is 
in God is eternal? or that all his unknown Attributes 
are infinite? though we have fo very imperfect an 
Idea of God? Eternity? and Infinity f Again, may we 
not fafely judge of particular Objecls? whofe Idea is 
obfeure, by a clear Idea of the general I May I not 
affirm, that every unknown Species of Animals has 
inward Springs of Motion? becaufe I have a clear 
Idea that thefe inward Springs belong to an Animal 
in general ? 

Anfwer* AH thofe fuppofed unknown Parts? Pro* 
perties or Species? are clearly and ditti nelly perceived 
to be connected with, or contained in the known 
Parts? Properties? ox general Ideas? which we fuppofe 
to be clear and dittinct as far as we judge of them : 
And as we have no particular Idea of thofe unknown 
divine Attributes? or unknown Species of Anirnals ; fo 
there is nothing particular affirmed concerning them 
beyond what belongs to the general Idea of Divine 
Attributes or Animals? with which I clearly and dis- 
tinctly perceive them to be connected. 

It may be illuttrated in this Manner. Suppofe 
a long Chain lies before me, whofe nearett Links I 
fee are iron Rings, and I fee them fattened to a Poll 
near me, but the moil diflant Links lie beyond the 
Reach of my Sight, fo that I know not whether 
they are oval or round, Brafs or Iron : Now I may 
boldly affirm, the whole length of this Chain is f aft* 
ened to the Pofl? {qv I have a clear Idea that the 
neareft Links -Sre thus fattened, and a clear Idea 
that the dittant Links are connected with the near- 
eft, if I can draw the whole Chain toy one Link. 

Q3 Or, 



23(3 L0GICK, OR, THE [PART II, 

Or thus : If two known Ideas, A and B, are 
evidently joined, or agree, and if C unknown be 
included in A, and alfo D unknown be included 
in B, then I may affirm that C and D are joined 
and agree : For I have a clear Perception of the 
Union of the two known Ideas A and B ; and alfo 
a clear Perception of the Connexion of the un- 
known Ideas with the known. So that clear and 
dijlincl Ideas muft (till abide as a general necefiary 
Qualification, in order to form a right Judgment j 
And in4eed it is upon this Foot that all Ratiocina- 
tion is built, and the Conclufions are thus form- 
ed, which deduce things unknown from Things 
known. 

Yet it feems to me, that there is one juft Li- 
mitation or Exception to this general Ride of Judg* 
ment 9 as built on clear and diftincl: Ideas, and it is 
this : 

Exception. In Matters of mere Tejlimony, whe* 
ther hitman or divine, there is not always a Necejfity 
of clear and dijlincl Ideas of the Things vjhich are be-. 
lie-ved. Though the Evidence of Proportions, which 
are entirely for " d by ourf elves, depends on the Clear* 
rjefs and Difhnct. efs of thofe Ideas of which they 
are compofed, auu on our own clear Perception of 
their Agreement or Difagreernent, yet we may 
juftly aftent to Proportions formed by others, when 
we have neither a very clear Conception in our- 
felves of the two Ideas contained in the Words, 
nor how they agree or dii agree ; provided always, 
that we have a clear and fufficient Evidence of the 
Credibility of the Perfons who inform us. 

Thus when we read in Scripture the great Doc- 
trines of the Deity ofChrift, of the Union of the divine 
and human Natures in him, of the divine Agency of 
the hie fled Spirit, that the Son is the Brightness of his 
Father's Glory, that all things were created by him 
andjor him, that the Son Jhall give up his Kingdom to 

the 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON, 237 

the Father, and that God Jh all be all in all; we may 
fafely believe them : For though our Ideas of thefe 
Objedts themfelves are not fufficien'tly clear, dif- 
tinct, and perfect, for our own Minds to form thefe 
Judgments or Proportions concerning them, yet 
we have a clear and diftinct Perception of God's 
revealing them, or that they are contained in Scrip- 
ture ; and this is fufficient Evidence to determine 
our ArTent. 

The fame thing holds true in fome Meafure, 
where credible human Tejiimony afTures us of fome 
Propoiitions, while we have no furlicient Ideas of 
the Subject and Predicate of them to determine 
our Aflent. So when an honert and learned Ma- 
thematician afTures a Ploughman that the three An- 
gles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles, or 
that the Square of the Hypotenufe of 'a right-angled 
Triangle is equal to the Swn of the Squares of the two 
Sides ; the Ploughman, who has but confufed Ideas 
of thefe Things, may firmly and fafely believe thefe 
Propoiitions, upon the fame Ground, becaufe he 
has evidence of the Skill and Faithfulnefs of his 
Informer.* 

III. Direclion. 



* Perhaps fome may object againft this Reprefentat 
Things, and lay, that " We cannot properly be faid to 



fentation of 
believe 
M a Proposition any farther than we ourfelves have Ideas under 
ii the Terms : Therefore if we have no Ideas under the Term?, 
(t we believe nothing but the Connexion of Words or Sounds ; 
" and if we have but obfeure and inadequate Ideas under the 
" Terras, then we partly believe a Connexion of Things, and 
(s partly a Connection of Sounds. But that we cannot pro- 
'•' perk- be faid to believe the Proposition, for our Faith can never 
w go beyond our Ideas." 

Now to fet this Matter in a clear Light. I fuppofe that every 
Proportion which is propofed to my ArTent, is a Sentence made 
up of Terms which have fome Ideas under them known or un- 
known to me. I confefs, if I believe there are" no Ideas at all 
under the Terms, and there is nothing meant by them, then in- 
deed, with regard to me, it is the mere joining of Sounds : But 
if, for Inftance, a Ploughman has credible Information from an 
RbAfcfft and (kiiiui Mathematician, that an Ellipsis is made by the. 

Seflion 



238 LO&ICK : OR, THE [PART H, 

III. Diredion. When you have obtained a 
clear and comprehenfive Ideas as are needful, both 

of 

Seflion of a Cone, he believes the Proportion, or he believeg 
the Sentence is true, as it is made up of Terms which his ln- 
fprmant underftands, though the Ideas be unknown to him ; 
that is, he believes there are fome Ideas which his Informant 
has under thefe Words which are really connected. And, I 
think, this may juftly be called believing the Propofition, for it is 
a belief of fomething more than the mere joining of 'Sounds ; it is 
a Belief of the real Connexion of fome unknown Ideas belong- 
ing to thofe Sounds, and in this Senfe a man may be faid to 
believe the Truth of a Propofition, which he doth not under- 
stand at all. 

With more Reafon ftill may we be faid to believe the Propo- 
sition upon credible Teftimony, if we have fome Sort of Ideas 
under the Terms, though they are but partial, or inadequate 
and obfeure ; fueh as divine Anfwcrs were given by Urim ond 
Thu?mnim : For fince it is purely upon Teftimony we believe 
the known Parts of the Ideas fignified by thofe Words to be con- 
nected, upon the fame Teftimony we may alfo believe the ««- 
known Parts of the Ideas fignified by thofe Words to be con- 
nected, namely, becaufe our Informant is knowing and faith- 
ful. And in this Senfe we may juftly be faid to believe a Pro- 
pofition of Scripture entirely, which we underftand but very 
impefedlly, becaufe God who reveals it is knowing and faithful 
\n Perfection. 

And, indeed, unlefs this Reprefentation of the Matter be al- 
lowed, there are but very few Proportions in the World, even 
inhuman Things, to which we can give an entire AfTent, or 
which we may be faid either to know, or to believe, becaufe 
there is fcarce any Thing on Earth of which we have an ade- 
quate, and moft perfect idea. And it is evident, that in divine 
Things there is fcarce any Thing which we could either know 
or believe without this allowance: For though Reafon and Re- 
velation join to inform me that God is holy, how exceeding ina- 
dequate are my Ideas of God, and of his Holinefs? Yet 1 may 
boldly and entirely aflent to this whole Propofition, fince I 
am fure that every known and unknown Idea fignified by the 
I erm God, is connected with the Ideas pf the Term Holinefs, 
becaufe Reafon partly informs me, but efpecially becaufe the 
divine Teitimony which has connected them, is certainly cre- 
dible. 

I might argue upon this Head perhaps more forcibly from 
the 'Doctrine of God's fncomprehensiblenefs. Jf we could believe 
nothing but what we have Ideas of, it would be impoffiblc for 
v>: to believe that God is incomprehensible: For this implies in it 

a Belief 



CH. IV.] RIGHT UjSE OP REASON. "23(*) 

of the Subject and Predicate of a Proposition, then 
compare thofe Ideas of the Subjecl and Predicate 
together- with the utmoft attention , and obferve how 

far 

a Belief that there are fome unknown Ideas belonging to the 
Nature of God. Therefore we do both believe and proteis that 
fomething concerning unknown Ideas, when we believe and 
pro lefs that God is inccmprebensible. 

I perfuade my felt* that mod of thofe very Perfons who object 
againil my Reprefentation of Things, will yet readily confefs, 
they believe all the Proportions in Scripture, rather than declare 
they do not believe fever al of them ; though they muft acknowledge 
that feveral of them are far above their Underftanding, or that 
they have fcarce any Ideas of the true Senfe of them. And there- 
fore where Proportions derived from credible Teflimony are made 
up of dark or inadequate Ideas, I think it is much more proper 
to iuy, ive believe them, than that ive do not belien/e them, left we 
cut off a Multitude of the Proportions of the Bible from our 
Atfent of Faith. 

Yet let it be obferved here, that when we believe a Pro- 
polition on mere Tettimony, of which we have no Ideas at all, 
we can only be faid to give a general implicit Affent to the Truth of 
that Proposition, without any particular Knowledge of, or explicit 
Jljfent to the fpec'ial Truth contained in that Proposition : And this 
our implicit Jjfent is of very little Ufe, unlefs it be to teftify 
our Belief of the Knowledge and Veracity of him that in- 
forms us. 

As our Ideas of a Proportion are more or lefs clear and 
adequate, as well as juft and proper, fo we do explicitly af- 
fent more or lefs to the particular Truth contained in that Pro- 
portion. And our Affent hereby becomes more or lefs ufeful 
for the Increaie of our Knowledge, or the Direction of our 
Practice. 

When divine Teftimony plainly propofes to our Faith fuch 
a Proportion whereof we have but obfeure, doubtful and in- 
adequate Ideas, we are bound implicitly to believe the Truth 
of it, as expreiTed in thole Terms, in order to mew our Sub-» 
million to God who revealed it, as a God of perfect Know- 
ledge and Veracity : But it is our Duty to ufe all proper Me- 
thods to obtain a farther and explicit Knowledge of the par* 
ticular Truth contained in the Proportion, if we would im- 
prove by it either in Knowledge or Virtue. All neceiTary Rules 
oi Grammar and Criticifm mould be employed to find out the 
very Ideas that belong to thofe Words, and which were de-_ 
figned by the divine Speaker or Writer. Though we may be-* 
lieve the Truth of a Propolition which we do not understand, 
yet we mould endeavour to underftand every Proportion which 
>ve believe to be true. 



240 JLOGICK, OR, THE - [FART IT. 

far they agree \ and wherein they differ : Whether 
the Proportion may be affirmed A bfo lute iy or Rela- 
tively^ whether in Whole or in Party whether Uni- 
verfally or Particularly, and then under what par- 
ticular Limitations, Turn thefe Ideas about in 
your Mind, and take a View of them on all Sides, 
juit as a Mafon would do to fee whether two hewn 
Stones exadtly fait eaeh other in every Part, and 
are fit to be joined in erecting a carved or fluted 
Pillar. 

Compare the whole Subjecl with the whole Pre- 
dicate in their feveral Parts : Take Heed in this 
Matter that you neither add to nor diminifh the 
Ideas contained in the Subjecl: or in the Predicate ; 
for fuch an Inadvertence or Miflake will expofe 
you to great Error in Judgment. 

IV. Direction. Search for Evidence of Truth 
with Diligence and Honejiy, and be heartily ready to 
receive Evidence ', %vh ether for the Agreement or Dif- 
agreement of Ideas, 

Search with Diligence ; fpare no Labour in fearch- 
ing for the Truth in due Proportion to the Impor- 
tance of the Proportion . Read the beft Authors 
who have writ on that Subjecl: ; confult your wife 
and learned Friends in Convcrfation ; and be not 
unwilling to borrow Hints toward your Improve- 
ment from the meaneft Perfon, nor to receive any 
Glimpfe of Light from the movt unlearned. Dili- 
gence and Humility is the Way to thrive in the 
Riches of the Underftanding, as well as in Gold 
ar Silver. Search carefully for the Evidence of 
Truth, and dig for Wifdom as for hid Treafure. 

Search with a fieady Honefty of Soul, and a 
fincere Impartiality to find the Truth. Watch 
againft every Temptation that might bribe your 
Judgment, or warp it aiide from Truth. Do not 

indulge 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 241 

indulge yourfelf to wifh any unexamined Propofition 
were true orfalfe. A Wifh often perverts the Judg- 
ment, and tempts the Mind ftrangely to believe 
upon flight Evidence whatfoever we wifli to be true 
or falfe. 

V. Direclion. Since the Evidence of the Agree- 
ment or Difagreement of two ideas is the Ground 
of our Afient to any Propofition, or the great 
Criterion of Truth ; therefore we Jhould fufpend our 
Judgment, and neither affirm nor deny till this Evi~ 
dence appear. 

This Direclion is different from the fecond; for 
though the Evidence of the Agreement or DiJ agree- 
ment of two Ideas mod Times depends on the Clear- 
nefs and Diilinclnefs of the Ideas themfelves, yet 
it does not always arife thence. Tefiimony may be 
a fufficient Evidence of the Agreement or Difa- 
greement of two obfcure Ideas, as we have feen juft 
before in the Exception under the fecond Direclion, 
Therefore, though we are not univerfally and in 
all Cafes bound to fufpend our Judgment, //// our 
Ideas of the Objecls themfelves are dear and difiincl, 
yet we muft always fufpend our Judgment, and 
withhold our Afient to, or Denial of any Propofi- 
tion, till forne juft Evidence appear of its Truth ,or 
EalfooocL It is an Impatience of Doubt and Suf- 
penfe, a Rafhnefs and Precipitance of Judgment, 
and Haitineis to believe fomething on one Side or 
the other, that plunges us into many Errors. 

This Direclion to delay and fufpend our Afient is, 
more particularly neceflary to be obferved when fuch 
Propofitions offer themfelves to us as are fupported 
by Education, Authority, Cuflom, Inclination, Inte- 
reft, or other powerful Prejudices; for our Judg- 
ment is led away infenfibly to believe all that they 
diclatc; and where Prejudices and Dangers of Error 

are 



242 logick: or the [part. ir. 

are multiplied, we fhould fet the drifter Guard 
upon our AHent. 

Yet remember the Caution or Limitation here 
which I gave under the firji DireBion, namely, that 
this is not to be too ftrfctly applied to Matters of 
daily PraBice, either in human Life or Religion ; 
but when "we confider ourfelves as Philofophers, or 
Searchers after Truth, we fhould always withhold 
our Aflent where there is not juft Evidence : And 
as far and as fad as we can, in a due Confidence 
with our daily neccfiary Duties, we (hould alfo re- 
form and adjud all our Principles and Practices both 
in Religion and the civil Me, by thefe Rules. 

VI. DireBion. We mud judge of every Propor- 
tion by thefe proper and peculiar Mediums or Means, 
whereby the Evidence of it is to be obtained, whether 
it be Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafon, or 
Teflimony. All our Faculties and Powers are to be 
employed in judging of their proper Objects. 

If we judge of Sounds, Colours, Odours, Sapors, 
the Smoothnefs, Roughnefs, Softnefs, or Hardnefs of 
Bodies, it nmft be done by the Ufe of our Senfes : 
But then we muft take Heed that our Senfes are 
well difpofcd, as fhall be (hewn afterward. 

And fince our Senfes in their various Exercifes 
arc in fotmc Cafes liable to be deceived, and more 
especially when by our Eyes or Ears we judge of 
the Figure, Quantity, Diflance, and I ofition of Ob- 
jects that are afar off, we ought to call our Reafon 
in to the AffrTtance of our Senfes, and correct the 
Errors of one Senfe by the Help of another. 

It is by the rowers of Senfe and Reafon joined 
together, that we muft judge philosophically of 
the inward Nature, the fee ret Properties and Powers, 
the C a ufe s and EffeBs, the Relations and Proportions 
of a thoufand corporeal Objects which furround us 

on 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 1A3 

on Earth, or are placed at a Diftance in the Hea- 
vens. If a Man, on the one Hand, confines him- 
felf only to fenfibk Experiments, and does not ex- 
ercife Reafon upon them, he may furprife himfelf 
and others with ftrange Appearances, and learn to 
entertain the World with Sights and Shows, but 
will never become a Philofopher : And, on the other 
Hand, if a Man impriibn himfelf in his Clofet, and 
employ the moil exquifite Powers of Reafon to find 
out the Nature of things in the corporeal World, 
without the Ufe of his Se?ifes, and the Practice of 
Experiments,, he will frame to himfelf a Scheme of 
Chimeras inftead of true Pbilofophy. Hence 
came the Invention of fubftantial Forms and Quali- 
ties^ of Materia prima and Privation, with all the 
infignificant Names ufed by the Peripatetick Wri- 
ters ; and it was for want of more Experiments, 
that the great Defcartes failed in feveral Parts of 
his philofophical Writings. 

In the abfir acted and fpeculative Parts of the Ma- 
thematicks, which treat of Quantity and Number, 
the Faculty of Reafon muft be chiefly employed to 
perceive the Relation of various Quantities, and 
draw certain and ufeful Conclufions ; but it wants the 
Affifiance of Senfe alfo to be acquainted with Lines, 
Angles and Figures. And in praclical Mathematicks 
our Senfes have frill greater Employment. 

If we would judge of the pure Properties and 
Aclions of the Mind, of the Nature of Spirits, their 
various Perceptions and Powers, we mull: not en- 
quire of our Eyes and our Ears, nor the Images 
or Shapes laid up in the Brain, but we muft have 
Recourfc to our own Ccnfcioufnefs of' what paiTes 
within our own Mind. 

If we are to pafs a Judgment upon any Thing 
that relates to Spirits in a State of Union with ani- [ 
mal Nature, and the mist Properties of Senfaj'wn,. 

Fancy 3 



244 tOGlCK : o&, tHR [pA&t. ii* 

Fancy+ Appetite, PaJJton, Pleafure and P^/«, which 
arife thence, we mud confult our own Senfations, 
and the other Powers which we find in ourfelves 
confidered as Men or Creatures madi up of a Mind 
and an Animal, and by juft Reafons deduce proper 
Confequences, and improve our Knowledge in 
thefe Subjects. 

If we have Occalion to judge concerning MaU 
ters done in paji Ages, or in diftant Countries, and 
where we ourfelves cannot be prefent, the Powers 
of Senfe and Reafon, for the mofl Part, are not Ef- 
ficient to inform us, and we muft therefore have 
Recourfe to the Teftimony of others : And this is 
either divine or human* 

In Matters of .mere human Prudence, we'fhall find 
the greateft Advantage by making wife Obferva- 
tions on our own Conduct, and the Conduct of 
others, and a Survey of the Events attending fuch 
Conduct. Experience in this Cafe is equal to a na* 
tural Sagacity, or rather fuperior. A Treafure of 
Qbfervations and Experiences collected by wife Men, 
is of admirable Service here. And perhaps there 
is nothing in the World of this Kind equal to the 
facred Book of Proverbs, even if we look on it as a 
mere human Writing. 

In Queftions of Natural Religion, we muft exer- 
cife the Faculty of Reafon which God has given us ; 
and fince he has been pleafed to afford us his Word^ 
we fhould confirm and improve, or correct our 
Reafoning on this Subject by the Divine Afliftance 
of the Bible. 

In Matters of Revealed Religion, that iSj Chri/Ii* 
anity, Judaifm, EsV. which we could never have 
known by the Light of Nature, the Word of God 
is our only Foundation and chief Light ; though 
here our Reafon muft be ufed both to find out the 
true Meaning of God in his Word, and to derive 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 245 

juft Inferences from what God has written, as well 
as to judge of the Credentials whereby Divine Tes- 
timony is diftinguilhed from mere human Teftimony y 
or from Impofture. 

As Divine Revelation can never contradict right 
Reafon, for they are two great Lights given us by 
our Creator for our Gondii el ; fo Reafon ought by 
no Means to affume to itfelf a power to contradict 
Divine Revelation. 

Though Revelation be not contrary to Reafon, yet 
there arc four Clajfes wherein Matters of Revelation 
may be faid to r\it above, or go beyond our Reafon. 

1 . When Revelation afferts two Things of which %ve 
have clear Ideas, to be joined, whofe Connection or 
Agreement is not dif cover able by Reafon ; as when 
Scripture informs us, that The Dead Jh all rife, that 
The Earth Jhall be burnt up, and the Man Chrift 
Jefus Jhall return from Heaven, none of the Things 
could ever be found out or proved by Reafon. 

2. When Revelation affirms any Proportion, while 
Reafon has no clear and diftincl Ideas of the Subjecl 
or of the Predicate ; as God created all Things by Je- 
fus Chrift : By the Urim and Thummim God gave 
forth Divine Oracles. The Predicate of each of thefe 

Proportions is to us an obfeure Idea, for we know 
not what was the peculiar Agency of Jefus Chrift f 
when God the Father created the World by him ; 
nor have we any clear and certain Conception what 
the Urim and Thummim were, nor how God gave 
Anfwers to his People by them. 

3. When Revelation, in plain andexprefs Language^ 
declares fome Doctrine which our Reafon at prefent 
knows not with Evidence and Certainty, how or in 
what Senfe to reconcile to fome of its own Principles j 
as, that the Child Jefus is the mighty God, I fa. ix. 6. 
which Proportion carries a feeming Oppofition to 
the Unity and Spirituality of the Godhead, which are 
Principles of Reafon. 

4. When 



246 LOGICK I OR, THE [PART IJ, 

4. When two Propofitions or Doclrines are plainly 
ajferted by Divine Revelation, which our Reafon at 
prefent knows not how or in what Senfe, with Evidence 
and Certainty ', to reconcile with one another ; as, The 
Father is the only true God, John xvii. 3. and yet 
Chrift is over all, God blejfedfor ever, Rom. ix. 5. 

Now Divine Revelation having declared all thefe 
Propofitions, Reafon is bound to receive them, be- 
cause it cannot prove them to be utterly inconfiftent 
or impoflible, though the ideas of them may be 
obfcure, though we ourfelves fee not the rational 
Connexion of them, and though we know not cer- 
tainly how to reconcile them. In thefe Cafes Rea- 
fon muft fubmit to Faith ; that is, we are bound to 
believe what God ajferts, and wait till he {hall clear 
up that which feems dark and difficult, and till the 
Myjleries of Faith (hall be farther explained to us, 
either in this World or in the World to come,* and 
Reafon itfelf diclates the Submiffion. 

VII. Direclion. It is very ufcful to have fome ge- 
neral Principles of Truth fettled in the Mind, whofe 
Evidence is great and obvious, that they may be always 
ready at Hand to affifl us in judging of the great Va- 
riety of Things which occur. Thefe may be called 
firjl Notions, or fundamental Principles ; for though 
many of them are deduced from each other, yet 
moll or all of them may be called Principles when 
compared with a thoufand other Judgments which 
we form under the Regulation and Influence of 
thefe primary Propofitions. 

Every Art and Science, as well as the Affairs of 
civil Life and Religion, have peculiar Principles 
of this Kind belonging to them. There are Me- 
taphyseal, Phyfical, Mathematical,' Political, (Econo- 
mical, Medicinal, Theological, Moral and Prudential 

* See fomething more on this Subjedt. Dire ft. II. preceding, 
and Chap, V. Seel. 6. 

Principles* 



€!H. iv] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 247 

Principles of Judgment. It would be too tedious 
to give a Specimen of them all in this Place. Thofe 
which are of the moil: univerfal Ufe to us, both as 
Men and as Ghrifiians, may be found in the follow- 
ing Chanter among the Rules of "Judgment about par- 
ticular Objects. 

VIII. Diretfiotik Let the Degrees of your Affeni to 
every Proportion, bear an exact Proportion to the dif- 
fere?tt Degrees of Evidence. Remember this is one 
of the greater! Principles of Wifdom that Man can 
arrive at in. this World, and the bed human Secu- 
rity againft dangerous Miftakes in Speculation or 
Practice. 

In the Nature of Things of which our Know* 
ledge is made up, there is infinite Variety in their 
Degrees of Evidence. And as God hath given our 
Minds a Power to fufpend their AfTent till the 
Evidence be plain, fo we have a Power to receive 
Things which are propofed to us with a ftronger or 
weaker Belief in an infinite Variety of Degrees^ 
proportionable to their Evidence, I believe that the 
Planets are inhabited, and I believe that the Earth 
rolls among them yearly round the Sun \ but I do not 
believe both thele Proportions with an equal Firm- 
nefs of Aflent, becauie the Arguments for the lat- 
ter are drawn from mathematical Obfervations ; but 
the Arguments for the former are but probable Gon± 
jeclures and moral Reafo?iings» Yet neither do I be- 
lieve either of thefe Proportions fo firmly, as I do 
that the Earth is about twenty-four thoufand Miles 
round, becauie the mathematical Proof of this is 
much eafier^ plainer and ftronger. And yet farther, 
when I fay that the Earth' was created by the Power 
if God, I have iiili a more infallible Afiiirance of 
this than of all the reft, becaufc Reafon and Scrip* 
ture ioin to aflure me of it. 

R IX, 



248 LOGICK t OR, THE [PART tl. 

IX. Direction. Keep your Mind always open U 
receive Truths and never Jet Limits to your own Im- 
provement. Be ready always to hear what may be 
objected even againft your favourite Opinions, and 
thofe which have had longeft Pofleflion of your Af- 
fent. And if there fhould be any new and uncon- 
troulable Evidence brought againft thefe old or be- 
loved Sentiments, do not wink your Eyes faft againft 
the Light, but part with any Thing for the Sake of 
Truth : Remember when you overcome an Error 
you gain Truth ; the Victory is on your Side, and 
the Advantage is all your own. 

I confefs, thofe grand Principles of Belief and 
Practice, which univerfally influence our Conduct 
both with Regard to this Life and the Life to come, 
fhould be fuppofed to be well fettled in the flrft 
Years of our Studies ; fuch as, the Exigence and Pro- 
vidence of God, the Truth of Chrijlianity, the Autho- 
rity of Scripture, the great Rules of Morality, &c* 
We fhould avoid a light fluttering Genius, ever 
ready to change our Foundations, and to be carried 
about with every wind of Doclrine* To guard againft 
which Inconvenience, we fhould labour with ear- 
ned Diligence and fervent Prayer, that our moft 
fundamental and important Points of Belief and 
Practice, may be eftablifhed upon juft Grounds of 
Reafon and Scripture, when we come to Years of 
Difcretion, and fit to judge for ourfelves in fuch 
important Points. Yet fince it is poflible that the 
Folly or Prejudices of younger Years may have 
eftablifhed Pcrfons in fotne miftaken Sentiments, 
even in very important Matters, we fhould always 
hold ourfelves ready to receive any new Advantage 
toward the Correction or Improvement even of our 
eflablijhcd Principles, as well as Opinions of lefler 
Moment. 

CHAR 



CH. T.3 RIGHT USE OP REASON. 249 



CHAP. V. 

Special Rules to direft us in judging of parti- 
cular Objects. 

IT would be endlefs to run through all thofe par- 
ticular Objects concerning which we have Oc- 
cafion to pafs a Judgment at one time or another. 
Things of the mofl frequent Occurrence, of the 
wideft Extent, and of the greater!: Importance, are 
the Objects and Exercifes of Senfe, of Reafon and 
Speculation ; the Matters of Morality , Religion and 
Prudence-, of human and divine Teftimony, together 
with the EJfays of Reafoning upon Things paft and 
future. Special Rules relating to all thefe will be 
the Subject of the following Sections. 



SECT. I. 

Principles and Rules of Judgment concerning the 
Objects of Senfe. 

THOUGH our Senfes are fometimes liable to 
be deceived, yet when they are rightly dif- 
pofed, and fitly exercifed about their proper Objecls, 
with the juft Afliltance of Reafon, they give us fuf- 
ficierrt Evidence of Truth. 

This may be proved by an Argument drawn 
from the Wifdom, Goodnefs, and Faithfulnefs of God 
our Creator. It was He gave us our Senfes, and he 
would not make us of fuch a Conftitution as to be li- 
able to perpetual Deception and unavoidable Error 
in uling theffc faculties of Senfe in the belt Manner 
R 2 we 



'25Q logick: or the [part. 11 

we are capable of, about thofe very Things which 
are the proper Objecls of them. 

This may be proved alio by the /// Confequences 
that would follow from the Suppofttion of the Con- 
trary. If we could have no Certainty of the Dic- 
tates of our Senfes, we could never be fure of any 
of the common Affairs and Occurrences of Life. 
Men could not tranfacl any of their civil or moral 
Concerns with any Certainty of Juftice ; nor in- 
deed could we eat or drink, walk or move, with 
Safety. Our Senfes direct; us in all thefe. 

Again, the Matters of Religion depend in fome 
Meafure upon the Certainty of the Dictates of 
Senfe ; for Faith comes by Hearing ; and it is to our 
Senfes that God appeals in working Miracles to 
prove his own Revelation. Now if when our Eyes 
and Ears, and other Organs of Senfe are rightly 
difpofed aad exercifed about their proper Objecls, 
they were always liable to be deceived, there 
could be no Knowledge of the Gofpel, no proof 
of Divine Revelation by Virions, Voices, or Mi- 
racles. 

Our Senfes will difcover Things near us and 
round about us, which are neceflary for our prefent 
State, with fufficient Exact nefs ; and Things dif- 
tant alfo, fo far as they relate to our neceflary Ufe 
of them. 

Nor is there Need of any more accurate Rules 
for the Ufe of our Senfes in the Judgment of all 
the common Affairs of Life, or even of miraculous and 
divine Operations, than the vulgar Part of Mankind 
are iu&iciently acquainted with by Nature, and by 
their own daily Observations. 

But if we would ex prefs thefe Rules in a more 
exact Manner, how to judge by the Dictates of our 

$enfes, they fhould be reprcferucd thus ; 

» 

1. We 



CF. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 251 

1 . Wc muft take Care that the Organs of our Se?ife 
be rightly difpofed, and not under the Power of any 
Diftemper or confiderable Decay ; as for Inftance, 
that our Eyes are not tinctured with the jfaundice, 
when we would judge of Colours, left we pronounce 
them all yellow : That our Hands are not burning 
in a Fever, nor benumbed with Frofl or the Palfy^ 
when we would judge of the Heat or Coldnefs of any 
Object : That our Palate be not vitiated by any 
Difeafe, or by fome other improper Ta/le, when we 
would judge of the true Tq/ie of any Solid or Li- 
quid. This Direction relates to all our Senfes, but 
the following Rules chiefly refer to our Sight. 

2. Wc muft obferve whether the Objecl be at a 
proper Difiance ; for if it be too near or too far off, 
our Eyes will not fufficiently diftinguifh many 
Things which are properly the Objects of Sight ; 
and therefore (if poffible) we muft make nearer Ap- 
proaches to the Object, or remove farther from it, 
till we have obtained that dueDiftauce which gives 
us the clcareft Perception. 

3. We muft not employ our Sight to take a full 
Survey at once of 'Objecl l s that are too large for it; 
but we muft view them by Parts, and then judge of 
the Whole : Nor muft our Senfes judge of Objecls 
too finally for fome Things which appear through 
Glaffes to be really and diftinctly exiftent, are either 
utterly in vifible,or greatly confufed, when we w ? ould 
judge of them by the naked Eye. 

4. We muft place ourfehes in fuch a Pofition to- 
ward the Objecl, or place the Objecl in fuch a Po- 
fition toward our Eye. as may give us the cleareft Re- 

prefentation of it ; for a different Pofition greatly 
alters the Appearance of the Shape of Bodies. 
And f r this Reafbn we fhould change the Pofition 
both of the Eye and the Objecl in fome Cafes, that 
. R 3 by 



252 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART 1U 

by viewing the Objecl in feveral Appearances, we 
may pafs a more complete and certain Judgment- 
concerning it 

5. We mult confider what the Medium is by 
which Objecls are reprefented to our Seufes ; whether 
it be thinner or thicker ; whether it be Air or Va- 
pour, or Water, or Glafs, &c. whether it.be duly- 
enlightened or dufky ; whether it reflect or refract, 
or only tranfmit the Appearance of the Object; and 
whether it be tinctured with any particular Colour; 
Whether it be moving or at Reft. 

6. We muft fometimes ufe other Helps to affift 
our Senfes ; and if we make ufe of Glajfes, we 
muft make all juft Allowances for the Thieknefs 
or Thinnefs of them, for the Clearnefs or Dulnefs, 
for the Smoothnefs or Roughnefs, for the Plain- 
nefs, the Convexity or Concavity of them, and for 
the Diftance at which thefe Glajfes are placed from 
the Eye, or from the Object, (or from one another, 
if there be two or more Glaffes ufed) and all this 
according to the Rules of Art. The fame Sort of 
Caution fhould be ufed alfo in Mediums which aflift 
the Hearing, fuch as Speaking-Trumpets, Hearing- 
Trumpets, &c. 

7- If the Object-may be propofed to more Senfes 
than one, let us call in the Affift a nee of iome other 
Senfes to examine it, and this will increale the Evi- 
dence of what one Senfe dictates. For Example ; 
Our Ear may affift our Eye in judging of the Dif- 
tance of Bodies, which are both vifible and fono- 
rous, as an exploded Cannon, or a Cloud charged with 
Thunder. Our Feeling may affift our Sight in judg- 
ing of the Kind, the Shape, Situation, or Diftance 
of Bodies that are near at Hand, as whether a Gar- 
merit be Silk or Stuff, &c. So if I bothy^, hear, and 
embrace my Friend, I am fure he is prefent. 

8. We 



€H. V.] RIGHT USE OP SEASON. 253 

8. We fhould alfo make feveral Trials, at fome 
diftant Times, and in different Circum fiances, com- 
paring former Experiments with later, and our own 
Obfervations with thofe of other Perfons. 

It is by fuch Methods as thefe that modern Phi- 
lofophy has been fo greatly improved by the Ufe of 
fenfible Experiments. 

SECT. XL 

Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
Reafm and Speculation. 

IT is by Reafon we judge both in Matters of Spe- 
culation and Pradke$ there are peculiar Rules 
which relate to Things pradical, whether they be 
Matters of Religion, Morality, or Prudence; yet 
many Thiogs in this Section may be applied to 
fraclical Enquiries and Matters of Faith, though 
it chiefly relates to Knoidedge or Speculations of 
Reafon. 

1 . Whatfbever clear Ideas we can join together 
without InconMency, are to be counted PoJfible 9 
becaufe Almighty Power can make whatfoever we 
can conceive. 

2. From the mere PoJJibility of a Thing we can- 
not infer its aclual Exijience , nor from the Non- 
Exijlence of it can we infer its hipojfibility. 

Note, The Idea of God feems to claim an Ex- 
emption from this general Rule ; for if he be pof- 
iible, he certainly exifts, becaufe the very Idea 
includes Eternity, and he cannot begin to be : If 
he exift not, he is impoflible, for the very fame 
Reafon. 

R 4 3. What 



254 logick : or, the [part rr. 

3. Whatfoever is evidently contained in the Idea 
of any Thing, may be affirmed of that Thing with 
Certainty. Reafon is contained in the Idea of a 
Man ; and Exifience is contained in the Idea of 
God ; and therefore we may affirm God exi/is, and 
Man is reafcnable. 

4. It is impoffible that the fame Tiling mould 
be, and not be at the fame Time, and in the fame 
Ilefpect. Thence it follows, that two contradictory. 
Ideas cannot be joined, in the fame Fart of the fame 
Subjecl, at the fame Time, and in the fame Ref peels .* 
Or, that two contradictory Propofitions can never be 
both true. 

5. The more we converfe with any Subject: in its 
various Properties^ the better Knowledge of it we 
are likely to attain; and by frequent and repeated 
Enquiries and Experiments, Reafonings and Con- 
verfations about it, we confirm our true Judgments 
of that Thing, and correct our former Miftakes. 

6. Yet after our utmoft Enquiries, we can never 
be allured by Reafon, that we know all the Powers 
and Properties o\ any finite Being. 

7. {(finite Beings are not adequately known by 
us, much lefs the Things' infinite: For it is of the 
Nature of a finite Mind not to be able to compre- 
hend what is infinite. 

8. We may judge and argue very juftly and cer- 
tainly concerning Infinites, in fome Parts of them, 
or fo far as our Ideas reach, though the Infinity of 
them hath fomething ineomprehenfible in it. And 
this is built on the general Rule following, namely, 

9. Whatfoever is fufficiently clear and evident, 
ought not to be denied, though there are other 
Things belonging to the fame Subject, which can- 
not be comprehended. I may affirm many Things 
\vith Certainty concerning human Souls 5 their Union 

with 



CH. V.] RIGHT USE OP SEASON". 255 

with Bodies, concerning; the Divisibility of Matter, 
and the Attributes of God, though many other Things 
relating to them are all Darknefs to us. 

10. If any Opinion propofed has either no Argils 
merits, or equal Arguments for and again ft it, we 
mult remain in perfect Sufpenfe about it, till con- 
vincing Evidence appear on one Side. 

] 1 . Where preferit Neccffity of Action does not 
con (train us to determine, we fhould not immedi- 
ately yield up our AfTent to mere probable Argu- 
ments, without a due Referve, if we have any rea- 
sonable Hope of obtaining greater Light and Evi- 
dence on one Side or the other : For when the Ba- 
lance of the Judgment once refigns its Equilibrium 
or Neutrality to a mere -probable Argument, it is 
too ready to fettle itfelf on that Side, to that the 
Mind will not eafilv change that Judgment, though 
bright and ftrong Evidence appear afterwards on 
the other Side. 

12. Of two Opinions, if one has unanfwerable 
Difficulties attending it, we mult not reject it im- 
mediate! v, till we examine whether the contrary 
Opinion has not Difficulties as unanfwerable. 

13. It each Opinion has Objections againft it 
which we cannot anfwer, or reconcile, we fhould 
rather embrace that which has the leafi Difficulties 
in it, and which has the belt Arguments to lup- 
port it : And let our Aflent bear Proportion to the 
fuperior Evidence. 

14. If any Doctrine hath very ftrong and fuf- 
ficient Light and Evidence to command our AfTent, 
we ill ou Id not reject it becauie there is an Objection 
or two againft it which we are not able to anfwer ; 
for upon this Foot a common Chriftian would be 
baffled out of every Article cf his Faith, and mud 
renounce even the Dictates of his Reafon and his 

Senfes ; 



256 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART IJT. 

Senfes; and the moft learned Man perhaps would 
hold but very few of them fail : For fome Objec- 
tions which attend the facred Doclrine of the Eter- 
nity and the Omniprefence of God, and the philofo- 
phieal Doctrines of Light, Atoms, Space, Motion, 
&c. are hardly folvable to this Day. 

15. Where two Extremes are propofed, either 
in Matters of Speculation or Praclice, and neither 
of them has certain and convincing Evidence, it is 
generally fa fed to take the Middle Way. Mode- 
ration is more likely to come near the Truth than 
doubtful Extremes. This is an excellent Rule to 
judge of the Characters and Value of the greatelt 
Part of Perfons and Things ; for Nature feldom 
deals in Superlatives. It is a good Rule alfo by 
which to form our Judgment in many fpeculative 
Controverfies ; a reconciling Medium in fuch Cafes 
does often bell fecure Truth as well as Peace. 

l6. When two different Proportions have each 
a very Itrong and cogent Evidence, and do not 
plainly appear inconliltent, we may believe both 
of them, though we cannot at prefent fee the Way 
to reconcile them. Reafon, as well as our own 
Co7ifcioufnefs, allures us, that the Will of Man is 
free, and that Multitudes of human Aclions are in that 
Refpecl contingent-, and yet Reafon and Scripture 
allure us, that God foreknows them all, and this im- 
plies a certain Fatality. Now though learned Men 
have not to this Day hit on any fo clear and happy 
Method as is delired to reconcile thefe Propolitions, 
yet fince we do not fee a plain Inconliftency in 
them, we juftly believe them both, becaufc their 
Evidence is great. 

17. Let us not therefore too fuddenly determine 
in difficult Matters, that two Things are utterly in- 
conftflcnt : For there are many Proportions which 

may 



CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REAS0X. 257 

may appear inconfijlent at firft, and yet afterwards 
we find their Conlljkncy, and the Way of reconciling 
them may be made plain and ealy : As alio, there 
are other Proportions which may appear conjiftent 
at firit, but after due Examination we find their 
Inconfifhncy. 

18. For the fame Heafon we fhould not call 
thofe Difficulties utterly infolvable^ or thole Objec- 
tions unanfuuerable, which we are not prefently able 
to anfwer : Time and Diligence may give farther 
Light. 

19. In fhort, if we will fecure ourfelves from 
Error, we fhould not be too frequent or hafty in 
afferting the certain ConJJlency or Inconfijlency , the 
abfolute Uni-verfality, JSecejfity, or ImpoJJibUity of 
Things, where there is not the brighter! Evidence. 
He is but a young and raw Philofopher, who, when 
he fees two particular Ideas evidently agree \ imme- 
diate! v afieris them to 'agree imi-ve?fally, to agree 

r arilv, and that it is impojjible it Jhoitld be other- 
. Or when he fees evidently that two particular 
Ideas happen to difagree, he prefently aflerts their 
corn,.;,; and natural huonjiftency, their utter Im- 
poffibility of Agreement, and calls every Thing 
contrary to bis Opinion Abfurdity and Nonfenfe* A 
true Philosopher will affirm or deny with much 
Caution [od^fty, unlefs he has thoroughly ex- 

amine;: and found tm- Evidence of every Part of 
his "Allen ion exceeding plain. 

20. Let ib have a Care of building our AfTurance 
of any important Point ol Doctrine upon one Jingle- 
Argument^ if there are more to be obtained. We 
fhould not flight and reject all other Arguments 
which fupport the fame Doctrine, left if our jfa- 
vourite Argument ihould be refuted, and fail us, we 
fhould be tempted to abandon that important Prin- 
ciple 



258 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 

ciple of truth. I think this was a very culpable 
Practice in Defcartes y and fome of his Followers, 
who when he had found out the Argument for the 
Existence of 'God r , derived from the Idea of a mojl per- 
feci and felfexiflent Beings he feemed to defpife and 
abandon all other Arguments againft Atheifm* 

21. If we happen to have our chief Arguments for 
any Opinion refuted, we (hould not immediately 
give up the Opinion itfelf ; for perhaps it may be a 
Truth ftill, and we may find it to be juftly fup- 
ported by other Arguments, which we might once 
think weaker, or perhaps by new Arguments which 
we knew not before. 

22. We ought to efleem that to be fufficient Evi- 
dence of a Propofition, where both the Kind and the 
Force of the Arguments or Proofs, are as great as 
the Nature of the Thing admits, and as the Necef- 
fity or Exigence of the Cafe requires. So if we 
have a credible and certain Teftimony that Chrijl rofe 
from the Dead, it is enough ; we are not to expecl 
mathematical or ocular Demonfiration for it, at leafl 
in our Day. 

23. Though we (hould feek what Proofs may be 
attained of any Proposition, and we fhould receive 
any Number of Arguments which are juft and Evi- 
dent for the Confirmation of the fame Truth, yet 
we muft not judge of the Truth of any Proportion 
by the Number of Arguments which are brought to 
fupport it, but by the Strength and Weight of them : 
A Building will ft and firmer and longer on four 
large Pillars of Marble, than on ten of Sand, or 
Earth or Timber. 

24. Yet where certain Evidence is not to be 
found or expected, a confiderable Number of proba- 
ble Arguments carry great Weight with them even 
in Matters of Speculation. That is a probable Hy- 
pothecs 



CH. V.] RIGHT USE OP REASOtf. 25$ 

pothefis in Philofophy, or in Theology, which goes 
farthett towards the Solution of many difficult 
Queitions arifing on any Subject. 



SECT. III. 

Principles and Rales of Judgment in Matters of 
Morality and Religion. 

HERE it may be proper in the firft Place to 
mention a few Definitions of Words or 
Terms. * 

By Matters of Morality and Religion, I mean 
thole Things which relate to our Duty to God, 
ourfelves, or our Fellow-Creatures. 

Moral Good, or Virtue, or Holinefs, is an Action 
or Temper conformable to the Rule of our Duty. 
Moral Evil, or Vice, or Sin, is an Action or Tem- 
per unconformable to the Rule of our Duty, or a 
Neglect to fulfil it. 

Note, The Words Vice, or Virtue, chiefly imply 
the Relation of our Actions to Men and this World. 
Sin and Holinefs rather imply their Relation to 
God and the other World. 

Natural Good is that which gives us Pleafure or 
Satisfaction. Natural Evil is that which gives us 
Pain or Grief. 

Happinefs confifts in the Attainment of the high- 
eft and molt lafting natural Good. Mifery con fi ft s 
in fuffering the higheft and mod laiting natural 
Evil ; that is, in fhort, Heaven or Hell. 

Though this be a juft Account of perfecl Happi- 
nefs and perfecl Mifery, yet wherefoever Pain over- 
balances Pleafure, there is a Degree of Mifery ; and 

wherefoever 



266 LOGICK : OE, THE fpART It, 

wherefoever Pleafure overbalances Pain, there is a 
Degree of Happinefs. 

I proceed now to lay down fome Principles and 
Rules of Judgment in Matters of Morality and Reli- 
gion, i 

1. The Will of our Maker, whether discovered 
by Reafon or Revelation, carries the higher! Au- 
thority with it, and is therefore the highefl Rule of 
Duty to intelligent Creatures ; a Conformity or 
Nonconformity to it determines their Actions to 
be morally good or evil. 

2. Whatfoever is really an immediate Duty to- 
ward ourfelves, or toward our Fellow-Creatures, is 
more remotely a Duty to God ; and therefore in 
the Practice of it we mould have an Eye to the 
Will of God as our Rule, and to his Glory as our 
End. 

3. Our wife and gracious Creator has clofely 
united our Duty and our Happinefs together ; and 
has connected Sin, or Vice, and Punijhment ; that 
is, he has ordained that the highefl natural Good and 
Evil fhould have a clofe Connection with moral 
Good and Evil, and that both in the Nature of 
Things, and by his own pofitive Appointment. 

4. Confcience fhould feek all due information, 
in order to determine what is Duty, and what is 
Sin, becaufe Happinefs and Mifery depend upon it. 

5. On this Account our Inclination to prefent 
temporal Good, and our Averfion to prefent temporal 
Evil, muft be wifely overbalanced by the Conlide- 
ration of future and eternal Good or Evil, that is, 
Happinefs or Mifery. And for this Reafon we 
fhould not omit a Duty, or commit a Sin, to gain 
any temporal Good, or to avoid any temporal Evil. 

6. Though our natural Reafon in a State of Inno- 
cence might be fufficicnt to find out -thofe Duties 

which 



CH. V.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. *l6\ 

which were neceflary for an innocent Creature, in 
order to abide in the Favour of his Maker, yet in a 
fallen State, our natural Reafon is by no Means fuf- 
ficient to find out all that is neceffory to reflore a 
finful Creature to the divine Favour. 

7. Therefore God hath condefcended, in various 
Ages of Mankind, to reveal to finful Men what 
he requires of them in order to their Reforation 9 
and has appointed in his Word fome peculiar Mat- 
ters of Faith and Practice, in order to their Sal- 
vation. This is called Revealed Religion", as the 
Things knowable concerning God and our Duty 
by the Light of Nature, are called Natural Reli- 
gion* 

8. There are alfo many Parts of Morality, and 
natural Religion, or many natural Duties relating to 
God, to ourfelves, and to our Neighbours, which 
would be exceeding difficult and tedious for the 
Bulk of Mankind to find out and determine by na- 
tural Reafon ; therefore it has pleafed God in this 
facred Book of Divine Revelation, to exprefs the 
mofl necefTary Duties of this Kind in a very plain 
and eafy Manner, and make them intelligible to 
Souls of the lowelt Capacity ; or they may be very 
eafily derived thence by the Ufe of Reafon. 

9. As there are fome Duties much more necef 
fary, and more important than others are, fo every 

Duty requires our Application to underfland and 
praclife it, in Proportion to its Neceffity and Im* 
portance. 

10. Where two Duties feem to (land in Oppo- 
sition to each other, and we cannot practife both, 
the left muft give Way to the greater, and the 
Omifiion of the lefs is not finful. So ceremonial 
Laws give Way to moral : God zuill have Mercy 
and not Sacrifice* 

11. 



262 LOGICK : OR, THE £pART 1U 

J 1 . In Duties of natural Religion, we may judge 
of the different Degrees of their NeceAity and Im- 
portance by Reafon, according to their greater or 
more apparent Tendency to the Honour of God/ 
and the' Good of Men : But in Matters of revealed 
Religion, it is only divine Revelation can certainly 
inform us what is mo ft neceAary and moil impor- 
tant ; yet we may be a Aided alfo in that Search by 
the Exercifes of Reafon. 

12. In Actions wherein there may be fome Scruple 
about the Duty or Lawfulness of them, we mould 
choofe always the fafed Side, and abftain as far as 
we can from the practice of Things whofe Lawful- 
ness we fufpecl. 

13. Points of the greatejl Importance in human 
Life, or in Religion, are generally the mod evi- 
dent, both in the Nature of Things, and in the 
Word of God ; and where Points of Faith or 
Practice are exceeding difficult to find out, they 
cannot be exceeding important. This Propofition 
may be proved by the Goodnefs and Faithfulnefs 
of God, as well as by Experience and Obferva- 
tion. 

15. In fome of the outward Practices and Forms 
of Religion, as well as human Affairs, there is fre- 
quently a prefent NeceJJity offpeedy Aclion one Way 
or another: In fuch a Cafe, having Surveyed Argu- 
ments on both Sides, as far as our Time and Cir- 
cumdnnces admit, we mud guide our Practice by 
thofe Re a Jons which appear moft probable, and feem 
at that Time to overbalance the red ; yet always 
referring Room to admit farther Light and Evi- 
dence, when fuch Occurrences return again. It 
is a Preponderation of circumjtaniial Arguments that 
mud determine our Actions in a thouiand Occur- 
rences* 

15. We 



CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 203 

15. We may alfo determine upon probable Argu- 
ments where the Matter is off?nall Confequence and 
would not anfwer the Trouble of feeking after Cer- 
tainty, Life and Time are more precious than to 
have a large Share of them laid out in fcrupulous 
Enquiries, whether fmoaking Tobacco, or wearing a 
Perriwig be lawful or no. 

1 6. In Affairs of greater Importance, and which 
may have a long, lading, and exteafive Influence 
on our future Conduct or Happinefs, we fhould 
not take up with Probabilities, if Certainty may be 
attained. Where there is any Doubt on the Mind, 
in fuch Cafes, we fhould call in the Afliftance of 
all manner of Circum trances, Reafons, Motives, 
Confequences on all Sides : We muit wait longer 
and with earned Requeit feek human and divine 
Advice before we fully determine our Judgment, 
and our Practice ; according to the old Roman 
Sentence, Quod Jiatuendum eft femel, deliberandum eft 
diu. We mould be long in coniidering what w§ 
mult determine once for all. 



SECT. IV. 

Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
human Prudence* 

THE great Defign of Prudence, as diflinct from 
Morality and Religion, is to determine and 
manage every Affair with Decency, and to the bed 
Advantage. 

That is decent, which is. agreeable to our. State, 
Condition or Circumftances, whether it be in Be- 
haviour, Difcourfe, or Action. 

S That 



264 tOGICK ! OR, THE ' [pART II. 

That is advantageous which attains the mbft and 
beft Purpofcs, and avoids the moft and greateft In- 
conveniences. 

As there is infinite Variety in the Circumftances. 
of Perfons, Things, Actions, Times and Places, fo 
"we niuii be mrnilhcd with fuch general Rules as are 
accommodable to all this Variety by a wife Judg- 
ment and Discretion : For what is an Act of con* 
fummate Prudence in ibme Times, Places, and Cir- 
cumftances, would be confummaie Folly in others. 
ISIow thefe Rules may be ranged in the following 
Manner. 

1 . Our Regard to Perfons or Things mould be 
governed by the Degrees of Concernment we have 
with them, the Relation we have to them, or the 
Expectation we have from them. Thefe mould be 
the Meafures by which we fhould proportion our 
Diligence and Application in any Thing that re- 
lates to them. 

2. We mould always confider whether the 
Thing. we purfue be attainable-, whether it be wor- 
thy our Purfuit ; whether it be worthy of the De- 
gree of Purfuit ; whether it be worthy of the Means 
ufed, in order to attain it. This Rule is neceflary 
both in Matters of Knowledge, ' and Matters of 
Praclice* 

3. When the Advantages and Difadv ant ages, Con- 
veniences and Inconveniences of any Action are ba- 
lanced together, we mud finally determine on that 
Side which has the fuperior Weight ; and the fooner 
in Things which are neceflarily and fpeedily to be 
done or determined. 

4. If Advantages and Difadv ant ages in their 
own Nature arc equal, then thole winch are moft 
certain or likely as to the Event, mould turn the 
Scale of our Judgment, and determine our Prac- 
tice. 

5. Where 



CH. V.] * EIGHT USE OF REASON. 265 

5. Where the Improbabilities, of Succefs or Ad* 
vantage are greater than the Probabilities, it is not 
Prudence to act or venture, if the Action may be 
attended with Danger or Lofs equal to the propofed 
Gain It is proper to enquire whether this be not 
the Cafe in almofl all Lotteries ; for they that hold 
Stakes will certainly fecure Part to them (elves ; and 
only the Remainder being divided into Prizes, mull 
render the Improbability of Gain to each Adventurer 
greater than the Probability, 

6. We mould not defpife or neglect any real 
Advantage i and abandon the Purfuit of it, though 
we cannot attain all the Advantages that we defire. 
This would be to act like Children, who are fond of 
fomething which itrikes their Fancy moft, and ful- 
len and regardlefs of every Thing elfe, if they are 
not humoured in that Fancy. 

7. Though a general Knowledge of Things be ufe- 
ful in Science and in human Life, yet we fhould 
content ourfelves with a more fuperflcia! Know- 
ledge of thofe Things which have the leafl Relation 
to our chief End and Defign. 

8. This Rule holds good alfo in Matters of Bu- 
finefs and Practice, as well as in Matters of Know- 
ledge ; and therefore we fhould not grafp at every 
Thing, left in the End we attain nothing, Perfons 
that either by an Inconstancy of Temper, or by a 
vain Ambition, will purfue every Sort of Art and 
Science, Study and Bufinefs*, feldom grow excel- 
lent in any one of them : And Projeclors who form 
twenty Schemes, feldom ufe itifficient Applica- 
tion to finiih one of them, or make it turn to good 
Account. 

Q. Take heed of delaying and trifling amongft 

the Mea?is inftead of reaching at the End, Take- 

'heed of waiting a Life in mere fpeculative Studies, 

which is called to Aclion and EwJ)!;yment : Dwell 

S 2 not 



^66 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART H, 

not too long in philofophical, mathematical, or gram* 
piatical Parts of Learning, when your chief Defign 
is Law, Phyfck, or Divinity. Do not fpend the 
Day in gathering Flowers by the Way-fide, left 
Night come upon you before you arrive at your 
Journey's End, and then you will not reach it. 

10. Where the Cafe and Circumjiances of wife 
and good Men refcmble our own Cafe and Circum- 

fiances, we may borrow a great deal of Inflruction 
toward our prudent Conduct from their Example ; 
as well as in all Cafes we learn much from their 
Converfaiion and Advice. 

11. After all other Rules remember this, that 
mere Speculation in Matters of human Prudence can 
never be a perfect Director, without Experience 
and Obfervation. We may be content therefore in 
our younger Years to commit fome unavoidable 
Miftakes in Point of Prudence, and we (hall fee 
Miftakes enow in the Conduct of others, both 
which ought to be treafured up amongft our ufeful 
Obfervations, in order to teach us better Judgment 
for Time to come. Sometimes the Mi/lakes, Impru- 
dencies, and Follies, which ourfelves or others have 
been guilty of, give us brighter and more effectual 
Leflbns of Prudence, than the wifeft Counfels, and 
the faireft Examples could ever have done. 



SECT. V. 

Principles and Rides of Judgment in Matters of 
hitman Tcftimony. 

THE Evidence of human Teftimony is not fo 
proper to lead us into the Knowledge of the 
Effcnce and inward Nature of Things, as to ac- 
quaint us with the JSxiftence of Things, and to 

inform 



CH. V.] BIGHT USE OP REASOtf. l6f 

inform us of Matters of Fuel both paft and prefent. 
And though there be a great deal of Fallibility in 
the Teftimony of Men, yet there are fome Things 
we may be almoft, as certain of, as that the Sun 
Jhines, or that five twenties make a Hundred. Who 
is there at London that knows any Thing of the 
World, but believes there is fuch a City as Paris 
in Fra?ice ; that the Pope dwells at Rome ; that Ju- 
lius Caefar was an Emperor \ or that Luther had a 
great Hand in the Reformation f 

If we obferve the following Rules, we may ar- 
rive at fuch a Certainty in many Things of hu- 
man Teftimony, as that it is morally impoffible we 
fhould be deceived, that is, we may obtain a moral 
Certainty. 

1. Let us confider whether the Thing reported 
be in itfelf pojftble ; if not, it can never be credible^ 
whofoever relates it. 

2. Confider farther whether it be probable, 
whether there are any concurring Circumjlances to 
prove it, befide the mere Teftimony of the Perfon 
that relates it. I confefs, if thefe laft Conditions 
.are wanting, the Thing may be true, but then it 
ought to have the ftronger Teftimony to fup- 
port it. 

3. Confider whether the Perfon who relates it be 
capable of knowing the Truth : Whether he be a 
Jkilful Judge in fuch Matters, if it be a Bufinefs of 
Art, or a nice Appearance in Nature, or fome cu- 
rious Experiment in Philofophy. But if it be a 
mere Occurrence in Life, a plain, fenfible Matter 
of Facl, it is enough to enquire whether he who 
relates it were an Eye or Ear-Witnefs, or whether 
he himfclf had it only by Hearfay, or can trace it 
up to the Original. 

S3 4, Con- 



2(38 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART. II, 

4. Confider whether the Narrator be honeft and 
faithful, as well as fkilful : Whether he hath no 

Bias upon his Mind, no peculiar Gain or Profit by 
believing or reporting it, no Inter eft ox Principle 
which might warp his own Belief afide from Truth; 
or which might tempt him to prevaricate, to fpeak 
faffely, or to give a Reprefentation a little different 
from the naked Truth of Things. In fhort, whe- 
ther there be no Occafion ofSufpicion concerning this 
Report. 

5. Confider whether fever al Perfons agree toge- 
ther in the Report of this Matter ; and if fo, then 
whether thefe Perfons who joined together in their 
Teftimony, might not be fuppofed to combine toge- 
ther in a Falfloood. Whether they are Perfons of 

ft efficient ft ill? Probity? and Credit. It might be alfq 
enquired, whether they are of different Nations, 
Seels, Parties, Opinions, or Interefts. For the 
more divided they are in all thefe, the more likely 
is their Report to be true, if they agree together 
in their Account of the fame Thing ; and efpecially 
if they peril ft in it without wavering. 

6. Confider farther, whether the Report were 
capable of being eaftly refuted at ft? ft if it had not 
been true; if fo, this confirms the Teftimony. 

7. Enquire yet again, whether there has been a 
conftant? uniform Tradition and Belief of this Matter, 
from the very firft Age or Time when the Thing 
was tranfacled, without any reafonable Doubts or 
Contradictions. Or, 

8. If any Part of it hath been doubted by any 
conflderablc Perfons, whether it has been fearched 
out and afterwards cdnfirmea^ by having all the 
ScfUpfes and Doubts removed. In cither of thefe 
Cafes the Ttftimonv becomes more "firm and cre- 
dible. 

9. Enquire, 



CM. V.] RIGHT USE OP REASON, I69 

q. Enquire, on the other Hand, whether there 
are any confiderable Objections remaining againfl the 
Belief of that Proportion fo attefted. Whether 
there be any Thing very improbable in the Thing 
itfelf. Whether any concurrent Circumflances feern 
to oppofe it. Whether any Perfon or Perfons give 
a pofitive and plain Tefiimony againfl it. Whether 
they are equally Jkilful and equally faithful as thofe 
who affcrt it. Whether there be as many or 
more in Number, and whether they might have 
any fecret Bias or Influence on them to contra- 
dict it. 

10. Sometimes the entire Silence of a Thing may 
have fomething of Weight toward the Decifion of 
a doubtful Point of Hi dory, or a Matter of hu- 
man Faith, namely, where the Facl is pretended 
to be publick, if the Perfons who are filent about 
it were fkilful to obferve, and "could not but 
know fuch an Occurrence $ if they were engaged 
by Principle or by Intereft to have declared it: 
If they had fair Opportunity to fpeak of it : And 
thefe Things may tend to make a Matter fufpi- 
cious, if it be not wery well attefted by pofitive 
Proof. 

11. Remember that in fome Reports there are 
more Marks of Falfhood than of Truth, and in 
others there are more Marks of Truth than of 
Falfhood. By a Companion of all thefe Things 
together, and putting every Argument on one 
Side and the other into the Balance, we mud 
form as good a Judgment as we can which Side pre- 
ponderates ; and give a ftrong or a feeble Affent 
or Diflent, or withhold our judgment entirely, 
according to the greater or leffer Evidence, accord- 
ing to more plain or dubious Marks of Truth or 
Falfhood* 

S4 12.0b* 



270 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 

1% Obferve that in Matters of human Tefti- 
itiony there is oftentimes a great Mixture of Truth 
and Faljloood in the Report itfelf: Some Parts of 
the Story may be perfectly true, and ibme utterly 
falfe ; and fome may have fuch a blended Confu- 
iion of Circumftances whieh are a little warpt afide 
from the Truth, and mifreprefented, that there is 
need of good Skill and Accuracy to form a Judg- 
ment concerning them, and determine which Part 
is true, and which is falfe. The whole Report is 
not to be believed, becaufe fome Parts are indubi- 
tably true, nor the whole to be rejected, becaufe 
fome Parts are as evident Faljhoods. 

We may draw two remarkable Obfervations from 
this Section. 

Obferv. I. Plow certain is the Truth of the Chrif- 
tian Religion, and particularly of the Refurrr^lion of 
Chrift, which is a Matter of Fact on which Chrif- 
tianity is built ! We have almoft all the concurrent 
Evidences that can be derived from human Testimony 
joining to confirm this glorious Truth. The Fa6t 
js not impoffible ; concurrent Circumftances call 
a favourable Afpeci on it ; it was foretold by one 
who wrought Miracles, and therefore not unlikely, 
nor unexpected : The Apoftles and firft Difciples 
were Eye and Ear-Witnefles, for they converfed 
with their rifen Lord ; they were the moft plain, 
honell: Men in themfelves ; the Temptations of 
worldly Interefts did rather difcourage their Belief 
and Report of it : They all agree in this Matter, 
though they were Men of different Characlcrs; 
Pharifces and FiJJjermen, and Publicans, Men of yu- 
dea and Galilee, and perhaps fome Heathens, who 
were early converted : The Thing might eafily 
have been difproved if it were falfe ; it hath been 
conveyed by conftant Tradition and Writing down 

to 



CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 271 

to our Times ; thofe who at firft doubted, were af- 
terwards convinced by certain Proofs ; nor have any 
pretended to give any Proof of the contrary, but 
merely denied the Fact with Impudence, in Oppo- 
fition to all thefe Evidences. 

Obferv. II. How weak is the Faith which is due 
to a Multitude of Things in Ancient human Hif- 
tory ! For though many of thefe Criteria, or Marks 
of Credibility, are found plainly in the more general 
and publick Facls, yet as to a Multitude of particu- 
lar Fuels and Circumftances, how deficient are they 
in fuch Evidence as (hould demand our Aflent ! 
Perhaps there is nothing that ever was done in all 
paft Ages, and which was not a publick Fact, fo 
well attefted as the Refurreclion ofChrift. 

SECT. VI. 

Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of divine 

Teftimony. 

AS human Teftimony acquaints us with Matters 
of Fad, both paft and prefent, which lie be- 
yond the Reach of our own perfonal Notice ; fo 
divine Teftimony is fuited to inform us both of the 
Nature of Things, as well as Matters of Fact, and 
of Things future, as well as prefent ox paft. 

Whatfoever is dictated to us by God himfelf, or 
by Men who are divinely infpired, muft be believed 
with full AfTurance. Reafon demands us to believe 
whatfoever divine Revelation dictates : For God is 
perfectly wife, and cannot be deceived ; he is faith- 
ful and good, and will not deceive his Creatures : 
And when Reafon has found out the certain Marks 
or Credentials of divine Teftimony to belong to any 

Proportion, 



27^ toGTCK : on, the [part ii. 

Proportion, there remains then no farther Enquiry 
to be made, but only to find out the true Senfe 
and Meaning of that which God has revealed, for 
Reafon itfelf demands the Belief of it. 

Now divine Teftimony or Revelation requires thefe 
following Credentials. 

] . That the Proportions or Doctrines revealed 
be not inconjtfient with Reafon ; for intelligent Crea- 
tures can never be bound to believe real Inconfif- 
tencies. Therefore we arefurethe Popifh Doctrine 
of Tranfubftantiation is not a Matter of divine Re- 
velation, becaufe it is contrary to all our Senfes and 
our Reafon, even in their proper Exercifes. 

God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of 
himfelf, and agreeable to his own Nature and di- 
vine Perfections. Now many of thefe Perfections 
are difcoverable by the Light of Reafon, and what- 
soever is inconfiftent with thefe Perfections cannot 
be a divine Revelation, 

But let it be noted that in Matters of Praclice 
towards our Fellow-Creatures -, God may command 
us to act in a Manner contrary to what Reafon 
would direct antecedent to that Command. So 
Abraham was commanded to offer up his Son a Sa- 
crifice : The Jfraelites were ordered to borrow of the 
Egyptians without paying them, and to plunder 
and flay the Inhabitants of Canaan : Becaufe God 
has a fovereign Right to all Things, and can with 
Equity difpoflefs his Creatures of Life and every 
Thing which he has given them, and efpecially 
fuch finful Creatures as Mankind ; and he can ap- 
point whom he pleafes to be the Init rumen ts of 
this juft Difpoffeffion or Deprivation. So that 
thefe divine Commands are not really inconfiftent 
with right Re<?fo;i ; for whatsoever is fo cannot be 
believed, where that Inconfjlency appears. 

- 2. Upon 



CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON - . 273 

2. Upon the lame Account the whole Doclrine of 
Revelation muft be confijient with itfelf; every Part 
of it muft be confident with each other : And 
though in Points of Practice latter Revelation may 
repeal or cancel former divine Laws, yet in Matters 
of Belief no latter Revelation can be inconfiftent 
with what has been heretofore revealed. 

3. Divine Revelation mud be confirmed by fome 
divine and fuper natural Appearances , fome extraor- 
dinary Signs or Tokens i Vifions, Voices, or Miracles 
wrought^ or Prophecies fulfilled. There muft be 
fome Demonftrations of the Prefence and Power of 
God, iuperior to all the Powers of Nature, or the 
fettled Connection which God as Creator has eftab- 
lifhed among his Creatures in this vifible World. 

4. If there are any fuch extraordinary and won- 
derful Appearances and Operations brought to con- 
tefl with, or to oppofe divine Revelation, there mult 
and always will be fuch a Superiority on the Side of 
that Revelation which is truly divine, as to manifeft 
that God is there. This was the Cafe when the 
Egyptian Sorcerers contended with Mofes. But the 
Wonders which Mofes wrought, did fo fartranfcend 
the Power of the Magicians, as made them confefs 
It was the Finger of God. 

5. Thefe divine Appearances or Atteftations to 
Revelation muft be either known to our/elves, by 
our own perfonal Observation of them, or they 
muft be fufficienUy dttejzed by others, according to 
the Principles and Rules by which Matters of human 
Faith are to be judged in the foregoing Section. 

Some of thofe, who lived in the Nations and 
Ages where Miracles were wrought, were Eye and 
Ear-WitnefTes of the Truth and Divinity of the 
Revelation ; but we, who live in thefe diftant Ages, 
mull Jiave them derived down to us byjuftand 

inconteftible 



27^ LOGICK, OR, THE [PART H* 

inconteftible Hijlory and Tradition. We alfo, eveft 
in thefe diftant Times, may fee the Accomplifh- 
ment of fome ancient Prediclions, and thereby ob- 
tain that Advantage toward the Confirmation of 
our Faith in divine Revelation, beyond what thofe 
Perfons enjoyed who lived when the Predictions? 
were pronounced. 

6. There is another very confiderable Confirma- 
tion of divine Teftimony ; and that is, when the Doc- 
trines themfelves, either on the Publication or the 
Belief of them, produce fupernatural Effects. Such 
were the miraculous Powers which were communi- 
cated to Believers in the firft Ages of Chriftianity, 
the Converfion of Jews or Gentiles, the amazing Suc- 
cefs of the Gofpel of Chrifl, without human Aid, and 
in Oppofition to a thoufand Impediments ; its 
Power in changing the Hearts and Lives of igno- 
rant and vicious Heathens, and wicked and profane 
Creatures in all Nations, and filling them with a 
Spirit of Virtue, Piety and Goodnefs. Wherefoever 
Perfons have found this Effect in their own Hearts, 
wrought by- a Belief of the Gofpel of Chrijl, they 
Lave a Witnefs in themfelves of the Truth of it, 
and abundant Reafon to believe it divine. 

Of the Difference between Reafon and Revelation 
and in what Senfe the latter is fuperior, fee more 
in Chap. II. Seel. 9. and Chap. IV. Direcl. 6. 



SECT. 



CH. V.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 275 

SECT. VII. 

Principles a?id Rides of judging, concerning Things 
pafi, prefent, and to come, by the ?nere Ufe of 
Reafon, 

THOUGH we attain the greateft Affurance of 
Things pafi and future by divine Faith, and 
learn many Matters of Fa6t, both pafi and prefent, 
by human Faith, yet Reafon alfo may in a good De- 
gree affift us to judge of Matters of Fact, both pafi y 
prefent, and to come, by the following Principles. 

1. There is zSyfiem of Beings round about us, of 
which we ourfelves are a Part, which we call the 
World, and in this World there is a Courfe of Na- 
ture, or a fettled Order of Caufes, Effecls, Antece* 
dents, Concomitants, Confequences, &c. from which 
the Author of Nature doth not vary but upon very 
important Occafions. 

2. Where Antecedents, Concomitants, and Confe* 
quents, Caufes and Effecls, Signs and Things fignified, 
Subjecls and Adjuncls, are neceffarily connected 
with each other, we may infer the Caufes from the 
Effecls, and Effects from Caufes, the Antecedents 
from the Confequents, as well as Confequents 
from Antecedents, EsrV. and thereby be pretty 
certain of many Things both pafi, prefent^ and to 
come. It is by this Principle that Afironomers can 
tell what Day and Hour the Sun and Moon were 
eclipfed five hundred Tears ago, and predict alj. 
future Eclipfes as long as the World fhall Hand. 
They can tell precifely at what Minute the Sun rifes 
or fets this Day at Pequin in China^ or what Alti* 
tudes the Dogfiar had at Mid-night or Mid*noon in 
Rome, on the Day when Julius Caefar was Jlain. 

Gardeners 



376 kOGlCK, OR, THE [fART II,, 

Gardeners upon the fame Principle can foretel the 
Months when every Plant will be in Bloom, and the 
Ploughman knows the Weeks of Harveft : We are 
fure, if there be a Chicken, there was an Egg : If 
there be a Rainbow, we are certain // rains not far 
off': If we behold a Tree growing on the Earth, we 
know it has naturally a Root under Ground. 

3. Where there is a necejfary Connexion between 
Caufes and Effecls, Antecedents and Consequents, Signs 
and Things figriified, we know alfo that like Caufes 
will have like Effects, and proportionable Caufes will 
have proportionable Effects, contrary Caufes will 
have contrary Effecls ; and obferving Men may 
form many Judgments by the Rules of Similitude 
and Proportion, where the Caufes, Effeds, &V. are 
not entirely the fame. 

. 4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain 
Connexion between Antecedents, Concomitants and 
Confeque?its, we can give but a Conjecture, or a 
probable Determination. If the Clouds gather, or 
the Weather-Glafs finks, we fuppofe it will rain : 
If a Man /pit Blood frequently with Coughing, we 
fuppofe his Lungs are hurt : If very 'dangerous Symp- 
toms appear, we expect his Death, 

5. Where Caufes operate freely, with a Liberty 
of Indifference to this or the contrary, there we can- 
not certainly know what the Effects will be : For 
k fcems to be contingent, and the certain Know- 
ledge of it belongs only to God. This is the' Cafe 
in the great eft Part of human Actions. 

6. Yet wife Men by a juil Obfervation of human 
Nature, will give very probable Conjectures in this 
Matter, alfo concerning Things pafl, or Things* 
future, becaufe human Nature in all Ages and Na- 
tions has fuch a Conformity to itfelf. By a Know- 
ledge of the Tempers of Men and their prefent 

Cir- 



CH. V,] RIGHT USE OF- REASON". 277 

Ci ream fiances, we may be able to give a happy 
Guefs what their Condudt will be, and what will 
be the Event, by an Obfervation of the like 
Cafes in former Times. This made the Emperor 
Marcus Antoninus to fey, " By looking back into 
" Hiftory, and confidering the Fate and Revoiu- 
" tions of Governments, yon will be able to form 
" a Guefs, and almoft prophefy upon the Future. 
• f For Things pa ft, prefent, and to come, are 
cf flrangely uniform, and of a Colour ; and are 
" commonly caff, in the .fame .Mould. So that 
" upon the Matter, forty Years of human Life may 
" ferve for a Sample of ten thouiand." Collier's 
Antoninus, Book VII. Sect. 50. 

7. There are alfo fome other Principles of Judg- 
ing concerning the part Actions of Men in former 
Ages, befides Books, Hi/lories and Traditions, which 
are the Mediums of conveying human Teftimony ; 
as we may infer the Skill and Magnificence of the 
Ancients by fome Fragments of their Statues, and 
Ruins of their Buildings. We know what Roman 
Legions came into Great Britain by Numbers of 
Bricks dug out of the Earth in fome Parts of the 
Ifland, with the marks of fome particular Legion 
upon them, which mutt have been employed there 
in ^Brick-making. We rectify fome Miflakes in 
Hiftory by Statues, Coins, old Altars, Uienfds of War, 
&c. We confirm or di.i prove fome pretended Tra- 
ditions'and hiflorical Writings, by Medals, Images ', 
Piclures, Urns, SsV, 

Thus I have gone through all thofe particular 
Objects of our Judgment which I firft propofed, and 
have laid down Principles and Rules by which we 
may fafely conduct ourfelves therein. There is a 
Variety of other Objecls, concerning which we 
are occasionally called to pafs a Judgment, namely, 
The Characters of Perfons* the Value and Worth 



27& LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 

of Things, the Senfe and Meaning of particular 
Writers, Matters of Wit, Oratory, Poefy, Matters of 
Equity in judicial Courts, Matters of Trqffick and 
Commerce between Man and Man, which would be 
endlefs to enumerate. But if the general andfpe- 
cial Rules of Judgment which have been mentioned 
in thefe two laft Chapters, are treamred up in the 
Mind, and wrought into the very Temper of our 
Souls in our younger Years, they will lay a Foun- 
dation for juft and regular Judgment concerning 
a thoufand fpecial Occurrences in the religious, ci- 
vil, and learned Life* 



THE 



I V9 1 



THE 



THIRD PART 



OF 



L O G I C K. 



Of Reafoning and Syllogifm. 

AS the firft Work of the Mind is Perception, 
whereby our Ideas are framed, and the fe- 
cond is Judgment, which joins or disjoins our Ideas, 
and forms a Proportion, lb the third Operation of 
the Mind is Reafoning, which joins feveral Propo- 
rtions together, and makes a Syllogifm, that is, an 
Argument whereby we are wont to infer fomething 
that is lefs known, fro?n Truths which are more evi- 
dent* 

In treating of this Subject, let us confider more 
particularly, 

I. The Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts of 
which it "is compofed. 

- 2. The feveral Kinds of Syllogifms, with parti- 
€ular Rules relating to them. 

T 3. The 



280 LOGICK? OR THE [p ART. III. 

3. The Doclrine of Sophifms, or falfe Reafoning r 
together with the Means of avoiding them, and the 
Mariner offolving or anfwering them. 

4. Some general Rules to direcl our Reafoning. 



CHAP. I. 

Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts of 
which it is compofed. 

F the mere Perception and Comparison of two 
Ideas would always fhew us whether they agree 
or difagree ; then all rational Propofitions would be 
Matters of Intelligence, or firft Principles, and there 
would be no Ufe of Reafoning, or drawing any 
Confequences. It is the Narrownefs of the human 
Mind which introduces the Neceffity of Reafoning. 
When we are unable to judge of the Truth or Falf- 
hood of a Proportion in an immediate Manner, by 
the mere Contemplation of its Subject and Predi- 
cate, we are then conftrained to ufe a Medium, and 
to compare each of them with foine third Idea, that 
by feeing how far they agree or difagree with it, 
we may be able to judge how far they agree or dif- 
agree among themfelves : As, if there are two 
Lines, A and B, and I know not whether they are 
equal or no, I take a third Line C, or an Inch, and 
apply it to each of them ; if it agree with them 
both, then I infer that A and B are equal', but if 
it agree with one, and not with the other, then I 
conclude A and B are unequal : If it agree with 
neither of them, there can be no Companion. 

So 



CH. I.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 281 

So if the Queftion be whether God muft be wor- 
Jhipped, we feek a third Idea, fuppofe the Idea of a 
Creator, and fay, 

Our Creator muft be worfhipped. 

God is our Creator. 

Therefore God muft be worjhipped. 

The Comparifon of this third Idea, with the two 
diftincT: Parts of the Queftion, ufually requires two 
Proportions, which are called the Premifes : The 
third Proportion which is drawn from them is the 
Conclufion, wherein the Queftion itfelf is anfwered, 
and the Subject and Predicate joined either in the 
Negative or the Affirmative. 

The Foundation of all affirmative Conclufions is 
laid in this general Truth, that fo far as two pro- 
pofed Ideas agree to any third Idea, they agree 
alfo among themfclves. The Character of Creator 
agrees to God, and Worjhip agrees to a Creator, 
therefore Worjhip agrees to God. 

The Foundation of all Negative Conclufions is this, 
that where one of the two propofed Ideas agrees 
with the third Idea, and the other difagrees with 
it, they muft needs difagree fo far alfo with one 
another ; as, if no Sinners are happy, and if Angels 
are happy, then Angels are not Sinners. 

Thus it appears what is the ftridl and juft No- 
tion of a Syllogifm: It is a Sentence or Argument 
made up of three Propolitions, fo difpofed, as that 
the laft is neceflarily inferred from thofe which go 
before, as in the Inftances which have been juft 
mentioned. 

In the Conftitution of a Syllogifm two Things may 
be confidered, viz. the Matter and the Form of it. 

The Matter of which a Syllogifm is made up, is 

three Proportions ; and thefe three Proportions are 

made up of three Ideas or 'Terms varionflv joined. 

T2 'The 



282 LOGICK : OR, TtfE [PART III, 

The three Terms are called the remote Matter of 
a Syllogifm ; and the three Propofitions the proximo 
or immediate Matter of it. 

The three Terms are named the Major, the M/- 
nor, and the Middle. 

The Predicate of the Conelufion is called the 
w^/or Term, becaufe it is generally of a larger Ex- 
tenfion than the minor Term, or the Subjecl. The 
major and minor Ternis are called the Extremes* 

The middle Term is the f/>/ro? Idea invented and 
difpofed in two Propofitions, in fuch a Manner as 
to fhevv the Connexion between the major and minor 
Terms in the Conelufion ; for which Reafon the 
?niddle Term itfelfis fomctimes called the Argument* 

That Proportion which contains the Predicate 
of the Conelufion, connected with the middle 
Term, is ufnally called the major Proportion, where- 
as the minor Prepojition conne6ts the middle Term 
with the Subjecl: of the Conelufion, and is fome- 
times called the AJJumption. 

Note, This exact Diftinclion of the feveral Parts 
of a Syllogifm, and of the major and minor Terms 
connected with the middle Term in the major and 
minor Propofitions, does chiefly belong to Jimplc 
or categorical Syllogifm, of which we (hall fpeak in 
the next Chapter, though all Syllogifms whatfoever 
have fomething analogical to it. 

Note farther, That the major Proportion is ge- 
nerally placed firft, and the minor fecond, and the 
Conelufion in the laft Place, where the Syllogifm is 
regularly compofed and reprefented. 

The Form of a Syllogifm is the framing and dif- 
pofing of the Premifes according to Art, or juft 
Principles of Reafoning, and the regular Inference 
of the ° nclufion from them. 



The 



CH. II.] HIGHT USE OF REASON. 283 

The Ac! of Reafoning, or inferring one Thing 
from another, is generally exprefled or known by 
the Particle Therefore, when the Argument is form- 
ed according to the Rules of Art ; though in com- 
mon Difcourfe or Writing, fuch cafual Particles as 
For, Becaufe, manifeft the Act of Reafoning as well 
as the illative Particles Then and Therefore: And 
wherefoever any of thefe Words are ufed, there is 
a perfect Syllogifm expreffed or implied, though 
perhaps the three Proportions do not appear, or 
jare not placed in regular form. 



CHAP. II. 

Of the various Kinds of Syllogifms, with parti* 
cular Rules relating to them. 

SYLLOGISMS are divided into various Kinds, 
either according to the Queftion which is proved 
by them, according to the Nature and Compofitim 
of them, or according to the middle Term, which is 
ufed to prove the Queftion. 

S E G T. I. 

Of 'univerfal and particular Syllogifms, both negative 
and affirmative. 

ACCORDING to the Quefiion which is to be 
proved, fo Syllogifms are divided into uni* 
verfal Affirmative, univerfal Negative, particular Af- 
firmative^ and particular Negative,. This is often 
called a Pivifionof Syllogifms drawn from the Con- 
T $ clufion - 9 



284 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART IIT. 

clujion ; for fo many Sorts of conclusions there may 
be, which are marked with the Letters A,E, I, 0. 

In an univerfal affirmative Syllogifm, one Idea is 
proved univerfally to agree with another, and may 
be univerfally affirmed of it ; as, every Sin deferves 
Death, every unlawful Wijh is a Sin ; therefore every 
unlawful Wifh deferves Death. 

In an univerfal negative Syllogifm, one Idea is 
proved to difagrce with another Idea univerfally, 
and may be thus denied of it; as, no, Injuflice can 
be pleafing to God; all Perfecution for the Sake of 
Confcience is Injuflice ; therefore no Perfecution for 
Confcience Sake can be pleafing to God. 

Particular affirmative ', and particular negative SyU 
logifms, may be eafily underftood by what is faid of 
Univerfals, and there will be fufficient Examples 
given of all thefe in the next Section. 

The general Principle upon which thefe univerfal 
and particular Syllogifms are founded, is this, 
Whatfoever is affirmed or denied univerfally of 
any Idea, may be affirmed or denied of all the par- 
ticular Kinds or Beings, which are contained in 
the Extenflon of that univerfal Idea. So the De- 
fert of Death is affirmed univerfally of Sin, and an 
unlawful Wijh is one particular Kind of Sin, which 
is contained in the univerfal Idea of Sin, therefore 
the Defert of Death may be affirmed concerning an 
unlawful Wijh. And fo of the reft. 

Note, In the Poctrine of Syllogifms, a fingular 
and an indefinite Propofition are ranked among 
Univerfals, as was before obferved in the Doctrine 
of Proportions. 



SECT. 



CM. II.] HIGHT USjE OF REASON. 2,85 

SECT. II. 

Of plain, Jimple Syllogifm, and their Rules. 

THE next Divifion of Syllogifms is mto fingle 
and compound. This is drawn from the Nature 
and Compofition of them. 

Single Syllogifms are made up of three Propor- 
tions : Compound Syllogifms contain more than 
three Proportions, and may be formed into two or 
more Syllogifms. 

Single Syllogifms, for Diftinclion's Sake, may be 
divided into * Simple, Complex, and Conjunctive.^ 

Thofe are properly called fimple or categorical Syl- 
logifms, which are made up of three plain, fingle or 
categorical Proportions, wherein the middle Term is. 
evidently and regularly joined with one Part of the 
Queftion in the major Proportion, and with the 
other in the minor, whence there follows a plain 
fingle Concluflon ; as, every human Virtue is to be 
fought with Diligence ; Prudence is a human Virtue y 
therefore Prudence is to be fought diligently. 

Note, Though the Terms of Proportions may 
be complex-, yet where the Com portion of the 
whole Argument is thus plain, fimple, and regular, 
it is properly called a fimple Syllogifm, rnce the 
Complexion does not belong to the fyllogiftic Form 
of it. 

Simple Syllogifms have feveral Rules belonging to 

them, which being obferved, will generally fecure 

us from falfe Inferences : But thefe Rules being. 

T 4 founded 

* As Ideas and Proportions are divided into single and com- 
pound, and single are fubdivided mto.simpk and complex ; io there 
are the fame Divilions and Subdiviiions applied to Syllogifms. 



28(5 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART III, 

founded on four general Axioms, it is neceflary to 
mention thefe Axioms beforehand, for the Ufe of 
thofe who will enter into the fpeculative Reafon of 
all thefe Rules. 

Axiom i. Particular Proportions are contained 
in Univerfals, and may be inferred from them ; 
but Univerfals are not contained in Particulars, 
nor can be inferred from them. 

Axiom 2. In all univerfal Proportions, the Sub- 
ject is univerfal : In all particular Propofitions, the 
Subject is particular. 

Axiom 3. In all affirmative Propofitions, the Pre- 
dicate has no greater Exrenfion than the Subject ; 
for its Extenfion is retrained by the Subject, and 
therefore it is always to be efteemed as a particular 
Idea. It is by mere Accident, if it ever be taken 
univerfally, and cannot happen but in fuch univer- 
fal or lingular Propofitions as are reciprocal. 

Axiom 4. The Predicate of a negative Propofition 
is always taken univerfally, for in its whole Ex- 
tenfion it is denied of the Subject. If we fay no 
Stone is vegetable, we deny all Sorts of Vegetation 
concerning Stones, 

The Rules of Jimple, regular Syllogifms are 
thefe. 

Rule I. The middle Term mufl not be taken twice 
particularly, but once at leaft univerfally. For if the 
middle Term be taken for two different Parts or 
Kinds of the fame univerfal Idea, then the Subject 
of the Conclufion is compared with one of thefe 
Parts, and the Predicate with another Part, and this 
will "never (hew whether that Subject and Predicate 
agree or difagree : There will then be four di/lincl 
Terms in the Syllogifm, and the two Parts of the 

Queftion 



€H. II.] RIOHT USE OP REASON. 287 

Queftion will not be compared with they^ third 
Idea; as if I foy,fome Men are pious, and fame Men 
are Robbers, I can never infer that fome Robbers 
are pious, for the middle Term Men being taken 
twice particularly, it is not the fame Men who are 
fpoken of in the major and minor Proportions. 

Rule II. The Terms in the Conclufion mufi never be 
taken more univerfally than they are in the Premifes. 
The Reafon is derived from the firft Axiom, that 
Generals can never be inferred from particulars. 

Rule III. A negative Conclufion cannot be proved 
by two affirmative Premifes. For when the two 
Terms of the Conclufion are united or agree to the 
middle Term, it does not follow by any Means that 
they difagree from one another. 

Rule IV. If one of the Premifes be negative, the 
Conclufion mufi be negative. For if the middle Term 
be denied of either Part of the Conclufion, it may 
fhew that the Terms of the Conclufion difagree, 
but it can never (hew that they agree. 

Rule V. If either of the Premifes be particular, the 
Conclufion mufi be particular. This may be proved 
for the molt Part from the firft Axiom. 

Thefe two laft Rules are fometimes united in this 
ftngle Sentence, The Conclufion always follows the 
weaker Part of the Premifes. Now Negatives and 
Particulars are counted inferior to Affirmatives and 
Univerfals. v 

Rule VI. From two negative Premifes nothing can 
be concluded. For they ieparate the middle Term 
both from the Subject and Predicate of the Con- 
clufion, and when two Ideas difagree to a third, 

we 



2S8 logick: or, the [part m. 

we cannot infer that they either agree or difagree 
with each other. 

Yet where the Negation is a Part of the middle 
Term, the two Premifes may look like Negatives 
according to the Words, but one of them is affir- 
mative in Senfe ; as, What has no Thought cannot 
reafon ; but a Worm has no Thought \ therefore a 
Worm cannot reafon. The minor Propofition does 
really affirm the middle Term concerning the Sub- 
ject, namely, a Worm is what has no Thought L , and 
thus it is properly in this Syllogifm an affirmative 
Propofition. 

Rule VII. From two particular Premifes nothing 
can be concluded. This Rule depends chiefly on the 
firfl: Axiom. 

A more laborious and accurate Proof of thefe 
Rules, and the Derivation of every Part of them 
in all poffible Cafes, from the foregoing Axioms, 
require fo much Time, and are of fo little Impor- 
tance to affirt the right Ufe of Reafon, that it is 
needlefs to infift longer upon them here. See all 
this done ingenioufly in the Logick called the Art 
of Thinking, Part III. Chap. III. &c. 



SECT 



CH. II.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 18Q 

SECT. III. 

Of the Moods and Figures of Jimple Syllogifm^ 

SIMPLE Syllogifms are adorned and furrounded 
in the common Books of Logick with a Variety 
of Inventions about Moods and Figures, wherein by 
the artificial Contexture of the Letters A, E, /, and 
0, Men have endeavoured to transform Logick, or 
the Art of Reafoning, into a Sort of Mechanifm, and 
to teach Boys to fyllogife, or frame Arguments and 
refute them, without any real inward Knowledge 
of the Queftion. This is almofl in the fame Man- 
ner as School-boys have been taught perhaps in their 
trifling Years to compofe Latin Verfes, that is, by 
certain Tables and Squares, with a Variety of Let^ 
ters in them, wherein by counting every fixth, fe- 
venth, or eighth Letter, certain Latin Words fhould 
be framed in the form of Hexameters or Pentameters; 
and this may be done by thole who know nothing 
of Latin or of Verfes. 

I confefs fome of thefe logical Subtleties have 
much more Ufe than thofe verifying Tables, and 
there is much Ingenuity difcovered in determining 
the precife Number of Syllogifms that may be 
formed in every Figure, and giving the Reafons of 
them ; yet the Light of Nature, a good Judgment 
and due Confideration of Things, tend more to ' 
true Reafoning than all the Trappings of Moods 
and Figures. 

But left this Book be charged with too great De- 
fects and Imperfections, it may be proper to give 
fhort Hints of that which fame Logicians have fpent 
fo much Time and Paper upon. 

All 



290 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART III. 

All the poffible Compofitions of three of the Let- 
ters, A, E, /, 0, to make three Proportions amount 
to Jixty-four; but fifty-four of them are excluded 
from forming true Syllogifms by the [even Rules in 
the foregoing Seclion . The remaining "Ten are va- 
rioufly diverlified by Figures and Moods into four- 
teen Syllogifms. 

The Figure of a Syllogifm is the proper Difpofi- 
tion of the middle Term with the Parts of the 
Queftion. 

A Mood is the regular Determination of Propo- 
rtions according to their Quantity and Quality, 
that is, their univerfal or particular Affirmation or 
Negation; which are fignified by certain artificial 
Words wherein the Confonants are neglecled, and 
thefe four Vowels A^ E, I, 0, are only regarded. 

There are generally counted thre£ Figures* 

In ihcjir/l of them the middle Term is the Sub- 
ject of the major Propofition, and the Predicate of 
the minor. This contains four Moods, called, Bar* 
bara^ Celarent, Darii, Ferio, And it is the Excel- 
lency of this Figure, that all Sorts of Queftions or 
Conclufions may be proved by it, whether A, E, I 9 
or 0, that is, univerfal or particular, affirmative or 
Hegative; as, 

Bar- Every wicked Man is truly miferable ; 
ba- All Tyrants are wicked Men ; 
ra. Therefore all Tyrants are truly miferable, 

Ce~ He that's always in Fear is not happy ; 
la- Covetous Men are always in Fear; 
rent. Therefore covetous Men are not happy. 



D& 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 2QI 

Da- Whatfoever furthers our Salvation is good 
for us. 
ri- Some Afflictions further our Salvation ; 
/. Therefore fome Afflictions are good for us. 

Fe- Nothing that muft be repented of is truly 

* defirable ; 
rl- Some Pleafures muft be repented of; 
0. Therefore there are fome Pleafures which 
are not truly defirable. 

In the fecond Figure the middle Term is the Pre- 
dicate of both the Premifes : this contains four 
Moods, namely, Cefare, Came/ires, Feftino, Baroco, 
and it admits only of negative Concluiions; as, 

Ce- No liar is fit to be believed ; 

fa- Every good Christian is fit to be believed : 

re. Therefore no good Chriflian is a liar. 

The Reader may eafily form Examples of the 
reft. 

The third Figure requires that the middle Term 
be the Subject of bot*h the Premifes. It has fix 
Moods, namely, Darapti, Felapton, Bijamis y Datifi 9 
Bocardo^ Ferijon : And it admits only of particular 
Concluiions ; as, 

Da- Whofoever loves God (hall be faved ; 
rap- All the Lovers of God have their Ircmer- 
feci ions. 
//. Therefore fome who have Imperfections 
ihall be faved. 

I leave the Reader to form Examples of the 
reft. 

The 



figi LOGICK : OK, THE [PART III. 

The Moods of thefe three Figures are comprized 
in four Latin Verfes : 

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, quoque primae. 
Cefare, Came/ires, Fejlino, Baroco, fecundse. 
Tertia Darapti, fibi vindicat, atque Felapton, 
Adjungens D if amis, Datifi, Bocardo, Ferifon. 

The Jpecial Rules of the three Figures are thefe. 

In the Jir/t Figure the major Propofition muft al- 
ways be univerfal, and the minor affirmative. 

In the fecond Figure alfo the major muft be uni- 
verfal, and one of the Premifes, together with the 
Conclufion, muft be negative. 

In the third Figure the minor muft be affirma- 
tive, and the Conclufion always particular. 

There is alfo a fourth Figure, wherein the middle 
Term is predicated in the major Propofition, and 
fubjected in the minor : But this is a very indirect 
and oblique Manner of concluding, and is never 
ufed in the Sciences, nor in human Life, and there- 
fore I call it ufelefs. — Some Logicians will allow it 
to be nothing elfe but a mere Inverfion of the firft 
Figure ; the Moods of it, namely, Baralipton, or 
Barbari, Calentes, Dibatis, Fefpamo, Frefifom, are 
not worthy to be explained by one Example. 

SECT. IV. 

Of Complex Syllogifms. 

IT is not the mere Ufe of complex Terms in a 
Syllogifm that gives it this Name, though one 
of the Terms is ufually complex ; but thofe are pro- 
perly called complex Syllogifms, in which the middle 
Term is not connected with the whole Subject, or 

the 



CH. II.] EIGHT USE OF EEASO>7. 1Q3 

the whole Predicate in two diliincl: Proportions, 
bat is intermingled and compared with them by 
Parts, or in a more confuted Manner, in different 
Forms of Speech ; as, 

The Sun is a fer.felefs Being ; 

The Perlians worshipped the Sun ; 

Therefore the Perfians i bed afenfelefs Being* 

Here the Predicate of the Conclusion is ivorfbip- 

ftddfenfelefs Being, Part of which is joined with 
the middle Term Sun in the major Proportion, and 
the other Part in the minor. 

Though this Sort of Argument is confefTed to be 
entangled or . .and irregular •, if examined by 

the Rules of Jimp: V bis ; vet there is a great 

Variety of Arguments ufed in Books of Learning, 
and in common Life, whole Conlequence is Itrong 
and evident, and which mult be ranked under this 
Head ; as, 

I. Exclufive Proportions will form a complex 
Argument ; as, fcs cf 
Heaven; true Cbriftians are Favourites cf Heaver.; 
therefore true Chriftians are pious Men. Or thus, 
Hypocrites are r. Mem therefore Hypocrites 

wt Favour ires cf Heaven. 

II. Ext [ make fuch com- 
plex Syllogifms : as, 1 I . ime to the 

the Nur/e is no r :; therefore 

the Nurfe came not to the Confi 

III. Or*. Comparative Proportions ; as, Know-' 

than Riebes ; is better than 

. ban Rii 

Or 



294 LOGICK ! OR, THE [PARTlII. 

Or thus, a Dove will fly s a Mile in a Minute ; a 
Swallow flies fwifter than a Dove ; therefore a Swal- 
low will fly more than a Mile in a Minute. 

IV. Or Inceptive and Defltive Proportions \ as, 
the Fogs vanijh as the Sun rifes ; but the Fogs have 
not yet begun to vanijh \ therefore the Sun is not yet 
rifen. 

V. Or Modal Proportions ; as, it is necejfary 
that a General under/land the Art of War ; but Caius 
does not under/land the Art of War ; therefore it is 
necejfary Caius Jhould not be a General, Or thus, A 
total Eclipfe cf the Sun would caufe Darknefs at Noon ; 
it is pojfible that the Moon at that Time may totally 
eclipfe the Sun ; therefore it is pojfible that the Moon 
may caufe Darknefs at Noon. 

Beficie all theie, there is a great Number of com- 
plex Syllogifms which can hardly be reduced under 
any particular Titles, becaufe the Forms of human 
Language are fo exceeding various ; as, 

Chriflianity requires us to believe what the Apoflles 
wrote: St. Paul is an Apoflle\ therefore Chriflianity 
requires us to believe what St. Paul wrote. 

No human Artifl can make an- Animal ; a Fly or a 
Worm is an Animal ; therefore no human Artifl can 
make a Fly or a Worm. 

The Father always lived in London ; the Son al- 
ways lived with the Father ; therefore the Son always 
lived in London. 

The Bloffom foon follows the full Bud; this Fear- 
tree hath many full Buds ; therefore it will fhortly 
have many Blofjoms. 

One Hailflone never falls alone ; but a Hail/lone 
fell jufl now 5 therefore others fell with it. 

Thunder 



CH. II. j EIGHT USE OF REASON. 2Q5 

Thunder feldom comes without Lightning ; but it 
thundered Teflerday \ therefore probably it light ned 

Mofes wrote before the Trojan War ; the firfl 
Greek Hiftorians wrote after the Trojan War ; there- 
fore the firfl Greek Hiftorians wrote after Mofes* 1 . 

Now the Force of all thefe Arguments is {o 
evident and conclufive, that though the Form of 
the Syllogifm be never fo irregular, yet we are fure 
the Inferences are juft and true ; for the Premifes, 
according to the Reafori of Things, do really con- 
tain the Conclufion that is deduced from them, which 
is a never-failing Teftof a true Syllogifm, as fhall 
be fhewn hereafter; 

The Truth of rrioft of thefe complex Syllogifms 
tnay alfo be made to appear, if needful, by reduc- 
ing them either to regular , ftmple Syllogifms, Or to 
fome of the conjunctive Sytlogifms, which are de- 
fcribed in the next Section. I will give an Inftance 
only in the firft, and leave the reft to exercife the 
Ingenuity of the Reader. 

The firfl: Argument may be reduced to a Syllo- 
gifm in Barbara, thus, 

The Sun is afenfelefs Being} 

What the Perfians worfhipped is the Sun; 

Therefore what the Perfians worfhipped is afenfe- 
lefs Beingi Though the coriclufive Force of this 
Argument is evident without the Reduction. 

* Perhaps fome of thefe Syllogifms may be reduced to thofe 
which I call Connexive afterward ; but it is of little Moment to 
what Species they belong 5 for it is not any formal Set of Rules, 
fo much as the Evidence and Force of Reafon, that mud de- 
termine the Xruth Gr Falfhood of all fuch Syllogifms. 



V SECT, 



296 logick : or, the [part hi, 

SECT. V. 

Of Conjunctive Syllogifms. 

THOSE are called conjunclive Syllogifms, wherein 
one of the Premifes, namely the Major, has 
diftinct. Parts, which are joined by a Conjunction, 
or fome fuch Particle of Speech. Mofi: Times the 
Major or Minor, or both, are explicitly compound 
Proportions : and generally the major Proportion 
is made up of two diftincl Parts or Proportions, 
in fuch a Manner, as that by the Aflertion of one 
in the Minor, the other is either aflerted or denied 
in the Conclufwn: Or, by the Denial of one in the 
Minor, the other is either afferted or denied in the 
Conclufion. It is hardly poffible indeed to fit any 
fhort Definition to include all the Kinds of them ; 
but the chief amongft them are the conditional 
Syllogifm, the disjunclive, the relative, and the 
connexive. 

I. The conditional, or hypothetical Syllogifm, is 
that whofe Major or Minor, or both, are conditional 
Proportions ; as, If there be a'God, the World is go- 
verned by Providence-, but there is a God; therefore 
the World is governed by Providence. 

Thcfc Syllogifms admit two Sorts of true x\rgu- 
mentation, whether the Major is conditional. 

1. When the Antecedent is aflerted in the Mi- 
nor, that the Confequent may be aflerted in the Con- 
clufion ; fuch is the preceding Example. This is 
called arguing from the P oft ion of the Antecedent to 
the Poftion of the Confequent. 

2. When the Confequent is contradicted in the 
minor Proportion, that the Antecedent may be 

contradicted 



Ctt. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. iQl 

contradicted in the Conclufion ; as, If Atheifts are 
in the right, then the World exifis without a Caufe ; 
but the World dees not exift without a Caufe ; there- 
fore Atheifts are not in the right. This is called ar- 
guing from the renoving of the Confequent to the re~ 
moving of the Antecedent. 

To remove the Antecedent or Confequent here, 
does not merely fignify the Denial of it, but the 
Contradiction of it ; for the mere Denial of it by a 
contrary Proportion will not make a true Svllo- 
gifm, as appears thus : If every Creature be rea- 
sonable, every Brute is reafonable ; but no Brute is 
reafonable ; therefore no Creature is reafonable. — 
Whereas if you fay in the Minor, but every Brute 
is not reafonable, then it would follow truly in the 
Conclufion, therefore every Creature is not rea* 
fonable. 

When the Antecedent or Confequent are nega- 
tive Proportions, they are removed by an Affirma- 
tive ; as 5 If there be no God, then the World does not 
dif cover creating Wifdom ; but the World does dij cover 
creating Wifdom ; therefore there is a God. In this 
Inftance the Confequent is removed or contra- 
dicted in the Minor, that the Antecedent may be 
contradicted in the Conclufion. So in this Argu- 
ment of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. If the Dead rife nop, 
Chrifl died in vain ; but Chrift did not die in vain \ 
therefore the Dcadjhall rife. 

There are alfo two Sorts of falfe Arguing, 
namely, (\.)From the removing of the Antecedent 
to the removing of the Confequent) or, (2.) From the 
Pofttion of the Confequent, to the Pofttion of the Ante- 
cedent. Examples of thefe are eafiiy framed ; as, 

(].) If a Minifter were a Prince he muft be ho- 
noured ; but a Minifter is not a Prince ; 

Therefore he muft not be honoured. 

U 2 (2.) If 



2Q8 LO&ICK : OR, THE [PART III. 

(2.) If a Minijier were a Prince ', he muft be ho- 
noured; but a Minijier muft be honoured \ 

Therefore he is a Prince. 

Who fees not the ridiculous Falfhood of both 
thefe Syllogifms ? 

Objerv. I. If the Subject of the Antecedent and 
the Coniequent be the fame, then the, hypothetical 
Syllogifm may be turned into a categorical one ; as, 
If Caefar be a King, he muft be honoured ; but Caefar 
is a King , therefore, &c. This may be changed 
thus, Every King muft be honoured , but Caefar is a 
King'? therefore, &c. 

Obferv. II. If the major Proportion only be eon-, 
ditional, the Conclufion is categorical: But if the 
Minor or both be conditional, the Conclufion is alio 
eonditional ; as, 57?? Worjhippers of Images are Idola- 
iers ; If the Papifts worfhip a Crucifix, they are Wor- 
jhippers of an Image : therefore, If the Papifls wor- 
jhip a Crucifix, they are Idolaters. But this Sort of 
Syllogifms fhould be avoided as much as poffible 
in Difputation, becaufe they greatly embarrafs a 
Caufe : The Syllogifms, whofe Major only is hypo- 
thetical, are very frequent, and ufed with great Ad- 
vantage. 

II. A disjunctive Syllogifm is when the major 
Proportion is disjunctive ; as, The Earth moves in 
a Circle or an Ellipfis ; but it does not move in a 
Circle ; therefore it moves in an Ellipfis. 

A disjunclive Syllogifm may have many Members 
or Parts ; thus, /*/ // either Sp?-ing, Summer, Autumn, 
or Winter, but it is not Spring, Autumn, or Winter ; 
therefore it is Summer. 

The true Method of arguing here, is from the 
Affirtion of one, to the Denial of the rejl, or Jrom 

the 



CSH. II.] SIGHT USE OF REASON". 2QQ 

the Denial of one or more, to the Affertion of what 
remains ; but the Major fhould be fo framed, that 
the feveral Parts of it cannot be true together, 
though one of them is evidently true. 

Ill* A relative Syllogifm requires the Major Pro- 
portion to be relative; as, Where Chrift is , there 
Jhall his Servants be ; but Chrijl is in Heaven ; there- 
fore his Servants Jhall he there alfo. Or, As is the 
Captain, fo are his Soldiers ; but the Captain is a 
Coward ; therefore his Soldiers are fo too. 

Arguments that relate to the Doctrine of Pro- 
portion, muft be referred to this Head ; as, As two 
are to four, fo are three to fix; but two make the half 
of four, therefore three make the half of fix. 

Befides thefe, there is another Sort of Syllogifm 
which is very natural and common, and yet Au- 
thors take very little Notice of it, call it by an im- 
proper name, and defcribe it very defectively ; and 
that is, 

IV. A connexive Syllogifm. This fome have called 
copulative ; but it does by no Means require the 
Major to be a copulative nor a compound Propo- 
fition (according to the Definition given of it, 
Part II. Chap. II. Seel. 6.) but it requires that two 
or more Ideas be fo connected, either in the com- 
plex Subject or Predicate of the Major, that if 
one of them be affirmed or denied in the Minor, 
common Senfe will naturally fhew us what will be 
the Confequence. It would be very tedious and 
ufelefs to frame particular Rules about them, as 
will appear by the following Examples, which are 
very various, and yet may be farther multiplied. 

U3 (I.) Meek- 



300 I.0GICK : OR, THE [PART. HI. 

(l.) Meeknefs and Humility always go together*, 
Mofes was a Man of Meeknefs-, therefore Mqfes was 
alfo humble. Or we may form this Minor, Pharaoh 
was no humble Man ; therefore he was not meek. 

(2.) No Man can ferve God and Mammon \ the 

covetous Manferves Mammon ; therefore he cannot 

ferve God, Or the III in or may run thus, the true 

Chrifiian ferves God} therefore he does not ferve 

Mammon, 

(3.) Genius muff join with Study to make a great 
Man \ Florino has Genius ', but he cannot ffudy ; 
therefore Florino will never be a great Man, Or 
thus, Quint us ffudies hard, but has no Genius; 
therefore Ouintus will never be a great Man. 

(4.) Guio cannot make a Dinner without Flefh and 
Fifh ; there was no Fiji to be gotten To-day ; there- 
fore Gulo this Bay cannot make a Dinner, 

(5.) London and Paris are in different Latitudes \ 
ihe Latitude of London is 5 if Degrees ; therefore 
this cannot be the Latitude of Paris. 

(6.) Jofeph and Benjamin had one Mother ; Ra- 
chel was the Mother of Jofeph ; therefore Jhe was 
Benjamin's Mother too, 

(7.) The Father and the Son are of equal Stature \ 
the Father is fix feet high ; therefore the Son is fix 
Feet high alfo, 

(8.) Pride is inconfffent with innocence; Angels 
have innocence ; therefore they have no Pride. Or 
thus, Devils have Pride; therefore they have not 
Innocence. 

. I might multiply other Inftanccs of thefe con- 
nexive Syllqgifms, by bringing in all Sorts of ex- 
ceptive, exclufve, comparative, and modal Propor- 
tions into the Compofition of them ; for all thefe 
may be wrought into conjunclive, as well as into 
fmple Syllogiiius, and thereby we may render 

them 



C.H. II.] RIGHT. USE OF REASON. 301 

them complex. But it would wafte Time and Paper 
without equal Profit. 

Concerning thefe various Kinds of conjunctive 
Syllogifms, take thefe two Obfervations. 

Obferv. I. Mod of them may be transformed into 
categorical Syllogifms, by thofe who have a Mind 
to prove the Truth of them that Way ; or they 
may be eafily converted into each other by chang- 
ing the Forms of Speech. 

Obferv. II. Thefe conjunctive Syllogifms are fel- 
dom deficient cr faulty in the Form of them ; for 
fuch a Deficience would be difcovered at firft 
Glance generally by common Reafon, without any 
artificial Rules of Logick : The chief Care there- 
fore is to fee that the major Proportion be true, 
upon which the whole Force of the Argument ufu- 
ally depends. 



SECT. VI. 

Of Compound Syllogifms* 

WE properly .call thofe compound Syllogifms , 
which are made of two or move Jingle Syl- 
logifms, and may be refolded into them. The chief 
Kinds are thefe ; Epkhircma, Dilemma*. Profyllogif 
tn&s 9 and Sorites* 

I. Epichirema is a Syllogifm which contains the 
Proof of the Major or Minor, or both, before it 
draws the Concluiion. This is often ufed in Writ- 
ing, in publick Speeches, and in common Conver- 
fation ; that fo each Part of the Difcourfe may be 
confirmed and put out of Doubt, as it^fnoves 
* U4 - on 



302 5 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART III. 

on toward the Conclufion, which was chiefly de- 
figned. Take this Inftance : 

Sicknefs may be good for us ; for it weans us from 
the Pleafures of Life, and makes us think of dying \ 

But we are uneafy under Sicknefs, which appears 
by our Impatience, Complaints, Groanings, &c. ' 

Therefore we are uneafy fometimes under that which 
is good for us. 

Another Inftance you may fee in Cicero's Oration 
an Defence of Milo, who had flain Clodius. His 
major Proportion is, that it is lawful for one Man to. 
kill another who lies in wait to kill him $ which he 
proves from the Cuftom of Nations , from natural; 
Equity, Examples, he. his Minor is, that Clodius 
laid wait for Milo ; which he proves by his Arms % 
Guards, &c. and then infers the Conclusion, that 
it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 

II. A Dilemma, is an Argument which divides 
the Whole into all its Parts or Members by a difi 
junclhe Proposition, and then infers fomething con- 
cerning each Part which is finally inferred con- 
cerning the Whole. Inrlances of this are frequent ; 
as, In this Life we tnufi either obey our vicious Inclh 
nations, or r'ejijh them : To obey them, will bring Sir$ 
and Sorrow ', to rejifi them is laborious and painful \ 
therefore we cannot be perfectly free from Sorrow 
or Pain in this Life. 

A Dilemma becomes faulty or ineffeBual three 
Ways : Fir/l, When the Members oi the Divifion 
are not well oppofed, or not fully enumerated ; 
for then the Major is falfe. Secondly, When what 
is aflerted concerning each Part is not juft ; for 
then the Minor is not true. Thirdly, When it- 
may be retorted with equal Force upon him who 
utters it. 

There 



<CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON* 303 

There was a famous ancient Inftance of this 
Cafe, wherein a Dilemma was retorted. Euathlus 
promifed Protagoras a Reward when he had taught 
him the Art of Pleading, and it was to be paid the 
iirft Day that he gained any Caufe in the Court* 
After a eonfiderable Time Protagoras goes to Law 
with Euathlus for the Reward, and ufes this Di- 
lemma: Either the Caufe will go on my Side, or on 
yours : if the Caufe goes on my Side, you muft pay me 
according to the Sentence of the fudge : If the Caufe 
goes on your Side, you muft pay me according to your 
Bargain : Therefore, whether the Caufe goes for me 
or againft me, you muft pay me the Reward^ But 
Euathlus retorted this Dilemma thus : Either I 
Jhall gain the Caufe or lofe it: If I gain the Caufe ^ 
then nothing will be due to you according to the Sen-? 
fence of the Judge : But if I lofe the Caufe, nothing 
will be due to you according to my Bargain : There- 
fore whether I lofe or gain the Caufe, I will not pay 
you, for nothing will be due to you. 

Note i, A Dilemma is ufualiy defcribed as though 
it always proved the Abfurdity, Inconvenience, or 
Unreafonablenefs of fqme Opinion or Practice; 
and this is the motl: common Defign of it ; but it 
is plain, that it may alfo be ufed to prove the 
Truth or Advantage of any Thing propofed ; as ? 
In Heaven we Jhall either have Defires or not : If we 
have no Defires, then we have full Satisfaction ; if 
we have Defires, they fh all be fatisfied as f aft as they 
arife ; therefore in Heaven we Jhall be completely fa- 
tisfied. 

Note 2. This Sort of Argument may be com? 
pofed of three or more Members, and may be called 
a Trilemma, 

III. A Profyllogifm is when two or more Syllo- 
gifms are fo connected together, that the Conclu- 



301 LOGICK *. OR, THE [PART III. 

fion of the former is the i irjor or the Minor of the 
following; cs, Blood cannot think ; to the Soul cf 
Man thinks ; therefore //;<? SW ^ M^« w not Bhod; 
but the Soul of a Brute is his Blood, zee or ling to the 
Scripture; therefore the Soul of Man is diferent 
from the Soul of a Brute. See another Inftance in 
the Introduction to this Treat ife, p. 5. 

IV. A Sorites is when feveral middle Terms are 
chofen to connect one another fucceffively in feve- 
ral Piopofitions, till the lafl Proportion connects 
its Predicate with the fkfi Subjecl. Thus, All Men 
of Revenge have their Souls often uneafy ; uneafy 
Souls are a Plague to t hen f elves ; now to be one's own 
Plague is Folly in the Exirehie : therefore all Men of 
Revenge are extreme Fools. 

The Apoft'e, Ro?n. viii. 2g. gives us an Inftance 
of this Sort of Argument, if \i were reduced to ex- 
act Form : Whom he foreknew thofe he predeflinated ; 
'whom he predeflinated he called ; whom he called he 
juftified; whom he jvftifted he glorified ; therefore 
whom he fore k tew he glorified. 

To thef. byllogtfms it may not be improper to 
add, induction, which is, when ftoni fevieral Parti- 
cular Proportions we infer one general ; as, The 
Doctrine of the Socinians cannot be proved from the 
Gofpels, it cannot be proved from the Acls of the Apof 
ties, it cannot be proved from the Epiflles, nor the 
Look of Revelation; therefore it cannot be proved 
from the New, Tcfiamer.t. 

Note, This Sort of Argument is often defcclivc, 
becnufe there is not. due Care taken to enumerate 
all the Particulars on which the Conclufion fhould 
depend. 

Aii thefc four Kinds of Syllcgifms in this Scclion 
may be called redundant, becaufe they have more 

than 






CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASONS 305 

than three Proportions. But there is one Sort of 
Syllogifm which is defective, and is called an En* 
thymem, becaufe only the Conclufion with one of 
the Premifes is exprefled, while the other is fup- 
pcfed and referved in the Mind : Thus, There is 
no true Religion without good Morals : Therefore a 
Knave cannot be truly religious ; Or thus, It is our 
Duty to love our Neighbours as ourf elves.; therefore 
there are but few who perform their duty, * 

Note, This is the moft common Sort of Argu- 
ment smongft Mankind both in Writing and in 
Speaking; for it would take up too much Time, 
and too much retard the Difcourfe, to draw out all 
our Arguments in Mood and Figure. Bcfides, 
Mankind love to have fo much Compliment paid 
to their Underflandings, as to fuppofe that they 
know the Major or Minor, which is fupprefTed and 
implied, when you pronounce the other Premife 
and the Conclufion. 

If there be any Debate about this Argument, 
the Syllogifm muft be completed in order to try its 
Force and Goodnefs, by adding the abfent Propo- 
rtions. 

SECT. VII, 

Of the middle Terms, of common Places or Toficks^ 
and Invention of Arguments, 

THE next Divifion of Syllogifms is according 
to the middle Term, which is made ufe of in 
the Proof of any Propofition. Now the middle 
Term (as we have hinted before) is often calied 
Argument, becaufe the Force of the Syllogifm de- 
pends upon it. We muft make a little Delay here 

to 



306 LOGICK : OP., THE £pART I jr. 

to treat briefly of the Doctrine of Topics , or Places 
whence middle Terms or Arguments are drawn. 

Ail Arts and Sciences have fome general Sub- 
jects which belong to them, which are called Topics 
or common Places 5 becaufe middle Terms are bor- 
rowed, and Arguments derived from them for the 
Proof of the various Proportions which we have 
Occafion to difcourfe of. The Topics of Gram- 
mar, are Etymology, Noun, Verb, Conflruclion, Signi- 
fication, &c. The Topics of Logick are Genus, Spe- 
cies, Difference, Property, Definition, Divifion, &c. 
The Topics of Ontology, or Metaphyficks, are, Caufe, 
Effecl, Aclion, Paffion, Identity, Oppofition, Subjecl, 
Adjuncl, Sign, &c. The Topics of Morality, or 
Ethics, are Law, Sin, Duty, Authority, Freedom of 
Will, Command, Threatning, Reward, Punijhment y 
&c. The Topics of Theology, are, God, Chrifi, 
Faith, Hope, Worjhip, Salvation, &c. 

To thefe feveral Topics there belong particular 
Obfervations, Axioms, Canons, or Rules,* which 
are laid down in their proper Sciences ; as, 

Grammar hath fuch Canons, namely, Words in a 
different Conflruclion obtain a different Senfe. Words 
derived from the fame Primitive may probably have 
fome Affinity in their original Meaning, &c. 

Canons in Logick are fuch as thefe, Every Part 
of a Divifion fingly taken mujl contain lefs than the 
Whole. A Definition muft be peculiar and proper to 
the Thing defined. Whatever is affirmed or denied of 
the Genus, may be affirmed or denied of the Species, &c. 

Metaphyfical Canons are fuch as thefe : Final 
Caufes belong only to intelligent Agents. If a natural 
and neceffary Caufe operate, the Effecl will follow, 

* A Canon is a Propofition declaring fome Property of the 
Subject, -which is not expreffed ip the Definition or Divifion of 
it. 

he. 



CH. II.] EIGHT USE OF REASON". 30/ 

&c. and there a: of many more 

in eac 

Now i: has been the Cuftom of thole who teach 
. Rbe::rick, to direct their Difciples when 
they n Argument^ to confultthe feveral To- 

ich are lliited to the Subject of Difcourfe, 
and to rummage over the Definitions, Divisions, 
and Canons that belong to each Topic. This is 
called the /:•:_ / and it is 

taught with much Solemnity in fome Schc 

I grant there may be good U this Practice 

for Peribos of a lower Genius, when they are to 

jurfe for the Publick : or for 

e of fuperior Parts, to i their Memory, 

a Subject which 

nlongal xigjhts, or when 

thei: ier Indifpdfition and 

Languor : but when a Man of moderate Sagacity 

sr ot his Theme by juit Di- 

and Enc bldoro need to run 

::" all the Topics that he 

anient or Matter of 

ig : And indeed it is only a Man of Seme 

and Judgment I 1 ufe common Places or Topics 

well; for amongft this A' he only knows 

: is fit tc : out; as well as what is rlt to 

be fpoken. 

By fotne logical Writers this Bufinds of Topics 
and Inve ner with 

Matl Figures and £ filled with 

the barbarous technics 

R:p:;:, _ EsV. as lad 

were to be led illy in certain e 

Harnelies an _>;s to find out Arguments 

to prove or ;\ ion whatsoever, 

w i th e of the Ideas. No w 

there is no Need to throw Words of Contempt on 

fuch 



308 LOGICK, OR, THE [pART lit, 

fuch a Practice; the very Defcription of it carries 
Reproof and Ridicule in Abundance* 



SECT. VIII. 



Of fever al Kinds of Arguments and Demonjlrations. 

WE proceed now to the Diviflon of Syllogifms 
according to the middle Term ; and in this 
Part of our Treatife the Syllogifms themf^lves are 
properly called Arguments, and are thus distributed ; 

I. Arguments are called Grammatical, Logical, 
Metaphyseal, Phyfical, Moral, Mechanical, Theolo- 
gical, &c. according to the Art, Science, or Sub- 
ject, whence the middle Term or Topic is borrow- 
ed. Thus, if we prove that no Man Jhould fieal 

from his Neighbour, becaufe the Scripture forbids 
it, this is a theological Argument : If we prove it 
from the Laws of the Land, it is political ; but if 
we prove it from the Principles of Reafon and 
Equity, the Argument is moral* 

II. Arguments are either certain and evident, or 
doubtful and merely probable* 

Probable Arguments are thofc whofe Conclufions 
are proved by ibme probable Medium ; as, This 
Hill zvas once a Church-yard, or a Field of Battle, be- 
caufe there are many human Bones found here* This 
is not a certain Argument, for human Bones might 
have been conveyed there fome other Way. 

Evident and certain Arguments are called Demon- 
flratiuns ; for they prove their Conclufions by clear 
Mediums and undoubted Principles; and they are 
generally divided into thefc two Sorts. 

1. Do 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 30<) 

]. Demon ftrations a Priori^ which prove the 
Effect by its necefiary Caufe ; as, I prove the Scrip- 
ture is infallibly trilt, becaufe it is the Word of God? 
who can?iot lie, 

'2. Demon ft rations a Pofier'wri, which infer the 

Caufe from its neccilary 1 -ffeet ; as, I infer there 

hath been the Hand offome Artificer here, became I 

find a curious Figure,, Or, I infer ^ there is a God? 

from the Works of his Wifdom in the vfible World, 

The la(t of thefe is called Demonfiraiio t* oti, 
becaufe it proves only the Exittence of a Tiling; 
the firft is named Demonfiraiio t« Mori, becaufe it 
fhews only the Caufe of Exiftencc. 

But Note, That though thefe two Sorts of Argu- 
ments are moft peculiarly called De?nonfirations, yet 
generally any ftrong and convincing Argument ob- 
tains that name; and it is the Cuftom of Mathe- 
maticians to call all their Arguments Demonfirations? 
from what Medium foever they derive them. 

V 

III. Arguments are divided into artificial and 
, inartificial. 

An artificial Argument is taken from the Nature 
and Circum [lances of the Things; and if the Ar- 
gument be ftrong, it produces a natural Certainty; 
as, The World was firft created by God 3 becauie no- 
thing can create itfelf. 

An inartificial Argument is the Tefiimony of 
s another: and this is called orinnaL when our In- 
formation proceeds i mined lately from the Perfons 
concerned, or from Eye or Ear-Wit nefles of a Facb 
It is called Tradition when it is delivered by the 
Report of others. « 

We have taken Notice before, the Tefiimony is 
either dh'iue'or human. If the human Testimony 
be ftrong, it produces a 'moral Certainty, but 

uiviae 



310 LOGICKt OR, THE [PART. Ill; 

divine Teffimony produces a fupef natural Certainty 
which is far fuperior. 

Note, Arguments taken from human < fejiimony^ 
as well as from Laws and Rules of Equity, are called 
moral \ and indeed the fame Name is alfo applied 
to every Sort of Argument which is drawn from 
the free Adions of God, or the contingent A ft ions of 
Men, wherein we cannot arife to a natural Certainty, 
but content ourfelves with an high Degree of Pro- 
bability, which in many Cafes is fcarce inferior to 
natural Certainty* 

IV. Arguments are either direii or indtrecl. It 
is a direcl Argument, where the middle Term is fuch 
as proves the Quefiion itfelf, and infers that very 
Proportion which was the Matter of inquiry. An 
indirect, or oblique Argument, proves or refutes fome 
other Proportion, and thereby makes the Thing 
enquired appear to be true by plain Confequence. 

Several Arguments are called indireel i as, (l.) 
When fome contradictory Propofition is proved to 
be falfe, improbable, or impoffible : Or when upon 
Suppofition of the Falfhood, or Denial of the ori- 
ginal Proportion, fome Abfurdity is inferred* This 
is called a Proof per impojfibile, or a Reduclio ad 
abfurdum. (2.) When fome other Proportion is 
proved to be true which is lefs probable, and thence 
it follows that the original Proportion is true, be- 
caufe it is more probable. This is an Argument 
ex minus probabili ad magis. (3.) When any other 
Proportion is proved, upon which it was before 
agreed to yield the original Queftion. This is an 
Argument en Concejfo. 

V K There is yet another Rank of Arguments 
which have Latin Names ; their true Diftinclion is 
derived from the Topics or middle Terms which 

are 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 311 

are ufed in them, though they are called an Addrefs 
to our Judgment, our Faith, our Ignorance, our Pro- 
fefpon, our Modefty, and our Pajfions. 

1 . If an Argument be taken from the Nature or 
Exiftence of Things, and addrcfled to the Reafon 
of Mankind, it is called Argumentum ad Judicium. 

2. When it is borrowed from fome convincing 
Teftimony, it is Argumentum ad Fidum, an Addrefs 
to our Faith. 

3. When it is drawn from any infufficient Me- 
dium whatfoever, and yet the Oppofer has not Skill 
to refute or anfwer it, this is Argumentum ad Igno- 
rantiam, an Addrefs to our Ignorance. 

A. When it is built upon the profefTed Principles 
or Opinions of the Perfon with whom we argue, 
whether the Opinions be true or falfe, it is named 
Argumentum ad Hominem, an Addrefs to oxxv profef- 
fed Principles. St. Paul often ufes this Argument 
when he reafons with the Jews, and when he fays, 
1/peak as a Man. 

5. When the Argument is fetched from the Sen- 
timents of fome wife, great, or good Men, whofe 
Authority we reverence and hardly dare oppofe, it 
is called Argumentum ad Verecundiam, an Addrefs 
to our Mode fly. 

6. I add finally, When an Argument is borrowed 
from any Topics which are fuited to engage the In- 
clinations and Paffions of the Hearers on the Side 
of the Speaker, rather than to convince the Judg- 
ment, this is Argumentum ad Pajfioncs, an Addrefs 
to the Pajfions ; or if it be made publickly, it is 
called ad Populum, or an Appeal to the People. - 

After all thefe Divifions of Syllogifms or Argu- 
ments, anting from the middle Term, there is one 
Diftinclion proper to be mentioned which arifes 
from the Premifes. An Argument is called uniform, 
when both the Premifes are derived from the fame 

X Spring 



312 kOGJCKt OR, THE [PART Id. 

Spring of Knowledge, whether it be Senfe, Reafon, 
Confcioufnefs , human Faith, or divine Faith : But 
when the two Premifes are derived from different 
Springs of Knowledge, it is called a mixt Argu- 
ment. 

Whether the Conclusion rauft be called Human 
or Divine, when one or both Premifes are Matters 
of Divine Faith, but the Conclusion is drawn by 
human Reafon, I leave to be difputed and determined 
in the Schools of Theology. 

Thus the fecond Chapter is finifhed, and a parti- 
cular Account given of all the chief Kinds of Syllo- 
fifms or Arguments which are made Ufe of among 
Men, or treated of in Logick, together \v\th fpecial 
Rules for the Formation of them, as far as is ne- 
cefiary. 

If a Syllogifm agrees with the Rules which are 
given for the Conftruclion and Regulation of it, it 
is called a true Argument : If it difagrees with thefe 
Rules, it is a Paralogifm, or falfe Argument : But 
when a falfe Argument puts on the Face and Ap- 
pearance of a true one, then it is properly called a 
Sophifm, or Fallacy, which fhall be the Subject of 
the next Chapter. 



CHAP, 



CH. III.] RIGHT USJE OF HEASOtf. sH3 

CHAP. III. 

The DoSirlne of Sophifms. 

FROM Truth nothing can really follow but 
what is true : When toever therefore we find 
afalfe Conchl/Ion drawn from Premifes which feem 
to be true, there muft be fome Fault in the De- 
duction Gr Inference; or elfe one of the Premifes 
is not true in the Senfe in which it is ufed in that 
Argument. 

When an Argument carries the Face of Truth 
with it, and yet leads us into Mifrake, it is a So* 
phifm ; and there is fome Need of a particular De« 
fcription of thefe fallacious Arguments, that we 
may with more Eafe and Readinefs detect and 
folve them. 

SECT. I. 

Of J eve nil Kinds of Sofdiijms, and their Solution. 

AS the Rules of right Judgment, and of good 
Ratiocination, often coincide with each other, 
io the Docirine of Prejudices, which was treated of 
in the Seco?id Part of Logick, has anticipated a great 
deal of what might be laid on the Subject of So- 
fhifms ; yet I (hail mention the mod remarkable 
Springs of falfe Argumentation, which are reduced 
by Logicians to fome of the following Heads. 

X 2 1. The 



314 logick: or, the [part hi. 

I. The firft Sort of Sophifm is called Ignoratio 
JZlenchi, or a Miftake of the Que/} ion ; that is, when 
fomething elfe is proved which has neither any ne- 
ceflary Connexion or Confiitency with the Thing 
enquired, and confequently gives no Determination 
to the Enquiry, though it may feem at firft Sight 
to determine the Queilion ; as, if any mould con- 
clude that St. Paul was not a native Jew, by prov- 
ing that he was born a Roman ; or if they mould 
pretend to determine that he was neither Roman 
nor Jew, by proving that he was born at Tarjus in 
Cilicia : Thefe Sophifms are refuted by {Viewing 
that all thefe three may be true ; for he was born 
of Jewifh Parents in the City of Tarjus, and by 
fome peculiar Privilege granted to his Parents, or 
bis native City, he was born a Denizen of Rome. 
Thus there is neither of thefe three Characters of 
the A po file inconlirtent with each other, and there- 
fore the proving one of them true does not refute 
the others. 

Or if the Que ft ion be propofed, Whether Exccfs 
of Wine can be hurtful to him that drinks it, and the 
Sophifter fhould prove that it revives his Spirits, it 
exhilarates his Soul, it gives a Man Courage, and 
makes him firong and aStive, and then he takes it 
for. granted that he has proved his Point. 

But the Refpondent may eafily (tew, that though 
Wine- may do all this, yet it may be finally hurt- 
ful both to the Soul and Body of him that drinks it 
io Rxcefs. 

Difputers when they grow warm, are ready to 
run into this Fallacy : They drefs up the Opinion 
of their Adverfary as they pleafe, and afcribe Sen- 
timents to him which he doth not acknowledge ; 
and when they have with a great deal of Pomp at- 
tacked and confounded thefe 'Images of Straw 

of 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 315 

of their own making, they triumph over their Ad- 
verfary as though they had utterly confuted his 
Opinion. 

ft is a Fallacy of the fame Kind which a Difpu- 
tant is guilty of, when he finds that his x\dveriary 
is too hard for him, and that he cannot fairly prove 
the Queflion firft propofed ; he then with Slynefs 
and Subtlety turns the Difcourfe aiide to fome other 
kindred Point, which he can prove, and exults in 
that new Argument wherein his Opponent never 
contradicled him. 

The Way to prevent this Fallacy is by keeping 
the Eye fixed on the precife Point of Difpute, and 
neither wandering from it ourfelves, nor fufFering 
our Antagonift to wander from it, or fubflitute any 
Thing elfe in its Room. 

II. The next Sophifm is called Petitio Pr'meipii, 
or a Suppoftion of what is not granted ; that is, when 
any Proportion is proved by the fame Proportion 
in other Words, or by fomething that is equaliy un- 
certain and difputcd : As if any one undertake to 
prove that the human Soul is extended through all -the 
Parts of the Body, becaufe it refides in every Mem- 
ber, which is but the fame Thing in other Words. 
Or, if a Papjl fbould pretend to prove that his Re- 
ligion is the only Catholick Religion ; and is derived 
from Chrijt and his Apoftles, becaufe it agrees zvitti 
tlie Doclrine of all the Fathers of the Church, all the 
holy Martyrs, and all the Chrifiian World throughout 
all Ages : Whereas this is the great Point in Con- 
tefl, whether their Religion does agree with that of 
all the Antients and the primitive Chriftians, or no. 

III. That Sort of Fallacy which is called a Circle, 
is very near akin to the Petitio Principii ; as when 

X 3 one 



3l6 tOGlCK!" OR, THE- [pAKt III. 

one of the Premifes in a Syllogifm is queftioned 
and oppofed, and we intend to prove it by the Con- 
clufion : Or, when in a Train of Syllogifms we 
prove the laft by recurring to what was the Conclu- 
sion of the Firft. The Papifts are famous at this 
Sort of Fallacy, when they prove the Scripture to 
he the Word of God by the Authority or infallible Tef- 
timony of their Church ; and when they are called to 
fbew the infallible Authority of their Church, they 
pretend to prove it by the Scripture. 

IV. The next Kind of Sophifm is called non 
Caufd pro Caufa, or the Afjtgnation of a falfe Qaufe. 
This the Peripaietick Philofophers were guilty of 
continually, when they told US' that certain Beings, 
which they caUcdfubftantial Forms, were the Springs 
of Colour, Motion, Vegetation, and the various Ope- 
rations of natural Beings in the animate and inani- 
mate World ; when they informed us that Nature 
was terribly afraid of a Vacuum, and that this was 
the Caufe why the Water would not fall out of a 
long Tube if it was turned upfide down : The jl/o- 
derns as well as the Antients fall often into this Fal- 
lacy, when they pofitively affign the Reafons of na- 
tural Appearances, without Sufficient Experiments 
to prove them. 

A/lrologei's.are overrun with this Sort of Falla- 
cies, and they cheat the People grofsly by pretend- 
ing to tell Fortunes, and to deduce the Caufe of the 
various Occurrences in the Lives of Men from the 
various Fo/itions of the Stars and Planets, which 
they call AfpecJs. 

When Comets and Eclipfes of the Sun and IS loon 
arc conftrued to fignify the Fate of Princes, the 
Revolution of States, Famine, Wars and Calami- 
tics of all Kinds, it is a Fallacy that belongs to this 
Rank of Sophifms. 

There 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 317 

There is fcarce any Thing more common in hu- 
man Life than this Sort of deceitful Argument. 
If any two accidental Events happen to concur, 
one is prefently made the Caufe of the other. If 
Ti tius wronged his 'Neighbour of a Guinea, and in 
fix Months after he fell down and broke his Leg, 
weak Men will impute it to the divine Vengeance 
on Titius for his former Injuftice. This Sophifm was 
found alfo in the early Days of the World : For 
when holy Job was fur rounded with uncommon Mife- 
ries, his own Friends inferred, that he was a mofl 
heinous Criminal, and charged him with aggravated 
Guilt as the Caufe of his Calamities ; though God 
himfelf by a Voice from Heaven folved this uncha- 
ritable Sophifin, and cleared his Servant Job of that 
charge. 

How frequent is it among Men to impute Crimes 
to wrong Perfons ? We too often charge that upon, 
the wicked Contrivance and premeditated Malice 
of a Neighbour, which arofe merely from Ignorance, 
or from an unguarded Temper. And on the other 
Hand, when we have a Mind to excufe ourfelves^ 
we pracTife the fame Sophifm «, and charge that upon 
our Inadvertence or our Ignorance, which perhaps 
was defigned Wickednefs. What is really done by 
a Neceffity of Ci re um fiances, we fometimes im- 
pute to Choice. And again, we charge that upon 
Neceffity which was really defired and chofen. 

Sometimes a Perfon acts out of Judgment, in 
Oppoiition to his Inclination ; another Perfon per- 
haps acls the fame Thing out of Inclination, and 
againft his Judgment. It is hard for us to deter- 
mine with Aifarance, what are the inward Springs 
and fecret Caufcs of every Man's Conduct \ and 
therefore we mould be cautious and flow in palling 
a Judgment where the Cafe is not exceeding evi- 
X 4 dent : 



318 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART III. 

dent : And if we fhould miftake, let it rather be on 
the charitable, than on the cenforious Side. 

It is the fame Sofhifm that charges mathematical 
Learning with leading the Minds of Men to Scepticifm 
and Infidelity ', and as unjuftly accufes the new Philo- 
fophy of paving the Way to Herefy and Schifm. Thus 
the Reformation from Popery has been charged ^ith 
the Murder and Blood of Millions, which in Truth 
is to be imputed to the Tyranny of the Princes and 
the Priefis, who would not fuffer the People to re- 
form their Sentiments and their Practices accord- 
ing to the Word of God. Thus Christianity in the 
primitive Ages was charged by the Heathens with 
all the Calamities which, befel the Roman Empire, 
becaufe the Chriftians renounced the Heathen Gods 
and Idols. 

The Way to relieve ourfelves from thofe So- 
phifms, and to fecure ourfelves from the Danger of 
falling into them, is an honeft and diligent Enquiry 
into the real Nature and Caufes of Things, with a 
conitant Watchfulnefs againit all thofe Prejudices 
that might warp the Judgment afide from Truth in 
that Enquiry. 

5. The next is called Fallacia-Accidentis, or a 
Sophifm wherein we pronounce concerning the 
Nature and ejfential Properties of any Subject ac- 
cording to fomething which is merely accidental to 
it. This is akin to the former, and is alfo very fre- 
quent in human Life. So if Opium or the Peruvian 
Bark has been ufed imprudently or unfuccefsfully, 
whereby the Patient has received Injury, fome 
weaker People abfolutely pronounce againft the Ufe 
of the Bark or Opium upon all Occalions whatfoever, 
and arc ready to call them Poifon. So Wine has 
been the accidental Occalion of Drunkennefs and 

Quarrels ; 



CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 31Q 

Quarrels ; Learning and Printing may have been the 
accidental Caufe of Sedition in a State ; the Read- 
ing of the Bible, by Accident, has been abufed to 
promote Herefies or deftruclive Errors ; and for thefe 
Reafons they have all been pronounced evil Things* 
Mahomet forbad his Followers the Ufe of Wine ; 
the Turks difcourage Learning in their Dominions; 
and the Papijls forbid the Scripture to be read by 
the Laity. But how very unreafonable are thefe 
Inferences, and thefe Prohibitions which are built 
upon them ! 

VI. The next Sophifm borders upon the former; 
and that is, when we argue from that which is true 
in particular Circu??i/lances, to prove the fame Thing 
true abfolutely r , Jimply ', and abflracled from all Circum- 
Jlances ; this is called in the Schools a Sophifm a 
diclo fecundum quid ad diclum fimpliciter ; as, That 
which is bought in the Shambles is eaten for Dinner ; 
raw Meat is bought in the Shambles ; therefore raw 
Meat is eaten for Dinner. Or thus, Livy writes 
Fables and Improbabilities when he defcribes Prodigies 
and Omens ; therefore Livfs Roman Hi/lory is never 
to be believed in any Thing. Or thus, There may be 
fome Mi /lake of Tranfcribers in fome Part of Scrip- 
ture ; therefore Scripture alone is not afafe Guide for 
cur Faith. 

This Sort of Sophifm has its Reverfe alfo ; as 
when we argue from that which is true Jimply, and 
abfolutely, to prove the fame Thing true in all par- 
ticular Circwnjlances whatfoever* ; as if a Traitor 
fhould argue from the fixth Commandment, Thou 

Jhalt 

* This is arguing from a moral Univerfality , which admits of 
fome Exceptions, in the fame Manner as may be argued from 
metaphyseal or a natural Univerfality, which admits of no Ex- 
ception. 



320 rOGICKL: OR, THE [PART. III. 

Jhalt not kill a Man, to prove that he himfelf ought 
not to be hanged : Or if a Madman fhould tell me, 
/ ought not to withhold his Sword from him, becaufe 
no Man ought to withhold the Property of another, 

Thefe two fait Species oi 'Sophifms are eafily folv- 
ed, by (hewing the Differenec betwixt Things in 
their abfolute Nature, and the fame Things fur- 
rounded with peculiar Circumflances, and confidered 
in regard to fpecial Times, Places, Perfons and Oc- 
cafions; or by (hewing the Difference between a 
moral and a metaphyseal Univerfality, and that the 
Proportion will hold good, in one Cafe, but not in 
the other. 

VII. The Sophifms of Compojition and Divijion 
come next to be mentioned. 

The Sophifm of Compofition is when we infer any 
Thing concerning Ideas in a compounded Senje, 
which is only true in a divided Serif e. And when 
it is faid in the Gofpel that Chrift made the Blind to 
fee, and the Deaf to hear, and the Lame to walk, 
we ought not to infer hence that Chrifi performed 
Contradictions ; but thofe who were blind before, 
were made to fee, and thofe who were deaf beJore 9 
were made to hear, &c. So when the Scripture af- 
fures us, the worft of Sinners may be faved; it lig- 
nites only, that they who have been the worft of Sin- 
ners may repent and be faved, not that they fhall 
be faved in their Sins. Or if any one mould argue 
thus, Two and three are even and odd', Jive are two 
and three-, therefore Jive are even and odd. Here 
that is very faifely inferred concerning two and three 
in Union, which is only true of them divided. 

The Sophifm of Divijion is when we infer the 
lame Thing concerning Ideas in a divided Senfe, 
which is only true in a compounded Scnfe\ as, it we 
fhould pretend to prove that every Soldier in the 

Grecian 



CH. III.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 321 

Grecian Army put an hundred thoufand Perfons to 
Flight, becaule the Grecian Soldiers didfo. Or if a 
Man fhould argue thus, five is one Number ; two 
and three are five ; therefore two and three are one 
Number* 

This Sort of Sophifms is committed when the 
Word All is taken in a collective and a dtjlributive 
Senfe, without a diit Diftinelion ; as, if any one 
fhould reafon thus ; All the mufical Injiruments of 
the Jewifh Temple made a noble Concert-, the Harp 
was a mufical Inftrument of the Jewifh Temple \ 
therefore the Harp made a noble Concert. Here the 
Word All in the Major is collective, whereas fuch 
a Conclulion rea/aires that the Word AM fhould be 
distributive. 

It is the fame Fallacy when the univcrfal Word 
All or No refers to Speciss in one Proportion, and 
to Individuals in another ; as, All Animals were in 
Noah's Ark ; therefore no Animals perifhed in the 
flood: Whereas in the Preinife all Animals fiemfies 
every Kind of Animals, which does not exclude or 
deny the drowning of a thoufand Individuals. 

VIII. The la ft Sort of Sophifms arifes from cur 
jfibvfe of the Ambiguity of Words, which is the largeft 
and molt extenfive Kind of Fallacy; and indeed 
feveral of the former Fallacies might be reduced to 
this. Head. 

When the Words or Phrafes are plainly equivocal?, 
they are called Sophifms of Equivocation , as, if we 
fhould argue thus : He that fends forth a Book into 
the Light, defires it to be read ; He that throws a 
Book into the Fire, fends it into the Light ; therefore 
he that throws a Book into the Fire defires it to be 
read. 

This Sophifm, as well as the foregoing, and all 
of the like Nature, are folved by (hewing the diffe- 
rent 



322 logick: or, the [part hi, 

rent Senfes of the Words, Terms or Phrafes. Here 
Light in the major Proportion {ignifies the publick 
View of the World; in the Minor it fignifies the 
Brightnefs of Flame and Fire ; and therefore the Syl- 
logifm has four Terms, or rather it has no middle 
Term, and proves nothing. 

But where fuch grofs Equivocations and Ambigui- 
ties appear in Arguments, there is little Danger of 
im poling upon ourfelves or others. The greater! 
Danger, and which we are perpetually expofed to 
In Reafoning, is, where the two Senfes or Signifi- 
tions of one Term are near akin, and not plainly 
diftinguifhcd, and yet they are really fufficiently 
different in their Senfe to lead us into great Mis- 
takes, if we are not watchful. And indeed the 
greater! Part of Controversies in the facred or civil 
Life, arife from the different Senfes that are. put 
upon Words, and the different Ideas which are in- 
cluded in them ; as have been (hewn at large in 
the firft Part of Logick, Chap, IV. which treats of 
Words and Terms. 

There is after all thefe, another Sort of Sophifm 
which is wont to be called an imperfecl Enumeration 
or afalfe Induclion^ when from a few Experiments 
or Obfervations Men infer general Theorems and 
univerfal Proportions. But this is fufficiently no- 
ticed in the foregoing Chapter, where we treated of 
that Sort of Syllogifm which is called Induclion. 



SECT. 



CH. III.] KIGHT USE OP REASON, 323 



SECT. II. 

Two general Tefls of true Sylkgifms, and Methods of 
f Giving all Sophifms. 

BESIDES the fpecial Defcription of true Syl- 
logifms and Sophifns already given, and the 
Rules by which the one are framed, and the other 
refuted, there are thefe two general Methods of re- 
ducing all Syllogifms whatfoever to a Teji of their 
Truth or Falfhood. 

I. The firft is, that the Premifes mufl, at leaft 
implicitly, contain the"Conclufion ; or thus, One of the 
Premifes mujl contain the Gonclufion, and the other 
mujl Jhew that the Conclufion is contained in it. The 
Reaibn of this Rule is this ; when any Propofition 
is offered to be proved, it is necefTary to find ano- 
ther Proportion which confirms it, which may be 
called the containing Propofition ; but becaufe the 
fecond muft not contain the firft in 'an exprefs 
Manner, and in the fame Words,* therefore it is 
necefTary that a third or ojlenfive Propofition be 
found out, to fhewthat the fecond Propofition con- 
tains the firft, which was to be proved. Let us 
make an Experiment of this Syllogifm : Whofoever 
is a Slave to his natural Inclinations, is miferable : 
the wicked Man is a Slave to his natural Inclinations ; 
therefore the wicked Man is miferable. Here it is 
evident that the major Propofition contains the 

* It is confeffed that conditional and disjundi<ve major .Propo- 
rtions do expreisly contain all that is in the Conclufion; but 
then it is not in a certain and condufi-ve Manner, but only in a 
dubious Form of Speech, and mingled with other Terms ; and 
therefore it is not the fame exprefs Propofition. 

Conclufion*; 



324 logicx : or, the [part m. 

Conclufion ; for under the general Character of a 
Slave to natural Inclinations i a wicked Man'is con- 
tained or included ; and the minor Proportion de- 
clares it ; whence the Conclujion is evidently de- 
duced, that the wicked Man is ?niferable. 

In many affirmative Syllogifms we may fuppofe 
either the Major or the Minor to contain the Con- 
clusion, and the other to fhew it; for there is no 
great Difference. But in negative Syllogifms it is 
the negative Proportion that contains the Conclu- 
iion, and the affirmative Proportion fhews it ; as, 
every wife Man majlers his FaJJions ; no angry Man 
majlers his Paffions ; therefore no angry Man is wife* 
Here it is more natural to fuppofe the Minor to 
be the containing Propoftion ; it is the Minor impli- 
citly denies Wifdom concerning an angry Man y be- 
catife jiiqjzering the Pafjions is included in Wifdom y 
and the Major (hews it. 

Note, This Rule may be applied to complex and 
conjunctive ', as well as fimpie Syllogifms, and is 
adapted to fhew the Truth or FaKhood of any of 
them. 

II. The fecond is this ; As the Terms in every 
Syllogifm are ufually repeated twice y fo they mufl be 
taken precifely in the fame Senfe in both places : For 
{he greateft Part of Mi (lakes that arife in forming 
Syllogifms, is derived from fomc little Difference 
jn the Senfe of one of the Terms in the two Parts of 
the Syllogifm wherein it is ufed. Let us con^der 
the following Sophifms. 

1 . It is a Sin to kill a Man ; a Murderer is a 
Man ; therefore, it is a Sin to kill a Murderer. Flere 
the Word /{"///in the firft Proportion lignites to kill 
unjujtty> or without Law ; in the Conclu^on it is 
taken abfolutely for putting a Man to Death in gc* 
neraL and therefore the Inference is not good. 

2. What 



CH. III.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 325 

2. What I am , you are not ; but 7" am a Man\ 
therefore you are not a Man. This is a relative Syl- 
logifm : But. if it be reduced to a regular 'categorical 
Form, it will appear there is Ambiguity in the 
Terms, thus ; What I am, is a Man ; you are not 
what I ara ; therefore you are not a Man. Here 
what I am in the major Proportion is taken fpe~ 
daily tor my Nature \ but in the minor Proportion 
the fame Words are taken individually for my Per- 

Jon ; therefore the Inference muft be falfe, for the 
Syllogifm docs not take the Term what I am both 
Times in the fame fenfe. 

3. He that fays you are an Animal, fays true \ y b\\t 
he that fays you are a Goofe, fays you are an Animal \ 
therefore, he that fays you are a Goofe, fays true. In 
the major Proportion the Word Animal is the Pre- 
dicate of an incidental Propofiticn ; which incidental 
Proportion being affirmative, renders the Predicate 
of it particular, according to Chap. II. Seel. 2. 
Axiom 3. and confequently the Word Animal there 
fignires only human Animality. In the major Pro- 
portion the Word Animal, for the fame Reafon, 
iignires the Animality of a Goofe ; whereby it be- 
comes an ambiguous Perm, and unrt to build the 
Concluron upon. Or if you fay, the Word Animal 
in the Minor, is taken for human Animality, then 
the Minor is evidently falfe. 

It is from this laft general Tefi of Syllogifms. that 
we derive the Cuftom of the Refpondent in anfwer- 
ing the Arguments of the Opponent, which is to 
diringuifh upon the major or minor Proportion, 
and declare which Term is ufed in two Senfes, and 
in what Senfe the Proportion may be true 5 and in 
$rhat Senfe it is falfe. 



CHAP. 



326 &OGICK : OR; THE [PART IIT. 



CHAP. IV. 



Some general Rules to direct our Reafonhig. 

OST of the general and fpecial Directions 
given to form our Judgments aright in the 
preceding Part of Logick might be rehearfed here; 
for the Judgments which' we pafs upon Things are 
generally built on fome fecret Reafonihg or Argu- 
ment by which the Proportion is fuppofed to be 
proved. But there may be yet fome farther Af- 
fifrances given to our reajoning Powers in their 
Search after Truth, and an Obiervation of the fol- 
lowing Rules will be of great Importance for that 
End. 

Rule I. Accujlom your) elves to clear and dijlincl 
Ideas i to evident Proportions, tojlrong and convincing 
Arguments. Converfe much with thofe Friends, and 
thole Books, and thofe Parts of Learning, where 
yon meet with the greateft Clearnefs of Thought, 
and Force of Rcafoning. The mathematical Sci- 
ences, and particularly Ariihmeiick^ Geometry, and 
Mechanicks^ abound with thefe Advantages : And 
if there were nothing valuable in them for the Ufes 
of human Life, yet the very fpeculative Parts of 
this Sort of Learning' are well worth our ftudy ; 
for by perpetual Examples they teach us to conceive 
with Clearnefs, to connect our Ideas and Propor- 
tions in a Train of Dependence, to Reafon with 
Strength and Demon fl ration, and to diftinguifli 
between Truth and Falfhood. Something of thefe 
Sciences fhould be ftudied by every Man who pre- 
tends to Learning, and that, as Mr. Locke cxprefTes 

it. 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP SEASON. 327 

it, not fo much to make us Mathematicians^ as to make 
us reasonable Creatures. 

We mould gain fuch a Familiarity with Evi- 
dence of Perception and Force of Reafoning, and 
get fuch a Habit of difcerning clear Trirhs, that 
the Mind may he foon offended with Obfrurity 
and Confufion : Then we (hall, as it were, natu- 
rally and with Eale reftrain our Minds from rafh 
Judgment, before we attain juft Evidence of the 
Propofition which is offered to us: and we (hall 
with the fame Eafe, and, as it were, naturally feize 
and embrace every Truth that is propofed with juft 
Evidence. 

This Habit of 'conceiving clearly ', of judging jujlly, 
and of realoning well, is not to be aitained merely 
by the Happinefs of Constitution, the Brightness 
of Genius, the belt natural Parts, or the heft Col- 
lection of logical Precepts : It is Cuflom and Prac» 
the that mujl form and eilablifh this Habit. We 
mult apply ourfelves to it till we perform all this 
readilv and without reflecYme on Rules. A cohe- 
rent Thinker \ and a Jlricl Reafoner^ is not to be 
made at once by .a Set ot Rules, any more than a 
good Painter or Mufician may be formed extempore ', 
by an excellent Lecture on Mufick or Painting. 
It is of infinite importance, therefore, in our youn- 
ger Years, to be taught both the Value and the 
Praclice of conceiving clearly, and realoning right: 
For when we are grown up to the Middle of Life, 
or part it, it is no wonder that we fhould not learn 
good Realoning, any more than that an ignorant 
Clown mould not be able to learn fine Language, 
Dancing, or a courtly Behaviour, when his ruftic 
Airs have grown up with him till the Age of 
Forty. 

Y For 



328 LOGICK : OR, THE [p'AET lit. 

For want of this Care, fo?ne Perfons of Rank and 
Education dwell all their Days among obfcure Ideas ^ 
they conceive and judge always in Confufion, they 
take weak Arguments for Demonstration, they an* 
led away with the Difguifcs and Shadows of Truth, 
Now if fueh Perfons happen to have a bright Ima- 
gination, a Volubility of Speech, and a Copioufhefs 
of Language, they not only impofe many Errors 
upon their own Underfrandings, but they (lamp 
the Image of their own Miftakes upon their Neigh- 
bours alfo, and fpread their Errors abroad. 

It is a Matter of jufl Lamentation and Pity, to 
confider the Weaknefs of the common Multitude of 
Mankind in this Refpeel, how they receive any 
Thing into their AfTent upon the moft trifling 
Grounds. True Reafoning hath very little Share 
in forming their Opinions. They relift the moft 
convincing Arguments by an obftinate Adherence 
to their Prejudices, and believe the moft impro- 
bable Things with the greateft Affurance. They 
talk of the abftrufeft Myfteries, and determineupon 
them with the utmoft Confidence, and without jufl 
Evidence either from Reafon or Revelation. A 
confufed Heap of dark and inconfiftent Ideas make 
up a good Part of their Knowledge in Matters of 
Philofofhy as well as Religion, having never been 
taught the Ufe and Value of clear and juft Rea- 
foning. 

Yet it mult be flill con felled that there are fome 
Myjieries in Religion, both natural and revealed, as- 
well as fome abjirufe Points in Pbilofophy, wherein 
the Wife as well as the Unwife mull be content 
with obfcure Ideas! There are feveral Things,, 
efpecially relating to the invilibie World, which 
arc unfearehable in our prefent State, and there- 
fore we muft believe what Revelation plainly dic- 
tates. 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 329 

tates, though the Ideas may be obfcure. Reafon 
itfelf demands this of us; but we mould feek for 
the brighteft Evidence both of Ideas, and of the 
Connection of them, wherefoever it is attainable. 

Rule IT. Enlarge your general Acquaintance with 
Tidings daily i in order to attain a rich Furniture of 
Topicks, or middle Terms, whereby thofe Proportions 
which occur may be either proved or dif proved ; but 
efpecially meditate and enquire with great Diligence 
and Exaclnefs into the Nature, Properties, Circum- 
fiances and Relations of the particular Subjecl about 
which you judge or argue. Coniider its Caufes, Ef- 
fects, Confequences, A ijuncls, Gppofites, Signs, 
&c. fo far as is needful to your prefent Purpofe* 
You mould furvey a Queftion round about, and on 
all Sides, and extend yonr Views as far as poffible, 
to every Thing that has a Connection with it. This 
Practice has many Advantages in it; as,. 

1. It will be a Means to fuggeft to your Mind 
proper Topicks for Argument about any Propor- 
tion that relates to the fame Subjecl. 

1. It will enable you with greater Readinefs and 
Juflnefs of Thought to give an anfver to any fud- 
den Quetlion upon that Subjrcl, whether it arifes 
in your own Mind, or is propofed by others. 

3. This will inftrucl you to give a plainer and 
fpeedier Solution of any Difficulties that may at- 
tend the Theme of your Difcourfe, and to refute 
the Objections of thofe who have efpoufed a con- 
trary Opinion. 

4. By fuch a large Survey of the whole Subjecl 
in all its Properties and Relations,. you will be bet- 
ter fecured from Inconfiftencies, that is, from avert- 
ing or denying any Thing in one Place, which 
contradicts what you have aiTerted or denied in 

Y 2 another ; 



330 LOGICK ! OH, THE [^ART III. 

another : And to attain thefe Ends, an Exten five- 
nefs of Undertaking, and a large Memory, are of 
unfpeakable Service. 

One would be ready to wonder foinetimes bow 
eafily great and wife and learned Men are led into 
Affcrtions in fome Parts of the fame Treatifc, 
which are found to be fcarce confident with what 
they have afierted in other Places : But the true 
Reafon is, the Narrownefs of the Mind of Man, that 
it cannot take in all the innumerable Properties and 
Relations of one Subject with a fingle View ; and 
therefore whilft they are intent on one particular 
Part of their Theme, they bend all their Force of 
Thought to prove or difprove fome Propofition 
that relates to that Part, without a fufficient Atten- 
tion to the Confequences which may flow from it, 
and which may unhappily affect another Part of the 
fame Subject ; and by this Means they are fome- 
times led to fay Things which are inconfifrent. 
In fuch a Cafe, the great Dealers in Difpute and 
Controverfy take Pleafure to caft Nonfenfe and Self 
Contradiction on their Antagonifl, with huge and 
hateful Reproaches. For my Part, I rather choofe 
to pity human Nature, whofe neceffary Narrownefs 
of UnderfTanding expofes us all to fome Degrees 
of this Frailty. But the moil extenlive Survey 
poffible of our whole Subject is the beft Remedy 
againfl it. It is our judging and arguing upon a 
partial View of Things, that expofes us to Mif- 
takes, and pufhes us into Abfurdities, or at leaft 
to the very Borders of them. 

Rule III. hifearching the Knowledge of Things, 
always keep the precife Point of the prefent Quef 
lion in your Eye. Take Heed that you add nothing to 
it while you are arguing, nor omit any Part of it. 

Watch 



CH* IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 331 

Watch carefully left any new Ideas Aide in to 
mingle themfelves either with the Subject or the 
Predicate. See that the Queftion be not altered by 
the Ambiguity of any Word taken in different 
Senfes ; nor left any fecret Prejudices of your own, 
or the fophiftical Arts of others, cheat your Under- 
ftanding by changing the Queftion, or fhuffling in 
any Thing elfe in its Room. 

And for this End it is ufeful to keep the precife 
Matter of Enquiry as ftmple as may be, and difen- 
gaged from a Complication of Ideas, which do not 
neceffarily belong to it. By admitting a Compli- 
cation of Ideas, and taking too many Things at 
once into one Queftion, the Mind is fometimes 
dazzled and bewildered, and the Truth is loft in 
fuch a Variety and Confufton of Ideas ; whereas 
by limiting and narrowing the Queftion, you take 
a fuller Survey of the whole of it. 

By keeping the lingle Point of Enquiry in our 
conftant View, we fhall be fecured from fudden, 
rafh, and impertinent Refponfes and Determina- 
tions, which fome have obtruded inftead of Solu- 
tions and folid Anfwers, before they perfectly knew 
the Queftions, 

Rule IV. When y-ou have exafily conjtdered the 
preeife Point of Enquiry, or what is unknown in the 
Queftion, then conjider what, and how much you know 
already of this Queftion, or of the Ideas and Terms of 
which it is compofed. It is by a Com pari fon of the 
known and unknown Parts of the Queftion toge- 
ther, that you find what Reference the Part known 
hath unto, or what Connection it hath with the 
Thing that is fought: Thofe Ideas, whereby the 
known and unknown Parts of the Queftion are 
connected, will furmfh you with middle Terms or 

Y 3 Argu-« 



332 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART lit, 

Arguments whereby the Things propofed may be 
proved or dii proved. 

In this Part of your Work, namely, Comparing 
Ideas together*, take due Time, and be not too hairy 
to come to a Determination, efpeeially m Points of* 
Importance. Some Men when they fee a little 
Agreement or £)H agreement between Ideas, they 
prefume a great deal, and to jump into the Con- 
clufion : This is a fhort Way to Fancy, Opinion 
and Conceit, but a moll unfafe and uncertain Way 
to true Knowledge and Wifdom. 

Eulr V. In c hoofing your middle Terms or Argu* 
ments to prove any Queftion^ always take fuch Topicks 
as are fureft^ and leaf fallible ; and which carry the 
great eft Evidence and- Strength with them. Be not fo 
foiienous about the Number, as ihe Weight of your 
Arguments, efpeeially in proving any Proportion 
wheh admits of natural Certainty , or of compleai 
Demonfrat'wn. Many Times we do Injury to a 
Caufe by dwelling upon trifling Arguments. We 
amufc our Heareis with uncertainties, by multi- 
plying the Number of feeble Reafonings, before 
we mention thofe which are more fubftantial, con- 
clusive and convincing. And too often we yield 
up our own Alien? to mere probable Arguments, 
where ceuain proofs may be obtained. 

"1 et it mutf be confeffed, there are many Cafes 
wen rein the g owing Number of probable Argu- 
ments i icrcaics (he Degree of Probability, and gives 
a great and fufbcient Confirmation to the Ttinh 
which i- fought ; as, 

(i.) "When we are enquiring the true Senfe of 
any W »rd or Phrafe, we arc more confirmed in 
the S 'Unification of it, by finding the lame Expre£- 
fiori to w[r(\ in feveral Authors, or in feveral Places 
of the lame Author. 

(2.) When 



<:H. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 333 

(2.) When we are fearching out the true Mean- 
ing or Opinion of any Writer, or enquiring into 
any facred Doctrine of Scripture, we come to a 
iurer Determination of the Truth by feveral diftinct 
Places wherein the fame Thing is exprefled or 
plainly implied ; becaufe it is not fo probable that 
an honeft ikilful Reader fhouid miftake the mean- 
ing of the Writer in many Places, as he may in 
one or two. 

(3.) When we would prove the Importance of 
any fcriptural Doctrine or Duty, the Multitude of 
Texts wherein it is repeated and inculcated upon 
the Reader, feems naturally to inftruct us that it 
is a Matter of greater Importance, than other 
Things which are but ilightly or fingly mentioned 
in the Bible. 

(4.) In fearching out Matters of Fa 61 in Times 
paft, or in diftant Places, in which Cafe moral EvL 
dence is fufficient, and moral Certainty is the utmoft 
w r hich can be attained, here we derive a greater 
AfTurance of the Truth of it by a Number of Per- 
fons, or a Multitude of Circumftances concurring 
to bear Witnefs to it. 

(5.) From many Experiments in natural Philofo- 
pby we more fafely infer a general Theorem, than 
we can from one or two. 

(6.) In Matters which require prefent Practice, 
both facred and civil, we rnuft content ourfelves 
oftentimes with a mere Preponderation ofprobabfe 
Reafons or Arguments. Where there are feveral 
Reafons on each Side, for and againft a Thing that 
is to be done or omitted, a fmall Argument added 
to. the Heap may juftly turn the Balance on one 
Side, and determine the Judgment, as I have noted 
in the Second Part of LogicL 

Y4 To 



334 toGiCK : or, the [part nr. 

To conclude- ■• ; a growing Acquaintance with 
Matters of Learning, and a daily Improvement of 
our Undemanding in Affairs human and divine, 
will belt teach us to judge and dittinguihh in what 
Cafes the Number of Arguments adds to their 
Weight and Force : It is only experience can fully 
inform us when wemuftbe determined by probable 
Tof'cks, and when we mull feek and expedt Demon* 
Jl rat ions* 

Rule VI Prove your Conelufion (as far as pof 
Jible) by' fame Proportions that are in them/elves more . 
plain , evident., ana certain, than the Conelufion \ or 
at leafi fuch as are more known, and more intelligible 
to the perfon whom you would convince. If we neglect 
this Rule, v\e (hall endeavour to enlighten that 
which is obfeure by fomething equally or more 
obfeure, and to confirm that which is doubtful by 
fomething equally or more uncertain. Common 
Senle dictates to all Men, that it is unpoilible to 
eftablifh any Truth, and to convince others of it, 
but by fomething that is better known to them 
than that Truth is. 

Bull VII. Labour in all your A rguings to enlighten 
the Underflanditig, is well as to conquer and capti- 
vate the Judgjient. Arpuc in luch a Manner as 
may give a natural (lift i.cl, and tolid Knowledge 
of Things* to yo'ui Hc< icrs, as well as to force their 
Aficnt b\ a mere Proof at the Queftion. Now to 
att.iin this End, the chief Topick or Medium of 
your D 1 odtraiion mould be fetched as much as 
pofliblc, from the IN;. ture of the Thing to be proved, 
or trom I of Things which are moil naturally con- 
nected With it. 

Geometri* 



CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 335 

Geometricians fometimes break this Rule with- 
out Neceffity, two Ways, namely, 

1. When they prove one Proportion only by 
fhewing what Abfurdities will follow if the con- 
tradictory Proportion be fuppofed or admitted t 
This is called Reduclio ad Abfurdum*, or Demonftra- 
tio per Impojfibile. As for In (lance, When they prove 
ail the Radii of a Circle to be equal, by fuppofing one 
Radius to be longer or fhorier than another, and 
then {hewing what abfurd Confequences will fol- 
low. 1 his, I confefs, forces the Aflent, but it does 
not enlighten the Mind, by fhewing the true Rea- 
fon and Caufe why all Radii are equal, which is de- 
rived from the very Construction of a Circle: For 
fince a Circle is formed by fixing one End of a 
ftraight Line in the Centre, and moving the other 
End round, (or which is all one, by Compaffes kept 
open to a certain Extent) it follows evidently that 
every Part of the Circumference being thus de- 
fcribed, mud be equally diftant from the Center, 
and therefore the Radii, which are Lines from the 
Center to the Circumference, muft be all equal. 

2. Geometricians forget this Ride when they 
heap up many far-fetched Lines, Figures and Pro- 
portions to prove fome plain, fimple, and obvious 
Propofition. This is called a Demonftration per 
aliena Iff remota, or an Argument from unnatural 
and remote Mediums : As if, in order to prove the 
Radii of a Circle are all equals I ihould make fe- 

vera! 

* Note, This Rule chiefly refers to the Hftablijbmcnt of fome 
Truth, rather than to the Refutation of Error. It is a very 
common and ufeful Way of arguing, to refute a falfe Propor- 
tion, by {hewing what evident balfhood or Abfurdity will fol- 
low from it : For what Fropofition foever is really abfurd and 
falfe, does effectually prove that Principle to be falfe from which 
it is derived; fo that this Way of refuting an Error, is not fo 
ufually called Redtiilto ad Abfmdum^ 



S3fj LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART III. 

veral Triangles and Squares about the Circle, and 
then from fome Properties and Proportions of 
Squares and Triangles prove that the Radii of a 
Circle are equal* 

Yet it mufl be confefled, that fometimes fuch 
Queftions happen, that it is hard!}' poilible to prove 
them by dired Arguments drawn from the Nature 
of Things, &c. and then it may not only be lawful 
but necefiary to ufe indirect Proofs, and Arguments 
drawn from remote Mediums, or from the Abfurdity 
sf the contradictory Suppqfitions. 

Such indireel and remote Arguments may alfo 
be fometimes ufed to confirm a Proportion, which 
has been before proved by Arguments more dircei 
and immediate. 

Rule VIII. Though Arguments fhould give 
Light to the Subject, as well as conftrain the Af- 
fent, you mud learn to diftinguijh well between an 
Explication and an Argument, and neither impofe upon- 
yourf elves, nor ffjfer yourf elves to be impofe d upon by 
others ) by miftaking a mere Ulujiration for a convin" 
cing Reafon, 

Axioms themfelves, or felf-evident Proportions, 
may want an Explication or Ulujiration, though they 
are not to be proved by Reafoning. 

Similitudes and Allufions have oftentimes a very 
happy Inflaenee to explain fome' difficult Truth, 
and to render the Idea of it familiar and eafy. 
Where the Refemblance is juft and accurate, the 
Influence of a Simile may proceed fo far as to (hew 
the Poflibility of the Thing in Queftion : But 67- 
miliiudes muft not be taken as a folid Proof of the 
Truth or Exiftence of thofe Things to which they 
have a Refemblance. A too great Deference paid 
to Similitudes, or an utter Rejection of them, feem 

to 



CH. IV.] RIGHT tTSE OF KEASON. 33? 

to be two Extremes, and ought to be avoided. The 
late ingenious Mr. Locke, even in his Enquiries 
after Truth, makes great Ufe of Similes for fre- 
quent Illuftration, and is very happy in the Inven- 
tion of them, though he warns us alfo left we mi£- 
take them for conclufive Arguments. 

Yet let it be noted here, that a Parable or a Si- 
militude ufed by any Author, may give a (ufficient 
Proof of the true Senle and Meaning of that Au- 
thor, provided that we draw not this Similitude 
beyond the Scope and Defign for which it was 
brought ; as when our Saviour affirms, Rev. iii. 3. 
/ will come on thee as a Thief', this will plainly prove 
that he defcribes the Unexpeclednefs of his Appear- 
ance, though it is by no Means to be drawn to iig^ 
nify any Injuftice in his Defign. 

Rule IX In your whole Courfe of Reafoning keep 
your Mind Jincerely intent on the Purfuit of Truths 
and follow folid Argument wherefoever it leads you* 
Let not a Party Spirit , nor any Pajfion or Prejudice 
whatfoev^r, ftop or avert the Current of your Rea- 
foning in Qaeft of true Knowledge. 

When you are enquiring therefore into any Sub- 
ject, maintain a due Regard to the Arguments and 
Objections on both Sides of a Queftion : Confider, 
compare, and balance them well, before you de- 
termine for one Side. It is a frequent, but a very 
faulty Practice, to hunt after Arguments only to 
make good one Side of a Queftion, and entirely to 
neglect and refufe thofe which favour the other 
Side. If we have not given a due Weight to Ar- 
guments on both Sides, we do but wilfully mif- 
guide our Judgment, and abufe our Reafon, by for- 
bidding its Search after Truth. When we efpoufe 
Opinions by a fecret Bias on the Mind, through 
the Influences of Fear, Hope, Honour, Credit, In- 
terest, 



338 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART. HI. 

ierefti or any other Prejudice \ and then feek Argu- 
ments only to fupport thofe Opinions, we have 
neither done our Duty to God nor to ourfelves ; 
and it is a Matter of mere Chance if we '(tumble 
upon Truth in our Way to Eafe and Preferment. 
The Power of Reafoning was given us by our Maker 
for this very End, to purfue Truth ; and we abufe 
one of his richefl Gifts, if we bafely yield it up to 
be led attray by any of the meaner Powers of Na- 
ture, or the perifhing Interefts of this Life. Rea» 
fan itfelf, if honeftly obeyed, will lead us to receive 
the divine Revelation of the Gofpel, where it is duly 
propofed, and this will (hew us the Path of Life 
everlafting. 



THE 



RIGHT USE OP REASON. 339 



THE 



FOURTH PART 



OF 



L O G I C K 



Of Di/fiofition and Method. 

IT is not merely a clear and dijlincl Idea, a well 
formed Proportion, or a juji Argument, that is 
fufficient to fearch out and communicate the 
Knowledge of a Subject. There muft be a Variety 
and Series of them difpofed in a due Manner, in 
order to attain this End : And therefore it is the 
Defign of the laft Part of Logick, to teach us the 
Art of Method. It is that muft fecure our Thoughts 
from that Confufion, Darknefs and Miftake, which 
unavoidably attend the Meditations and Difcourfes 
even of the brighteft Genius who defpifesthe Rules 
of it. 

I. We fhall here confider the Nature of Method, 
and the fever al Kinds of it. 

II. Lay down the general Rules of Method, with 
a few Particulars under them. 

CHAP. 



34fc LOGICK : OK, THE £ PART IV. 



CHAP. L 

Of the Nature of Method, and the fever al Kinds 
of it, namely, Natural and Arbitrary, Syn- 
thetick and Analytick. 

METHOD, taken in the largeft Senfe, implies 
the placing of fever al Things , or performing 
fever al Operations, in fuch an Order, as is moft con- 
venient to attain fome End propofed : And in this 
Senfe it is applied to all the vt oiks of Nature and 
Art, to all the divine Affairs of Creation and Pro- 
vidence; and to the Artifices Schemes, Contri- 
vances and Practices of Mankind, whether in na- 
tural, civil, or facred Affairs. 

Now this orderly Dlpoiition of Things includes 
the Ideas of Prior, Pofierior, and Simultaneous ; of 
Superior, Inferior, and. Equal', of Beginning, End, 
and Middle, &c. which are defcribe>i more par- 
ticularly among the general Affeclions of Being, in 
Ontology. 

But in Logick Method is ufually taken in a more 
limited Senle, and the Nature of it is thusdefcribed: 
Method is the Difpojition of a Variety of Thoughts on 
any Subjecl, in fuch Order as may befi ferve to find 
oat unknown Truths, to explain and confirm Truths 
that are known, or to fix them in the Memory. 

It is diftributed into two general Kinds, namely, 
Natural and Arbitrary. 

Natural Method is that which obferves the Or- 
der of Nature, and proceeds in fuch a Manner, as 
that the Knowledge of the Things which follow, 
depends in a great Meafure on the Things which 

8° 



€H. 1-3 RIGHT USE OP REASON. 341 

go before, and this is twofold, viz. Synthetick and 
Analytick, which are fometimes called Synt hefts, and 
Analyfis* 

Synthetick Method is that which begins with. the 
.Parts-f~, and leads onward to the Knowledge of 
the Whole ; it begins with the mod fimple Prin- 
ciples, and general Truths, and proceeds by De- 
grees to that which is drawn from them, or com- 
pounded 

* The Word Analyjis has three or four Senfes, "which it may 
not be improper to take Notice of here. 

t. It fignifies the general and particular Heads of a Difcourfe, 
with their mutual Connections, both co-ordinate and fubordi 
nate, drawn out by Way of Abftract into one or more Tables, 
which are frequently placed like an Index at the Beginning or 
End of a Book. 

2. It iignifies the refolving of a Difcourfe into its various 
Subjects and Arguments, as when any Writing of the ancient 
Prophets is refolved into the prophetical, hifiorical, doflrinal, 
and practical Parts of it ; it is laid to be analyfed in general, 
when a Sentence is didinguifhed in the Nouns, the Kerbs? 
Pronouns, Ad'verbb, and other particles of Speech which com- 
pofe it, then it is faid to be analyfed grammatically ■. When the 
lame Sentence is diftinguifhed into %ubjecl and Predicate, Pra- 
poftion, Argument, Ail, Object, Caufe, Ejfetf, Adjunct, Oppo~ 
Jite > &c. then it is analyfed logically and mstaphyfcally. This lat'i 

is what is chiefly meant in the theological Schools, when they 
fpeak of analyfng a Text of Scripture. 

3. Analysis Iignifies particularly the Science of Algebra? 
wherein a Quedion being propofed, one or more Letters, as, 
x, y, %, or Vowels, as «, e , /, &c. are made Ufe of to fignify 
the unknown Number, which being intermingled with feverai 
known Numbers in the Queition, is at iaft, by the Rules of 
Art, feparated or releafed from that Entanglement, and its par- 
ticular Value is found out by mewing its Equation, or Equality 
to fome known Number. 

4. It figmfies analytical Method, as here explained in Logick. 

f Note. It is conferred that Synthesis often begins with the 
Genus, and proceeds to the Species and Individuals. But the genus 
or generick Nature is then confkiered only as a physical or ejjintml 
Part of the Species, though it be fometimes called an univefal. 
or logical Whole. Thus fynthetick Method maintains its own Der 
fcription Mill, for its begins with the Parts, and proceeds to the- 
Whole, which is compofed of them. 



342 LOGICK, OK, THE [PART HI. 

pounded of them : And therefore it is called the 
Method of Compojition. 

Analytick Method takes the whole compound as 
it finds it, whether it be a Species or an Individual, 
and leads us into the Knowledge of it, by refolving 
it into its firft Principles or Parts, its generick Na- 
ture, and its fpecial Properties ; and therefore it is 
called the Method of Refolution. 

Asfynthetick Method is generally ufed in teaching 
the Sciences after they are invented, fa analytick is 
moft praclifed in finding out Things unknown. 
Though it niuft be confefTed, that both Methods 
are fometimes employed to find out Truth and to 
communicate it. 

If we know the Parts of any Subject eafier and 
better than the Whole, we confidcr the Parts dif- 
tindrJv, and by putting them together, we come to 
the Knowledge of the Whole. So in Grammar, 
we firlt learn to know Letters, we join them to 
make Syllables, out of Syllables we compofe Words, 
and out o Words we.nhke Sentences and Difcourfes. 
So the Phyjician and Apothecary knows the Nature 
and Powers of his Simples, namely, his Drugs, his 
Herbs, his Minerals, &c, and putting ihem toge- 
ther, and confidermg their fpveral Virtues, he finds 
what will be the Nature and Powers of the Bolus, 
or any compound Medicine: This is the fynthetick 
Method. 

But if we are better acquainted with the Whole 
than we are with particular Parts, then we divide 
or relolve the Whole into its Parts, and thereby 
gain a diftincl Knowledge of them. So in vulgar 
Life we learn in the grois what Plants or Minerals 
are; and then by Chemiftry we gam the Knowledge 
of Salt, Sulphur, Spirit, Water, Earth, which are 
the Principles ot them. So we are firft acquaint- 
ed with the whole Body of an Animal, and then 

by 



CH. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON". 343 

by Anatomy or Dijfefiion, we come to learn all the 
inward and outward Parts of it. This is the analytic 
Method. 

According to this moft general and obvious Idea 
of fynthetick and analytick Method, they differ from 
each other as the Way which leads up from a 
Valley to a Mountain differs from itfclf, con fide reel 
as it leads down from the Mountain to the Valley ; 
or as St Matthew and St. Luke prove Chrift to be 
the Son of Abraham ; Luke finds it out by Analyfis, 
riling from Chri/i to his Anceftors ; Matthew teaches 
it in the fynthetick Method, beginning from Abra- 
ham, and (hewing that Chrift is found among his 
Pcfterity. Therefore it is a ufual Thing in the Sci- 
ences, when we have by Analyfts found out a Truth, 
we ufe the fynthetick Method to explain and deliver 
it, and prove it to be true. 

In this eafy View of Things, thefe two Kinds of 
Method may be preferved confpicuoufly, and en- 
tirely diviincf : But the Subjects of Knowledge be- 
ing infinite, and the Ways whereby we arrive at 
this Knowledge being almofl infinitely various, it 
is very difficult, and almoft impofiible, always to 
maintain the precife Diftinction between thefe two 
Methods. 

This will evidently appear in the following Ob* 
fervations. 

Obferv. I. Analytick Method being ufed chiefly to 
find out Things unknown, it is not limited or con- 
fined merely to begin with fame whole Subject, and 
proceed to the Knowledge of its Parts, but it takes 
its Rife fometimes from any fmgle Part or Property, 
or from any thing whatsoever that belongs to a 
Subject which happens to be firlt and moft eafily 
known, and thereby enquires into the more ab- 
flrufe and unknown Parts, Properties, Caufes, Ef- 
Z ' feds, 



344 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART IV. 

fects, and Modes of it, whether abfolute or rela- 
tive : As for inflance, 

(1.) Anatyfis finds out Caufes by their Effects. 
So in the lpcculative Part of natural Philofophy, 
when we obfcrve Light, Colours, Motions, Hard- 
nefs, Softnefs, and other Properties and Powers of 
Bodies, or any of the common or uncommon Ap- 
pearances of Things either on Earth or in Heaven, 
we fearch out the Caufes of them. So by the va- 
rious Creatures we find out the Creator, and learn 
his Wifdom, Power and Goodnefs. 

(2.) It. finds out Effects by their Caufes. So the 
practical and mechanical Part of natural Philofophy 
confiders fuch Poweis of Motion, as the Wind, the 
Fire, and the Water, &c. and then contrives what 
Ufes they may be applied to, and what will be their 
Effects in order to make Mills and Engines of va- 
rious Kinds. 

(3.) It finds out the general and fpecial Nature 
of a Thing by eonfidering t»he various Attributes 
of the Individuals, and obferving what is common 
and what is proper, what is accidental, and what is 
efTcntial. So by furveying the Colour,, the Shape, 
Motion, Reji, Place, Solidity, Extenfion of Bodies, 
we come to find that the Nature of Body in general 
hfolid Extenfion ; becaufe all other Qualities of Bo- 
dies are changeable, but this belongs to all Bodies, 
and it endures through all Changes; and becaufe 
this is proper to Body alone, and agrees not to any 
Thing die ; and it is the Foundation of all other 
Properties. 

(4.) It finds out the remaining Properties or 
Parts of a Thing, by having lb me Parts or Properties 
given. So the Area of a Triangle is found by know- 
ing the Height and the Bafe. So by having two 
Sides, and an Angle of a Triangle given, we find the 
remaining Side and Angles. So when we know Co- 
gitation 



GH. I.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 345 

gitation is the prime Attribute of a Spirit, we infer 
its Immateriality ', and thence its' Immortality* 

(5.) Analyfis finds the Means neeeffary to attain a 
propofed End, by having the End firft affigned. 
So in morale political ', (Economical, Affairs, having 
propofed the Government of 'Self ] a Family, a Society 9 
or a Nation, in order to their bed Intereft, we con- 
flder ana fearch out what are the proper Lazvs, Rules 
and Means to effect it. So in the Practices of Ar- 
tificers ^ and the Manufacturers of various Kinds, 
the End being propofed, as, making Cloth, Houfes, 
Ships, &c. we find out Ways of compofing thefe 
Things for the feveral Ufes of human Life. But 
the putting any of thefe Means in Execution to at- 
tain the End, is fynthetick Method* 

Many other Particulars might be represented to 
(hew the various Forms of analytick Method, where- 
by Truth is found out, and fome of them come 
very near to fynthetick ; fo as hardly to be diflin- 
guifhed. 

Obferv. II. Not only the Investigation of Truth, 
but the Communication of it alfo is often practifed 
in fuch a Method, as neither agrees precifely to 
fynthetick or analytick. Some Sciences, if you con- 
sider the whole of them in general, are treated in 
fynthetick Order ; fo Phyfics, or. natural Philcfophy, 
begins ufually with an Account of the general Na- 
ture and Properties of Matter or Bodies, and by De- 
grees defcends to confider the particular Species of 
Bodies with their Powers and Properties ; yet it is 
very evident, that when Philofophers come to parti- 
cular Plants and Animals, then by Chemiftry and Ana- 
tomy they analyfe or refolve thofe Bodies into their 
feveral conilituent Parts. On the other Hand, Lc- 
gick is begun in analytick Method ; the Whole is di- 
vided into its integral Parts, according to the four 
Z 2 Operations 



% 

346 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART IV- 

Operations of the Mind ; yet here arid there fynthe- 
tick Method is ufed in the particular Branehes of it, 
for it treats of Ideas in general firft, and then de- 
fcends to the feveral Species of them ; it teaches us 
how Proportions are made up of Ideas, and Syllogifns 
of Propositions, which is the Order of Compofition. 

The antient Scholaflic Writers have taken a great 
deal of Pains, and engaged in ufelefs Difputes about 
thefe two Methods, and after all have not been able 
to give fuch an Account of them as to keep them 
entirely diftinct from each other, neither in the 
Theory nor in the Practice. Some of the Moderns 
have avoided this Confufion in fome Meafure, by 
confining themfelves to defcfibe almoft nothing 
elfe but the fynthetick and analytick Methods of Geo- 
??ietricians, and Algebraifls, whereby they have too 
much narrowed the Nature and Rules of Method, 
as though every Thing were to be treated in ?nathe- 
matical Forms. 

Upon the whole, I conclude, that neither of thefe 
two Methods fhould be too fcrupuloufly and fupci- 
ftitioufly purfued, either in the Invention or in the 
Communication of Knowledge. It is enough, if 
the Order of Nature be but obferved in making the 
Knowledge of Things following depend on the 
Knowledge of the Things which go before. Often- 
times a mixed Method will be found moft effectual 
for thefe Purpofes ; and indeed a wife and judi- 
cious Profpedl of our main End and Dcfign muft 
regulate all Method whatfoever. 

Here the Rides of natural Method ought to be 
propofed, (whether it be analytick or fynthetick, or 
mixed :) but it is proper firft to give fome Account 
of arbitrary Method, left it be thruft at too great a 
Diftance from the firft mention of it. 

Arbitrary Method leaves the Order of Nature, and 
accommodates itfelf to many purpofes; fuch as, to 

treafurc 



CH. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 347 

treafure up Things, and retain them in Memory,; 
to harangue and perfuade Mankind to any Practice 
in the religious or the civil Life ; or to delight, 
amufe, or entertain the Mind. 

As for the Affiftance of the Memory, in 'mod 
Things a natural Order has an happy Influence ; 
for Reafon itfelf deducing one Thing from another, 
greatly affifts the Memory by the natural Connec- 
tion and mutual Dependence of Things. But there 
are various other Methods which Mankind have 
made Ufe of for this Purpofe, and indeed there are 
fome Subjects that can hardly be reduced to Ana- 
lyfis or Synthefis. 

In reading or writing Hi/lory, fome follow the 
Order of the Governors of a Nation, and difpofe 
every Tran faction under their particular Reigns : So 
the facred Books of Kings and Chronicles are writ- 
ten. Some write in A?inals or Journals, and make 
a new Chapter of every Year. Some put all thofe 
Tranfactions together which relate to one Subjecl : 
that is, all the Affairs of one War, one League, one 
Confederacy, one Qouncil, &c. though it lafted many 
Years, and under many Rulers. 

So in writing the Lives of Men, which is called 
Biography, fome Authors follow the Tract of their 
Tears, and place every Thing in the precife Order 
of Time when it occurred : Others throw the Tem- 
per and Character of the Perfons, their private Life, 
their public k Stations, their perfonal Occurrences, 
their domejliclz Conduct, their Speeches, their Boohs 
or Writings^ their Sicknefs and Death, into fo many 
di ft in 61 Chapters. 

In Chronology fome Writers make their Epochas 
to begin all with one Letter : So in the Book called 
Duclpr Hifloricus, the Periods all begin with C; as, 
Creation, Catcdyfm^ or Deluge, Chaldean Empire, 
Cyrus, Chrift, Conjlantine, <kc. Some divide their 
Z 3 Accounts 



348 LOGICK *. OR, THE [PART IV. 

Accounts of Time according to the four great 
Monarchies ; Ajfyfian, Perfian, Grecian and Ro- 
man. Others think it ferves the Memory beft to 
divide all their Subjects into the remarkable Num- 
ber of Sevens ; fo Prideaux has written an Intro* 
duclion to Ilijlory And there is a Book of Divinity 
called Fajciadus Controverfarium, by an Author of 
the fame Name, written in the fame Method, 
wherein every Controverfy has /even Queflions be- 
longing to it ; though the Order of Nature feems 
to be too much neglected by a Confinement to this 
Jeptenary Number. 

1 hole Writers and Speakers, whofe chief Bufinefs 
is toamufe or delight, to allure, terrify, or perfuade 
Mankind, do not confine. themfelves to any natural 
Order, but in a cryptical or hidden Method, adapt 
every Thing to their deiigned Ends. Sometimes 
they omit thofe Things which might injure their De- 
fi gn, or grow tedious to their Hearers, thoueh they 
feem to have a neceffary Relation to the Point in 
Hand : Sometimes they add thofe Things which 
have no great Reference to the Subject, but are 
fuited to allure or refrefh the Mind and the Ear. 
They dilate fometimes, and flourifh long upon little 
Incidents, and they fkipover, and but lightly touch 
the drier Part of their Theme. They place thejirji 
Things lqfi 9 and the laft Things firjl, with won- 
drous Art, and yet fo manage it as to conceal their 
Artifice, and lead the Senfes and Paffions of their 
Hearers into a pleafingand powerful Captivity. 

It is chiefly Poefy and Oratory that require the 
Practice of this Kind of arbitrary Method: They 
omit Things cfTentia! which are not beautiful, they 
infert little need lets Circumftances, and beautiful 
Digreffions, they invert Times and Actions, in 
order to place every Thing in the moll: affecting 
Light, and for this End in their Practice they ne- 

gle6l 






CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 349 

gleet all logical Forms ; yet a good Acquaintance 
with the Forms of Logick and natural Method is of 
admirable Ufe to thofe who would attain thefe Arts 
in Perfection. Hereby they will be able to range 
their own Thoughts in fueh a Method and Scheme, 
as to take a more large and comprehenlive Survey of 
their Subject and Defign in all the Parrs of it; and 
by this Means they will better judge what to ehoofe 
and what to refute ; and how to drefs and manage 
the whole Scene before them, fo as to attain their 
own Ends with greater Glory and Succefs. 



CHAP. II. 

The Rules of Method, general and particular. 

THE general Requisites of true Method in the 
Purfuit or Communication of Knowledge, 
may be all comprifed under the following Heads. 
It muft be (\.) Safe. (2.) Plain and eaj). (3.) 
Diftmcl. (4.) Full or without Defecl. (5.) Short 
or without Superfluity. (6.) Proper to the Subjecl 
and the Dtjign. (7.) Connecled,. 

Rule I. Among all the Qualifications of a good 
Method, there is none more neceflary and impor- 
tant than that it fhoukl befafe andfecure from Er- 
ror ; and to this End thefe four particular or /fecial 
Directions (hould be obferved. 

] . Ufe great Care and Circumfpeclion in laying the 
Foundations of your Dtfcourfe, or your Scheme of 
Thoughts upon any Sutjecl. Thofe Propositions 
which arc to (tand as fii ft Principles, and on which 
the whole Argument depends, mull be viewed on 
all Sides with the iitmoft Accuracy, left an. Error 

being 



350 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART IV. 

being admitted there, fhould diffufe itfelf through 
the whole Subject. See therefore that jour gene- 
ral Definitions or Descriptions are as accurate as the 
Nature of the Thing will bear : See that your £■*- 
neral Divifions and Distributions be juft and cxacl, 
according to the Rules given in the firfl Part of 
Logick : See that youf Axioms be fufficiently evi- 
dent, fo as to demand the Aflent of thofe that ex- 
amine them with due Attention : See that your firji 
and more immediate Conjequences from thefe Principles 
be well drawn ; and take the fame Care of all other 
Proportions that have a powerful and fpreading In- 
fluence through the feveral Parts of your Dif- 
courfe. 

For want of this Care fometimes a large Treatife 
has been written by a long Deduction of Confe- 
quences from one or two doubtful Principles, which 
Principles have been effectually refuted in a few 
Lines, and thus the wholeTreatife has been deftroyed 
at once : So the largeff and faireft Building finks and 
tumbles to the Ground, if the Foundations and Cor- 
ner-Stones of it are feeble and inefficient. 

2. It is a very advifeable Thing that yowx primary 
and fundamental Propofitions be not only evide?it and 
true, but they Jhould be made a little familiar to the 
Mind by dwelling upon them before you proceed far- 
ther. By this Means you will gain fo full an Ac- 
quaintance with them, that you may draw Confe- 
quences from them with much more Freedom, 
with greater Variety, brighter Evidence, and with a 
firmer Certainty, than if you have but a flight and 
fuddcn View of them. 

3. As you proceed in the Connection of your 
Arguments, fee that your Ground be made firm in 
every Step. See that every Link of your Chain of 
.Rca foning be itrong and good : For if but one 

Link 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF EEASOK. 351 

Link be feeble and doubtful, the whole Chain of 
Arguments feels the Weaknefs of it, and lies cx- 
pofed to every Objector, and the original Queftion 
remains undetermined. 

4. Draw up all your Propojitions and Arguments 
with fo much Caution, and exprefs your Ideas with 
fuch a jajl Limitation, as may preclude or anticipate 
an) t Objections. Yet remember this is only to be 
done as tar as it is poilible, without too much in- 
tangling the Quciiion, or introducing complicated 
Ideas and obfeuring the Senfe. But if fuch a cau- 
tious and limited Diefs of the Quefiion ihould ren* 
der the Ideas too much complicated, or the Senfe 
obfeure, then it is better to keep the Argument 
more fimple, clear and ealv to be underftood, and 
afterwards mention the Objections diitinclly in their 
full Strength, and give a diftinct Anfwer to them. 

Rule II. Let your Method be plain and eafy, fo 
that your Hearers or Readers, as well as yourfelf, 
may run through it without Embarraflment, and 
may take a clear ;md comprehenfive View of the 
whole Scheme. To this End the following parti* 
cidar Direcliojis will be ufeful. 

] . Begin always with thofe Things which are beft 
known, and mqft obvious, whereby the Mind may have 
no Difficulty or Fatigue, and proceed by regular and 
eafy Steps to Things that are more difficult. And as 
far as poilible, let not the UnderLtanding, or the 
Proof of any of your Portions, depend on the Po- 
ll tions that follow, but always on thofe which go 
before. It is a Matter of Wonder that in fo know- 
ing an Age as this, there (hould be fo manv Per- 
fons offering Violence daily to this Rule, by teaching 
the Lathi Language by a Grammar written in Latin y 
which Method feems to require a perfect Know- 
ledge 



352 LOGICK : OR, THE [PAKT IV. 

ledge of an unknown Tongue, in Order to learn 
the firft Rudiments of it. 

2. Do not affeel excefjive Hq/le in learning or 
teaching any Science, nor hurry at once into the Midji 
of it, left you be too foon involved in feveral new 
and flrange Ideas and Propofitions, which cannot 
be well underftood without a longer and clofer 
Attention to thofe which go before. Such Sort of 
Speed is but a Wade of Time, and will conllrain 
you to take many Steps backward again, if you 
would arrive at a regular and compleat Knowledge 
of the Subject. 

3. Be not fond of crowding too many Thoughts and 
Reafonings into one Sentence or Paragraph, beyond the 
Apprehenfion or Capacity of your Readers or Rearers. 
There are fome Perfons of a good Genius and a 
capacious Mind, who write and fpeak very ob- 
fcurely upon this Account ; they affeel; a long Train 
of Dependencies before they come to a Period ; 
they imagine that they can never fill their Page with 
too much Senfe ; but they little think how they 
bury their own bed Ideas in the Crowd, and ren- 
der them in a Manner invifible and ufelefs to the 
greater! Part of Mankind. Such Men may be 
great Scholars, yet they are but poor Teachers. 

4. For the fame Rcafon avoid too many Subdivi- 
fions. Contrive your Scheme of Thoughts in fuch 

a Manner as may finifh your whole Argument with 
as few inferior Branchings as Rcafon will admit; 
and let them be fuch as are obvious and open to the 
Underftanding, that they may come within one 
fingle View of the Mind. This will not only affift 
the Underftanding to receive, but it will aid the 
Memory alfo to retain 'Truth : Whereas a Difcourfe 
cut out into a vaft Multitude of gradual Subordi- 
nations, has many Ineonvenicncics in it ; it gives 

Pain 



CH. II ] RIGHT USE OF REASON-. 353 

Pain to the Mind and Memory, in fur v eying and 
retaining the Scheme of Difcourfe, and expofes the 
unfkilful Hearers to mingle the fuperior and infe- 
rior Particulars together ; it leads them into a thick 
Wood inftead of open Day-light, and places them 
in a Labyrinth, in ft cad of a plain Path. 

5 . Give all Diligence in your younger Tears to ob- 
tain a clear and eafy Way of exprejfing your Concep- 
tions, that your Words, as fait as you utter them, 
may {tamp your own Ideas exaclly on the Mind of 
the Hearer. This is a mod happy Talent for the 
Conveyance of Truth, and an excellent Security 
againft Miftakes and needlefs Controverfies. 

Rule III. Let your Method be diflincl, and with- 
out the perplexing Mixture of Things that ought 
to be kept feparate, and this will be eafily prac- 
tifed by four Direclions. 

1. Do not bring unnecejfary heterogeneous* Mat- 
ter into your Difcourfe on any Subjecl ; that is, do not 
mingle an Argument on one Subjecl: with Matters 
that relate entirely to another, but juft fo far as is 
neceffary to give a clearer Knowledge of the Subjecl: 
in Hand. Examples in Logick may be borrowed 
from any of the Sciences to illudrate the Rules: 
But long Interpolations of 'natural Philofophy, of the 
Imagination and Pafjlons, of Agency of Spirits united 
to bodies, &c. break the Thread of Difcourfe, and 
perplex the Subjecl. 

2. Let every complicated Theme or Idea be divided 
into its diftinci fingle Parts, as far as the Nature of 
the SubjeSf and your prefent Defgn requires it. Tho* 
you mu(t not abound in ncedieis bubdivifions, yet 

* Things of one Kind are called Homogeneous, Things of 
different kinds are Heteroo-tneous. 

fom string 



354 LOGICK ! OR, THE [pART. IV. 

fomething of this Work is very necefTary ; and it 
is a good Judgment alone can dictate how far to 
proceed in it, and when to ftop. 

Compound Ideas mult be reduced to a fimple 
Form in order to underftand them well. You may 
eafily matter that Subject in all the Parts of it by a 
regular Succeffion, which would confound the Un- 
.derftanding to furvey them at once. So we come 
to the Knowledge of a very perplexed Diagram in 
Geometry, or a complicated Machine in Mechanicks % 
by having it parcelled out to us into its feveral 
Parts and Principles, according to this and the 
foregoing Rule of Method. 

3. Call every Idea, Proportion and Argument to its 
proper Clafs, arid keep each Part of the Sub j eel in its 
own. Place. Put thole Things all together that be- 
long to one Part or Property, one Confederation or 
View of your Subject. This will prevent needlefs 
Repetitions, and keep you from intermixing Things 
which are different. We mull maintain this Dif- 
tinction of Things and Places if we would be fafe 
from Error. It is Confufion that leads us into 
endlefs Miftakes, which naturally arife from a va- 
riety of Ideas ill-joined, forted, or ill-difpofed. It 
is one great Ufe of Method, that a Multitude of 
Thoughts and Proportions may be fo diftinctly 
ranged in their proper Situations, that the Mind 
may not be overwhelmed with a confufed Atten- 
tion to them all at once, nor be diffracted with 
their Variety, nor be tempted to unite Things 
which ought to be feparated, nor to disjoin Things 
which fhould be united. 

4. In the Partition of your Difcourfe into di/lincl 
Heads, take Heed that your Particulars do not inter- 
fere with the General, nor with each other. Think 

it is not enough that you make ufe of diftinct Ex- 

preflions 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 355 

preflions in each Particular, but take Care that the 
Ideas be diftindt alfo. It is mere Foolery to mul- 
tiply diftincT: Particulars in treating of Things , 
where the Difference of your Particulars lies only 
in Na?nes and Words, 

Rule IV. The Method of treating a Subject: 
fhould be plenary or full, fo that nothing may be 
wanting \ nothing which is neceflary or proper 
fhould be omitted. 

When you are called to explain a Subject, do 
not pafs by, nor ikip over any Thing in it which is 
very difficult or obfcure. 

When you enwneraie the Parts or the Properties 
of any Subject, do it in a compleat and compre- 
henfi've Manner. 

When you are ajferting or proving any Truth, 
fee that every doubtful or difputable Part of the 
Argument be well fupported and confirmed. 

If you are to illuflrate or argue a Point of Djffi* 
atlty, be not too fcanty of Words, but rather be- 
come a little copious and difFulive in your Lan- 
guage : Set the Truth before the Reader in feve- 
ral Lights, turn the various Sides of it to View, in 
order to give a full Idea and firm Evidence of the 
Proportion. 

When you are drawing, up a Narrative of any 
Matter of Fact, fee that no important Circum- 
stance be omitted. 

When you propofe the Solution of any Difficulty \ 
confider all the various Cafes wherein it can hap- 
pen, and (hew how they may be folved. 

In fhort, let your Enumerations, your Divijions 
and Dijlributions of Things be fo accurate, that no 
needful Part or Idea may be left out. 

This 



356 logick: or, the [part iv. 

This Fulnefs of Method does not require that every 
Thing fhould be laid which can be laid upon any 
Subject ; for this would make each (ingle science 
endlefs : But you fbould fay every Thing which is 
ijecefTary to the Defign in View, and which has a 
proper and direct Tendency to this End ; always 
proportioning the Amplitude of your Matter, and 
the Fulnefs of your Difcourfe to your great De- 
iign, to the Length of your Time, to the Conve- 
nience, Delight and Profit of your Hearers. 

Rule V. As your Method mull be full without 
Deficiency , fo it mud be fhort, or without Super* 
fiuity. The Fulnefs of a Difcourfe enlarges our 
Knowledge, and the well concerted Brevity faves 
our Time. In order to obferve this Rule, it will 
be enough to point out the chief of thofe Super- 
fluities or Redundancies which fome Perfons are 
guilty of in their Difcourfes, with a due Caution 
againfl them. 

1 . Avoid all needlefs repetitions of the fame Thing 
in different Farts of your Difcourfe, It muft be con- 
feffed there are feveral Cafes wherein a Review of 
the fame foregoing Proportion is needful to ex- 
plain or prove feveral of the following Pofitions ; 
but let your Method be fo contrived, as far as pdf- 
fiblc, that it may occafion the feweft Rchearfals 
of the fame Thing ; for it is not grateful to the 
Hearers without evident Neceffity. 

2. Have a Care of tedious Prolixity, or drawing 
out any Fart of your Difcourfe to an unneceffary and 
tirefome length. It is much more honourable for 
an Instructor, an Orator, a Pleader, or a Preacher, 
that his Hearers fhou Id fay, I was afraid he woidd 
have done, than that they fhould be tempted to ihew 
Signs of Uncafinefs, and long for the Conclufion. 

Befides, 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 357 

Betides, there is another Inconvenience in it ; 
when you affect to amplify on the former Branches 
of a Difcourfe, you will often lay a Neceffity upon 
yourfelf of contracting the latter and mod ufeful 
Parts of it, and perhaps prevent yourfelf in the 
mod important Part of your Delign. Many a 
Preacher has been guilty of this Fault in former 
Days, nor is the prefent Age without fome In- 
fiances of this Weaknefs. 

3. Do not multiply Explications where there is no 
Difficulty ', or Darknefs, or Danger of Mijlake. Be 
not fond of tracing every Word of your Theme, 
through all the grammatical, the logical, and meta- 
phyfical Characters and Relations of it; nor fhevv 
your critical Learning in fpreading abroad the va- 
rious Senfes of a Word, and the various Origin of 
thofe Senfes, the Etymology of Terms, the fynony- 
mous and the paronymous or Kindred Names, &c. 
where the chief Point of Difcourfe does, not at all 
require it. You would laugh at a Pedant, who pro- 
felting to explain the Athanafian Creed, mould ac- 
quaint you that Aihanafiiis is derived from a Greek 
Word, which, fignifies Immortality , and that the 
fame Word \A3-avac-i* fignifies alio the Herb Tanfy. 

There are fome Perfons fo fond of their learned 
Diitinclions, that they will fhevv their Subtlety by 
dijlinguifning where there is no Difference-: And the 
la m-e lil ly Affectation will inUoduce . Di/linclions, 
upon every Occurrence, and bring three or four 
Negatives upon every Subject of Difcourfe ; firft to 
declare what it is not, and then what it is : Whereas 
fuch Negatives ought never to be mentioned where 
there is no apparent Danger of Mifiake. How 
ridiculous would that Writer be, who, if he were 
fpeaking of the Nicene Creed, fhould declare nega- 
tively, 1 . That he did not mean the Doclr'me which 

the 



358 logick: on, ths [part ir. 

the Inhabitants of Nice believed, nor (1.) A Creed 
written by them, but (3.) Positively a Creed com- 
pofed by fever at Chriftian Bifliops met together in the 
City gf" Nice : The Pofitive is Sufficient here> and 
the two Negatives are impertinent. 

4. Be not fond of proving thofe Things which need 
flo Proof; Such as felf-evident Proportions and 
Truths univerfally confefled, or Such as are entirely 
agreed to and granted by our Opponents. It is 
this vain AfFeclation of proving every Thing that 
has led Geometricians to Sorm ufclefs and intricate 
DemonvTrations to Support Some Theorems which 
are Sufficiently evident to the Eye by InSpeclion, 
or to the Mind by the ftrit Mention of them ; and 
it is the Same Humour that reigns Sometimes in 
the Pulpit, and Spends half the Sermon in proving 
Some general Truth which is never disputed or 
doubted, and thereby robs the Auditory of more 
ufeSul Entertainment. 

5. As there are Some Things So evidently true, 
that they want no Proof, So there are others fo evU 
dently falfe that they want no Refutation. It is mere 
trifling, and a Wade of our precious Moments, to 
invent and raiSe Such Objections as no Man would 
ever make in earned, and that merely for the Sake 
of anfwering and folvingthem : This breaks in no- 
torioufly upon the due Brevity of Method. 

6. Avoid in general all learned forms, all Trap" 
pings of Art, and Ceremonies of the Schools, where 
there is no need of them. It is reported concern- 
ing the late Czar of Mifcovy, that when he lirSt ac- 
quainted himielf with mathematical Learning, he 
praclifed all the Rules of Circumvallation and Con- 
iravallation, at the Siege of a Town in Livonia ; 
and by the Length of thofe Formalities 'he' loSt the 
Opportunity oS taking the Town, 

7- Da 



CH. II. ] RIGHT USE. OF REASON. 359 

7. " Do not liiffer every occafional and inciden- 
a tal Thought to carry you away into a long Pa- 
" rentbefis, and thus to ftretch out your Diicourfe, 
£i and divert you from the Point in Hand." In 
the Purfuit of your Subject, if any ufeful Thought 
occur which belongs to ibme other Theme, note it 
down for the Sake of your Memory on ibme other 
Paper, and lay it by in Referve for its proper Place 
and Seafon : But let it not incorporate itfelf with 
your prefent Theme, nor draw off your Mind from 
your main Bufmefs, though it fhould be ever fo in- 
viting. A Man, who walks directly but flowly to- 
wards his Journey's End, will arrive thither much 
fooner them his Neighbour, who runs into every 
crooked Turning which he meets, and wanders 
afide to gaze at every Thing that ftrikes his Eyes 
by the Way, or to gather every gaudy Flower that 
grows by the Side of the Road. 

To fum up all : ." There is an happy Medium to 
£i be obferved in our Method, fo that the Brevity 
" may not render the Senfe obfeure, nor the Argu- 
si ment feeble, nor our Knowledge merely fuperfi- 
if cial -. And on the other Hand, that the Fulnefs 
&i and Copioufnefs of cur Method may not wafte 
(i the Time, tire the Learner, or fdl the Mind with 
<c Trifles and I iri pertinencies." 

The copious and the cantracledWzv of Writing 
have each their peculiar Advantages. There is a 
proper Ufe to be made of large Paraphrafes, and 
full, particular, and dtffujt^e Explications and Argu- 
ments \ thefe are fitter! for thofe who de(i<in to be 
acquainted thoroughly with every Part of the Sub- 
ject. There is alfo a Ufe of ' Jkorter Hints, Abflracls, 
and Compendtumz, to inllruct thole who feck only a 
flight and general Knowledge, as well as to refrefh 
the Memory of thofe who have learned the Science 
already, and gone through a larger Scheme. But 

A a it 



300 LOGIC K : OR, THE [PART IV. 

it is a grofs Abufe of thefe various Methods of In- 
ft ruction, when a Perfon has read a mere Compen- 
dium or Epitome of any Science, and he vainly ima- 
gines that be underftands the whole Science. So 
o le Boy may become a Pkilofopher by reading over 
the mere dry Definitions and Divifions of Scheiblers 
Compmdium of Peripateticifm: So another may boaft 
that he underftands Anatomy, becaufe he has fecn 
a Skeleton; and a third profefs himfelf a learned 
Divine, when he can repeat the Apojlles Creed. 

Rule VI. "Take Care that your Method be 
" proper to the Subjecl in Hand, proper to your 
" prefent Deiign, as well as proper to the Age and 
" Place wherein you dwell." 

1 . Let your Method be proper to the SubjecJ. All 
Sciences muft not be learned or taught in one Me- 
thod. Morality and Theology, Metaphyfich and Lo- 
gick, will not be eafily and happily reduced into a 
ftricl: mathematical Method : Thofe who have tried, 
have found much inconvenience therein. 

Some Things have more Need to be explained 
than to be proved ; as Axioms, or felf-evident Pro- 
portions ; and indeed all the jirft great Principles, 
the chief and moft important Doctrines both ofna^ 
tural and revealed Religion % for when the Senfe of 
them is clearly explained, they appear fo evident in 
the Light of Nature or Scripture, that they want no 
other Proof. There are other Things that Hand 
in Need of Proof, as well as Explication, as many 
mathematical Theorems^ and feveral deep Contro- 
versies in Morality and Divinity. There are yet 
other Sorts of Subjects which want rather to be 
warmly imprcfled upon the Mind by fervent Ex- 
hortations, and ftand in more Need of this than 
they do cither of Proof or Explication ; fuch are 
the moft general, plain and obvious Duties of Piety 

towards 



CH. II.] RIGHT USB OP REASON. 36l 

towards God, and Love towards Men, with the Go- 
vernment of all our Inclinations and PaJJions. Now 
thefe feveral Subjefls ought to be treated in a dif- 
ferent Manner and Method. 

Again, There are fome Subjects in the fame 
Treatife which are more ufeful and neoerlary than 
others, and fome Parts of a Subjecl which are emi- 
nently and chiefly deftgned by a Writer or Speaker : 
True Method will teach us to dwell longer upon 
thefe Themes, and to lay out more Thought and 
Labour upon them ; whereas the fame Art of Me- 
thod will teach us to cut fhort thcfe Things which 
are ufed only to introduce our main Subject, and to 
Hand as Scaffolding merely to aid the Structure of 
our Difcourfe. It will teach us alfo to content our- 
felves with brief Hints of thofe Matters which are 
merely occafional and incidental. 

2. Your Method mud be adjufted by your De- 
fign ; for if you treat of the fame Subjecl: with two 
different Views and Defigns, you will find it ne- 
ceflary to ufe different Methods. Suppofe the 
Doclrine of the facred Trinity were your Theme, 
and you were to read a Lecture to young Stu- 
dents on that Subjecl, or if you defigned a Trea- 
tife for the Conviction of learned Men, you would 
purfue a very different Method from that which 
would be proper to regulate a practical Difcourfe, 
or a Sermon to inftruct common Cbriftians merely 
in the pious Improvement of this Doctrine, and 
awaken thera to the Duties which are derived 
thence. 

In fhort, we muft not firft lay down certain and 
precife Rules of Method, and refolve to confine the 
Matter we difcourfe of to that particular Form and 
Order of Topics ; but we mult well confider, and 
itudy the Subject of our Difcourfe thoroughly, and 

A a 2 take 



362 LOGICK : OR, THE [fAKT IT, 

take a jufl Survey of our prcfent Dejign, and thcfe 
will give fufficient Hints of the particular Form and 
Order in which we fhould handle it, provided that 
we are moderately {killed in the general Laws of 
Method and Order. 

Yet let it be noted here, that, neither the Subjecl 
nor Matter of a Difcourfe, nor the particular De~ 
fign of it, can fo preeifely determine the Method, 
as to leave no Room for Liberty and Variety. The 
very fame Theme may be handled, and that alfo 
with the fame Defign, in feveral different Me- 
thods, among which it is hard to fay which is the 
bell. In writing a Syftem of Divinity, fome begin 
with the Scriptures, and thence deduce all other 
Doctrines and Duties. Some begin with the Being 
of God and his Attributes, fo far as he is known by 
the Light of Nature, and then proceed to the Doc- 
trines of Revelation. Some diflinguifh the whole 
Subjecl: into the Credcnda and Agenda, that is, 
Things to be believed, and Things to be done. Some 
think it bed to explain the whole Chriftian Reli- 
gion by an hiftorical Detail of all the Difcoveries 
"which God has made of himfelf to this lower JForld, - 
beginning at the Creation in the firft Chapter of 
Genefis, and fo proceeding onward according to 
-the Narrative of the Old and New Teftament. 
And there are others that endeavour to include the 
Whole of Religion under thefe four Heads, namely, 
The Jpoftles Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Ten I 
mandments, and the two Sacraments; though 1 cim- 
not but think this is the lealt accurate of any. The 
fame Variety may be allowed in treating other Sub- 
jects ; this very Treatife of Logic k is an Inftance of 
it, whole Method differs very considerably from 
any others which 1 have fecn, as they differ alfo 
greatly from one another, though feveral of them 
arc conferred to be well written. 

3. Though 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON-. 363 

3. Though a juft View of our Subjetl and our 
Defign may dictate proper Rules of natural Method, 
yet there mull be fome little Deference at leaft 
paid to the Cuftom of the Age wherein we live, and 
to the Humour and Genius of our Readers or 
Hearers ; which if we utterly reject and difdain, 
our Performances will fail of the defired Succefs, 
even though we may have followed the juft Rules 
of Method. 1 will mention but this one Inftance: 
In the former Century it was frequent with learned. 
Men to divide their Theme or Subject into a great 
Multitude of co-ordinate Members or Parts, they 
abounded alfo in the Forms of Logick and Diftinc- 
tion, and indulged numerous Ranks of Subordina- 
tion. Now though we ought not to abandon the 
Rules of juft Method and DhiJio?i, in order to com- 
port with the modifh Writers in our Age who have 
renounced them, yet it is prudent to pay fo much 
Refpecl to the Cuftom of the Age, as to ufe thefe 
Forms of Divifion with due Moderation, and not 
affect to multiply them in fuch a Manner, as to give 
an early and needlefs Difguft to the Generality of 
our prefent Readers. The fame may be faid con- 
cerning various other Methods of conduct in the 
Affairs of Learning, as well as the Affairs of Life, 
wherein we muft indulge a little to Cuftom : And 
yet we muft by no Means fuffer ourfelves fo far to 
be impofed upon and governed by it, as to neglect 
thofe Rules of Method which are neceftary for the 
fafe, eafy, and compleat Inquiry into Truth, or the 
ready and effetlual Communicatio7i of it to others. 

Rule VII. The laft Requifite of Method is, that 
the Parts of a Difcourfe fnoidd be ^well connected ; 
and thefe three (liort Dire&ions will fuffice for this 
Purpofe. 

1. " Keep 



364 logick: or, the [part ir, 

1. "Keep your main End and Defign ever in 
* View, and let all the Parts of your Difcourfe 
4 * have a Tendency towards it, and as far as poffi- 
" ble make that Tendency vifible all the Way:'* 
Otherwife the Readers or Hearers will have Reafon 
to wonder for what End this or that Particular was 
introduced. 

2. " Let the mutual Relation and Dependence 
" of the feveral Branches of your Difcourfe be fo 
" juft and evident, that every Part may naturally 
*' lead onward to the next, without any huge 
" Chafms or Breaks, which interrupt and deform 
" the Scheme." The Connexion of Truths Ihould 
arife and appear in their fucceffive Rank and Or- 
der, as the feveral Parts of a fine Profpecl afcend 
juft behind each other, in their natural and regu- 
lar Elevations and Diftances, and invite the Eye to 
climb onward with conftant Pleafure till it reach 
the Sky. Whatfoever horrid Beauty a Precipice 
or a Cataract may add to the ProfpccT of a Coun- 
try, yet fuch Sort of hideous and abrupt Appear- 
ances in a Scene of Reasoning are real Blemifhes 
and not Beauties. When the Reader is palling 
over fuch a Treatife, he often finds a wide Vacancy, 
and makes an uneafy Stop, and knows not how to 
tranfport his Thoughts over to the next Particular, 
for want of foine Clue or connecting Idea to lay 
hold of it. 

3. " Acquaint yourfelf with all the proper and 
" decent Forms of Tranfiiion from one Part of a 
"Difcourfe to another, and praclife them as Oc- 
u cafion offers." Where the Ideas, Proportions 
and Arguments, are happily difpofed, and well 
connected, the Truth indeed is fecure; but it ren- 
ders the Difcourfe much more agreeable, when 
proper and graceful Exprcffion joins the Parts of it 

together 



CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP KEASGN. 365 

together in fo entertaining a Manner, that the 
Reader knows not how to leave off till he hath ar- 
rived at the End. 

Thefe are the general and moil important Rules 
of true Method ; and though they belong chiefly 
to the Communication of Knowledge, yet an early 
and thorough Acquaintance with them will be of 
confiderable Ufe toward the Purfuit and Attain- 
ment of it. 

Thofe Perfons who have never any Occafion to 
communicate Knowledge by Writing or by publick 
Difcourfes, may alfo with great Advantage perufe 
thefe Rules of Method, that they may learn to judge 
with Juuice and Accuracy concerning the Per- 
formances of others. And befldes, a good Ac- 
quaintance with Method, will greatly affift every 
one in ranging, difpofing and managing all human 
Affairs. 

The particular Means or Method for a farther 
Improvement of the Underflanding are very va- 
rious, fuch as Meditation, Reading * Converfmg, 
Difputing hy Speech or by Writing, Quefiion and An- 
fwer, &c. And in each of thefe Praclices fome 
ipecial Forms may be obferved, and fpecial Rules 
may be given to facilitate and fecure our Inquiries 
after Truth : but this would require a little Volume 
by itfelf, and a Treat; fe of Logick has always been 
efteemed fufficientJy compleat without it. 



THE END. 



T. Gillet, Printer, Saliibory-Square. 






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